Chapter 91 — That in God there is love

In like manner it follows that love is in God (ST I.20.) as an act of his will.

For it belongs properly to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved. Now God wills his own and others’ good, as stated above. (Cc. 74–75.) Accordingly, then, God loves both himself and other things.

Again. True love requires one to will another’s good as one’s own. For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another’s good is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking. Now God loves each thing’s good as its own, since he wills each thing to be inasmuch as it is good in itself, although he directs one to the profit of another. God, therefore, truly loves both himself and other things.

Moreover. Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Therefore, it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way, for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) Hence the greater the thing that makes the lover one with the beloved, the more intense is the love: for we love those more who are united to us by the origin of birth, or by frequent companionship, than those who are merely united to us by the bond of human nature. Again, the more the cause of union is deeply seated in the lover, the stronger the love; therefore, sometimes a love that is caused by a passion becomes more intense than a love arising from natural origin or from some habit, although it is more liable to be transitory. Now the cause of all things being united to God, namely his goodness (which all things reflect), is exceedingily great and deeply seated in God, since he is his own goodness. (Ch. 38.) Therefore, in God not only is there true love, but also most perfect and most abiding love.

Again. On the part of its object, love does not denote anything inconsistent with God, since that object is a good. Nor again, as regards the way in which it is referred to its object, since a thing when possessed is loved not less, but more, because a good is more closely united to us when possessed. Therefore, in natural things movement towards an end is more intense if the end be near (although the contrary happens accidentally sometimes, for instance, when we discover something repugnant to love in the beloved, for then possession diminishes love). Accordingly, love is not inconsistent with the divine perfection as regards its specific nature. Therefore, it is in God.

Further. It belongs to love to move toward union, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) For, since, on account of likeness or suitability between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is somehow united to the beloved, the appetite tends to the completion of the union, namely, that the union which was begun in the affections be completed in actions. Therefore, it belongs to friends to rejoice in mutual companionship, living together, and common pursuits. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.12.) Now God moves all other things to union—for inasmuch as he gives them being and other perfections, he unites them to himself as far as possible. Therefore, God loves both himself and other things.

Again. Love is the source of all the emotions. (ST I-II.25.2.) For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved; fear and sorrow are only of evil that is contrary to the beloved good; and from these all the other emotions arise. Now joy and delight are in God, as we have shown above. (Ch. 90.) Therefore, in God there is love.

Someone, however, might think that God does not love one thing more than another. For if intenseness and remissness are proper to a changeable nature, they cannot apply to God, from whom all change is far removed. (Ch. 13.)

Again. None of the other things that are said of God by way of operation are applied to him more or less, since he does not know one thing more than another, nor rejoices more in this than in that.

Accordingly, it must be observed that while other operations of the soul are about one object only, love alone appears to be directed to a twofold object. For if we understand or rejoice, it follows that we are referred somehow to some object, whereas love wills something to someone, since we are said to love that to which we will some good, in the aforesaid way. Hence when we want a thing, we are said simply and properly to desire it, and not to love it, but rather to love ourselves for whom we want it. Consequently, we are said to love it accidentally and improperly. Accordingly, other operations are greater or lesser in proportion to the energy alone of the action. But this cannot apply to God, because energy of action is measured by the force from which it proceeds, and every divine action is of one and the same force. On the other hand, love may be greater or lesser in two ways. In one way, as regards the good that we will someone, according to which we are said to love that person more for whom we will a greater good. In another way, as regards the energy of the action, according to which we are said to love that person more for whom, although we will not a greater good, nevertheless we will an equal good with greater fervor and efficacy.

In the first way, accordingly, nothing forbids us to say that God loves one thing more than another, according as he wills for it a greater good. But in the second way this cannot be said, for the same reason as we have stated in the case of other operations.

It is therefore clear from what has been said, (Cc. 89–91.) that none of our emotions, properly speaking, can be in God, except joy and love: and yet even these are not in him as they are in us, by way of passion.

That joy or delight is in God is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said in the Psalm: in your right hand are delights forevermore (Ps 16[15]:11). Divine wisdom, which is God, as we have proved, (Cc. 45, 60.) says: I was delighted every day, playing before him (Prov 8:30); and: there is joy before the angels of God over one sinner who repents (Luke 15:10). Also, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b21–22.) that God rejoices with one simple delight.

Scripture also makes mention of God’s love: he loved his people (Deut 33:3); I have loved you with an everlasting love (Jer 31:3); the Father himself loves you (John 16:27). Certain philosophers (Empedocles, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.4, 984b32–985a5.) also taught that God’s love is the principle of things, which agrees with Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) who says that: God’s love did not allow him to be unproductive.

It must, however, be observed that even other emotions which by their specific nature are inapplicable to God are applied to God in Sacred Scripture, not indeed properly, as we have shown. (Ch. 89; cf. ch. 30.) but metaphorically, on account of a likeness either of effects, or of some preceding emotion.

I say of effects, because sometimes his will, by the ordering of his wisdom, tends to an effect to which a person is inclined through a defective passion: thus a judge punishes out of justice as an angry man out of anger. Accordingly, sometimes God is said to be angry insofar as by the ordering of his wisdom he wills to punish someone, according to the saying of the Psalm: his wrath is quickly kindled (Ps 2:12). He is said to be merciful insofar as out of his goodwill he removes man’s unhappiness, (ST I.21.3; I-II.30.1.) even as we do the same through the passion of mercy. Hence the Psalm says: the Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love (Ps 103[102]:8). Sometimes also he is said to repent insofar as in accordance with the eternal and unchangeable decree of his providence, he makes what he destroyed before, or destroys what previously he made, even as those who are moved by repentance are wont to do. Hence: I am sorry that I have made man (Gen 6:7). That this cannot be taken in the proper sense is clear from the words of 1 Samuel 15:29: the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance.

I also say on account of a likeness to a preceding emotion. For love and joy, which are in God properly, are the principles of all the emotions: love by way of moving principle; joy by way of end. Therefore, even an angry man rejoices while punishing, as having obtained his end. Hence God is said to grieve insofar as certain things occur contrary to those he loves and approves, even as we grieve for what has happened against our will: the Lord saw it, and it displeased him that there was no justice. He saw that there was no man, and wondered that there was no one to intervene (Isa 59:15–16).

By what has been said we can refute the error of certain Jews who ascribed to God anger, sorrow, repentance, and all such passions in their proper sense, failing to discriminate between the proper and the metaphorical expressions of Scripture.