Chapter 94 — Of the certainty of divine providence

A difficulty, however, arises from what has been said. For if all, even the contingent, happenings of this lower world are subject to divine providence, it would seem to follow that either providence is uncertain, or all happens necessarily.

For the Philosopher proves (Metaphysics bk 6, D. 5. ch. 3.) that if we suppose every effect to have a per se cause, and also that, given any per se cause, we must of necessity grant the effect: it will follow that all future events happen of necessity. For if every effect has a per se cause, every effect will be reducible to some cause either present or past. Thus if it be asked whether a certain man will be killed by robbers, this effect is preceded by a cause, which is his being met by the robbers; and this effect is again preceded by another cause, namely that he went out; and this again was preceded by another cause, namely that he went to fetch some water; and this by another cause, namely that he was thirsty; and this was caused by his partaking of salt meat, which he is either eating now or has ate already. Accordingly if given the cause we must necessarily grant the effect: if he eats the salt meat, he is of necessity thirsty; if he thirsts, it is necessary that he wish to seek water; and if he wish to seek water, that he leave his house; and if he go out, that the robbers meet him; and if they meet him, that they kill him. Therefore, from first to last, it is necessary that this eater of salt meat be killed by robbers. The Philosopher concludes, then, that it is untrue that given the cause, the effect must of necessity be granted also, since some of these causes may be ineffective. Nor again is it true that every effect has a per se cause, because that which is accidental (namely, that the man who wants water should meet some robbers), has no cause.

This argument proves, then, that all effects reducible to a per se cause happen themselves of necessity, whether present or past, if the effect follows of necessity when they are given. Either, therefore, we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence (and thus providence would not be about all things, contrary to what was proved above), (Ch. 64.) or we must say that, granted providence, it is not necessary for its effects to follow (and then providence will not be certain), or that all things must happen of necessity. For providence is not only in the present and the past, but from eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal.

Further. If divine providence is certain, this conditional proposition must be true: if God foresaw this, it will be. Now the antecedent of this proposition is necessary, for it is eternal. Therefore, the consequence is necessary, because whenever the antecedent of a conditional proposition is necessary, the consequence is likewise necessary; so that the consequence is like a conclusion of the antecedent, and whatever follows from a necessity is itself a necessity. Accordingly, if divine providence is certain, all things must happen of necessity.

Moreover. Suppose a thing to be foreseen by God—for instance, that so and so will reign. Either, then, it is possible for it to happen that he does not reign, or it is not possible. If it is not possible for him not to reign, then it is impossible: therefore, it is necessary that he will reign. On the other hand, if it be possible that he will not reign, then, since given a possibility nothing impossible follows (8 Phys. v. 4), it follows that divine providence is at fault; therefore it is not impossible for divine providence to fail. Consequently, if all things are foreseen by God, it follows that either divine providence is uncertain, or that all things happen of necessity.

Again. Cicero argues thus. (Cicero, De Divination, bk. 2, ch. 7; see also On Fate, ch. 14; Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 9.) If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. If this be true, all things are subject to fate. If all things are subject to fate, nothing is subject to our power, and there is no such thing as free-will. Therefore, if divine providence is certain, there is no free-will. And it will also follow that there is no such thing as a contingent cause.

Besides. Divine providence does not exclude intermediary causes, as we have proved. (Ch. 77.) But some causes are contingent and defectible. Therefore, the effect of divine providence may fail. Therefore, God’s providence is uncertain.

In order to solve these difficulties, we must recall some points already laid down, so as to make it clear that nothing escapes from divine providence, and that the order of divine providence is utterly unchangeable, and that nevertheless it does not follow that whatever results from divine providence must happen of necessity.

First, we must observe that as God is the cause of all existent things by giving them their very being, the order of his providence must include all things, because to those things to which he has given being, he must grant a continuance of being, and perfection by attaining their last end. (Ch. 64. seqq.)

