D. 44 - Those who will rise
After the Master has examined the conditions of the resurrection, here he determines the conditions of those who will rise. And this is divided into two parts: in the first part, he considers the conditions of those who will rise who had attained the perfection of human nature; in the second, the conditions of those who lacked this perfection in the present life, namely, fetuses prematurely born or miscarried, at: it is also necessary to inquire. (Sententiae IV, 44.8 (258). 2.)
The first part is in two parts: in the first, he determines the conditions of the blessed who rise; in the second, the conditions of the wicked, at: as to the reprobate, it is usual to ask. (Sent. IV, 44.4 (254). 1.)
The first of these is in three parts: in the first, he considers the age and stature of those who will rise; in the second, the integrity of their bodies, at: “for the earthly matter out of which mortal flesh is created does not ever perish”; (Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 88.) in the third, their glory, at: this is to be understood as applying to the bodies of the saints. (Sent. IV, 44.3 (253). 1.)
As to the reprobate, it is usual to ask whether they rise again with the deformities which they had here. Here he examines the conditions of the reprobate: and first as to the reprobation of nature; second, as to the passion of suffering, at: but if it is asked about the bodies of the wicked, how they will burn in fire and not be consumed, Augustine by various examples demonstrates. (Sent. IV, 44.5 (255). 1.)
And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how the bodies of the condemned could suffer punishment; second, he shows the same thing about the spirits of the damned, at: it is also usual to ask whether the demons burn in a corporeal fire. (Sent. IV, 44.6 (256). 1.)
And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows how the spirits of the demons are able to suffer from a physical fire; second, he shows the same thing about the spirits of the damned, at: since it is established that souls are to suffer the torments of material fire in their own bodies, it is usual to ask. (Sent. IV, 44.7 (257). 1.)
Here three questions arise about the condition of those who will rise. First, concerning those things that pertain in common to the good and the wicked. Second, about those things that pertain only to the good. Third, about those things that only have to do with the wicked.
Question 1
The conditions of the risen
Concerning this three questions arise:
first, about the identity of those who will rise;
- second, about the integrity of their bodies;
- third, about the quality of their bodies.
- Article 1
About the identity of those who will rise
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: Super I Cor. 15, lec. 5, 6, and 9; SCG IV, chs. 80–81; Quodl. XI, q. 6, a. un.; De anima, a. 19, ad 13; Super Iob 19, lec. 2; Comp. theo., ch. 153.) It seems that the soul does not up take again the same body in the resurrection: what you sow is not the body which is to be, but a bare kernel (1 Cor 15:37). But the Apostle is comparing death to sowing there, and the resurrection to sprouting. Therefore, the body that is cast aside through death and the body that is taken up again in the resurrection are not the same.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, matter is adapted to any given form according to its own condition, and similarly an instrument is adapted to any given agent. But the body is related to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Therefore, since the soul is not of the same condition in the resurrection as it is now, for either it will be transformed entirely into heavenly life, to which it clung while living in the world; or it will be sunk into a beastly life, if it lived in a beastly way in this life; it seems that it would not resume the same body, but either a heavenly one or a beastly one.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the human body will be resolved into the elements after death, as was said above. But those parts of the elements into which the human body is resolved have nothing in common with the human body which was resolved into them except prime matter, which any other parts of elements have in common with the human body. Now, if a body were formed from other parts of the elements, it would not be said to be the same in number. Therefore, neither if it is reformed from these parts will it be the same body in number.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible for something to be one in number whose essential parts are different in number. But the form of a mixture, which is the essential part of the human body, as its form, cannot be taken up again the same. Therefore, the body will not be the same in number. Proof of the middle: that which completely passes into non-being cannot be taken up again the same in number, which is clear from the fact that what has diverse being cannot be the same in number. But interrupted being, which is the act of a being, is diverse, just as any other interrupted act is. But the form of a mixture entirely passes into non-being through death, since it is a bodily form, and likewise the qualities of the contraries from which the mixture is made. Therefore, the form of the mixture does not return the same in number.
On the contrary (1), Job says: in my flesh I will see God, my savior (Job 19:26). But he is speaking of his vision after the resurrection: which is clear from what precedes this verse: in the last day I shall rise out of the earth (Job 19:25). Therefore, the body will rise the same in number.
Furthermore (2), as Damascene says in Book IV, resurrection is the second rising of one who has been slain. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 27, PG 94:1219.) But this body that we now bear has been slain through death. Therefore, the same one in number will rise.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the man who will rise is not the same in number. (Parallels: Super I Cor. 15, lec. 9; SCG IV, chs. 80–81; De anima, a. 19, ad 5; Super Iob 19, lec. 2; Comp. theo., ch. 154.) For as the Philosopher says in Book 2 of On Generation and Corruption: whatever has a corruptible species, having been changed, is not repeated the same in number. (See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 11, 338b8–9: “men and animals do not return upon themselves so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time” and 338b16–17: “Those things . . . whose substance is perishable (not imperishable) must return upon themselves specifically, not numerically.”) But this is the sort of thing that the substance of a man according to his present state is. Therefore, after the change of death he cannot return the same in number.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, where humanity is different, there is not the same man in number; therefore, Socrates and Plato are two men and not one, for they each have different humanity. But the humanity of risen man is different from that which he now possesses. Therefore, he is not the same man in number. The middle can be proved in two ways. First, because the humanity that is the form of the whole is not the form and substance like the soul, but is the form alone; but a form of this kind passes entirely into non-being; and so it cannot be repeated. Second, because humanity results from the union of the parts, but the union cannot be taken up again the same in number as it was before, because repetition is opposed to identity. For repetition implies number, while identity implies unity, and these are not compatible with each other. Now, in the resurrection the union is repeated. Therefore, it is not the same union, and so neither is it the same humanity, nor the same man.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is not one man if it is several animals. Therefore, if it is not the same animal, it is not one man in number. But wherever there is not the same sense power, there is not the same animal. For animal is defined by the first sense power, namely, the sense of touch, as is clear from On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 413b4–6.) Now because the senses do not remain in a separated soul, as some say, the same ones in number cannot be taken up again. Therefore, in the resurrection the man who rises will not be the same animal in number, and so he will not be the same man.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the matter of a statue is more a principal in the statue than a man’s matter is in a man: for artificial things are completely in the genus of substance from their matter, but natural things from their form, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 193a34–193b3.) and the Commentator says the same thing about On the Soul 2. But if a statue be reconstituted out of the same bronze, it is not the same one in number. Therefore, much less, if a man were reconstituted out of the same dust, would he be the same man in number.
On the contrary (1), Job says: my eyes shall behold, and not another’s (Job 19:27). And he speaks of his vision after the resurrection, as was said above. Therefore, the same man in number will rise.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says in On the Trinity, Book 8, (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 8, ch. 5, l. 65.) that to rise again is nothing other than to be brought back to life again. But unless the same man in number returned to life who had died, he would not be said to be brought back to life. Therefore, he would not rise, which is against the faith.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that, by the resurrection, the dust of the human body must return to the same part of the body that it was dissolved from. For according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 2, as the whole soul is related to the whole body, so part of the soul is related to part of the body, as sight is related to the pupil. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412b17–24.) But after the resurrection, the body must be taken up by the same soul. Therefore, the parts of the body must be also taken up again to the same members in which they are completed by the same parts of the soul.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, diversity of matter makes for diversity in number. But if dust did not return to the same parts, individual parts would not be reformed from the same matter out of which they were originally constituted. Therefore, they will not be the same in number. But if the parts are different, the whole will be different, for parts are related to the whole as matter to form, as is evident from the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 195a19–21.) Therefore, a man will not be the same in number, which is against the truth of the resurrection.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, resurrection is ordered to a man receiving the reward of his works. But different parts of the body deserve merits or demerits for different works. Therefore, in the resurrection every part must return to its own state, so that it may be rewarded in its own way.
On the contrary (1), artificial things depend more on their matter than natural things do. But among artificial things, for the same object to be restored from the same matter, it is not necessary that the parts be brought back to the same place. Therefore, neither is it necessary in a man.
Furthermore (2), a change in accident does not make a difference in number. But the positioning of the parts is one of the accidents. Therefore, its difference in man does not make a difference in number.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, concerning this question, both philosophers have been wrong and certain modern heretics are wrong.
For some philosophers held that souls separated from bodies are united again to those bodies. But they were wrong in this in two respects. First, as to the manner of union, for some held that a separated soul would be naturally rejoined to a body by way of generation. Second, as to the body to which it would be joined, for they held that the second union would not be to the same body that had been laid aside in death, but to another. Sometimes it would be joined to one of the same species, but sometimes to a different one, when the soul dwelling in the body had led a beastly life outside the order of reason, so that after death it would pass from the body of a man into the body of another animal, to whose manners it had conformed itself while alive; as into a dog’s body because of sensuality, and a lion’s body because of violence and plunder, and so on with the others. But it would pass into a body of the same species when the soul, living well in its body, and having enjoyed some happiness after death, began to wish to return to its body after a certain number of centuries; and so it would be rejoined to a human body. But this opinion comes from two false roots; the first of which is that the soul is not united to a body essentially as a form to matter, but only accidentally, as a motor to what it moves, or a person to his clothing. And therefore they could hold that a soul pre-existed before being infused into a generated body by natural generation; and again, that it would be united to different bodies. The second is that they held that the intellect only differed from the senses accidentally, so that namely a man would be said to have understanding above the other animals because in him the sensitive power flourished more extensively because of the best composition of the body. For this reason they could hold that the soul of man would pass into the body of a brute animal, especially once the human soul had been bent to beastly effects. But these two roots are destroyed by the Philosopher in his book On the Soul; (The refutation is implicit in the treatment of the soul as form of the body in the opening chapters of Book 2 of Aristotle’s On the Soul; there are specific remarks at Bk. 1, ch. 3, 407b14–26, and Bk. 2, ch. 2, 414a19–28.) and once the roots are destroyed, the falsity of the position mentioned is obvious.
And in the same way the errors of certain heretics, who fell into the position described, are also destroyed. However, some held that the soul would be joined anew to heavenly bodies, or even to subtle bodies in the manner of a wind, as Gregory tells of a certain bishop of Constantinople, explaining that statement: in my flesh I shall see God my savior (Job 19:26). And these heretics’ errors can be destroyed by the fact that they harm the truth of the resurrection which Sacred Scripture professes. For it cannot be called a resurrection unless a soul returns to the same body, for a resurrection is a rising again; but what rises must be the same as what falls. Therefore, resurrection has more to do with the body that falls after death than with the soul that lives after death. And so, if it is not the same body that the soul takes up, it will not be called resurrection, but rather the assumption of a new body.
Reply Obj. 1: A likeness does not encompass all things, but only certain respects. For in the sowing of a seed, the seed sown and the seed sprouted are not the same in number, nor does it exist in the same way, since when it was first sown it was without the follicles with which it sprouts. Now the body that rises will be the same one, but existing in a different way; for it was mortal and it will rise in immortality.
Reply Obj. 2: The difference that exists between the soul of the risen and the soul of one living in this world is not according to anything essential, but according to glory and misery, which make an accidental difference. Therefore, it is not necessary that what rises is a different body in number, but existing in a different way, so that the difference of bodies may correspond proportionally to the difference of souls.
Reply Obj. 3: What is understood in matter before form remains in matter after its corruption, for when what is posterior is removed, what is prior can still remain. However, as the Commentator says on the Physics 1 (Averroes, Commentary on Physics, Bk. 1, text 63.) and in his book, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 1.) in the matter of things that are generated and corrupted, before substantial form it is necessary to understand unbounded dimensions, according to which the division of matter is found, so that it can receive different forms in different parts. Therefore, also after the separation of the substantial form from matter those dimensions still remain the same. And this is how matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it may receive, has a greater identity with what was generated from it than any other part of matter existing under any form. And so the same matter will be brought back to restore the human body that was formerly its matter.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but a proper accident of it, and the disposition by which matter is made proper to such a form, so also the form of a mixture which is the form resulting from simple qualities coming to a medium, is not the substantial form of a mixed body, but a proper accident, and the disposition by which matter is made necessary to the form. Now the human body does not have any other substantial form outside this form of mixture but the rational soul. For if it had another substantial form prior to that, it would give it substantial being, and thus it would be constituted by it in the genus of substance. Therefore, the soul would come to the body already constituted in the genus of substance. And in this way the relation of soul to body would be like the relation of artificial forms to their own matters as to being constituted in the genus of substance by their own matter. Therefore, the union of soul to body would be accidental, which is the error of ancient philosophers disproved in the books of On the Soul. It would also follow that the human body and individual parts of it would retain their prior names, not equivocally, which is against the Philosopher in On the Soul 2. (This may be a reference to Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412b20–22, but there is a better text in Parts of Animals, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 640b30–641b21.) Therefore, since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body passes completely into non-being. But the changing of accidental forms does not make diversity in number. Therefore, the same one in number will rise, since the matter will be taken up again the same in number, as was said in the previous answer.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the necessity of holding that there is a resurrection comes from the fact that a man should obtain the last end for the sake of which the man was made, which cannot happen in this life, nor in the life of a separated soul, as was said above. Otherwise a man would be created to no purpose, if he could not attain to the end he was made for. And because it is necessary that the same thing in number attain to the end for which it was made, lest it seem to have been made in vain, it is necessary that the same man in number rise. And this does indeed happen since the same soul is joined to the same body in number, as is clear from what has been said. For otherwise it would not be a resurrection, properly speaking, unless the same man were restored. Therefore, to hold that it is not the same one in number who rises is a heresy, detracting from the truth of Scripture, which foretells a resurrection.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking about the repetition that happens by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the full circle that exists in generation and corruption and the circle that exists in the motion of the heavens; for the heavens return the same in number to the beginning of their movement through local motion, for they have an incorruptible moved substance. But things that are generated and corrupted by generation return the same in species, but not the same in number. For a seed is generated by a man, out of which blood is generated, and so on, until a man is arrived at, not the same in number, but in species; and air is generated by fire, out of which water is generated, and out of water, earth, and out of earth, fire, not the same in number, but in species. Hence it is clear that the argument raised, according to the Philospher’s intention, is not to the point.
Or it could be said that the forms of other things that are generated and corrupted do not subsist in themselves, so that after the corruption of the composite, they are able to endure, as is the case with the rational soul, which retains the being that it acquired while in the body, even after the body, and the body is brought back into participation in this being through resurrection, since the being of the body is not one thing and the being of the soul in the body another. Otherwise, the union of soul and body would be accidental, and thus no interruption occurs in the substantial being of a man, so that he would be unable to return the same in number because of the interruption of his being, as happens in other corrupted things, whose being is completely interrupted, with no form remaining, but the matter remaining under some other being. But nevertheless a man is also not repeated the same in number by natural generation, for the body of a man generated is not made from all the matter of the one generating. Therefore the body is diverse in number, and consequently, so is the soul, and the whole man.
