Chapter 89 — That the movement of the will is caused by God, and not only the power of the will

Nevertheless, some, unable to understand how God can cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to liberty, have endeavored to give a false exposition to the authorities quoted. (See end of ch. 88.) They say, in fact, that God causes in us to will and to accomplish by causing in us the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that. This is the exposition of Origen, who defended free-will in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authorities. (3 Peri Arch. i.)

This seems to have been the source of the opinion of some who maintained that providence does not regard things subject to free-will—namely, our choices—but only external happenings. For he who chooses to get or do something (for instance, to build or get rich) is not always able to succeed; and so the outcome of our actions is not subject to our free-will, but is ordained by providence.

But the authority of Scripture is in manifest opposition to all this: for it is said: O Lord, you have wrought all our works in (Vulgate: for.) us (Isa 26:12). Hence we receive from God not only the power to will, but also our very operations.

Further. The very words of Solomon: He turns it wherever he will (Prov 21:1), (See end of ch. 88.) show that the divine causality extends not only to the will, but also to its act.

Again. Not only does God give things their powers, but also nothing can act by its own power unless it act by his power, as we proved above. (Cc. 67, 70.) Therefore, man cannot use the will-power given to him except insofar as he acts by God’s power. Now the thing by whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is apparent in the craftsman, by whose power the instrument acts even though it may not have received its form from the craftsman in question, and is merely applied by him to action. Therefore, God is the cause not only of our will but also of our willing.

Further. Order in spiritual things is more perfect than in corporeal things. Now in corporeal things every movement is caused by the first movement. Therefore, in spiritual things every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is God’s.

Besides. We proved above (Cc. 67, 70.) that God is the cause of every action, and that he works in every agent. Therefore, he is the cause of the movements of the will.

Again. Aristotle argues in the same sense (Eudemian Ethics, bk. 8,* D. 7. ch. 14.)* as follows. There must be some cause of a person understanding, taking counsel, choosing, and willing, because everything new must have a cause. And if the cause of these acts was another act of counsel and another act of will, we must come at length to something first since in such things we cannot proceed to infinity. And this first thing must be something better than the reason. And nothing but God is better than the intellect and the reason. Therefore, God is the first principle of our counsels and wills.