Chapter 90 — That in God are delight and joy, nor are they incompatible with the divine perfection

There are, however, certain passions which, though unbecoming to God as passions, nevertheless contain nothing in their specific nature incompatible with the divine perfection.

Among these are joy and delight. For joy has for its object a present good. Therefore, neither by reason of its object, which is a good, nor by reason of the way in which it is referred to that object, which is actually possessed, is joy incompatible with the divine perfection according to its specific nature.

Hence it is evident that joy or delight, properly speaking, is in God. Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to pursue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation. The difference is that the object of the intellective appetite is more universal than that of the sensitive appetite, since the intellective appetite regards good or evil simply, whereas the sensitive appetite regards good or evil according to the senses, even as the object of the intellect is more universal than that of the senses. Now the operations of the appetite take their species from their objects. Accordingly, we find in the intellective appetite (which is the will) operations specifically similar to those of the sensitive appetite, though differing in this: in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of its connection with a bodily organ, but in the intellective appetite they are pure operations. For just as by the passion of fear which, in the sensitive appetite, one shuns a future evil, so the intellective appetite has a like operation without passion. Since, then, joy and delight are not inapplicable to God according to their species, but only as passions, while they are in the will according to their species, but not as passions, it follows that they are not absent from the divine will.

Again. Joy and delight are a kind of repose of the will in the object of its willing. Now God is supremely at rest in himself, who is the principal object of his will, as finding all sufficiency in himself. (Ch. 74.) Therefore, by his will he rejoices and delights supremely in himself.

Further. Delight is a perfection of operation, as the Philosopher teaches, in Ethics 10, (Ethics 10.4, 1174b31–1175a9.) for it perfects operation as beauty perfects youth. Now God has a most perfect operation in understanding, as shown above. (Ch. 45.) Therefore, if our act of understanding is delightful on account of its perfection, God’s act of understanding will be most delightful to him.

Moreover. Everything naturally rejoices in its like (ST I-II.32.7.) as being congenial to it, except accidentally, insofar as this thing impedes its own utility. Thus potters quarrel among themselves, (Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.10, 1388a17.) because one hinders the profit of another. Now every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, as stated above, (Ch. 40.) nor is any good prejudicial to it. Therefore, God rejoices in every good.

Therefore, joy and delight are in him properly speaking. Yet joy and delight differ in aspect. For delight is caused by a good conjoined in reality, while joy does not require this conjunction, because the mere repose of the will in the thing willed suffices for the notion of joy. Hence delight is only in a conjoined good, if it be taken in its proper sense, whereas joy is in a separate good. Therefore, it is evident that, properly speaking, God delights in himself, but rejoices in himself in other things.