Reply Obj. 2: Concerning the humanity and every form of the whole, there are two opinions.
For some people say that the form of the whole and the form of the part are the same thing according to reality: the form of the part according as it perfects matter, but the form of the whole according as by it the whole notion of the species results. And on this opinion, humanity according to reality is nothing other than the rational soul; and thus, when the rational soul is taken up again the same in number, the humanity will be the same in number, and also remain after death, although not under the account of humanity, for the composite does not attain the account of the species from the soul.
The other opinion is Avicenna’s, which seems truer, for the form of the whole is not the form of a part alone, nor is any other form aside from the form of the part, but it is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, including both in itself. And this form of the whole is called the essence or ‘whatness.’ Therefore, since in the resurrection the body will be the same one in number, and the rational soul will be the same in number, it will of necessity be the same humanity. Now, the first argument proving that the humanity will be different proceeded as if the humanity were some other form on top of form and matter, which is false. But the second argument also cannot disprove the identity of the humanity, for a joining together signifies action or passion, which, although it is different, cannot prevent the humanity from being the same, for the action and passion from which the humanity existed are not of the essence of humanity. Therefore, their diversity does not bring about a diversity of humanity. For it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the same movement in number, nor, however, is the sameness of the person rising prevented on this account. Similarly, the sameness of the humanity is not impeded, if the union were taken for the relation itself; for that relation is not of the essence of humanity, but concomitant with it, by the fact that humanity is not from those forms that are composition and order, as it says in the Physics 2, (See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 1 (esp. 193a32–38) and ch. 3 (esp. 194b26–29 and 195a20–22).) like the forms of artificial things; which is why the form of a house is not the same in number when it exists in a composite different in number.
Reply Obj. 3: That argument concludes best against those who held that the sensible soul and the rational soul were divided in man, for according to this the sensitive soul in man was not incorruptible, as it is also not in other animals. Therefore, in the resurrection there will not be the same sensible soul, and consequently neither the same animal, nor the same man. But if we held that the same soul according to substance were rational and sensible in a man, we would suffer no difficulties in this, for an animal is defined by sense, which is the sensitive soul, as its essential form. But by sense, which is the sensitive power, its definition is known, as by the accidental form that contributes the most to knowing what something is, as it says in On the Soul 1. (This seems to be a reference to Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 402b17–25.) Therefore, after death the soul remains sensible as a rational soul according to substance, but the sensitive powers, according to some people, do not remain; and since these powers are accidental properties, their variety cannot take away the sameness of the whole animal, nor even of the parts of the animal; for they are not called the perfections of a power or the acts of organs unless they are principles of acting, like heat in fire.
Reply Obj. 4: A statue can be considered in two ways, either according as it is a kind of substance, or according as it is something artificial. And because it is included in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, if it is considered as a kind of substance, a statue that is put together from the same matter is the same in number. But it is included in the genus of artificial things according as it is a form which is a kind of accident, and when the statue is destroyed, this form passes away. And in this way it does not return the same in number, nor can the statue be the same in number. But the form of a man, namely, his soul, remains after the dissolution of the body; and therefore the argument is not the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in this question it is a different thing to consider what can be done without damage to sameness, and what is done so that fittingness is preserved.
Therefore, as to the first it should be known that in a man the diverse parts of the whole can be taken in two ways. In one way, as the different parts of something homogeneous, like different parts of flesh, or different parts of bone; in another way, different parts of different species of a heterogeneous whole. Therefore, if it were said that parts of matter will return to another part of the same species, this only causes variety in the position of the parts, but a changed position of the parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes. And so if the matter of one part returned to a different part, no damage would be done to the identity of the whole. And this is also how it is in the example given in the text: for a statue does not return the same in number according to form, but according to matter, according to which is a kind of substance. Now this is how a statue is homogeneous, although not according to artificial form. But if it were said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, then of necessity not only would the position of parts be changed, but also their identity. However this is how it would be if the whole matter, or something that was of the truth of human nature in one part were transferred to another, but not if anything that was superfluous in one part were transferred to another part. But if the identity of the parts were taken away, the identity of the whole is taken away, if we are speaking of essential parts; but not if we are speaking of accidental parts, like hair and nails, which is what Augustine seems to be speaking of. And so it is clear what kind of transfer of matter from one part to another takes away the sameness from the whole, and what kind does not.
But speaking according to fittingness, it is more probable that even the same positioning of parts will be preserved in the resurrection, especially as to the essential parts and organs, although perhaps not as to accidental parts, like nails and hair.
Reply Obj. 1: That objection is based on organs, and not similar parts.
Reply Obj. 2: Different positioning of parts of matter does not make for a diversity in number, although diversity of matter causes it.
Reply Obj. 3: An activity does not belong to the part, properly speaking, but to the whole. Therefore, a reward is not owed to the part but to the whole.
Article 2
About the integrity of their bodies
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: De potentia, q. 5, a. 10, ad 9; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 2; Comp. theo. 157.) It seems that not all members of the human body will rise. For once the end is removed, what exists for the sake of that end is restored in vain. Now the end of any member is its act. Since, therefore, nothing is in vain in divine works, and certain members will have no use after the resurrection, particularly the genitals, for then they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, (See Matt 22:30.) it seems that not all the members will rise.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, intestines are members. But they will not rise: for they cannot rise full, for then they would contain uncleanliness; nor empty, for nothing is empty in nature. (Perhaps a reference to the arguments in Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, chs. 7–9.) Therefore, not all members will rise.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the body will rise so that it may be rewarded for the works the soul performed through it. But a member that a thief has had cut off because of his stealing, though afterward he does penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded in the resurrection, whether for good, since it did not cooperate in this, nor for wickedness, for the punishment of a member would redound to the punishment of a man. Therefore, not all members will rise with a man.
On the contrary (1), the other members pertain more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. But hair and nails will be restored to a man at the resurrection, as it says in the text. Therefore, much more will the other members.
Furthermore (2), God’s works are perfect (Deut 32:4). But the resurrection will happen by divine work. Therefore, a man will be restored as perfect in all his members.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the hair and nails on a man will not rise again. (Parallels: ST III, q. 54, a. 3; Super Matt. 10.) For just as hair and nails are generated by an excess of food, so is urine, sweat, and other waste products like this. But these will not rise again with the body. Therefore, neither will hair and nails.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, among other excesses that are generated from food, the closest to the truth of human nature is semen, which is the excess of what is needed. But semen will not rise again in the human body. Therefore, much less will hair and nails rise.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing is perfected by the rational soul that is not perfected by the sensible soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by the sensible soul, for we do not sense with them, as it says in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 5, 410a29–410b2.) Therefore, since the human body rises again only owing to this, that it is perfected by the rational soul, it seems that hair and nails will not rise again.
On the contrary (1), it says in Luke 21:18: not a hair of your head will perish.
Furthermore (2), hair and nails are given to man as an ornament. But the bodies of men, especially the elect, should rise with every ornament. Therefore, they should rise with hair.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the fluids in the body will not rise. For it says, flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor 15:50). But blood is the most important fluid. Therefore, they will not rise in the blessed who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, fluids are for restoring what has been lost. But after the resurrection no loss will happen. Therefore, the body will not rise with its fluids.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is in the way of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. But there will still be fluids in the way of generation, for they are flesh and bone in potency. Therefore, they are not yet perfected in the rational soul. But the human body has no ordering to the resurrection except according as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore, the fluids in the body will not rise.
On the contrary (1), what belongs to the constitution of the human body will rise again in it. But this is true of its fluids, which is evident from Augustine, (In fact, Alcher of Clairvaux, On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15, PL 40:791.) who says that the body is constituted from functional members, functional members from homogenous parts, and homogenous parts from fluids. Therefore, the fluids in the body will rise with it.
Furthermore (2), our resurrection will be like the resurrection of Christ. (See Rom 6:5, Phil 3:10–11, 1 Cor 15:48.) But in Christ, his blood rose again, otherwise now the wine would not be transubstantiated into his blood in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore, the blood will also rise again in us, and by the same argument, the other fluids too.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not all that belonged to the truth of human nature in the body will rise in it. (Parallels: ST I, q. 119, a. 1; In II Sent. d. 30, q. 2, a. 1; Super Matt. 10; Quodl. VIII, q. 3, a. un.; Quodl. V, q. 3, a. 1.) For food is converted into the truth of human nature. But sometimes the flesh of a cow is taken as food. Therefore, if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise, the flesh of a cow will also rise again; which seems unfitting.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the rib of Adam belonged to the truth of human nature in him, just as our ribs do in us. But the rib of Adam will not rise again in him, but in Eve, otherwise Eve, who was formed from that rib, would not rise again. Therefore, not everything that belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise in him.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the same thing cannot exist in different people who rise. But it can be that something was of the truth of human nature in different people, as, for example, if someone ate human flesh which passed over into his own substance. Therefore, not everything that belonged to the truth of human nature in a person will rise in him.
If it be said that not all the flesh that is eaten belongs to the truth of human nature, and so some of it can rise in the first person, and some in the second, then against this: what is drawn from parents seems most of all to be of the truth of human nature. But if someone who only ate human flesh should generate a son, it is necessary that what the son draws from his parent would be the flesh of other men that his father had eaten, for semen is from an excess of food, as the Philosopher proves in his book On the Generation of Animals. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 1, ch. 18, esp. 725a12 et seq.) Therefore, what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child also belonged to the truth of human nature in other men, whose flesh the father ate.
If it be said that what belonged to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the people who had been eaten did not pass into the semen, but that what belonged to the truth of human nature did not exist there, then against that: let it be held that someone is fed only with embryos, in whom there seems to be nothing that does not pertain to the truth of nature: for all that is in them is drawn from their parents. Therefore, if an excess of food is converted into semen, it is necessary that what belonged to the truth of human nature in those embryos, who also pertain to the resurrection, after they have received a rational soul, belongs to the truth of human nature also in the child who is generated out of such seed. And thus, since the same thing cannot rise again in two people, not everything that belonged to the truth of human nature in anyone would be able to rise in him.
On the contrary (4), whatever in a man belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. But a human body has an ordering to the resurrection because it was perfected by the rational soul. Therefore, whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in everyone.
Furthermore (5), if something were subtracted from a person’s body that belonged to the truth of human nature, he would not have a perfect human body. But every imperfection will be taken away in the resurrection, especially from the elect, to whom it is promised that no hair of their heads will perish (Luke 21:18). Therefore, whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise in a man.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that whatever was materially in a man’s members will rise again entire. (Parallels: Super Matt. 10.) For hair seems to pertain to the resurrection less than other members. But whatever existed in the hair will all rise, and if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says in the text. Therefore, much more will whatever was materially in the other members rise as a whole.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as parts of flesh according to species are perfected by the rational soul, so are parts according to matter. But the human body has an order to the resurrection from the fact that it was perfected by a rational soul. Therefore, not only the parts according to species, but all the parts according to matter will rise.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a body gets its totality from what allows its division into parts. But division into parts happens to a body on the side of the matter, whose disposition is the quantity according to which it is divided. Therefore, the totality of the body is also found according to material parts. Therefore, if not all the parts of the matter rose again, the whole body would not rise again, which is unfitting.
On the contrary (1), parts according to matter do not remain in the body, but come and go, as is evident from what is said in On Generation and Corruption 1. (See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 5, 321b11–28.) Therefore, if all the parts rose according to matter, either the risen body would be extremely dense, or it would have an immoderate quantity.
Furthermore (2), whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can be a part of the matter in another man who eats of the flesh of the first. Therefore, if all the parts according to matter rose in a person, it follows that what would rise in one person would belong to the truth of human nature in another, which is unfitting.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, as it says in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415b9–27.) the soul is related to the body not only in the relation of form and end, but also in the relation of efficient cause. For the relationship of soul to body is like the relationship of an art to the artifact it produces, as the Philosopher says. (The Vives edition refers to Eudemian Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 5, but nothing of the sort is to be found there. Aristotle of course frequently compares the soul:body relationship to the artisan:tool relationship.) Now, whatever is explicitly shown in an artifact, is implicitly and originally contained as a whole in the art itself. And likewise also whatever appears in the parts of the body is contained originally and in some implicit way as a whole in the soul. Therefore, just as the work of an art would not be complete if the artifact were lacking anything that the art contained, so neither could a man be perfect unless all that is implicitly contained in his soul were made explicit in his body, nor would the body proportionally correspond to the soul to its full capacity. Therefore, since in the resurrection a person’s body should correspond to his soul completely, for it only rises according to the order that it has to a rational soul, and a person should also rise perfect inasmuch as he is restored in order to obtain his final perfection, therefore, all the members that now exist in the body must be restored in a man’s resurrection.
Reply Obj. 1: Members can be considered in two ways in relation to the soul, either according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent. For the relationship of the whole body to the whole soul is the same as the relationship of the parts of one to the parts of the other, as it says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412b10–24.) Therefore, if a member is taken according to the first relation, its end is not activity but rather the perfect being of the species, which would also be required after the resurrection. But if a member were taken according to the second relation, then its end is activity; nevertheless, it still does not follow that when the activity is lacking the instrument exists in vain, for an instrument does not only serve to carry out an agent’s activity, but also to show his strength. Therefore, it will be necessary that the strength of the soul’s powers be evidenced by the instruments of the body, even if they never result in an act, so that God’s wisdom may be displayed by this.
Reply Obj. 2: The intestines will rise in the body, just like the other members; and they will be full, not of disgusting waste products, but of noble fluids.
Reply Obj. 3: The acts by which we merit are not, properly speaking, acts of a hand or a foot, but of the whole person, just as the activities of an art are not attributed to an instrument, but to the artist, as the Philosopher says. (Vives suggests Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 9.) Therefore, although the member that was mutilated before repentance did not cooperate with the man in that state in which he merited glory afterward, nevertheless, the man himself merits to be rewarded as a whole, for he serves God out of all that he has.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that a soul is related to an animated body as an art is related to the artifact produced by it, and to its parts as an art to its own instruments, and this is why an animate body is said to be organic. Now an art uses certain instruments for accomplishing the work intended, and these instruments come from the first intention of the art. It also uses other instruments for preserving the chief instruments, and these come from the second intention of the art, as the military art uses a sword for warfare, and a sheath for preserving the sword. In the same way, among the parts of an animate body, some are ordered to accomplishing the activities of the soul, like the heart, liver, hands, and feet; while others are for the preservation of other parts; just as leaves are for covering fruits, so also hair and nails in a human are for the protection of other parts. So they are of the second perfection of the human body, although not of the first. Therefore, because a man will rise in every perfection of his own nature, it is necessary that hair and nails rise in him.
Reply Obj. 1: Those excesses are expelled by nature as useful for nothing, which is why they do not pertain to the perfection of the human body. But it is different with other excesses, which nature retains to itself for the generation of hair and nails, which it needs for the preservation of the other members.
