Article 7 — Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will

Seventh, it is asked whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 48, aa. 1–3; ST I-II.19.9.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for no one is bound to the impossible; but it is impossible for us to conform our will to the divine, since the divine will is unknown to us; thus, we are not bound to the previously mentioned conformity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever does not do what he is bound to do sins. Thus, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine, we sin by not conforming it. But whoever sins mortally does not conform his own will to the divine in the matter in which he sins; thus, he sins in this matter. However, he also sins in some other particular sin, such as that he robs or fornicates. Thus, whoever sins, commits two sins, which seems to be absurd.

Obj. 3: But one might say that the command of conformity of our will to the divine, since it is affirmative, does not oblige forever, even though it always obliges, and so it is not necessary that one sins whenever one does not conform.

On the contrary, even though someone not observing the affirmative precept does not sin in any instant whatsoever that one does not observe it, nevertheless, one sins whenever one does the contrary; as when one sins whenever one dishonors one's parents, even though one does not always sin when one does not honor them in act; but the one who sins mortally does what is contrary to the previously mentioned conformity; thus, one sins in this.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not observe what one is bound to is a transgressor; but one who sins venially does not conform one's own will to the divine will; thus, if one is bound to conform, then one would be a transgressor, and so one would sin mortally.

Obj. 5: But one might say that one is not bound to conform for that instant in which one sins venially, since affirmative precepts do not always bind.

On the contrary, whoever does not observe an affirmative precept in the place and time for which one is obliged is judged as a transgressor; but the time that our will is to be conformed to the divine will does not seem to be able to be determined in any other way except when the will goes forth in act; thus, whenever the will goes forth in act, it seems to sin, unless it be conformed to the divine will; and thus, when someone sins venially, it seems to be a mortal sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, no one is bound to what is impossible; but the obstinate are unable to conform their own will to the divine will; thus, they are not bound to this conformity, and so neither is anyone else; otherwise the obstinate would gain an advantage by their obstinacy.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, since whatever God wills he wills out of charity, for he himself is charity, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine, we are bound to have charity; but the one not having charity cannot obtain it, unless one prepares oneself for it diligently; thus, one not having charity is bound to continually prepare oneself to have charity; and so one sins in any instant that one does not have charity, for this comes from a defect in the preparation.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, since the form of an act consists primarily in the mode of acting, if we are bound to conformity to the divine will, we must want something in the same way that God wants it. However, someone can imitate the mode of the divine will to some extent both by natural love and by gratuitous love. However, the conformity about which we are speaking cannot be considered with regard to natural love, for in this way even the unfaithful and sinners conform their will to the divine so long as the natural love of goodness thrives in them; likewise, it cannot be considered with regard to the natural love that is charity, for then we would be bound to will whatever we will from charity, which is contrary to the opinion of many, (See Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 36, a. 6; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 2; Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 36, a. 6.) who say that the mode does not fall under a precept; thus, it seems that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, God's will is as far from man's will as God is from man, as the gloss says on Psalm 32:1 praise befits the upright; (Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps. 32:1 (PL 191:325D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, enarration 2, on Ps. 32:1, para. 2 (PL 36:277).) but God is so far from man that man cannot be conformed to him: for since man is infinitely far from God, there cannot be any proportion of him to God; thus, neither can man's will be conformed to the divine will.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, those things are said to be conformed that agree in some one form; thus, if our will can be conformed to the divine, there must be one such form in which both wills agree; and so there would be something more simple than the divine will, which is impossible.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, conformity is a relation of comparison; (relatio aequiparantiae: cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 3, n. 19.) but in such relations both of the extremes are referred to the other by the same relation, as when a friend is said to be a friend of a friend, and a brother a brother of a brother; thus, if our will can be conformed to the divine, so that we would be bound to the previously mentioned conformity, then the divine will could also be conformed to ours, which seems incompatible.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, those things by which we are obliged, which we are able to do and not to do, fall under a precept; but we are not able to make it such that our will conforms to the divine, for, as Anselm says, (Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus homo, bk. 1, ch. 15 (PL 158:380C).) just as what is within a spherical body, however much it withdraws from one part of the circumference, so much more does it approach to the other side, so also whoever departs from God's will in one respect fulfills the divine will in another respect; thus, we are not bound to the previously mentioned conformity in the same way that we are bound to what falls under a precept.

