Chapter 87 — That nothing can be the cause of the divine will

Now although it is possible to assign some reason of the divine will, it does not follow that anything is the cause of that will.

For the end is the cause of willing to the will. Now the end of God’s will is his goodness. Therefore, this is the cause of God’s willing, and is the selfsame as the act of his will. (Ch. 73.)

But none of the other things willed by God is the cause of his willing, although one of them is the cause of another being directed to the divine goodness. And it is in this sense that God wills one of them on account of another.

Nevertheless, it is clear that there is no need to allow of any discursion in the divine will. For where there is one act, we cannot find discursion, as we have proved above (Ch. 57.) with regard to the intellect. Now God by one act wills his goodness and all else, (Ch. 76.) since his action is his essence.

By what we have said we refute the error of some who say that all things proceed from God according to his simple will, so that no reason is to be given for anything except that God wills it. (Cf. bk. 3, ch. 97.)

Moreover. This is contrary to divine Scripture, which declares that God made all things in accordance with the order of his wisdom, as expressed in the Psalm: in wisdom have you made them all (Ps 104[103]:24); and: God poured out his wisdom upon all his works (Sir 1:9).