Article 8 — Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed, namely, that we are bound to will what we know that God wills

Eighth, it is asked whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed, namely, that we are bound to will what we know that God wills. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 48, aa. 2–4; ST I-II.19.10.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for Paul desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ as it says in Philippians 1:23; but God did not want this, hence, it says in the same place I know that I shall remain for your sake; (Phil 1:25.) thus, if we are bound to want what God wants, Paul sinned by desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ, which is absurd.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what God knows can be revealed to another; however, God knows that some are reprobate, thus, he is able to reveal to someone their reprobation. Therefore, if it is supposed that it is revealed to someone, it follows that he is bound to want his own damnation, if we are bound to will what we know God to will: however, to will one's own damnation is contrary to charity by which each one loves oneself for the sake of eternal life: therefore, one would be bound to will something against charity, which is inadmissable.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, we are bound to obey a prelate as though God since we obey him in the place of God; but a subject is not bound to do or to will whatever he knows that the prelate wills, even if he knows that the prelate wills that he do it, unless he should command this explicitly; thus, we are not bound to will whatever God wills or whatever he wants us to will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is praiseworthy and honorable is found most perfectly and without any contrary blending in Christ; but by some will Christ willed the contrary to what he knew God to will: for by some will he willed not to suffer, as the prayer shows which he prayed in Matthew 26:39, Father, if it can be done, let this cup pass from me, (According to Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 92:15 (PL 37:1206); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 15, ch. 2.) yet while God willed that he suffer; thus it is not praiseqworthy to will whatever God wills; and neither are we bound to it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 15 (PL 41:424).) sadness is about things which happen to us unwillingly. But the Blessed Virgin felt pain regarding the death of her son, which the words of Simeon signify, Luke 2:35 your very own soul a sword shall pierce. Thus, the Blessed Virgin did not want Christ to suffer, but God did want this: therefore, if we are bound to will what God wills, the Blessed Virgin sinned in this, which is inadmissible; and so it seems that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine in the thing willed.

On the contrary (1), on Psalm 100:3, a perverse heart has not clung to me, the Gloss says that a crooked heart is one that does not will whatever God wills; (Glossa interlinearis and Glossa ordinaria, at Ps 100:3, 3.1205; Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 100:3 (PL 191:902D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 100:3–4 (PL 37:1287).) but everyone is bound to avoid crookedness of heart; thus everyone is bound to will what God wills.

Furthermore (2), according to Tullius it pertains to friends to will the same thing and not to will the same thing; (It is actually Sallust, The War with Catiline, ch. 20; cf. especially to Moralium dogma philosophorum, q. 1, n. 22 (PL 171:1023B) where the same sentence is attributed to Cicero.) but everyone is bound to have friendship toward God; thus, everyone is bound to will what God wills and not to will what he does not will.

Furthermore (3), we ought to conform our will to the divine because God's will is the rule of our will, as the Gloss says on Psalm 32:1 praise befits the upright; (Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps. 32:1 (PL 191:325D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, enarration 2, on Ps. 32:1, para. 2 (PL 36:277).) but the divinely willed thing is also the rule of every other willed thing since it is the first thing willed, and the first in any genus is the measure of the things that come after, as it says in the Metaphysics; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1053b28.) thus, we are bound to conform our wills to what is divinely willed.

Furthermore (4), Furthermore, sin consists primarily in a perversity of choice; but there is a perversity of choice when the lesser good is preferred to the greater good: however, whoever does not will what God will does this, since it is evident that what God wills is the best; thus, whoever does not will what God wills sins.

Furthermore (5), according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.10, 1113a32; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 29, a. 3, sol. 1.) the virtuous man is the rule and measure in all human acts; but Christ is the most virtuous: thus we ought most of all to conform to Christ as to a rule and measure; but Christ conformed his own will to the divine even in respect to what was willed, which all the blessed do as well: thus, we also are bound to conform our will to the divine even with respect to what is willed.

I answer that it must be said that we are bound in a certain way to conform our will to the divine in the thing that is willed, but in another way we are not. For we are bound to conform our will to the divine for this reason, as has been said (a. 7), that the goodness of the divine will is the rule and measure of all goodness. However, since goodness depends upon the end, a will is said to be good with regard to its order toward the reason for willing, which is the end; but an absolute comparison of the will to the thing willed does not make the act of the will to be good, since the thing willed is related materially to the reason for willing, which is the correct end; for one can desire one and the same thing well or badly inasmuch as it is ordered to different ends; and contrarily, someone can will correctly different and contrary willed things by referring both to the correct end. Thus, even though God's will can only be good, and anything whatsoever that he wants he wants correctly, yet the goodness in the act of the divine will is considered from the reason for willing, that is, from the end to which he orders whatever he wills, which is his own goodness. Thus, we are bound to conform to the divine will simply in the end; but, in the thing itself willed, only inasmuch as what is willed is considered under the order to the end, which order should always please us, even though this same willed thing can also rightly displease us with regard to some other consideration, namely, inasmuch as it is able to be ordered to a contrary end. And it is for this reason that in this respect the human will is found to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed, which is related to the end of the divine will.