Reply Obj. 2: Semen is not needed for the perfection of the individual, like hair, but only for the perfection of the species.
Reply Obj. 3: Hair and nails are nourished and increase, and so it is clear that they do participate in some activity, which would not be the case if they were not parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in a human being there is only one soul, namely, the rational soul, it is evident that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not to the point that they partake in the activity of the senses, as neither do bones. And from this it is evident that they will rise, and they belong to the integrity of the individual.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that whatever pertains to the integrity of human nature in the risen will all rise in them for the reason given. Therefore, it is necessary that the bodily fluids in a man that pertain to his integrity will rise again. Now there are three kinds of fluid in a human being.
For one kind of fluid exists in moving away from the perfection of this individual, either because it is on the way to corruption, and it is discarded by nature, like urine, sweat, pus, and the like; or because it is ordered by nature to the conservation of the species in another individual, whether by the act of generation, like semen, or by the act of nourishment, like milk. And no fluid like these will rise again, due to the fact that they do not belong to the perfection of the individual who rises.
The second kind of fluid is what has not yet reached the last perfection that nature works in the individual, but is ordered to it by nature; and there are two such fluids. For there is one that has a certain determinate form, according as it is contained among the parts of the body, like blood, and the other three humours, which nature has ordered to the members that are generated by them, but nevertheless they have certain determinate forms, just as the other parts of the body do; and therefore they shall rise with the other parts. But some fluids are in the process of passing from one form to another, namely, from the form of the fluid into the form of the member. And fluids like this will not rise again, for after the resurrection individual parts of the body will be established in their forms, and one will not pass over into another. And therefore those fluids will not rise that are in the very act of passing from one form into another. But those fluids can be taken in two different states, either according as they exist in the principle of change; and thus it is called dew, namely, that fluid that is in the apertures of small blood-vessels; or according as it is in the process of change, and already begins to be whitened, and then it is called cambium. But in neither state shall it rise.
The third category of fluids is what has already attained to the last perfection that nature intends in the body of an individual, which is already whitened and incorporated with members. And this is called adhesive, and since it belongs to the substance of the members, it will rise again, just as the other members rise.
Reply Obj. 1: Flesh and blood in those words of the Apostle are not taken for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the works of flesh and blood, which are the works of sin, or the works of animal life. Or, according to what Augustine says, (See Augustine, Retractations (CCSL 57), Bk. 1, ch. 17 and ch. 22; Bk. 2, ch. 3.) flesh and blood are taken there for the corruption that now dominates flesh and blood, which is why the Apostle adds the words, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable (1 Cor 15:50).
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the members that serve generation will exist after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, but not for the activities that are now carried out by those members, so also the fluids will be in the body not for the replenishment of what is lost, but for restoring the integrity of human nature, and for displaying natural power.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as there are elements in the way of generation with respect to mixed bodies, because these elements are their matter, but not such that they are always passing into a mixed body, in the same way the humors are also related to the members. And consequently, just as the elements in the parts of the universe have determinate forms by reason of which they are in the perfection of the universe, like mixed bodies, so too, humors are of the perfection of the human body, as are the other parts, although they do not attain to the whole perfection like the other parts, nor do the elements have such perfect forms as mixed bodies. However, just as all the parts of the universe do not acquire perfection from God equally, but each in its own way, so too the humors are perfected in some way by the rational soul, but not in the same way as more perfect parts.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that as each thing is related to being, so it is related to truth, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 993b23–30.) For that thing is true that is such that it is seen by the knower according to act. And because of this Avicenna says that the truth of each thing is the property of its being that is firmly established for it. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract 2, ch. 4.) And according to this something is said to belong to the truth of human nature because it properly pertains to the being of human nature; and this is what partakes of the form of human nature, just that is called true gold that has the true form of gold, from which the proper being of gold exists. Therefore, to manifest what belongs to the truth of human nature, one should know that there are three opinions about this.
For some people have held that nothing new ever arises pertaining to the truth of human nature, but whatever pertains to the truth of human nature existed whole in the very institution of human nature concerning its truth. And this is multiplied through itself so that from it semen can be shed by the one generating, from which a child is generated, in which also that part that is shed is multiplied, and it attains its full quantity by increasing from then on. And this is how the whole human race is multiplied. Therefore, according to this opinion, whatever is generated from food, although it seems to have the appearance of flesh or blood, nevertheless does not pertain to the truth of human nature.
But others have said that something new is added to the truth of human nature by a natural transformation of food into the human body, when the truth of human nature is considered in its species, to whose preservation the act of the generative power is ordered. Now, if the truth of human nature were considered in the individual, to whose conservation and perfection the act of the nutritive power is ordered, nothing is added by nourishment that belongs to the truth of human nature of this individual primarily, but only secondarily. For they hold that the truth of human nature first and principally consists in the root moisture, namely, what is generated from semen out of which the first constitution of a human body exists; but what is converted from food into true flesh and blood does not belong to the truth of human nature of that individual principally, but secondarily. But it can pertain principally to the truth of human nature of another individual who is generated from the semen of that man. For they hold semen to be an excess of food, either with the admixture of something that belongs primarily to the truth of human nature in the one who generates, as some people say, or without any admixture, as others say; and so what is nutritional moisture in one, becomes root moisture in another.
The third opinion is that something new begins to principally belong to the truth of human nature even in a given individual, because there is no such distinction in the human body that any designated material part should necessarily remain through the whole life, but any given designated part is indifferent to remaining, because it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, but it can flow out and as regards what belongs to matter in it. And thus nutritional moisture is not distinguished from root moisture on the part of the principle, so that what is generated from seed is called ‘root,’ while what is generated from food is called ‘nutritional,’ but rather it is distinguished by its terminus, so that it is called ‘root’ if it attains the terminus of generation by the generative act or even by the nutritive power, but it is called ‘nutritional’ when it does not yet attain to this terminus but is still in the way of nourishment. And these three opinions were fully treated and investigated in Book II, Distinction 30, Question 2, Article 1. And therefore they do not have to be repeated here, except as they pertain to the matter at hand.
Therefore, it should be known that according to these opinions, one should answer this question in different ways.
For the first opinion, through the way of multiplication that the Master holds, can include the perfection of human nature both as to the number of individuals and as to the due quantity of each individual, without it being generated from food, which indeed is only added for resisting the consumption that could be brought about by the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver so that it will not be consumed by liquefaction. Therefore, since in the resurrection human nature must be restored in its perfection, nor will natural heat then act for the consumption of natural moisture, there will be no necessity that anything rise again in a person that is generated from food. But only that will rise which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and by diminishment and multiplication it arrives at the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity.
But the second opinion, since it holds that what is generated from food is needed for the perfection of individual quantity and for the multiplication that happens through generation, must necessarily hold that something that the food is converted into will rise; not all of it, but only as much as is needed for the perfect reconstitution of human nature in all its individuals. Therefore, this opinion holds that the whole that existed in the substance of semen will rise in that man who is generated from that semen, for this belongs principally to the truth of human nature in him. But concerning what comes afterward through nourishment, as much will rise in him as is necessary for the perfection of his quantity, and not all; for this does only pertains to the truth of human nature to the extent that nature needs it for the perfection of quantity. But since this nutritive moisture flows out and in, it will be restored in this order, that what was of the substance of a man’s body will be wholly restored, and what comes second and third and so on as much as is necessary for the quantity to be reconstituted, for two reasons. First, because it was introduced over and above what came so that what had first been lost might be restored, and therefore it does not pertain so principally to the truth of human nature as does what came before it. Second, because the addition of foreign moisture to the first root moisture causes the whole mixture to participate in the truth of the species not as perfectly as the first moisture participated, as the example of the Philosopher shows in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 10, 328a24–31.) that water mixed with wine continually weakens the virtue of the wine, so that in the end it renders it watery. Therefore, just as although the second water is assumed into the species of the wine, nevertheless, it does not partake so perfectly of the species of the wine as the first that was assumed into the wine, so too the food that is converted into flesh second does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as what was converted first. And therefore it is clear that this opinion holds that all that belongs to the truth of human nature principally shall rise, but not all that belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.
But the third opinion differs from the second in one respect, and agrees with it in another. It differs indeed in holding that all that is under the form of flesh and bone pertains to the truth of human nature by the same reason, for it does not distinguish any designated material thing enduring in a man the entire length of his life, which would pertain to the truth of human nature first and essentially, from something that comes and goes, which would only pertain to the truth of human nature because of the perfection of quantity, not because of the first being of the species, as the second opinion was saying. But it holds that all parts that are not begotten in addition outside the intention of nature pertain to the truth of human nature as to what they possess of the species, for that is how they remain, but not as to what they have of matter, for in that regard they come and go indifferently; so that we think of what it happens among the parts of one man as being like what happens in the whole multitude of a city, for individuals are removed from the multitude by death, and others come to take their place. Therefore, the parts of a multitude come and go materially, but formally they remain, for others are substituted in the same offices and orders from which the first ones were taken away. This is why the republic is said to remain one in number. And likewise also when certain parts pass away and others are restored in the same shape and position, all the parts come and go according to matter, but remain according to species; nevertheless, the man still remains one in number.
But the third opinion agrees with the second, for it holds that the parts arriving second do not so perfectly attain the truth of the species as those that came first. And therefore the same thing that the second opinion believes will rise again in a man, the third opinion also believes, but not entirely for the same reason. For it considers that all that was generated from semen will rise again, not because it pertains to the truth of human nature for any other reason than what comes afterward, but because it participates more perfectly in the virtue of the species, which is the order the second opinion held in those things that came afterward from food. In this too this opinion agrees with the other, that is, the second one.
Reply Obj. 1: A natural thing is not what it is by its matter, but by its form. Therefore, although that matter that was once in the form of cow flesh will rise in a man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of a cow will rise, but the flesh of a man, for then it would also be concluded that the mud that Adam was formed from would rise as well. However, the first opinion grants this argument.
Reply Obj. 2: That rib in Adam did not belong to the perfection of the individual, but it was ordered to the multiplication of the species. Therefore, it will not rise again in Adam, but in Eve, just as semen will not rise again in the one who generates, but in the one generated.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to respond to this, for flesh that has been eaten never belongs to the truth of human nature in the one who eats, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in someone whose flesh was eaten. And thus it will rise in the original person, but not in the second one.
But according to the second and third opinions, each part will rise in that person in whom it most closely approached the perfect participation of the virtue of the species; and if it approached it equally in both, it will rise in that one in whom it was first, for in him it first had an order to the resurrection from being joined to the rational soul of that man. And therefore if there were any excess in meat that was eaten, which did not pertain to the truth of human nature in the first, it could rise in the second. Otherwise, what pertained to the resurrection in the first will rise in him, and not in the second; but in the second, in its place will be taken either something of that which was converted from other food into the flesh of the second, or, if he had never been fed on any food but human flesh, divine power would supply from elsewhere as much as was needed for the perfection of quantity, as it supplies in those who die before maturity. Nor is any damage done by this to the identity in number, as neither would it be damaged by the fact that parts come and go according to matter.
Reply Obj. 4: According to the first opinion this is easy to resolve, for it holds that semen is not from an excess of food. Therefore flesh that is consumed does not become semen, from which children are generated. But according to the other two opinions, it should be said that it is not possible that all that existed in the flesh that was eaten would be converted into semen, for after much refinement of the food it arrives at the decoction of semen, which is the excess of the last food. But what is converted into semen of flesh that has been eaten pertains more to the truth of human nature in the one who is conceived from the semen than in the one from whose flesh the semen is generated. And therefore according to the rule given before, what is converted into semen will rise again in the one who is conceived from that semen, but the leftover matter will rise again in the one from whose flesh the semen was generated.
Reply Obj. 5: Embryos do not pertain to the resurrection before their animation by a rational soul, in which state it is already much advanced beyond the substance of semen from the substance of the nourishment by which the child is nourished in the mother’s womb. And therefore if someone were fed on embryos, and a person were generated from the excess of that food, what would be in the substance of the semen will indeed rise again in the one who was generated by that semen, unless something were contained in him that had been of the substance of semen in those from whose eaten flesh the semen was generated, for this would rise in the original person, and not in the second. But what is left over of flesh that has been eaten, which is not converted into semen, clearly would not rise again in the original person, with divine power supplying to both what is lacking. But the first opinion is not restricted by this objection, since it does not hold that semen is from an excess of food; but there are many other arguments against it, as was clear in Book II, Distinction 30, Question 2, Article 2.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that what exists materially in a human does not have an order to the resurrection except according as it pertains to the truth of human nature, for according to this it has an order to the rational soul. Now all that is in a human being materially does pertain to the truth of human nature as to what it has from the species, but not all the matter considered in its totality, for all the matter that was in a human from the beginning of his life until the end would exceed the due quantity of the species, as the third opinion says, which seems to me the most probable one among them. And therefore all that is in a human being will rise, considered in the totality of the species, for it is looked at according to quantity, shape, position, and order of parts. But all will not rise again, considered in the totality of matter.
Now the second and first opinion do not make use of this distinction, but they distinguish among the parts, both of which have species or matter. However, these two opinions agree in saying that what is generated from semen will all rise again, even considered in the totality of matter. But they differ in that the first opinion claims that nothing shall rise again that is generated from food, while the second opinion claims that some of it will rise, but not all, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as whatever is in other parts of the body will rise again considered in the totality of the species, but not considered in the totality of matter, so also is it with hair. Now in other parts something comes from food that causes increase, and this is counted as another part, considered in the totality of the species, for it occupies a different place and position in the body, and it stands under different parts of the dimension. But when something comes that does not cause increase, but works to the restoration of what is lost in the process of nourishment, it is not counted as another part of the whole, considered according to species, since it does not occupy a different place or position in the body than the part that it derived from was holding, although it could be considered another part when the totality of matter is considered; and it is similar with hair. Therefore, Augustine speaks about the cutting of that hair which was a part causing increase. And thus it is necessary that they rise, but not in the amount of the hair, lest it should be an immoderate amount, but in the other parts, as divine providence will judge necessary. Or he is speaking about that case when other parts are lacking, for then their defect could be restored by the excess of hair.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the third opinion the parts are the same according to species and according to matter. For the Philosopher does not use that distinction in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 5, 321b11–25.) to distinguish different parts, but to show that the same parts can be considered both according to species as to what is of the form and species in them, and according to matter as to what underlies the form and species. However, it is evident that the matter of flesh does not have an order to the rational soul except as it is under such a form; and therefore by reason of this it has an order to the resurrection. But the first and second opinion, which hold that there are some parts according to species and other parts according to matter, say that although the soul perfects both parts, nevertheless it perfects the parts according to matter by means of the parts according to species. And therefore they do not have an order to the resurrection equally.
Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of things that are generated and corrupted, unbounded dimensions must be understood before the reception of substantial form. And so the division that is according to this kind of dimension properly belongs to matter. But complete and bounded quantity comes to matter after the substantial form. Therefore, the division that is made according to bounded dimensions has to do with species, especially when the resurrection of the species pertains to the determinate placing of the parts, as in the human body.
Article 3
About the quality of their bodies
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 46, a. 9, ad 4; Super Eph. 4, lec. 4; SCG IV, ch. 88.) It seems that not everyone will rise as being of the same age, namely, as a youth. For God will not take away from the risen, particularly the blessed, anything that pertains to the perfection of a human being. But age pertains to the perfection of a human being, since old age is a venerable time of life. Therefore, the elderly will not rise as youthful.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, age is calculated according to the measure of time that has passed. But it is impossible for time that has passed not to have passed. Therefore, it is impossible for those who were of a greater age to be returned to youth.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what belonged more to the truth of human nature in each person will most certainly rise in him. But the earlier something was in a person, the more it seems to have pertained to the truth of human nature, for in the end the human body is compared to watered-down wine because of the weakened strength of the species, as is clear from the Philosopher in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 10, 328a27–29. Aristotle discusses the watered-down wine but does not apply it to the human body as Aquinas does here.) Therefore, if all must rise again at the same age, it is more fitting if they rise as children rather than youthful adults.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Ephesians 4:13: until we all attain . . . to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. But Christ rose at a youthful age, which begins around thirty years, as Augustine says. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 15.) Therefore, also others will rise as youthful adults.
Furthermore (2), a human being will rise in the greatest perfection of nature. But human nature has its most perfect state in youth. Therefore, all people will rise in that state.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that all will rise the same in stature. (Parallel: below, expos. text.) For just as a man is measured with a dimensive quantity, he is also measured with a quantity of duration. But the quantity of duration will be reduced to the same measure for all, since all will rise as having the same age. Therefore, the quantity of dimension in all will be reduced to the same measure, so that all will rise in the same stature.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in On the Soul, Book 2, that in the nature of all constant things there is a limit and ratio of size and increase. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 416a14–18.) But that limit only comes from the virtue of the form, with which quantity must be congruous, just as the other accidents must. Therefore, since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in everyone according to nature, unless there is an error. But the errors of nature will be corrected in the resurrection. Therefore, all people will rise in the same stature.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the quantity of someone who rises would not be proportionate to the natural power which first formed the body, for otherwise those who were unable to acheive a greater quantity by the power of nature would never rise in a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore, that quantity must be proportionate to the power restoring the human body through the resurrection, and the matter from which it is restored. But the power restoring all bodies is the same in number, namely, divine power, while all ashes, from which human bodies will be restored, are related equally to receiving the action of this power. Therefore, the resurrection will end in the same quantity for all men; and so, the same as before.
On the contrary (1), natural quantity follows the nature of each individual. But in the resurrection the nature of the individual will not be changed. Therefore, neither will its natural quantity. But not all men have the same natural quantity. Therefore, not all men will rise in the same stature.
Furthermore (2), human nature will be restored through the resurrection to glory or to punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory and punishment for all the risen. Therefore, neither will there be the same quantity of nature.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that all will rise with the male sex. (Parallel: Super Matt. 22; Super Eph. 4, lec. 4; SCG IV, ch. 88.) For it says in Ephesians 4:13, that we will all arrive at mature manhood. But this will not be the case without the male gender.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the future all governance will end, as the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15 says. (The text in question is: “Then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power” (1 Cor 15:24); see the Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:547.) But a woman is subject to a man by the order of nature. Therefore, women will not rise in the female gender, but in the male gender.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is by chance and brought about outside the intention of nature will not rise, for in the resurrection all error will be taken away. But the female gender is brought about outside the intention of nature by a lack of formative virtue in the semen, which cannot bring the matter of the one conceived to masculine perfection. Therefore the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals that a woman is a deformed male. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 737a27–29.) Therefore, the feminine sex will not rise again.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in the City of God, Book 22: they seem to know better who do not doubt that both sexes will rise again. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 17.)
Furthermore (2), in the resurrection God will restore what he made in man in his first condition. But he himself made the woman out of the man’s rib, as is clear from Genesis 2:21–22. Therefore, he himself will restore the feminine sex in the resurrection.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they will rise with animal life, so that they will use the nutritive and generative acts. (Parallels: ST I, q. 97, a. 3; Super Matt. 22; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 5; SCG IV, ch. 83; Super Iob 19, lec. 2; Super I Cor. 6, lec. 2; Comp. theo. 156.) For our resurrection will be like the resurrection of Christ. But after the resurrection we read that Christ ate, as is clear from the end of John’s and Luke’s Gospels. (See John 21:15; Luke 24:43.) Therefore, after the resurrection people will also eat, and by the same reasoning they will procreate.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the distinction between the sexes is ordered to generation, and likewise the instruments that serve the nutritive power are ordered to eating. But a human will rise with all of these things, as is seen from what has been said. Therefore, he will make use of the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the whole person is beatified according to both body and soul. But beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher, consists in proper activity. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, chs. 6–7.) Therefore, it is necessary that all the soul’s powers and all the members exercise their own acts in the blessed after the resurrection; and so, the same as before.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, after the resurrection there will be in the blessed a blessed and perfect enjoyment. But such enjoyment includes all pleasures, for beatitude is the complete state of all goods brought together, and the perfect is what lacks nothing. Therefore, since there is great pleasure in the act of the generative power and of the nutritive power, it seems that such acts pertaining to animal life will exist in the blessed, and much more in others who will have less spiritual bodies.
On the contrary (1), it says in Matthew 22:30: in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage.
Furthermore (2), generation is ordered to supplying the defect that comes through death, and for the multiplication of the human race; and eating is ordered to the restoration of what is lost and to increase in quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will already have the whole multitude of individuals fixed beforehand by God, for generation will be carried out up to this point, as is evident from the last distinction, Question 1, Article 3. Likewise, too, everyone will rise in the proper quantity, nor will death exist any more, or any loss from the parts of a person occur. Therefore, the acts of the nutritive and generative powers would be in vain.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, a human being will rise without any defect of human nature, for just as God instituted human nature without defect, so he shall restore it without defect. But human nature can be defective in two ways. In one way, when it has not yet obtained its final perfection; in another way when it has departed from its final perfection. And it is defective in the first way in children, and in the second way in the elderly. And so through the resurrection, human nature in both is reduced to the state of final perfection, which is at a youthful age, at which the movement of increase is concluded, and from which the motion of diminution begins.
Reply Obj. 1: Old age has reverence not because of the condition of the body, which is failing, but because of the wisdom of the soul, which is presumed to be there from the passage of time. This is why in the elect reverence for old age will remain because of the fullness of divine wisdom that will be in them, but the defects of old age will not remain.
Reply Obj. 2: We are not speaking of age as to the number of years, but as to the state that will be left by those years in the human body. This is why Adam is said to have been formed in the state of young adulthood because of the condition of his body which it had on the first day of his formation; and so the argument is not to the point.
Reply Obj. 3: The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man in a certain way, as to the efficacy of making the conversion from food, just as it is more perfect in semen than in a complete human being. But it is more perfect in young people as to the end point of growth. This is why what most pertained to the truth of nature will be led back to that perfection that someone has in his young adulthood, not what he has in his childhood, in which the humors have still not attained their final arrangement.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that in the resurrection human nature will be restored not only the same in species, but also the same in number. (That is, the body that is raised and reunited with the soul in the life to come is somehow exactly the same body (“same in number”) as that person’s body in this life, not merely the same kind of body, namely a human one (“same in species”).) And so in the resurrection we look not only for what belongs to the nature of the species, but also what belongs to the nature of the individual. Now the nature of the species has a certain quantity that admits of neither excess nor defect without error. Nevertheless this quantity has certain degrees of latitude, and is not to be taken according to one specific measure. Now each individual in the human species achieves within the boundaries of that latitude a certain degree of quantity that belongs to the nature of the individual; and it is brought to this at full growth, if there was not error in the work of nature by which something was added or subtracted from the aforementioned quantity; and its measure is taken according to the proportion of extending heat and extensible fluid, which is not of the same strength in everyone. And therefore not everyone will rise in the same quantity, but everyone will rise in the quantity he would have had at full growth, if nature had not erred or failed; but what is excessive or deficient in a person will be trimmed or supplied by divine power.
Reply Obj. 1: It is now evident from what has been said that all are not said to rise at the same age as though the same quantity of dimension belonged to all of them, but because the same state of perfection will be in everyone, which state indeed can be preserved with both a large and a small dimensive quantity.
Reply Obj. 2: The size of an individual like this does not only correspond to the form of the species, but also to the nature of the individual, as is clear from what has been said. And therefore the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 3: The size of the risen person is not proportionate to the power restoring him, for that is not from the nature of the body, nor in all people according to their condition before before the resurrection; but it is proportionate to the nature that the individual first had. Yet if the formative power could not bring someone to the proper size that befits the species because of some defect, divine power will supply the defect in the resurrection, as is seen in the case of dwarfs. And the same reasoning applies to those who are of immoderate magnitude beyond what is due to nature.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that just as when the nature of the individual is considered, different sizes are proper to different people, so when the nature of the individual is considered, different sexes are proper to different people. And this diversity also befits the perfection of the species, whose different degrees are filled by the diversity of sex or size. And therefore just as people will rise again in diverse statures, so too, in diverse sexes. And although there is a difference between the sexes, nevertheless there will be no embarrassment in the mutual sight, for there will be no sexual desire inciting people to base acts, which is the cause of this embarrassment.
Reply Obj. 1: Everyone is said to meet Christ in mature manhood, not because of the masculine sex, but because of the virtue of the soul that will be in all people, both men and women. (This response hinges on the conceptual connection between vir and virtus, which is untranslatable into English.)
Reply Obj. 2: A woman is subject to a man because of the weakness of her nature as to vigor of mind and strength of body. But after the resurrection there will be no difference in these things according to diversity of gender, but rather according to diversity of merit. And so the argument does not proceed.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the generation of a woman is outside the intention of a particular nature, it is nevertheless from the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor, as is clear from what has been said, will there be any defect owing to gender there.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his first perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that have to do with nature, for a human being can attain these in the state of the present life through the action of natural causes. But the necessity of the resurrection is for obtaining final perfection, which consists in attaining the final end, as was said in the previous distinction. And so those natural activities that are ordered to the first perfection of human nature, whether causing it or preserving it, will not exist in the resurrection; and among these are the actions of animal life in man, and the actions of nature in the elements, and the movement of the heavens. And therefore all these things will cease in the resurrection. And since eating and drinking and sleeping and procreating pertain to animal life, since they are ordered to the first perfection of nature, they will not exist in the resurrection.
Reply Obj. 1: That eating by which Christ ate was not from necessity, as though his human nature needed food after the Resurrection. But it was from power, so that he might show that he had resumed true human nature, which he had had before in that state, when he had eaten and drunk with the disciples. However, this display will not be necessary in the general resurrection, for it will be known to all. And so it is said that Christ ate dispensatively, in the manner of speaking by which lawyers say that a dispensation is a relaxation of common law; for Christ omitted what commonly belongs to the risen, namely, not to use food, for the reason named. And because of this the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: The difference between the sexes and members will be for reunifying the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual. Therefore, it does not follow that it is in vain, although there will be no animal activities.
Reply Obj. 3: The activities mentioned do not belong to a human being insofar as he is man, as the Philosopher also said. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1177b26–28: “But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him.”) And so the beatitude of the human body does not consist in them; but the human body will be beatified by the overflow from reason, by which man is man, inasmuch as it will be subject to him.
Reply Obj. 4: Physical pleasures are medicinal, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 and 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154a27–31, and various statements in Bk. 10, chs. 4–5.) for they are applied to man to take away his tedium, or they are also sickening, inasmuch as man is delighted by them inordinately, even if they were true pleasures; just as a man having a weak sense of taste enjoys things that are not pleasant to those who are healthy. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1176a4–30.) And thus it is not necessary that such pleasures belong to the perfection of beatitude, as held by Jews and Saracens (It was commonly held in medieval times that both the Jews and the Moslems envisioned the afterlife as a feast of sensuous delights. This is the only text in Aquinas that refers to chiliarchae. Technically, a chiliarch was the Greek term for a military commander of a thousand; the term is used in John 18:12. Perhaps Aquinas had in mind chiliasm, with a 1,000-year reign of Christ on earth in an earthly paradise.) and certain heretics who are called chiliarchs, who, even according to the teaching of the Philosopher, do not seem to have healthy affections. For only spiritual pleasures, according to him, are pleasures simply speaking, and to be sought for their own sakes; and therefore they alone are required for beatitude.
Question 2
The conditions of the blessed
Next, the conditions of the blessed are considered; and here four questions arise:
first, about impassibility;
- second, about subtlety;
- third, about agility;
- fourth, about the clarity of glorified bodies.
- Article 1
About impassibility
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 97, a. 3; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; SCG IV, ch. 86; Comp. theo. 168.) It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For every mortal is passible. But a human being after the resurrection will be a mortal rational animal, for this is the definition of a man, which will never be separated from him. Therefore, the body will be passible.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is in potency to the form of another thing is subjecto being changed by it, for it is in just this way that one thing is passive to another, as it says in Book 1 of On Generation and Corruption. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 9, 326b29–327a6.) But the bodies of the saints will be in potency to another form after the resurrection. Therefore they will be passible. Proof of the middle: of things that share in matter, one is in potency to the form of the other; for matter according as it is under one form does not lose the potency to another form. But after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will share in matter with the elements, for they will be restored from the same matter out of which they now exist. Therefore, they will be in potency to another form, and thus they will be passible.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, contraries are bound to act and be acted upon by each other, as the Philosopher says in Book 1 of On Generation and Corruption. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 323b29–32.) But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will be composed out of contraries, just as they now are. Therefore they will be passible.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the human body, blood and other fluids will rise again, as was said above. But sicknesses and other sufferings in the body arise from the conflict of bodily fluids with each other. Therefore, the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will be passible.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, an actual defect is more opposed to perfection than a potential defect. But passibility only implies a potential defect. Therefore, since there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the saints, like the scars of the wounds of the martyrs, just as these existed in Christ, it seems that nothing is lost of their perfection if those bodies are held to be passible.
On the contrary (1), everything passible is corruptible, for the more suffering happens, the more it breaks down substance. (Cf. Opera Omnia Sixti V; also disputed questions on de Ente et essentia.) But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection shall be incorruptible, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15:42: what is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. Therefore, they will be impassible.
Furthermore (2), the stronger thing does not suffer from a weaker thing. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, about which it is said, it is sown in weakness; it will rise in power (1 Cor 15:43). Therefore, they will be impassible.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that impassibility will exist equally in everyone. For the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15 says that all people will be equally unable to suffer. But they will not be able to suffer from the fact that they have the gift of impassibility. Therefore, impassibility will be equally in everyone.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, negations do not admit of more and less. But impassibility is a certain negation or privation of passibility. Therefore, it cannot be more in one person than in another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, something is said to be more white which does not have any admixture of black. But none of the saints’ bodies will have any admixture of passibility. Therefore, all bodies will be equally impassible.
