Chapter 48 — That man’s ultimate happiness is not in this life

Seeing, then, that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby he is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby he is known in science through demonstration, nor in that knowledge whereby he is known through faith, as we have proved above; (Cc. 38–40.) and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in his essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God in a way through that which is nearest to him, (Ch. 37.) as we have proved; and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown; (Ch. 45.) it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life.

Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more, because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end in which to be at rest. Now, this cannot happen in this life, since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him—this being natural to man—unless perhaps someone there be who understands all things. And in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone who was a mere man; seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances, which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved. (Ch. 38.) Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life.

Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end has a natural desire to be established and at rest in it. Hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore, it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently, unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When, therefore, a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest, so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness. Hence the Philosopher says: We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.10.) Now, in this life there is no sure stability: for however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which his happiness consists. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being: for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end. Hence we see that animals which live but a short time are perfected in a short time. But if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue, (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.) whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man’s ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved: (Ch. 37.) for man is hardly able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life. And then in the majority of cases only a short space of life remains to him. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good: otherwise it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil: just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life; not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For no one is there who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, in which virtue consists, either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another; or at least is ignorant of what he would wish to know, or feels doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore, no man is happy in this life.

Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it: not only shunning it now when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot escape death. Therefore, it is not possible for man to be happy in this life.

Besides. Ultimate happiness consists not in a habit but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore, man cannot be entirely happy in this life.

Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore, its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death, since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter disorders by which he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue, such as madness and the like, which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness, therefore, always has sorrow naturally connected with it: consequently, it will not be perfect happiness.

But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect—namely, in separate substances—and that it is imperfect in man, by way of a kind of participation. For he can arrive at a full understanding of the truth only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. (Ch. 45.) Therefore, neither is happiness, in its perfect form, possible to man; yet he has a certain participation in it, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Therefore, inquiring (Nicomachean Ethics 1.10.) whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way.

We must now show that this explanation does not avoid the foregoing arguments.

For although man is below the separate substances in the natural order, he is above irrational creatures: therefore, he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further: thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place; and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more, therefore, must man’s natural desire be at rest when he has obtained his last end. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore, in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore, he must obtain it after this life.

Again. The natural desire cannot be void, since nature does nothing in vain. (2 De Coelo xi.) But nature’s desire would be void if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore, man’s natural desire can be fulfilled; but it cannot be fulfilled in this life, as we have shown. Therefore, it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness is after this life.

Moreover. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection, it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are ever in motion and tending towards perfection, because those who follow make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as stated in 2 Metaphysics. (Metaphysics bk. 2 D. 1 {a}. ch.1.) Therefore, in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since, then (as Aristotle himself shows), (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.) man’s ultimate happiness in this life appears to consist in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life.

Moreover. Whatever is in potency tends to become actual: so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potency to the knowledge of the forms of all things, and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently, it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows everything, at least these material things. But man cannot obtain this through speculative sciences, by which in this life we know truth. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

For these and like reasons Alexander and Averroes held that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in human knowledge obtained through speculative sciences, but in that which results from conjunction with a separate substance, which conjunction they deemed possible to man in this life. But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through speculative sciences, he maintained that man does not attain to perfect happiness, but proportionate to his capacity. (Cf. ch. 42. seqq.)

Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, will avoid these straits if we suppose, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the second book. (Ch. 81.)

Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which he possesses after this life, a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward in heaven (Matt 5:12) and states that the saints shall be as the angels (Matt 22:30), who always see God in heaven (Matt 18:10).