Chapter 93 — That in God there are moral virtues which are about actions

Now there are some virtues which regulate man’s active life, and are concerned not with passions but with actions, such as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, and art.

Now since virtue derives its species from its object or matter, while the actions that are the matter or object of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection, neither is there in these virtues (according to their proper species) anything for which they should be excluded from the divine perfection.

Again. These virtues are perfections of the will and intellect, which are principles of operation without passion. Now in God there are will and intellect without any lack of perfection. (Cc. 45, 73.) Therefore, these virtues cannot be lacking in God.

Moreover. The proper reason about all things that take their being from God exists in the divine intellect, as we have proved above. Now the reason in the craftsman’s mind about the thing to be made is art: thus the Philosopher says, in Ethics 6.4, that art is right reason about things to be made. Therefore, art is properly in God. And for this reason it is said: wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me (Wis 7:21).

Again. God’s will, in things other than himself, is determined to one particular thing by his knowledge, as was shown above. (Ch. 82.) Now knowledge, directing the will to operation, is prudence, since prudence is right reason about things to be done, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4–5.) Therefore, prudence is in God, and this is what is said: with him is prudence and strength (Job 12:16).

Again. It was shown above (Ch. 83.) that through willing a particular thing, God wills whatever is required for that thing. Now that which is requisite for a perfection of a thing is due to it. Therefore, in God there is justice, which consists in rendering to each one what is his. (Corpus juris civilis, bk. 1, tit. 1, “De justitia et jure.”) Hence it is said in the Psalm: the Lord is just and loved justice (Ps 11:7[10:8]).

Moreover. As shown above, (Ch. 81.) the last end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on the things directed to the end, neither as to its being nor as to any perfection. Therefore, he wills to communicate his goodness to a thing not that he may gain by it, but because the very act of communicating is befitting him as the source of goodness. Now to give, not for a gain expected from the giving, but through goodness and becomingness, is an act of liberality, as the Philosopher teaches. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1, 1120a23–31.) Therefore, God is most liberal, and as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 6, ch. 5; bk. 9, ch. 4.) he alone can properly be called liberal, since every other agent, except God, gains by his action some good which is the end in view. Scripture declares this his liberality when it says in the Psalm: when you open thy hand, they are filled with good things (Ps 104[103]:28); and: who gives to all men generously and without reproaching (Jas 1:5).

Again. All that receive being from God must bear his likeness inasmuch as they are, and are good, and have their proper types in the divine intellect, as we have shown above. (Cc. 40, 54.) Now it belongs to the virtue of truth, according to the Philosopher, that a man show himself as he is by his words and deeds. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7.) Therefore, in God is the virtue of truth. Hence it is said: now God is true (Rom 3:4), and in the Psalm: all your ways are true (Ps 119[118]:151).

But whatever virtues are directed to certain actions of subjects in reference to superiors are inapplicable to God (for instance, obedience, religion, and the like, which are due to a superior).

Again, the aforesaid virtues cannot be ascribed to God in respect of any of their acts that may be imperfect. Thus prudence as to its act of taking good counsel does not befit God. For, since counsel is an inquiry, as it says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142a34–b1.) whereas the divine knowledge is not inquisitive, as was proved above, (Ch. 57.) it cannot become it to take counsel. Thus we read: to whom have you given counsel? Perhaps to him that has no wisdom? (Job 26:3); and: whom did he consult . . . and who taught him? (Isa 40:14). On the other hand, as regards the act of judging of things counselled and the choice of those approved, nothing hinders prudence being ascribed to God. However, counsel is sometimes ascribed to God either by reason of a likeness in the point of secrecy, for counsels are taken in secret (thus the secrets of the divine wisdom are called “counsels” metaphorically, for instance Isaiah 25:1, according to another version (Septuagint): may your counsel of old be verified; or in the point of satisfying those who seek counsel of him, for it belongs to one who understands, even without discursion, to instruct inquirers.

Likewise, justice as to its act of commutation cannot be ascribed to God, since he receives nothing from any one. Hence we read: who has first given to him, that he might be repaid? (Rom 11:35); and: who has given to me, that I should repay him? (Job 41:11). However, we are said metaphorically to give certain things to God, inasmuch as God accepts our gifts. Thus it befits him to not have commutative, but only distributive, justice. Hence Dionysius says that God is praised for his justice, because he distributes to all according to their merits (On the Divine Names, 8), as expressed by Matthew 25:15: he gave to each according to his ability.

It must be noted, however, that the actions about which the aforesaid virtues are concerned do not by their nature depend on human affairs, for to judge of what has to be done, and to give or distribute something, belongs not to man alone but to every intelligent being. But so far as they are confined to human concerns, they take their species from them to a certain extent, just as a crooked nose makes a species of ape. (Aristotle, Physics 1.3, 186b8–35.) Accordingly, the aforesaid virtues, so far as they regulate man’s active life, are directed to these actions as confined to human affairs and taking their species from them. In this way they cannot be ascribed to God. But so far as the aforesaid actions are understood in a general sense, they can be adapted even to divine things. For just as man is a dispenser of human things, such as money or honors, so is God the bestower of all the goods of the universe. Hence the aforesaid virtues in God have a more universal range than in man: for as justice in man relates to the state or the household, so God’s justice extends to the whole universe. Therefore, the divine virtues are called exemplar (Cf. ST I-II.61.5.) virtues, because things that are limited and particularized are likenesses of absolute beings, as the light of a candle in comparison with the light of the sun. But other virtues which properly are not applicable to God have no exemplar in the divine nature, but only in the divine wisdom, which contains the proper types of all beings, (Ch. 54.) as is the case with other corporeal things.