For the will of the blessed, who are in continuous contemplation of divine goodness and who rule all their affections by it, namely, knowing full well how everything that is to be desired is ordered to it, are conformed to the divine will in anything willed by them; for they will perfectly, and without any motion to the contrary, all that they know God wills. But sinners, who are turned away from the will of divine goodness, dissent in many ways from what God wants, disapproving of it and not assenting to it on any account. But the just in this life, whose will clings to divine goodness and yet who do not perfectly contemplate it such that they perceive every order to it of the things that are to be willed, are nevertheless conformed to the divine will with regard to the things willed whose reason they perceive, even though there is in them some affection to the contrary, yet it is praiseworthy on account of another order considered in them. But they do not obstinately follow such an affection, rather they subject it to the divine will, so long as it pleases them that the order of the divine will should be fulfilled in everything: for example, the man who wants his own father to live because of the affection of piety, whom God wants to die, if he is a just man, he subjects his very own will to the divine, such that he does not bear it impatiently if God's will should be fulfilled contrary to his own.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that for Paul to desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ was good in itself; nevertheless the contrary pleased him with respect to the profit that God wished to bring from his life. And thus he said but to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account (Phil 1:24).

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although in his absolute power God can reveal someone's damnation to him, yet this cannot be done from ordained power, for such a revelation would force one to despair. And if such a revelation were to be made to someone, it should be understood not as the prophecy of predestination or of foreknowledge, but of threat, (cf. supra q. 12 a. 10.) which is understood having supposed the condition of merit. But should it be granted that it is to be understood according to the prophecy of foreknowledge, still the one to whom such a revelation had been made would not be bound absolutely to will his own damnation, but only the order of justice by which God wills that those persisting in their sin be damned: for God does not will from himself to damn someone, but according to what is in us, as is clear from what was said above. (Above: a. 2.) Hence, to will one's own damnation absolutely would not be to conform one's own will to the divine but rather to the will of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the will of a prelate is not the rule of our will as is the divine will, but his precept is, and thus, the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the Passion of Christ can be considered in two ways: in one way in itself, that is, inasmuch as it was the affliction of someone innocent; in another way with regard to the order to the reward to which God ordered it, and in this way it was willed by God, but not in the first way. Thus, Christ's will, that is the will of reason, which was able to consider this order, willed this Passion just as God did; but the will of sensuality, to which it does not pertain to take counsel but rather to be simply borne toward something, did not want this Passion. And in this as well he conformed in some way to the divine will in the thing willed, for neither did God himself will the Passion of Christ considered with respect to itself alone.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the will of the Blessed Virgin dissented from the Passion of Christ considered in itself; yet she willed the reward of salvation that followed from the Passion of Christ; and so she conformed to the divine will both with regard to what it willed and with regard to what it did not will.

Reply Sed Contra 1: But to the first that was objected on the contrary, it must be said that the words of the Gloss must be understood regarding the things willed by the divine will and not absolutely.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that friendship consists in the agreement of wills more with respect to the end than with respect to the things themselves that are wished for; for a doctor who denied a feverish the wine for which he yearned, for the sake of the common desire of health, would be a greater friend than if he wished to satisfy his desire for drinking wine while in a condition of poor health.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that, as was said above, (Above: a. 4.) the thing first willed by God that is the measure and rule of all other willed things is the end of his will, namely, his own goodness; but he only wants all other things for the sake of this end. And thus, when our will is conformed to the divine will with respect to the end, all of the things willed by us are regulated by the first thing willed.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that choice has in itself both the judgment and the appetite of reason. Thus, if in one's judgment someone should prefer what is less good to what is more good, there will be a perversity of choice, but not if one should prefer it in the appetite; for man is not bound always to pursue the best in acting, unless they are things to which he is obliged by precept; for otherwise everyone would be bound to follow the counsels of perfection, which it is clear are better.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that there are some things in whcih we ought to admire Christ, but not to imitate him, like what pertains to his divinity and to the beatitude which he already possesses as a wayfarer; to which it pertains that Christ, even with respect to the things willed, conformed the will of his reason to the divine will.