On the contrary (1), a reward should correspond proportionally to merit. But some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility is a kind of reward, it seems that it will be greater in some than in others.
Furthermore (2), impassibility is in the same division of things as the gift of clarity. But that gift will not be equal in all people, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 15. (The passage Aquinas has in mind: “There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory. So is it with the resurrection of the dead” (1 Cor 15:41–42).) Therefore, neither will impassibility.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 3, a. 3; SCG IV, ch. 86.) For, as the Philosopher says in Book 2 of On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 5, 418a3–6; ch. 12, 424a17–24.) to sense is a kind of being passive. But glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not actually sense.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, natural change precedes animal change, just as natural being precedes intentional being. But by reason of impassibility glorified bodies will not be changed by natural change. Therefore, neither will they be changed by animal change, which is required for sensing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever actual sensation happens by something newly received, a new judgment arises. But there will be no new judgments there, for there will be no discursive thought processes. Therefore, there will be no actual sensation.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, when the soul is intent on the act of one power, the act of another power is diminished. (Aristotle makes this point in several places, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175b2–23.) But the soul will be most intent on the act of the intellective power, by which it will contemplate God. Therefore, it will be in no way engaged in the act of the sensitive power.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Revelation 1:7: every eye will see him. Therefore, there will be actual sensing.
Furthermore (2), according to the Philosopher in Book 1 of On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 403b23–27.) the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by sensation and movement. But there will be actual movement there, for they will run like sparks through the stubble (Wis 3:7). Therefore, there will also be actual sensation there.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not all the senses will exist there actually. For touch is the first among the other senses, as it says in the book On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 12, 434b10–435a10.) But glorified bodies will not have the sense of touch actually, for the sense of touch happens actually when an animal body is altered by some external body predominating in some active or passive quality, which touch is able to discern. But after the resurrection this kind of alteration will not be able to happen. Therefore, there will not be every sense actually.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sense of taste serves the act of the nutritive power. But as it says above, in the previous question, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 5, this kind of act will not exist after the resurrection. Therefore, the sense of taste would be useless there.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, after the resurrection nothing will be corrupted, for all creation will be clothed with some power of incorruption. But the sense of smell cannot have its own act except by some corruption happening, for odor is not sensed without some evaporation of fumes, which consists in a kind of coming apart. Therefore, the sense of smell will not exist there in its act.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, hearing serves learning, as it says in the book On Sense and Sensibilia. (Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, ch. 1, 437a1–16.) But after the resurrection learning through the senses will not be necessary for the blessed, for they will be completely filled with divine wisdom by the vision of God himself. Therefore, there will be no hearing.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, sight happens according as the species of the thing seen is received into the pupil. But this will not happen after the resurrection in the blessed. Therefore, there will be no actual sight there, which, however, is the noblest of all the senses. Proof of the middle: what is shining actually is not receptive of the species of the visible, which is why a mirror set directly under the sun’s rays does not represent the species of a body facing it. But the pupil, like the whole body, will be endowed with clarity. Therefore, no species of colored body will be received in it.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to the science of optics, everything that is seen is seen within an angle of view. But this does not apply to glorified bodies. Therefore, they will not have the sense of sight actually. Proof of the middle: whenever something is seen within an angle of view, there must be a certain proportion of the angle to the distance from the thing seen, for what is seen more remotely is seen less, and under a smaller angle; which is why there could be such a small angle that nothing would be seen of the thing. Therefore, if a glorified eye will see under an angle, it must see under a limited distance; and such that it does not see anything more remotely than we see now, which seems extremely absurd. And so it seems that the sense of sight will not actually be in glorified bodies.
On the contrary (1), potency joined to act is more perfect than potency not joined. But human nature will be in the blessed in its greatest perfection. Therefore, all the senses will exist there in their own acts.
Furthermore (2), the sensitive powers are more closely related to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished because of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore, all the senses will also be rewarded in the blessed and punished in the wicked according to pleasure and sorrow or sadness, which consist in the activity of the senses.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, passion is said in two ways. In one way, generally: and in this way everything received is called a passion, whether what is received is fitting to the recipient and perfective of him, or contrary and corruptive. And from the removal of this kind of passion, glorified bodies would not be called impassible, since nothing that belongs to perfection will be taken away from them. In the other way, it is said properly speaking, as Damascene defines it in Book II: a passion is a movement beyond nature. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 12, PG 94:942.) This is why an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate one is called its activity; the reason for which is that everything that is acted upon is drawn to the limit of what acts on it, for the agent assimilates to itself what is passive. And therefore what is passive, as such, is drawn outside its own limits in which it existed. Therefore, taking passion properly like this, there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the risen saints; and thus they are said to be impassible. Now the account of this impassibility is assigned in different ways by different people.
For some people attribute it to the condition of the elements, which will be related otherwise in the body than they are related now. For they say that the elements will remain there according to substance, but the active and passive qualities will be removed from the elements. But this does not seem to be true; for active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements. Therefore, if they were restored without these, the elements in the bodies of the risen would be of lesser perfection than they are now. And furthermore, since those qualities are proper accidents of the elements, caused by their form and matter, it seems extremely absurd that when this cause remained, its effect would be taken away.
And so others say that the qualities will remain, but they will not have their proper actions, for divine power will work to the conservation of the human body. But this also does not seem able to stand, for the action of active and passive qualities is required for a mixture; and according to the predominance of one thing or another, the things mixed become differently composed. We must hold that this happens in the case of the risen body, for there will be flesh and blood there, and parts like this, to which one single composition does not apply. And furthermore, according to this, impassibility cannot be considered a gift in them, for it would not include any disposition in the impassible substance, but only the prevention of passivity from the outside, namely, from divine power, which could also work the same thing for a human body in the state of this life.
And therefore, others say that in the body itself there will be something prohibiting passion in glorified bodies, namely, the nature of the fifth body, which they believe comes into the composition of the human body to reconcile the elements into some kind of harmony, by which they can be the due matter of a rational soul; but nevertheless in the state of this life, because of the domination of elementary nature, the human body is acted upon in the likeness of the other elements. But in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will dominate, and so the human body will be rendered impassible in the likeness of heavenly bodies. But this cannot stand: for the fifth body does not come materially into the composition of a human, as was shown in Book II, Distinction 17, Question 3, Article 1. And furthermore, it is impossible to say that any natural power, such as is the power of a heavenly body, would transfer the human body to a property of glory, such as is the impassibility of the glorified body, since the Apostle attributes the alteration of the human body to Christ’s power, for as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven (1 Cor 15:48); and who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the power which enables him even to subject all things to himself (Phil 3:21). And furthermore, the heavenly nature cannot dominate in this way in the human body such that the elementary nature does not remain, to which passibility belongs from its essential principles.
And so it should rather be said that every passion happens by the victory of whatever is acting over what is acted upon; otherwise, it would not draw it to its own boundaries. Now it is impossible that anything dominate over what is acted upon except inasmuch as the domination of its own form is weakened over the matter of what is acted upon, speaking about the passion that surrounds matter, which we are now speaking about. For the matter cannot be subject to one of two contraries without removing the dominance of the other over it, or at least lessening it. But the human body, and whatever is in it, will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, just as also it will be perfectly subject to God. And therefore in the glorified body there will not be able to be any change against that disposition by which it is perfected by the soul. And this is why that body will be impassible.
Reply Obj. 1: According to Anselm, (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, Bk. 2, ch. 11 (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 2:109).) mortal is included in the definition of man by the philosophers who did not believe the whole man could ever be immortal, for they did only saw men according to the state of this mortality. Or it could be said that, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, because essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidental differences to signify essential differences, which are the causes of accidents. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 8, ch. 2, 1043a1–11.) Therefore mortal is not included in the definition of man as though this very mortality pertained to the essence of a human, but because that which is the cause of passibility and mortality according to his present state, namely, composition out of contraries, belongs to the essence of a human. But after the resurrection that composition will not be the cause of passibility, because of the victory of the soul over the body.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of potency: bound and free. And this is not only true of active potency but also passive potency. For the form binds the potency of matter by determining it to one thing, according to which it dominates over it. And since in corruptible things form does not dominate perfectly over matter, it cannot perfectly bind it such that it does not sometimes receive by some passion the contrary disposition to the form. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will entirely dominate over the body, nor will that dominion be able to be removed in any way, for it will be immutably subject to God, which it was not in the state of innocence. And so in those bodies there remains the same potency to a different form as there is now, as regards the substance of potency. But it will be bound by the victory of the soul over the body, so that it will never be able to depart through an act of passivity.
Reply Obj. 3: Elemental qualities are instruments of the soul, as is clear in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 416b10–29.) for the heat of a fire is regulated in the body of an animal in the act of nourishment through the power of the soul. But when a principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument except according to the disposition of the principal agent. And therefore in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection no action or passion will be able to arise from elemental qualities that is against the disposition of the soul, which intends to preserve the body.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine in his Letter to Consentius, (Augustine, Epistle 205, par. 1 (CSEL 57:326).) concerning this visible and tractable nature of bodies, divine power is strong enough to remove whatever qualities it wants to, while leaving certain ones in place. Therefore, just as it took away the power of burning from the fire of the Chaldeans’ furnace in one respect, for the bodies of the boys were kept unharmed, but it remained in another respect, for that fire burned the wood; (See Daniel 3. The Vulgate version of this chapter is considerably longer and stresses more the contrast between the unhurt children and the stoking of the fire with material.) so also he may remove passibility from bodily humors and allow their nature to remain. But the manner in which this is done has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: The scars of the wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, as conveying a certain defect, but rather as signs of a most steadfast strength by which they suffered for justice and the faith, so that from this, joy may increase both for them and others. Therefore, Augustine says in the City of God, Book 22: (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 19.) I do not know how we are affected by the love of the blessed martyrs, so that in that kingdom we wish to see in their bodies the scars of their wounds, which they endured for Christ’s name; and perhaps we will see them. It will not be a deformity in them, but a dignity: and a certain beauty, although in the body, not of the body, but of virtue, will shine forth. However, if certain members were amputated or taken off the martyrs, they will not be without those members in the resurrection of the dead, for it was said to them: not a hair of your head will perish (Luke 21:18).
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that impassibility can be considered in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. If it were considered in itself, since it conveys only privation or negation, it would not admit of more and less, but it would be equal in all the blessed. However, if it were considered according to its cause, then it would be greater in one person than in another. Now, its cause is the soul’s governance over the body, which governance indeed is caused by its serving God immoveably. Therefore, in someone who more perfectly enjoys [God], there is a greater cause of impassibility.
Reply Obj. 1: That Gloss speaks about impassibility in itself, not according to its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Although in themselves negations and privations are not intensified or diminished, nevertheless, they are intensified or diminished by their causes; as a place is said to be darker if it has more and greater obstacles to light.
Reply Obj. 3: Some things are not intensified by departing from a contrary, but also by approaching a limit, as light is intensified. And because of this impassibility too is greater in one person than in another, although nothing of passibility will remain in anyone.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that everyone holds that there will be some sensation in the bodies of the blessed; otherwise, the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would resemble sleep more than waking, which does not befit its perfection, by the fact that in sleep the sensate body is not in its highest act of life, which is why sleep is called half of a life in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 13, 1102b3–11.) But as to how sensation will happen, different people have different opinions.
For some say that since glorified bodies will be impassible, and because of this they will not be able to receive a foreign impression, and much less than heavenly bodies, the act of sensation will not take place through the reception of a certain species from sensible things, but rather through a sending outward. But this cannot be the case, for in the resurrection the nature of the species will remain the same in man and in all his parts. But it is the nature of the senses to be passive powers, as the Philosopher proves in On the Soul 2. (See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, chs. 5 and 12.) Therefore, if in the resurrection the saints sensed by sending outward, and not by receiving, the senses would not be passive powers in them, and so they would not be of the same species with the senses that now exist, but they would be some other powers given to them; for just as matter never becomes form, so passive powers never become active.
And so others say that the act of sensation will happen not indeed by receiving from external sensible things, but by an overflow from higher powers, so that as higher powers receive from lower ones now, so conversely, lower ones will receive from higher ones then. But that movement of receiving does not cause true sensation, for every passive power according to the account of its own species is directed to some specific active thing; for a power, as such, has an order to whatever it is said in regard to. Therefore, since the proper active thing in an external sense is a thing existing outside the soul, and its intention does not exist in the imagination and reason, if a sense organ is not moved by something outside it, but by the imagination or other higher powers, it will not truly sense. Therefore, we do not say that madmen and other mentally handicapped people, in whom because of the victory of the imaginative power a flow like this happens of the species into the sense organs, are truly sensing, but that it seems to them that they sense.
And therefore it should be said with others that sensation in glorified bodies will happen through reception from things that are outside the soul. But it should be known that sense organs are changed by things that are outside the soul in two ways. In one way, by natural alteration, namely, when the organ is disposed by the same natural quality by which the thing outside the soul that acts on it is disposed; as when the hand becomes hot and scorched by the touch of something hot, or fragrant by contact with something fragrant. In the other way, by a spiritual change, when a sensible quality is received in the instrument according to spiritual being, that is, the species or the intention of the quality, not the quality itself; as the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet it itself is not made white. Therefore, the first kind of receiving does not cause sensation, speaking per se, because sense is susceptive of species in matter apart from matter, that is, apart from the material being that they had outside the soul, as it says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 12, 424a17: “Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold.”) And this receiving alters the nature of the receiver, for a quality is received in this manner according to its own material being. Therefore, this kind of receiving will not happen in glorified bodies, but the second kind will, which causes the act of sensation per se, and does not alter the nature of the receiver.
Reply Obj. 1: It is already clear from what has been said that by this kind of passion that belongs to actual sensation (which is nothing other than the kind of receiving described), a body is not drawn beyond its own natural qualities, but it is spiritually perfected. This is why the impassibility of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.
Reply Obj. 2: Everything passive receives the action of the agent according to its own mode. Therefore, if something exists that is of a nature to be changed by something active, with a natural and spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. However, if it is of a nature to be altered only spiritually, it is not necessary that it be altered naturally, just as with air, which is not receptive of color according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual being. And thus it is altered only in this way, just as conversely inanimate bodies are only altered by sensible qualities naturally, and not spiritually. But in the bodies of the glorified there will not be able to be any natural alteration. And thus there will only be spiritual alteration.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as there will be the new receiving of a species in the sense organ, so there will be a new judgment of the common sense, but not a new judgment of the intellect about this, as happens in someone who sees something that he previously knew. Now what Augustine says, (See Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 15, ch. 16.) that there will not be discursive thought processes there, is understood about the thoughts of the intellective part. Therefore, it is not to the point.
