Chapter 49 — That separate substances do not see God in his essence through knowing him by their own essences

We must now inquire whether this same knowledge (by which separate substances and souls after death know God by their own essences) is sufficient for their ultimate happiness.

In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first of all show that to know God in this way is not to know his essence.

An effect may be known through its cause in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and qualities of the cause: this happens in sciences which prove the cause from the effect. Second, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect: thus a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. This way differs from the first, because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, one of which is the cause of the other: for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. But in the second way there is one sight of both, because while seeing the effect we see the cause in it at the same time. Third, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: for instance, if a box had an intellect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect is equal to the cause, and expresses the whole power of the cause.

Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not, however, in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another; and in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God’s power, as we have shown in the second book. (Ch. 22. seqq.) Therefore, they cannot see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge.

Besides. The intelligible likeness by which a thing is understood as to its substance must be of the same species—in fact, it must be its species (even as the form of the house, which is in the architect’s mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species). For we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature; indeed, not even of the same genus, as we showed in the first book. (Ch. 25.) Therefore, a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature.

Further. Every created thing is confined to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the first book. (Ch. 28, 43.) Therefore, the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created.

Moreover. Every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood comprehends that thing in representing it: hence words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created image can possibly represent God thus, since every created image belongs to some fixed genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the first book. (Ch. 25.) Therefore, it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created image.

Further. It was proved in the first book (Ch. 25.) that God’s substance is his being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the second book. (Ch. 52.) Therefore, the essence of a separate substance is not a sufficient medium whereby God may be seen in his essence.

And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows about God that he is; and that he is the cause of all things; and that he is above all and far removed from all not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able to obtain somewhat, because we know of God that he is from his effects, and that he is the cause of other things, surpassing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point of our knowledge in this life where, as Dionysius says, we are united to God as to something unknown. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On Mystical Theology,* cc. 1–2.)* This happens when we know of him what he is not, while what he is remains utterly unknown. Hence in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it was said of Moses that he drew near to the thick darkness where God was (Exod 20:21).

Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate substances, which know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God than the effects through which we know God. Therefore, separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists.

Again. Since by negations we come by any way whatever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as stated above, (Ch. 39.) the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propinquity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of him. Even so, he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now, separate substances know more than we, and the things that are nearer to God; consequently, by their intelligence they remove from God more things and nearer things than we do. Therefore, they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we, although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance.

Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed, the better the knowledge one has of his eminence. Thus, although a peasant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has business, he does not realize the king’s exalted position as one does who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king to be placed (although neither of them comprehends the height of the kingly rank). Now we know none but the lowest things: consequently, although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, to whom the highest orders of things are known, while they know God to be higher than them all.

Again. It is clear that the causality and virtue of a cause are all the better known according as more and greater effects of it are known. Therefore, it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, although we know him to be the cause of all.