Chapter 96 — That God hates nothing, nor can the hatred of anything be ascribed to him

Hence it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed to God.

Because as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil: for we will good to those whom we love, but evil to those whom we hate. Therefore, if God’s will cannot be inclined to evil, as was proved above, (Ch. 95.) it is impossible for him to hate anything.

Again. As we have shown above, (Ch. 75.) God’s will tends to things other than himself, inasmuch as by willing and loving his being and goodness, he wills it to be poured forth by communicating its likeness as far as possible. Accordingly, what God wills in things other than himself is that the likeness of his goodness be in them. Now the goodness of each thing consists in its partaking of the divine likeness, since every other goodness is nothing but a likeness of the first goodness. (Ch. 40.) Therefore, God wills good to everything, and consequently he hates nothing.

Again. From the first being all others take the origin of their being. (Ch. 13.) Therefore, if he hates any one of the things that are, he wills it not to be, because to be is a thing’s good. Hence he wills his action not to be by which that thing is brought into being mediately or immediately; for it has been proved above (Ch. 83.) that if God wills a thing, it follows that he wills whatever is required for that thing. But this is impossible. And this is evident if things are brought into being by his will, since in that case the action by which things are produced must be voluntary. Likewise, if he is the cause of things naturally, because just as his nature pleases him, so also everything that his nature requires pleases him. Therefore, God does not hate anything.

Further. That which is found naturally in all active causes must most of all be found in the first active cause. Now every active cause loves its effect, as such, in its own way: for instance, parents love their children, a poet his poems, a craftsman his handiwork. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1, 1120b11–13; 9.7, 1167b33–1168a12.) Much more, therefore, God does not hate anything, since he is the cause of all.

This agrees with the saying of Wisdom 11:25: you love all things that exist, and have loathing for none of the things which you have made.

And yet God is said metaphorically to hate certain things, and this in two ways. First, from the fact that God in loving things, and willing their good to be, wills the contrary evil not to be. Therefore, he is said to hate evils, since we are said to hate that which we will not to be: do not devise evil in your hearts against one another, and love no false oath, for all these things I hate, says the Lord (Zach 8:17). But such things are not his effects as subsistent things, to which hatred or love are directed properly speaking.

The other way is due to God willing some greater good that cannot be without the privation of a lesser good. And thus he is said to hate, since to do more than this were to love. For in this way insofar as he wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe (which good is impossible without the punishment or destruction of some) he is said to hate those whose punishment or destruction he wills: I have hated Esau (Mal 1:3); and: you hate all evildoers; you destroy those who speak lies; the Lord abhors bloodthirsty and deceitful men (Ps 5:6).