On the contrary (1), the Gloss says on that Psalm, praise befits the upright (Ps 32:1), that the upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will; (Glossa ordinaria, at Ps 32:1, 3.651; Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 32:1 (PL 191:325D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, enarration 2, on Ps. 32:1, para. 2 (PL 36:277).) but anyone is bound to be upright; thus, anyone is bound to the previously mentioned conformity.

Furthermore (2), each thing ought to be conformed to its own rule; but the divine will is our will's rule, since uprightness of will is found first of all in God; thus, our will ought to be conformed to the divine will.

I answer that it must be said that anyone is bound to conform one's will to the divine. The reason for this can be found in the fact that there is one first thing in any genus, which is the measure of all things in that genus, in which the nature of the genus is most perfectly found, such as the nature of color that is in whiteness, which is for that reason called the measure of all colors, for how much each color participates in the nature of the genus is known from its proximity or its removal from whiteness, as is said in the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1053b28.) And in this way, God is the measure of all beings, as can be gathered from the words of the Commentator in the same place. (Averroes, Metaphysics, bk. 10, comm. 7.) For each things has being to the extent that it approaches him through likeness; but it draws near to non-being inasmuch as it is found to be unlike him; and one must speak in the same way regarding all things that are equally found in God and creatures. Hence, his intellect is the measure of all knowledge, and his goodness of all goodness, and, speaking particularly, the good will of every good will. Therefore, it follows from this that each will is good inasmuch as it is conformed to the good divine will. Thus, since anyone is bound to have a good will, one is likewise bound to have a will conformed to the divine will.

But it must be known that this conformity can be considered in many ways. For we are speaking here about the will which is in act; for our conformity to God with respect to the will's power is natural and pertaining to the image, (August. De trin. 10, Cap. 11 (PL 42, 983), cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. I d.3 c. 2.) thus it does not fall under a precept. But the act of the divine will does not only have that it be the act of a will, but it also has at the same time that it be the cause of all things that exist. Thus, the act of our will can be conformed to the divine will either as an effect to a cause or as one will to another will. But the conformity of an effect to a cause is found differently in natural things and in voluntary causes. For in natural causes the conformity is considered with regard to a likeness of nature, as when man generates man and fire fire; but in voluntary things an effect is said to be conformed to a cause from the fact that its cause is fulfilled in the effect, as when an artifact is likened to its cause not because it is of the same nature as the art that is in the artisan's mind, but because the form of the art is fulfilled in the artifact; and the will's effect is similarly conformed to it, when what the will disposes takes place. And so our will's act is conformed to the divine will inasmuch as we will what God wants us to will.

But the conformity in act of one will to another can be considered in two way: in one way with regard to the form of the species, as when man is made similar to man; in another way with regard to a form that has been superadded, as when the wise man is made similar to another wise man. And I speak of being made similar according to species when there is an agreement in the object from which the act draws its species.

