Chapter 95 — That the unchangeableness of divine providence does not exclude the usefulness of prayer

We must also observe that as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the usefulness of prayer. For we do not pray that the eternal disposition of his providence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that he may grant what we desire.

For it is fitting that God should assent to the pious yearnings of the rational creature—not as though our desires have the effect of changing a God who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting his goodness in granting our desires. For, since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved, (Ch. 3.) and since it belongs to the supereminent divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that he fulfils, according to his goodness, the pious desires of which our prayers are the expression.

Again. He who causes a thing to move should lead that thing to the end, so that by the same nature, a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end, and rests in it. Now every desire is a movement to a good, and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, who is good in his essence, and the source of goodness: for every mover moves to its like. Therefore, it belongs to God, according to his goodness, to bring to a fitting issue the reasonable desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers.

Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression: thus the things nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently, the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to this extent that they receive from it a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfilment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more, therefore, do intellectual substances attain to the fulfilment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers.

Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection. Hence it has been said that friends have but one will. (Sallust, Catilin. ch. 20.) Now we have proved (Bk. 1, ch. 75.) that God loves his creature, and so much the more as it has a greater share of his goodness, which is the first and chief object of his love. (Bk. 1, ch. 74.) Hence he wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now it is from his will that things derive their being, because he is the cause of things through his will, as was proved above. (Bk. 2, ch. 23. seqq.) Therefore, it belongs to God’s goodness to fulfill the rational creature’s desires, as laid before him in our prayers.

Besides. The creature’s good flows from the divine goodness, in a kind of likeness to it. Now it is seemingly a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the prayers of those who ask aright; since for this reason is he said to be liberal, gentle, merciful and kind. Therefore, it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant pious prayers.

Hence it is said in the Psalm: He fulfils the desire of all who fear him, he also hears their cry, and saves them (Ps 145[144]:19); and our Lord says: Every one who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened (Matt 7:8).