Reply Obj. 4: When one of two things is the account of the other, the occupation of the soul with one thing does not impede or relax its occupations with the other, as when a doctor sees urine, he is not less able to consider the rules of his art about the colors of urine, but more able. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the account of all things that are done or known by them, this is why their occupation with sensing sensible things or whatever other things they contemplate or do, in no way impedes the divine contemplation, nor vice versa. Or it should be said that one power is impeded in its own act when another one acts vehemently, for one power of itself is not sufficient for such an intense activity, unless it is supported by what was to flow into the other powers or members from the principle of life. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one power will be able to operate intensely in such a way that by this no impediment will be presented to the action of another power, as was also the case in Christ.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that concerning this there are two opinions.
For some people say that in glorified bodies all the powers of the senses will exist, but there will only be two acts of sensation, namely, vision and touch; nor will this be from a lack of sense powers, but from a lack of medium and object; nor, however, will they be in vain, for they will exist for the integrity of human nature and to display the wisdom of the Creator. But this does not seem to be true, for what is the medium in those senses is also the medium in others. For in sight the medium is air, which also is the medium in hearing and smell, as is clear from On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 7, 419a12–419b1; also chs. 8 and 9.) Likewise, taste also has its medium joined to it, like touch, too, since taste is a kind of touch, as it says in the same book. (See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 10.) Scent will also be there, which is the object of the sense of smell, since the Church sings that the sweetest odor will be the bodies of the saints. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; which is why Augustine says (Cf. Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, Ps 149:6, PL 36:1955.) about Psalm 149:6: let the high praises of God be in their throats, that hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God. And the same thing is also maintained by the Gloss on that text: resounding well in cymbals. (Nicolai’s edition has here: “super illud II Esdrae: In cymbalis et psalteriis et cytharis.”)
And therefore, according to certain people, it should be said that even the sensations of smell and hearing will exist there actually; but there will be no act of the sensation of taste such that it will be changed by any food or drink consumed, as is clear from what has been said; unless perhaps it were said that there will be an act of the sensation of tough via the alteration of the tongue from a certain moisture adjoining it.
Reply Obj. 1: The qualities that the sense of touch perceives are those from which the animal body is constituted; therefore, by tangible qualities an animal body according to its present state is of a nature to be altered by natural and spiritual alteration by the object of touch. And thus touch is said to be the most material among the other senses, for it has more material alteration connected with it. However, material alteration is not related to the act of sensing that is perfected by spiritual alteration, except incidentally; and therefore in glorified bodies from which impassibility excludes natural alteration, there will be only spiritual alteration from tangible qualities, as also was the case in the body of Adam, which neither fire could burn nor the sword sunder; and yet he would have sensed these things.
Reply Obj. 2: Taste, according as it is the sense of food, will not exist in act. If it does exist nevertheless, according as it is the judgment of flavors, this will be possible perhaps according to the mode described.
Reply Obj. 3: Some people have held that odor is nothing other than a certain evaporation of fumes. But this position cannot be true, for it is evident from the fact that vultures flock to a carcass from the most distant places by sensing an odor. Nor would it be possible that any evaporation reach from a carcass to such remote places, even if the whole were dispersed into vapors, especially since sensible things act at an equal distance to every part; this is why odor alters the medium sometimes and the instrument of sensing by spiritual alteration without any evaporation reaching the organ. But that some evaporation is required is because odor is diffused by moisture in bodies. Therefore, resolution must happen for it to be perceived. But in glorified bodies there will be odor in its final perfection, restricted in no way by wetness. Therefore, it will alter by spiritual alteration, just as the odor of evaporated fumes does, and the sense of smell in the saints, since it will be impeded by no moisture, will recognize not only the excellence of the odors, as now happens in us because of excessive moisture in the head, but also the slightest differences in odors.
Reply Obj. 4: There will be vocal praise in heaven, although some people say otherwise, that the organ of hearing will only be altered by spiritual alteration in the blessed; nor will it be for the sake of learning, which acquires knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of the senses, and for pleasure. But how the voice will be able to be formed there was stated in Book II, Distinction 2, Question 2, Article 1, response to the fifth objection.
Reply Obj. 5: The intensity of light does not impede the spiritual reception of a species of color as long as it remains translucent in nature; as it is clear that no matter how much the air is illuminated, it can be the medium of sight, and the more illuminated it is, the more clearly anything can be seen through it, unless there is a defect from the weakness of the sense of sight. But the fact that the species of a body opposite does not appear in a mirror set directly under the sun’s rays is not because the reception of it is impeded, but because its reflection is impeded. For, in order for a form to appear in a mirror, a certain reflection must happen to some dark body; and therefore lead is attached to the glass in a mirror. However, the sun’s rays repel this darkness, and so no species can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of the glorified body does not take away the translucence from the pupil, for glory does not destroy nature. Therefore, the magnitude of clarity in the pupil will work rather toward sharpness of vision than toward its loss.
Reply Obj. 6: The more perfect a sense is, the less alteration it takes for it to perceive its object. But the smaller the angle of view in which sight is altered by the visible, the less of an alteration there is; and this is why more perfect vision can see something from farther away than weaker vision, for the greater the distance from which something is seen, the smaller an angle of sight it is seen within. And since the sight of the glorified body will be the most perfect, it will be able to see by the tiniest alteration; which is why it will be able to see within a much smaller angle of view than it can now, and consequently much more distantly.
Article 2
About subtlety
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, a. 3, qa. 1; d. 49, q. 4, a. 5, qa. 3; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; Comp. theo. 168.) It seems that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory exceed the properties of nature, as the clarity of glory exceeds the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Therefore, if subtlety is a property of a glorified body, it seems that the glorified future body is more subtle than everything that is subtle in nature; and so it will be more subtle than winds and air, which is a heresy condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he tells in the Morals, Book 14. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 14, par. 56. Gregory attributes this position to Eutyches.)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as hotness and coldness are certain qualities of simple bodies, namely, the elements, so is subtlety. But hotness and other qualities of the elements are not intensified more in glorified bodies than now; rather, they are reduced more to the mean. Therefore, neither will subtlety be greater in them than it is now.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, subtlety is found in bodies because of the small amount of matter, which is why we call bodies that have less matter under equal dimensions more subtle, as fire is more subtle than air, and air than water, and water than earth. But there will be as much matter in glorified bodies as there now is, nor will the dimensions be greater, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, they will not be more subtle than they are now.
On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 15:44: it is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body, that is, a body that is like spirit. But the subtlety of spirit exceeds all subtlety of a body.
Furthermore (2), the more subtle bodies are, the more noble they are. But glorified bodies are the most noble. Therefore, they will be the most subtle.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that by reason of this subtlety it belongs to the body that it can be in the same place with a non-glorified body at the same time. (Parallels: ST III, q. 54, a. 1, ad 1; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; Quodl. I, q. 10, a. 1; Super Ioan. 20, lec. 4.) For as it says in Philippians 3:21: who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the working of his power which enables him even to subject all things to himself. But the body of Christ could exist together with another body in the same place, as is clear by the fact that after his resurrection he entered in through locked doors to his disciples, as it says in John 20:19. Therefore, by reason of their subtlety, glorified bodies will also be able to be with other non-glorified bodies in the same place.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, glorified bodies will be more noble than all other bodies. But certain bodies now by reason of their nobility can exist with other bodies, namely, the sun’s rays. Therefore, much more will this apply to glorified bodies.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a heavenly body cannot be divided, at least as to the substance of the spheres; which is why it says that the skies were poured out as though from solidified bronze (Job 37:18). Therefore, if by reason of its subtlety the glorified body cannot exist together with another body in the same place, it will never be able to ascend to the fiery heaven, which is erroneous.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a body that cannot be together with another body can be impeded in its movement by the obstacle of another body, or even enclosed. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore, they can exist together in the same place with other bodies.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as a point is related to a point, so is a line to a line, and a surface to a surface, and a body to a body. But two points can exist together, as is clear when two lines touch each other, and likewise two lines in the contact of two surfaces, and two surfaces in the contact of two bodies, for contiguous things are those whose edges are together, as is clear from the Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 6, ch. 1, 231a18–28.) Therefore, it is not against the nature of the body that it be able to exist with another body in the same place. But whatever of nobility the nature of the body is susceptible to will all be supplied to the glorified body. Therefore, the glorified body by its own property of subtlety will be able to exist together with another body in the same place.
On the contrary (1), Boethius says in his book On the Trinity: (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii, ch. 1 (Loeb, ed. Stewart et al., p. 6).) in number variety makes a difference of accidents, for three men are different not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. For if indeed we separate in our minds all accidents from these, nevertheless, place is different for all; it is the one that we can in no way modify. Therefore, if it is believed that two bodies are in one place, there will be one body in number.
Furthermore (2), glorified bodies will be more suited to being in a place than angelic spirits are. But angelic spirits, as some people say, could not be distinguished in number unless they were in different places. And because of this they hold that it is necessary for them to be in a place, and that they could not have been created before the world. Therefore, much more should they say that two bodies, no matter how they exist, cannot be together in the same place.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not even by a miracle could it happen that two bodies be in the same place. (Parallels: ST III, q. 54, a. 1, ad 1; q. 57, a. 4, ad 2; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; SCG IV, ch. 87; Quodl. I, q. 10, a. 2; Super Ioan. 20, lec. 4.) For it cannot happen by a miracle that two bodies be both two and one, for this would be to make contradictory things exist together. But if it were held that two bodies existed together, it would follow that those two bodies were one. Therefore, it is not possible for this to happen by a miracle.
Proof of the middle: let there be two bodies in the same place, of which one is called A and the other B. Therefore, either the dimensions of A will be the same as the dimensions of the place, or different. If different, there will be therefore some separated dimensions, which cannot be held, for the dimensions that are within the borders of the place are not in any subject, unless they are in the body located there. But if they are the same, then by the same reasoning the dimensions of B will be the same with the dimensions of the place. But any things that are the same as a third are the same as each other. Therefore, the dimensions of A and B are the same. But the dimensions of two bodies cannot be the same dimensions, just as neither can they be the same white. Therefore A and B are one body, and they were two: therefore, they are one and two at the same time.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, something miraculous cannot be done against the common concepts of the mind, such as that a part be not less than a whole; (See Euclid, The Elements, Common Notions, n. 5.) for what is contrary to the common concepts directly includes contradiction. Nor, likewise, against the conclusions of geometry which are infallibly deduced from the common concepts, such as that a triangle not have three angles equal to two right angles. (See Euclid, The Elements, Bk. 1, prop. 32.) Likewise, nor can something be done in a line against the definition of a line, for to separate a definition from what is defined is to hold two contradictories to exist together. (For the definition of a line, see Euclid, The Elements, Bk. 1, definitions 2–4.) But for two bodies to exist in the same place is against the conclusions of geometry, and against the definition of a line. Therefore, it cannot happen by a miracle.
Proof of the middle: it is a conclusion of geometry that two circles only touch in one point. (See Euclid, The Elements, Bk. 3, prop. 13.) But if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles outlined in them would touch each other entirely. Likewise also, it is against the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line within two points; (See Euclid, The Elements, Bk. 1, definitions 2–4.) which would happen if two bodies were in the same place, because within two designated points on different surfaces of the place there would be two straight lines of the two bodies located there.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it does not seem possible for it to happen through a miracle that a body enclosed in another body not be in a place, for then it would have a common place and not its own proper place, which cannot be. But this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore, this cannot happen through a miracle.
Proof of the middle: let there be two bodies in the same place, of which one is greater than the other according to any dimension: the smaller body will be enclosed in the larger body, and the place of the larger body will be its shared place; but it will not have its own place, for there will not be any designated actual surface of the body that contains it, which is the definition of place. Therefore it will not have its own proper place.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, place corresponds proportionately to what is located there. But it can never happen by a miracle that the same body be simultaneously in different places, except by some conversion, as happens in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, in no way can it happen by a miracle that two bodies be simultaneously in the same place.
On the contrary (1), the Blessed Virgin miraculously gave birth to her son. But in that childbirth two bodies had to be in the same place at the same time, for the body of the child did not break the hymen. Therefore, it can miraculously happen that two bodies be in the same place.
Furthermore (2), this same thing can be shown by the fact that the Lord came in to his disciples through closed doors (John 20:26).
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a glorified body could exist with another glorified body in the same place. For where there is greater subtlety, there is less resistance. Therefore, if a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified one, less resists the glorified body. And so, if the glorified body could be with a non-glorified body in the same place, much more with a glorified body.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a glorified body is subtler than a non-glorified body, so one glorified body will be subtler than another. Therefore, if a glorified body could exist together with a non-glorified one, then a subtler glorified body could also exist with a less subtle glorified one.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the body of heaven is a subtle body, and at that time it will be glorified. But the body of any saint will be able to exist together with the body of the heavens, for they will be able to descend to earth and ascend at the pleasure of their own will. Therefore, two subtle or glorified bodies will also be able to exist together.
On the contrary (1), glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is, like spirits in a certain respect. But two spirits cannot exist in the same place, although spirit and body can exist in the same place, as it said in Book I, Distinction 37, Question 1, Article 1. Therefore, neither could two glorified bodies exist in the same place.
Furthermore (2), one of two bodies existing together is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated by another body belongs to ignobility, which will be entirely absent from glorified bodies. Therefore, two glorified bodies will not be able to exist together.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the subility of the glorified body removes the necessity that it exist in a place equal to it. For glorified bodies will be like Christ’s body, as is clear from Philippians 3. But Christ’s body is not restricted by this necessity such that it exists in a place equal to it, which is why it is wholly contained under the small or large dimensions of the consecrated host. Therefore, it will also be the same in glorified bodies.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher proves in the Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 6, 213b3–12.) that if two bodies are in the same place, it follows that the largest body could occupy the smallest place, since different parts of it could be in the same part of the place, for it makes no difference whether two or any other number of bodies are in the same place. But a glorified body will be together in the same place with another body, as is commonly said. Therefore, it will be able to be in the smallest possible place.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as a body is seen by reason of its color, so it is commensurate with a place by reason of its quantity. But a glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able to be seen and not seen, especially by non-glorified eyes, at the pleasure of its own will, as was clear in the case in Christ. Therefore, quantity will be so subject to the command of the spirit that it will be able to exist in a large or small place, and have large or small quantity at will.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in the Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 4, 210b32–211a4.) that everything that is in a place is in a place equal to it. But the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will be in a place equal to it.
Furthermore (2), a place and the thing located there have the same dimensions, as is proved in the Physics 4. (Ibid.) Therefore, if the place were larger than what was located there, the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, which is unfitting.