Now in everyone that exercises providence there are two points for consideration: (Ch. 77.) namely, forethought about the order of things, and establishment of the premeditated order in the things subject to providence. The former pertains to the cognitive, and the latter to the executive faculty. And there is this difference between them: in designing the order, providence is so much the more perfect as its order is more able to reach the most minute things. For it is owing to our defective knowledge which cannot comprise all individual things that we are unable to arrange beforehand all the particulars. Thus a man is considered more fit to make provision according as his foresight extends to more particulars, and one whose foresight extends only to general considerations has but a small share of prudence. The same may be observed in all productive arts. On the other hand, as regards the causing of the premeditated order to be in things, the providence of the governor is the higher in order and perfection according as it is more universal, and brings about the realization of its forethought through more ministers. In fact, the mere organization of these ministers has a large place in the order of providence.

Now God’s providence must be supremely perfect, because he is simply and universally perfect, as we proved in the first book. (Ch. 28.) Consequently, in his providence he orders all things, even the most trivial, by the eternal forethought of his wisdom; all things that operate do so as instruments moved by him, (Ch. 67.) and serve him obediently, so as to bring forth into the world the order of providence thought out, as it were, from eternity. And if all things that are capable of action must act as his ministers, it is impossible that any agent hinder the execution of divine providence by acting contrary to it. Nor again is it possible for divine providence to be hindered through a defect in any agent or patient, since every power, active or passive, is caused in things according to God’s disposition. (Ch. 70.) Again, it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be prevented through a change in the author of providence, since God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 13.) It follows, therefore, that divine providence cannot possibly fail.

Second, it must be observed that every agent aims at a good, and at a greater good so far as it is able, as we have proved. (Ch. 3.) Now, the good and the better are not the same as considered in the whole and as considered in the parts. (Ch. 71.) For in the whole the good consists in integrity, which results from the order and composition of parts. Consequently, for the whole it is better that there be disparity of parts, which is necessary for the order and perfection of the whole, than that all the parts be equal, each one being on a level with the most excellent part. But each part of inferior degree would be better, considered in itself, if it were on the same level as a higher part. Take the human body as an example: the foot would be a more excellent part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye, but the whole body would be more imperfect if it were deprived of the service of the foot.

Accordingly, the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent, for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can, whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently, a defect is beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly beside the intention of a particular nature (namely, of this particular virtue in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible); on the other hand, it is the purpose of universal nature (namely of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings) that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner, corruption, diminution, and every defect is in the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature, because each thing shuns deficiency and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect (for instance, the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another).

Among the parts of the whole universe the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary, (Ch. 72.) since the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible, and unchangeable. But the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition; thus the lowest are corruptible in their very being, are changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects not of necessity, but contingently. Therefore, every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to remain firm in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect, while God, who governs the universe, intends to establish some of his effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly, he adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore, it belongs to the order of divine providence not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently. Consequently, some of the things subject to divine providence are necessary, and some contingent, and not all necessary.

It is therefore evident that although divine providence is the per se cause of a particular future effect, and more truly eternal even though it is present and past, yet it does not follow (as the first argument pretended) that this particular effect necessarily will be. For the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently, and this cannot fail.

From which it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: if God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, he foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows, then, infallibly that it will be contingently and not of necessity.

It is also clear that if this thing which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself: for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of divine providence cannot fail; thus it will happen contingently. Thus the third argument is solved. Consequently, we may say that the man in question might not reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen.

Again, the argument advanced by Cicero appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For, seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow that nothing is under our control if all things are ruled by divine providence. Thus they are foreseen by God so as to be freely done by us.

Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God himself works in all things according to the decree of his will, as we proved above. (Ch. 67; bk. 2, ch. 23.) Consequently, it belongs to his providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing.

Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things foreseen by God from the certitude of his knowledge were solved above, when we were treating of the divine knowledge. (Bk. 1, ch. 63. seqq.)