But there are two things to be considered in the will's object: one that is like the material, namely, the very thing willed, and another that is like what is formal, namely, the reason for willing, which is the end; as also in the object of sight color is like what is material, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7, 418b9; On Sense 1.3, 439a18.) but light is what is formal, for by it color is made visible in act. And so a double conformity can be found on the part of the object: one on the part of the thing willed, as when man wills something that God wills; and this is like being according to the material cause, for the object is like the matter of the act, hence, it is the least among the others; and another on the part of the reason for willing or on the part of the end, as when someone wills something for the same reason as does God: and this conformity is according to the final cause. But the form that comes upon the act is the mode which it acquires from the eliciting habit. And so our will is said to be conformed to the divine when one wills something out of charity as God does; and this is like being according to the formal cause.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that God's will cannot be fully known to us, hence, neither can we fully conform our will to his will; but inasmuch as we do know, we are able and are bound to conform.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that a man does not commit two sins by one act, since the essence of a sin is the act; but there can be two deformities of sin in one act, and this is the case when some circumstance happens to the act of a particular sin, which conveys it to the deformity of another sin; such as when someone steals another's things to spend it on prostitutes, the act of pillaging takes on the deformity of indulgence from the circumstance of that for the sake of which it is done. But when something pertaining to deformity is found in the act of a sin beyond the particular deformity of that sin, which is common to every sin, neither the sin nor the deformity of the sin is doubled by this, inasmuch as what are found commonly in all sins are like the essential principles of sin inasmuch as it is a sin, and they are included in the deformity of any particular sin whatsoever as the principles of a genus are included in the notion of the species; and thus they do not distinguish it in number against the particular deformity of sin; such as being turned away from God, not obeying the divine law, and other such things, among which ought to be counted the defect of conformity about which we are speaking: hence, it is not necessary that such a defect doubles the sin or the sin's deformity.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although the one acting contrary to conformity sins in this respect, yet this is in general, which does not distinguish it in number agains the particular.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the one who sins venially, even though he does not conform his will to the divine in act, yet he does conform it in habit; and neither is he bound to always go forth in act, but in the proper place and time; but he is bound to never act contrarily: however, the one sinning venially does not act contrary to the previously mentioned conformity but beside it, thus, it does not follow that he sins venially.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that a precept does not obligate conformity of the will for every time that our will goes forth in act, but for that time in which someone is bound to think of the state of their own salvation; as when one is bound to confess or to receive the sacraments or to do things of this sort.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that someone is said to be obstinate in two ways: in one way simply, namely, when one has an irreversible will, clinging to evil; and those in hell are obstinate in this way, but not someone who is in this life. But those in hell are still held to the conformity about which we are treating, which, even though they cannot attain, are nevertheless the cause of their own powerlessness; hence, they sin by not conforming, even though they might not demerit further since they are no longer wayfarers. In another way someone is said to be obstinate in a certain respect, when one has a will clinging to evil, indeed, not wholly irreversible but with difficulty, in which way some are said to be obstinate in this life, and such are able to conform their will to the divine; hence, not only do they sin by not conforming, but they also demerit.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that anyone is bound with respect to themselves to have charity, and if one does not, one sins by a sin of omission. Yet it is not necessary that one sins in any instant that one does not, but only when one is bound to, such as when necessity presses one to do something which cannot be done without charity, such as to receive the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that we are said to be bound to something in two ways: in one way such that if we do not do it we incur punishment, which is properly to be bound to something; and thus with respect to the more common opinion we are not bound to do something from charity but to do something from natural love, without which whatever is done is at least done badly. And I am speaking of natural love not only as that which is naturally within us and is common to all, such as that all desire happiness, but also that to which someone someone can attain by natural principles, which is found generically in those who are good as well as in political virtues. (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 8, n. 5; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.) We are said to be bound to something in another way inasmuch as we cannot attain to the end of happiness without it; and in this way we are bound to do something out of charity, without which nothing can be meritorious for eternal life. And so it is clear how the mode of charity falls in some way under the precept and in some way does not.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that man is conformed to God since he is made to the image and likeness of God. However, even though there cannot be a proportion of man and God since he is infinitely distant from God, inasmuch as proportion is found properly in quantities, embracing a certain measure of two quantities compared to one another; yet inasmuch as the name of proportion is transferred to signify any relationship of one thing to another, such as when we say that there is a likeness of proportions, when a prince is to the city as the pilot is to the ship, nothing prevents one saying that there is a certain proportion of man to God, since he stands to him in a certain relation, namely, as being made by him and being subject to him. Or one could say that although there cannot be a proportion properly understood of the finite to the infinite, yet there can be a proportionality, (Euclid, Elements, V sec. transl. Adelardi de Bath, Versio II (ed. Venetiis 1482, f. 29v).) which is the similarity of two proportions; for we say that four is proportionate to two since it is its double, but six is proportional to four since six is to three as four is to two. Similarly, even though the finite and the infinite cannot be proportionate, yet they can be proportional, for as infinite is equal to infinite so is finite to finite; and in this way there is a likeness between the creature and God, for as he is to what belongs to him so is the creature to what is its very own.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the creature is not said to be conformed to God as though participating in the same form that he participates in, but rather that God is substantially the very form in which the creature shares in by some likeness, such as if fire were to be likened to heat existing separately on its own.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that although likeness and conformity are relations of comparison, yet they do not always name each of the extremes in reference to the other; but only when the form according to which the likeness or conformity is considered exists in each of the extremes for the same reason, such as whiteness being in two men, inasmuch as each is appropriately said to have the form of the other, which is signified when something is said to be similar to another. But when the form is principally in one and in another secondarily, the reciprocation of likeness is not retained, as when we say that the statue of Hercules is similar to Hercules, but not conversely; for it cannot be said that Hercules has the shape of the statue, but only that the statue has the shape of Hercules: and in this way creatures are said to be similar and conformed to God, though not conversely. But since conformation is a motion toward conformity, it does not involve a relation of comparison but presupposes something to whose conformity another thing is moved; hence, posterior things are conformed to prior things, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the words of Anselm are to be understood not so much to be that man always does God's will to the extent that it exists in him, but that the divine will is fulfilled with regard to him, either with him willing or not willing.