Quaestiuncula 6
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the glorified body is impalpable by reason of its subtlety. (Parallels: ST III, q. 54, a. 2, ad 2; In III Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 2; SCG IV, ch. 84; Super Ioan. 20, lec. 6.) For Gregory says in his homily in the octave of Easter: what is palpable must be corrupted. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 2, hom. 26, par. 1 (CCSL 141:219).) But the glorified body will be incorruptible. Therefore, it will be impalpable.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is palpable resists the one handling it. But what can exist at the same time with something else does not resist it. Therefore, since the glorified body can exist together with another body, it will not be palpable.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every palpable body is tangible. But every tangible body has tangible qualities that exceed the qualities of the one touching it. Therefore, since tangible qualities do not exist in excess, but are brought back to the greatest equality in glorified bodies, it seems that they are not palpable.
On the contrary (1), the Lord rose with a glorified body and nevertheless had a palpable body, as is clear from Luke 24:39: handle me, and see; for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have. Therefore, glorified bodies will also be palpable.
Furthermore (2), as Gregory says in the Morals, Book 14, this is the heresy of Eutychius the bishop of Constantinople, who said that our body in the glory of the resurrection will be impalpable. (See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 14, par. 56.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, the name ‘subtlety’ is taken for the power of penetrating, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 329b35–330a5.) that the subtle is what fills up parts and the parts of parts: for because of the nature of the wet, which is badly bounded by its proper boundaries, but well-bounded by other things, it follows whatever it touches, and flows all over its own container and by its subtlety infiltrates every tiny part of it. However, that a given body can penetrate arises from two things. First, from smallness of quantity, especially according to depth and width, but not according to length, for penetration is made into the depth, which is why length is no obstacle to penetration. Second, from scarcity of matter, which is why we call rare things subtle. And since in rare bodies form predominates more than matter, for this reason the word ‘subtlety’ is transferred to those bodies that underlie from in the best way, and are perfected by it in the fullest manner, as we say that there is subtlety in the sun and moon, and other things like this. Just as also gold or something like it can be called subtle, when it is most perfectly completed in the being and power of its species. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the word ‘subtlety’ is transferred to them not only by reason of their substance, but also by reason of their power. For just as subtle is said of what penetrates, since it reaches into the innermost of a thing, so too a kind of intellect is called subtle, because it reaches to examining the intrinsic principles and natural properties hidden in a thing. And likewise someone is said to have subtle sight because he can attain to the sight of the smallest thing, and likewise with the other senses. And according to this too different people have attributed subtlety to glorified bodies in different ways.
For some heretics, as Augustine tells, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 23, ch. 22.) attributed subtlety to it according to the mode by which spiritual substances are called subtle, saying that in the resurrection the body will be turned into spirit; and for this reason the Apostle calls the bodies of the risen ‘spiritual’ (1 Cor 15). But this cannot stand. First, because a body cannot pass over into spirit, since they do not share in matter, which Boethius shows in his book On the Two Natures. (Or, to give it its fuller title, Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium.) Second, because if this were possible, once a body had changed into a spirit, a man, who is constituted of body and soul, could not rise. Third, because if the Apostle understood it in this way, then just as he called the body ‘spiritual’, by the same reasoning he would call ‘animal’ the body that is changed into a soul, which is clearly false.
This is why some heretics have said that the body will remain in the resurrection, but it will have subtlety after the manner of rarefaction, so that human bodies will be like air or wind in the resurrection, as Gregory tells in Morals 14. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 14, par. 56.) But this also cannot stand, for as is clear from the last chapter of Luke, after his resurrection the Lord had a palpable body, which particularly must be believed to be subtle. And furthermore, the human body will rise with flesh and bones, just like the body of the Lord, as it says in Luke 24:39: a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see that I have; and it says in Job 19:26: in my flesh will I see God my savior. But the nature of flesh and bones does not allow the rarity described. And so another mode of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, so that they are called subtle because of the most complete perfection of the body.
But some people attribute this completeness to glorified bodies by reason of a fifth essence that will predominate in them then: which cannot be. First, because nothing of the fifth essence can come into the composition of the human body, as was shown in Book II, distinction 17, question 2, article 1. Second, because if it were granted that it would come into the composition of the human body, it could not be understood to dominate more than it does now over the elementary nature, unless in such a way that it would exist in human bodies more according to the quantity of heavenly nature; and then human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elementary matter were diminished in a man, which is opposed to the integrity of those who will rise; or in such a way that the nature of the element would assume properties of heavenly nature by its dominion in the body, and then a natural power would be the cause of the properties of glory, which is absurd.
And so others say that the completion discussed, from which human bodies are called subtle, will arise from the governance of the glorified soul, which is the form of the body, over it, by reason of which the glorified body is called ‘spiritual’, as something entirely subject to the spirit. Now the first subjection by which the body is subject to the soul is for partaking in specific being, as it is subject to it like matter to form; and then it is subject to it for other works of the soul, inasmuch as the soul is the mover. And so the first account of spirituality in the body is from subtlety, and then from agility and the other properties of the glorified body; and for this reason in spirituality, the Apostle touched upon the gift of subtlety, as the Master explains. It is also for this reason that Gregory says in the Morals 14 that the glorified body is called subtle by the effect of spiritual power. (Ibid.)
And by this the solutions to the objections, which proceed concerning the subtlety that exists through rarefaction, are clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that one cannot maintain that a glorified body could be with another body in the same place by reason of its subtlety, unless what now prohibits it from being together with another body in the same place were taken away from it through subtlety.
Now, some people say that it is prevented from this in its own state by reason of its corpulence, by which it is made to fill a place, which corpulence indeed is taken away from it by the gift of subtlety. But this cannot stand for two reasons.
First, because the corpulence that the gift of subtlety removes is something pertaining to a defect, like any disordering of matter not perfectly underlying its form: for everything in the body that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise on the part of the form just as on the part of matter. But that a body fills its place occurs through what belongs to the integrity of its nature, and not from any defect of nature. For since full is opposed to empty, the only thing that does not fill its place is the kind of thing that, being situated in a place, nevertheless leaves the place empty. Now a vacuum is defined in the Physics 4 (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, 213b31–33.) as a place not filled with a sensible body. But a body is called sensible from matter and form and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of its nature. It is also clear that the glorified body will be sensible also according to touch, as is seen in the body of the Lord (Luke 24); for it will lack neither matter nor form, nor natural accidents according to heat and cold and such. This is why it is clear that a glorified body, notwithstanding the gift of subtlety, will fill its place. For it would seem insane to say that the place where a glorified body was, was empty.
The second of their reasons mentioned does not work, for to impede the coexistence of the body in the same place is more than to fill the place. For if we consider the dimensions to be separated without matter, those dimensions do not fill the place; and therefore some of those who believe there is a vacuum have said that the vacuum is the place in which dimensions exist like this without any sensible body. And yet those dimensions are prevented from existing together with a body in the same place, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 5, 212b24–29.) where he holds as unfitting that a mathematical body, which is nothing other than separated dimensions, exists together with a natural sensible body. Therefore, given that the subtlety of the glorified body would remove from it what allows it to fill its place, it would still not follow that because of this it could exist with another body in the same place; for removing what is less does not remove what is more.
Therefore, it seems that what impedes our body now from existing together with another body in the same place in no way could be removed from it by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent any body situated in a place from existing together with another body in the same place, except that in it which requires a different place. For nothing is an impediment to sameness but what is a cause of diversity. Now, no quality of a body requires this distinction of place, for no being in a place is due to a body by reason of its quality. Therefore, if it is removed from a sensible body that it be hot or cold, or heavy or light, the necessity of this distinction remains in it nevertheless, as is shown by the Philosopher in the Physics 4, (See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 5.) and is also plain in itself. Likewise, the matter cannot bring in the necessity for this distinction, since being in a place does not belong to matter except by means of dimensive quantity. Likewise too, form contains no being situated except by reason of the matter having situation.
Therefore, it remains that the necessity of distinction between the places of two bodies is caused by the nature of dimensive quantity, to which being situated belongs per se; for it falls within its definition that dimensive quantity is a quantity having place. And from this it is the case that when all other things are removed that exist in a thing, the necessity of such a distinction is found in dimensive quantity alone. Now, if we take a separated line, it is necessary that when there are two lines, or two parts of one line, they are distinct in place; otherwise a line added to a line would not become greater, which is against a common concept of the mind. (One is reminded by Aquinas’s words of the common notions at the start of Euclid’s Elements.) And it is similar with surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since being situated is due to matter inasmuch as it stands under dimensions, it is this that the necessity for matter to be situated is derived from; just as it is not possible for there to be two lines or two parts of a line unless they are distinct according to situation, so it is just as impossible for there to be two matters or two parts of matter, unless there is a distinction of place. And since the distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction of individuals, this is the reason for what Boethius says in his book On the Trinity: that in no way can we shape one place with two bodies; (Boethius, Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii, ch. 1 (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart et al., p. 6).) so that a distinction of individuals requires at least this difference in accidents. Now, subtlety does not remove dimension from the glorified body, and so in no way does it remove from it the necessity for distinction from another body in place. And so the glorified body will not be able to exist together with another body by reason of its subtlety, but it will be able to exist together with another body by the operation of divine power, just as also Peter’s body did not have the ability to cure the sick from the addition of any property instilled in it, but this was done by divine power for the building up of the faith; in the same way, divine power will make the glorified body capable of existing together with another body for the perfection of glory.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s body was not able to be together with another body in the same place due to its gift of subtlety, but this was done by the power of divinity after the Resurrection, just as in the Nativity. Therefore Gregory says in his Homilies: that body of the Lord entered to his disciples through locked doors, which to human eyes by his nativity went out of the locked womb of the Virgin. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 2, hom. 26, par. 1 (CCSL 141:218).) Therefore, it is not necessary that this pertain to glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety.
Reply Obj. 2: Light is not a body, as was said in Book II, Distinction 13, Question 1, Article 3. Therefore, the objection proceeds on faulty grounds.
Reply Obj. 3: The glorified body will cross the spheres of the heavens without their division, not by power of subtlety, but by divine power, which will assist them instantly in everything.
Reply Obj. 4: From this, too, that God will be present to them instantly in everything that they desire, it follows that it cannot be enclosed or imprisoned.
Reply Obj. 5: As is said in the Physics 2, it does not belong to a point to be a place. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 5, 212b25; cf. Euclid, The Elements, def. 1.) Therefore, if it were said to be in a place, this would only be incidentally, for the body of which it is a boundary is in a place. (Cf. Euclid, The Elements, defs. 3 and 4.) But just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the boundary of the place corresponds to the boundary of the body. Now it happens that two places have one boundary, as also two lines may be bounded by one point. And therefore although two bodies cannot be in the same place, nevertheless the same boundary of two places corresponds to two boundaries of two places; and according to this the edges of bodies touching each other are said to be together.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that, as is clear from what has been said, it is necessary that two bodies be in two places, for diversity of matter requires distinction in being placed. And so we see that when two bodies come together into one, the distinct being of both of them is destroyed, and one indistinct being is acquired by both together, as is seen in mixtures. Therefore, it cannot be that two bodies remain two and nevertheless exist together, unless each one preserves the distinct being that it had before, according as each was an undivided being in itself and divided from other things. However, this distinct being depends on the essential principles of the thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as first cause; as was said above in Distinction 12, Question 1, Article 1, Quaestiuncula 3, reply to the third objection, the being of an accident depends on its subject as proximate cause, but on God as first cause. And since the first cause can preserve a thing in being when secondary causes cease, as is clear from the first proposition in the Book of Causes, (The first proposition in the Liber de causis reads: “Every primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully than does a universal second cause.” See St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. V. Guagliardo, C. Hess, and R. Taylor (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 5–11.) for this reason it can happen by divine power and by it alone that an accident exist without a subject, as is seen in the sacrament of the altar. And likewise by divine power, and by it alone, it can happen that a body remain distinct from another body, although its matter is not distinct from the matter of another body in place; and this is how it can happen miraculously that two bodies exist in the same place.
Reply Obj. 1: That argument is sophistical, for it proceeds from a false supposition, or it begs the question. For that argument would proceed if between the two opposed surfaces of a certain place there were some dimension proper to the place, to which it would be necessary that the dimension of the body coming to be located there be united, for then it would follow that the dimensions of the two bodies located there became one dimension, if each became one with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, for according to it, whenever a body acquired a new place, some alteration would have to be made in the dimensions of the place or of what was there. For two things cannot become one, unless one of them is altered. But if, as the truth has it, no other dimensions are due to the place than the dimensions of the thing there, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, for according to this nothing else is said than that the dimensions of the thing there become the same with the dimensions of the place, except that the dimensions of the thing there are contained within the boundaries of the place, and the boundaries of the place are separated according to their measure, as they would be separated by their proper dimensions, if they had them. And thus for the dimensions of two bodies to be dimensions of one place is nothing other than for two bodies to be in the same place, which is the very claim under question.
Reply Obj. 2: Supposing that two bodies were in the same place by a miracle, nothing would follow either against the common concepts of the mind, or against the definition of a line or against any conclusions of geometry. For as was said above in Distinction 12, Question 1, Article 1, Quaestiuncula 3, reply to the third objection, dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in the fact that it has a special reason for individuation and distinction, namely, from the situating of parts, beyond the reason for individuation and distinction that is common to it and all other accidents, namely, from the underlying matter. Thus one line can be understood as divided from another, either because it is in another subject (which consideration only concerns a material line), or because it is stands apart from the other in its placement, which consideration also concerns a mathematical line understood apart from matter. Therefore, if the matter is removed, there can only be distinction between lines according to being in a different place; and likewise, no distinction between points, nor between surfaces, nor between any dimensions whatsoever. And in this way geometry cannot hold that one line be added to another as distinct from it, unless it differs from it in placement.
But on the supposition that subjects are distinct without a distinction of placement by a divine miracle, as was said, lines which do not stand apart in place are understood as different because of the diversity of subject; and similarly, different points, and in the same way two lines designated in two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points, so that we do not take the designated point as being in a place but as in the located body itself, for a line is not said to be drawn except from the point that is its terminus. And likewise too two circles designated in two spherical bodies existing in the same place are two, not because of diversity of location (otherwise they could touch each other along their whole length), but they are two by the diversity of subjects; and because of this, while entirely touching each other, they still remain two, just as a designated circle in a spherical located body touches, along its whole length, another designated circle in the body constituting its place.
Reply Obj. 3: God could cause a certain body not to be in a place, and supposing he did that, it does not follow that no body would be in that place, for the greater body is the place of the smaller body by reason of that surface that is designated from contact with the boundaries of the smaller body.
