Chapter 92 — How a man may be said to be fortunate, and how he is assisted by higher causes

It may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate.

For a man is said to have good luck when something good happens to him beside his intention: (Great Ethics, ch. 8.) for instance, when a man finds a treasure which he was not seeking while digging in a field. Now a man, while working, may do something beside his own intention, yet not beside the intention of someone above him. For instance, if a master send a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him: and therefore although in relation to this servant the meeting is fortuitous and casual, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since, then, man, is subordinate to the heavenly bodies as to his body; to the angels, as to his intellect; and to God as to his will, it is possible for something to happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influence of the angels or even of God. And although God’s action alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, nevertheless the angel’s action has a certain bearing on man’s choice by way of persuasion, and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, insomuch as the corporeal impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly, when through the influence of higher causes (in the aforesaid manner) a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit, without his being aware of the utility by his own reason; and besides this his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profitable to him, without knowing why it is so, he is said to be fortunate. And, on the contrary, he is said to be unfortunate when through the influence of higher causes his choice is inclined to contrary things. Thus it is said of someone: Write this man down as childless, a man who shall not succeed in his days (Jer 22:30).

Yet in this, we must observe a difference. For the impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently, from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says (Great Ethics, ch. 8.) that to be fortunate is to have a good natural disposition. For it is inconceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful without their knowing it is due to these people differing in understanding, since the nature of understanding and will is the same in all, because a formal difference would cause a specific difference, and a material difference causes a difference of individuals. Consequently, insofar as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed.

Again, another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the persuasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him. Nevertheless, he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to Jeremiah: We would have healed Babylon, but she was not healed (Jer 51:9); and much more so the influence of heavenly bodies. But divine providence never fails.

Yet another difference must be observed. For, since a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose except insofar as it makes an impression on our bodies (so that a man is influenced in his choice in the same way as he is led by his passions to choose), every disposition towards choosing resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies is by way of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice through hate, love, or anger and the like. On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which reason depends on the end. Consequently, sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know. (Great Ethics, ch. 8.) Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes he is instructed by the angel who enlightens him both as to the goodness of a thing to be done and as to the reason why it is good, which reason depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous. It must also be noted that the active force of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently, the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man’s choice.

Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both beside his intention, and beside the influence of heavenly bodies, and beside the angelic enlightenment, but not beside divine providence which is the governor of being as being (even as it is its maker). Thus it must hold all things in its power. Consequently, some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. For in relation to God not only in human affairs, but in all things whatsoever, there can be nothing fortuitous or unforeseen.

And since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional, and moral goods cannot be unintentional (because they are founded on choice), in their respect no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although in their respect one may say that he has by nature a good or evil disposition when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man beside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune, and as governed by God, and as guarded by the angels.

Man receives yet another assistance from the higher causes with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the faculty to choose and to follow his choice, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered. With regard to his choice, as we have said, insofar as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened (as it were) through the guardianship of angels, or led through the operation of God. With regard to the execution, insofar as man receives from some higher cause strength and efficiency to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, insofar as the aforesaid efficiency may be seated in the body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and efficiencies from heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and passive qualities of the elements—which qualities, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies. Thus, that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have occult powers. Therefore, there is no reason why one man should not receive a certain efficiency for certain corporeal effects through the influence of a heavenly body, which is not possessed by another man (for instance, a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting).

But this efficiency is bestowed on man by God much more perfectly for the purpose of accomplishing his works. Accordingly, as regards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him: and as to the second, he is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms, where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? And in reference to the second: The Lord is the stronghold of my life; of whom shall I be afraid? (Ps 27[26]:1).

There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. First, by the former, man is assisted both in things subject to his skill and in others; the second assistance extends only to such things for which man’s skill is available. Thus if a man finds a treasure while digging a grave, this does not result from any skill of his. Hence, with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the skill for finding treasures. But that a physician heals, or that a soldier conquers in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adopted to the end, and from skill received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal. The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Therefore, since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot properly speaking be said to be fortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above.

Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging; sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man, while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance, the man was assisted to his good fortune solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached beside his intention. In the second instance, both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter.

There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man both is from God and can be from a heavenly body. This is insofar man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached without being considered by the chooser, and insofar as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is no longer fortuitous, whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body.

This is proved as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to its essential cause. Now, the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature: and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly, if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its essential cause. And when two things are united together accidentally, they are one not really, but only accidentally. Therefore, no natural cause of itself can be the cause of such a conjunction. Suppose, then, that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body as by a passion (as we said before) to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently, the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination of itself to this effect, considered as a whole—namely, that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. Whereas one that acts through the intellect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelligent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there might send another who knew it not to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might find the treasure unintentionally. Accordingly, such fortuitous events cease to be fortuitous when referred to the divine causality, but not when they are referred to a heavenly cause.

The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every possible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always (or nearly always) those particular things to which some advantage or disadvantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only, and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number, as the Philosopher says, (Physics 2.5.) and is evident to the sense. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. But man can be directed to all things by the one divine disposition.