Chapter 95 — That God cannot will evil

From what has been said it can be proved that God cannot will evil.

For the virtue of a thing is that by which one produces a good work. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a15–23.) Now every work of God is a work of virtue, since his virtue is his essence, as we have shown above. (Ch. 92.) Therefore, he cannot will evil.

Again. The will never tends towards evil unless there be an error in the reason, at least as regards the particular object of choice. For, since the object of the will is an apprehended good, the will cannot tend towards an evil unless, in some way, it is proposed to it as a good, and this cannot be without an error. Now there can be no error in the divine knowledge, as we have shown. (Ch. 61.) Therefore, God’s will cannot tend to evil.

Moreover. God is the highest good, as was proved above. (Ch. 41.) Now the highest good does not suffer the company of evil, as neither does the supremely hot suffer an admixture of cold. Therefore, the divine will cannot be inclined to evil.

Further. Since good has the aspect of end, evil cannot be an object of the will except the latter turn away from its end. But the divine will cannot turn away from its end, because he cannot will anything except by willing himself, as we have proved. (Cc. 74–76.) Therefore, he cannot will evil.

It is, therefore, evident that in him free will is naturally established in good.

This is expressed in the words of Deuteronomy 32:4: God of faithfulness and without iniquity, and Habakkuk 1:13: you who are of purer eyes than to behold evil and cannot look on wrong.

Through this, the error of the Jews is confuted, who assert in the Talmud that God sins sometimes and is cleansed from sin; and also of the Luciferians, who say that God sinned in casting out Lucifer.