Chapter 96 — That it is not unfitting if sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God

And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God.

For it was proved that God fulfils the desires of the rational creature, inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature’s desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is good not truly but apparently, and is simply evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God. Hence it is said: You ask and do not receive, because you ask wrongly (Jas 4:3).

Again, it was shown to be fitting that God fulfils our desires because he moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement unless the movement continue. Accordingly, if the movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting if the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says that they ought always to pray and not lose heart (Luke 18:1); and the Apostle says: Pray without ceasing (1 Thess 5:17).

Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfils the desire of the rational creature on account of its being near to God. Now a man approaches to God by contemplation, devout affections, and humble but firm resolutions. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God does not deserve to be granted by him. Hence it is said in the Psalm: He has had regard to the prayer of the humble (Ps 102:17[101:18]); and: Let him ask in faith, without doubting (Jas 1:6).

Moreover. We proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently, if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said: If one turns away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer is an abomination (Prov 28:9); and: Even though you make many prayers, I will not listen; for your hands are full of blood (Isa 1:15).

It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends. Thus it is said: Do not pray for this people, or lift up cry or prayer for them, and do not intercede with me, for I will not hear you (Jer 7:16).

It happens, too, sometimes that a man refuses his friend’s request through friendship because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him. Thus a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for his health. Hence, since it has been proved that God, for love of the rational creature, fulfils the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if sometimes he does not fulfill the prayers of those even who are most dear to him so that he may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. For this reason, he did not remove from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because he foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as related in 2 Cor 12:8–9. Hence also our Lord said to some: You do not know what you are asking (Matt 20:22); and it is said: We do not know how to pray as we ought (Rom 8:26). For this reason Augustine says: The Lord is good, for often he grants not what we want, that he may give what we want more. (Augustine, Epistle ad Paulinus et Therasia Ep. 26.)

It is clear, then, from what has been said that prayers and pious desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown (Ch. 77.) that God’s providence does not exclude other causes: rather indeed does he dispose of them so that the order appointed by his providence may be established in things. Consequently, second causes are not inconsistent with providence—in fact, they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly, prayers are efficacious before God, yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of divine providence, since even the granting of each suppliant’s prayer is included in the order of divine providence. To say, therefore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God because the order of his providence is unchangeable is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nourishment, both of which are clearly absurd.

By the foregoing we refute a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied divine providence, and by those who (like certain Peripatetics) (See end of ch. 75.) withdrew human affairs from the providence of God, and again by those who, with the Stoics, (See end of ch. 73.) contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity. For it results from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all worship of the divinity is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malachi: It is vain to serve God. What is the good of our keeping his charge or of walking as in mourning before the Lord of hosts? (Mal 3:14).

On the other hand, some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers: thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations.

Certain passages in Sacred Scripture would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related that Isaias, at God’s command, said to King Ezechias: Thus says the Lord: Set your house in order; for you shall die, you shall not live (Isa 38:1), and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaiah: Go and say to Ezechias: I have heard your prayer . . . Behold, I will add fifteen years to your life (Isa 38:4–5). Also, it is said in the name of God: If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, and if that nation concerning which I have spoken turns from its evil, I will repent of the evil that I intended to do to it (Jer 18:7–8). And: Return to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful . . . Who knows whether he will not turn and repent? (Joel 2:13–14).

These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an impossibility. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is changeable. Also, that God acquires something from the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible, as is evident from what has been already laid down. (Bk. 1, ch. 13. seqq.)

They are also contrary to Sacred Scripture, which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said: God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should repent. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it? (Num 23:19). And: The triumpher in Israel will not lie or repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent (1 Sam 15:29). And: I, the Lord, do not change (Mal 3:6).

Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s overlooking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordained one to another insofar as they have one common cause, this order must be the more general as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause, which is God, must of necessity include all things. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner, because there is something that can change it outside that order. Therefore, it is not strange that the Egyptians, who referred the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites. This is because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence.

But outside that order, which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason, the Stoics, who referred the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For when they say that the result is the same on account of the universal order of things whether we pray or not, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant’s prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would follow through the divine ordinance from these, even as they follow through other causes. Accordingly, to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the unchangeableness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy, neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore, prayers are useful not as though they brought about a change in the order appointed from eternity, but as included in that very order.

On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer: for he transcends all causes, so that he is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to him, because it originated from him. Accordingly, when some change is brought about by prayer in the order of inferior causes, God is said to return or to repent—not as though his eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effect of his is changed. Hence Gregory says that God changes not his mind, although at times he changes his sentence. (Pope Gregory I, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 10.) I say not that one which expresses his eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes—in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of sentence is described metaphorically as repentance in God insofar as he behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behaviour. In the same way, he is said figuratively to be angry insofar as he does what an angry man does by punishing. (Bk. 1, ch. 91.)