Reply Obj. 4: For one body to be locally in two places at the same time cannot be done by a miracle (for the body of Christ is not on the altar locally, as was said above in Distinction 10), although it can happen miraculously that two bodies be in the same place, for to be in several places at the same time is opposed to the individual in its character as a being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it was distinct in placement. But to be with another body in the same place is opposed to it in respect of its being divided from another, as is clear from what has been said. Now the account of one is perfected in undivision, as is clear from the Metaphysics 4. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 4, ch. 2, where the topic is discussed but without a statement exactly like Aquinas’s being made.) But division from other things is one of the consequences of the notion of oneness. Therefore, for the same body to exist locally in different places at the same time includes a contradiction, just as if a man lacked reason; but for two bodies to exist in the same place does not include a contradiction, as is clear from what has been said. And therefore it is not the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the properties of a glorified body exclude its being with another glorified body in the same place, just as neither may it exist together with a non-glorified body. But it can happen by divine power that two glorified bodies exist together, or two non-glorified bodies, as also a glorified body and a non-glorified one. But nevertheless it is not fitting that a glorified body exist together with another glorified body, both because due order, which requires distinction, will be preserved in them, and because one glorified body will not be placed upon another. And thus two bodies will never exist together.
Reply Obj. 1: That argument would proceed if the power of being in the same place with another body were in a glorified body as a consequence of its subtlety; which is false.
And the second objection should be answered likewise.
Reply Obj. 3: The body of heaven and other bodies are called glorified equivocally, inasmuch as they shall partake in some glory, but not that they will share the gifts of glorified human bodies.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that the body is only related to its place by means of its proper dimensions, according to which a body in a place is circumscribed by contact with the place it is located in. Therefore, for a certain body to be in a smaller place than its own quantity can only happen by the body’s proper quantity being made less than itself in some way, which indeed can only be taken in two ways.
In one way by a change in quantity in the same matter, so that, namely, the matter that formerly exists in great quantity afterward exists in small quantity; and this is what some have posited about glorified bodies, saying that their quantity is subject to their command, such that when they wish they can possess great quantity, and when they wish, small quantity. But this cannot be, for no motion that happens according to anything intrinsic to a thing can exist without some passion affecting its substance. And therefore in incorruptible bodies, namely, heavenly bodies, there is only local motion, which is not according to anything intrinsic. Therefore, it is clear that change of quantity in the matter would be opposed to the impassibility of the glorious body and to its incorruptibility. And furthermore, it would follow that the glorified body would sometimes be rarer and sometimes denser, for since nothing of its own matter can be divided from it, sometimes the same matter would be under small dimensions, and sometimes under great ones; and thus it would become rare and dense, which cannot be.
The other way this can be understood is that the quantity of the glorified body be made less than itself by varying its placement, so that namely the parts of the glorified body would collapse into each other, and then it would return to whatever small quantity; and some people have held this, saying that by reason of its subtlety the glorified body will be able to exist together with another non-glorified body in the same place. And likewise one part can exist within another to the degree that the whole glorified body could enter by the tiniest hole in one body. And this is how they explain that Christ’s body left the virginal womb and entered by locked doors to his disciples. But this cannot be, both because the glorified body will not be able to exist together with another body by reason of its subtlety, and because even if it could, it still would not be able to exist together with a glorified body, as many say; and because it would be opposed to the right disposition of the human body, which requires a determinate placement and separation of its parts. Therefore, this cannot ever be done by a miracle. And therefore it should be said that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to it.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s body does not exist locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as was said above in Distinction 10.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher’s proof proceeds from the fact that by the same reasoning one part would collapse into another. But this kind of mutual permeation of the parts of a glorified body cannot happen, as was said; and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 3: The body is seen by the fact that it acts upon the sight. Now the fact that it acts upon the sight or does not act changes nothing in the body itself; and therefore it is not unfitting if it could be seen whenever it wishes, and not seen whenever it wishes. But to be in a place is not any action proceeding from it by reason of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color; and therefore it is not the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 6
To the sixth question, it should be said that every palpable body is tangible, but not vice versa. For every body is tangible that has qualities by which the sense of touch is of a nature to be changed. Therefore, air and fire, and all things like them, are tangible bodies. But to be palpable further adds that it resists the one touching; and so air, which in no way resists what passes through it, but is the easiest thing to divide, is indeed tangible but not palpable. Therefore, in this way it is clear that palpable is said of a body from two things: namely, from qualities of tangibility and from a resistance to what touches it, so that it cannot be passed through; for heat and cold and the like are tangible qualities, which are only found in heavy and light bodies that have contrariety to each other, and they are corruptible as a consequence. This is why heavenly bodies, which are incorruptible according to nature, are indeed sensible to sight, but not tangible, and thus neither are they palpable; and this is what Gregory says, that it is necessary for everything that is palpable to be corrupted.
Therefore, the glorified body will have qualities by its nature that naturally affect touch, but nevertheless because the body is entirely subject to the spirit, it is in its power to affect touch or not to affect it according to these qualities. Likewise too, according to the nature of the subject it happens that it resists any other body passing through, so that it could not exist with it at the same time in the same place. But it can happen miraculously at its command by divine power that it exist with another body in the same place, and then it would not resist something passing through. Therefore, according to its own nature the glorified body is palpable, but by supernatural virtue it can have that it not be palpable by a non-glorified body when it does not wish to be. And thus Gregory says that the Lord offered his flesh to be handled which he had taken through locked doors, so that after the resurrection he might show surely that his body was both of the same nature and of another glorified nature.
Reply Obj. 1: The incorruptibility of the glorified body is not from the nature of its components, according to to which nature everything that is palpable must necessarily be corrupted, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: Although in some way it could happen that a glorified body exist with another body in the same place, yet the glorified body has it in its power to resist anything that touches it whenever it wishes. And in this way it can be handled.
Reply Obj. 3: Tangible qualities in glorified bodies will not be brought back to the mean of a thing, taken as equidistant from the extremes, but to the mean of proportion according as it best befits the composition of a human in the individual parts. And therefore the touch of those bodies is the most delightful, for power is always delighted by what is fitting, and saddened by excess.
Article 3
About agility
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, q. 4, a. 5, qa. 3; ST III, q. 57, a. 3; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; Comp. theo. 168.) It seems that glorified bodies will not be agile. For what is in itself agile in movement does not need anyone to carry it. But after the resurrection glorified bodies will be borne in the clouds before Christ in the air by the angels, as the Gloss 1 says about 1 Thessalonians 4:16. Therefore, glorified bodies will not be agile.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no body that is moved with labor and pain can be called agile. But glorified bodies will be moved in this way, since their mover, namely, the soul, moves them against their nature; otherwise they would always be moved toward one place. Therefore, they will not be agile.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, among the activities of an animal, sensing is nobler than and prior to movement. But no property is attributed to glorified bodies that would perfect them for sensing. Therefore, neither should agility be attributed to them by which they would be perfected for movement.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, nature gives to different things instruments of different dispositions according to their different virtues, which is why it does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow animals as to fast ones. But God works with much greater order than nature. Therefore, since the glorified body has members of the same disposition in shape and quantity as now, it seems that it would have no other agility than it now has.
On the contrary (1), it is evident from 1 Corinthians 15:43 that it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power, that is, mobile and living. But mobility cannot mean anything but agility in movement. Therefore, the glorified body will be agile.
Furthermore (2), slowness seems extremely opposed to spirituality. But the glorified bodies will be spiritual, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15:44. Therefore, they will be agile.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they never make use of their agility so as to be moved by it. (Parallel: SCG IV, ch. 86.) For, according to the Philosopher, movement is the act of the imperfect. (See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 3, chs. 1–2, and Bk. 8, ch. 1.) But in those bodies there will be no imperfection. Therefore neither will there be movement.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every movement is for the sake of some need, for everything that moves does so for to obtain some end. But glorified bodies will not have any need, as Augustine says: whatever you want will be there; anything you do not want will not be. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 12, ch. 7.) Therefore, they will not move.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Heavens 2, (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 12, 292a22–293a11.) what participates in divine goodness without motion participates more nobly than what participates in it with motion. But glorified bodies participate in divine goodness more nobly than any other body. Therefore, since some other bodies remain entirely without motion, like heavenly bodies, it seems that human bodies would even more.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says that the soul made firm in God will also make firm its own body consequently. (It is not clear which text specifically Aquinas has in mind.) But the soul will be so firmly fixed in God that it will in no way be moved. Therefore, neither will there be any motion from the soul in the body.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the nobler the body is, the nobler a place is owed to it, which is why Christ’s body, which is the noblest, has the most eminent place among other places, as is seen in Hebrews 7:26: exalted above the heavens, on which the interlinear Gloss comments, in place and dignity. And likewise by the same reasoning every glorified body will have a place befitting it according to the measure of its own dignity. But a fitting place is one of the things pertaining to glory. Therefore, since after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary by more or less, since then they will be entirely at the ultimate end, it seems that their bodies will never withdraw from the place determined for them, and so they will not be moved.
On the contrary, there is what Isaiah 40:31 says, they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint; and likewise Wisdom 3:7 says, they will run like sparks through the stubble. Therefore, there will be some motion of the glorified bodies.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they will move in an instant. For Augustine says that wherever the spirit wishes to be, there will the body also be. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 30.) But the movement of the will according to which the spirit wills to be somewhere is in an instant. Therefore, the movement of the body will be in an instant as well.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher in the Physics 4 (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 8, 215a24–216a10.) proves that if a movement happened through a vacuum, something would have to be moved in an instant, for a vacuum does not resist what moves at all, though what is full does. And in this way there would be no proportion of the speed of the movement that happens in a vacuum to the movement that happens in something full, since the proportion of movements in speed is according to the proportion of resistance that exists in the medium. However, any two motions that happen in time mus have proportional speeds, for every time is proportional to every other time. But similarly no full space can resist the glorified body, which can exist with another body in the same place, however that happens, just as neither can a vacuum resist another body. Therefore, if it is moved, it will move in an instant.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of the glorified soul exceeds the power of the non-glorified soul as if beyond proportion. But the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore, the glorified soul moves the body in an instant.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is moved equally quickly to something close and to something distant is moved in an instant. But the movement of the glorified body is like this, for it is moved through any spatial distance in an imperceptible time. This is why Augustine says (Augustine, Epistle 102, qu. 1, par. 5 (CSEL 34.2:545).) in the questions on the resurrection that the glorified body covers any distance with equal speed, like the rays of the sun. Therefore, the glorified body is moved in an instant.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that moves either moves in time or moves in an instant. But the glorified body will not move in time after the resurrection, for time will no longer exist, as it says in Revelation 10:6. Therefore, that motion will be in an instant.
On the contrary (1), in local motion space and movement and time are divided together, as is proved demonstratively in the Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 6, ch. 2, 233a14–21.) But the space that a glorified body crosses by its own movement is divisible. Therefore, the movement and the time are also divisible. But an instant is not divided. Therefore, that movement will also not be in an instant.
Furthermore (2), something cannot be simultaneously entirely in one place, and exist partly there and partly elsewhere; for it would follow that one part would be in two places at once, which cannot be. But everything that is moving is partly at its starting terminus and partly at its ending terminus, as is demonstrated in the Physics 6. (See Aristotle, Physics, Bk.6, ch. 5.) However, everything that has been moved is wholly at the ending terminus to which it is moved. Therefore, it cannot be that it is simultaneously moving and moved. But everything that is moved in an instant is simultaneously moving and moved. Therefore, the local motion of the glorified body cannot be in an instant.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, the glorified body will be entirely subject to the glorified soul, not only so that there is nothing in it that resists the will of the spirit, for that also was the case in Adam’s body, but also such that there is in it a perfection of overflow from the glorified soul into the body, by which it is rendered apt for this subjection; and this perfection is called a gift of the glorified body. But the soul is united to the body not only as form, but also as mover; and in either way the glorified body must be consummately subject to the glorified soul. Therefore, just as through the gift of subtlety it is completely subject to it as the form of the body, giving specific being to it, so too by the gift of agility it is subject to it as its motor, namely, so that it is unencumbered and nimble to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul. Nevertheless, some people attribute the cause of this agility to the fifth essence, which will dominate in glorified bodies at that time. But it has frequently been said about this that it does not seem fitting; therefore, it is better that it be attributed to the soul, from which glory emanates into the body.
Reply Obj. 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by transporting angels, and also on the clouds, not as though they needed that, but to illustrate the reverence that will be offered to glorified bodies both by angels and by all creation.
Reply Obj. 2: The more the strength of the moving soul rules over the body, the less labor there is in motion, even that motion that happens against the nature of the body. Therefore, those in whom the moving force is stronger, or who have from practice a body more accustomed to obeying the moving spirit, labor less in this motion. And since after the resurrection the soul will perfectly govern the body both because of the perfection of its proper power, and because of the nimbleness of the glorified body by the overflow of glory from the soul into it, there will not be any labor in the motion of the saints; and thus the bodies of the saints can be said to be agile.
Reply Obj. 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body is rendered adroit not only at local motion, but also at sensing and exercising all the other activities of the soul.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as nature gives the faster animals instruments of a different disposition in figure and quantity, so God will give the bodies of the saints a different disposition than they have now, not indeed in figure and quantity, but in the property of glory which is called agility.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that it is necessary to hold that glorified bodies will sometimes move, for even Christ’s very body moved in the Ascension. And likewise the bodies of the saints that will rise from the earth will ascend to the fiery heaven. But even after they climb to the skies, it seems true that sometimes they will move at the pleasure of their will, so that exercising in action what they have in power, they will show how admirable is the divine wisdom, and so that their sight will also be refreshed with the beauty of different created things in whom God’s wisdom shines forth most powerfully, for sensation can only be of present things, although glorified bodies will be able to perceive from farther away than non-glorified ones, as was said above. Nor, however, will their movement detract from any of their beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, whom they will have present to them everywhere, as Gregory says the angels do, (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Bk. 2, homily 34, par. 13 (CCSL 141:313).) because within God they will run wherever they are sent.
Reply Obj. 1: Local motion does not change any of those things that are intrinsic to a thing, but it is according to what is outside the thing, namely, place. Therefore, what moves by local motion is perfect as to what is within the thing, as it says in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 8, ch. 6, 259a20–259b31.) although it does have imperfection with respect to place, for when it is in one place, it is in potency to another place, since it cannot actually be in several places at once, for this only belongs to God. Now this defect is not opposed to the perfection of glory, just as neither is it a defect that something created is made from nothing; and so defects like this will remain in glorified bodies.
Reply Obj. 2: A person can be said to need something either simply or in a certain respect. What someone needs simply is that without which he cannot be preserved in being or in his own perfection; and movement will not exist in glorified bodies for the sake of any such need, for their own beatitude will be sufficient to them for everything. But what someone needs in a certain respect is that without which he cannot have a certain intended end, or not have it as well, or in a certain way. And this is how movement will exist in the blessed for the sake a need, for they would not be able to manifest the motive power in themselves experientially unless they are moved; for nothing prevents this kind of need from existing in glorified bodies.
Reply Obj. 3: That argument would proceed if the glorified body could not partake of a divine goodness much higher than the celestial bodies even without movement, which is false; for glorified bodies will not move for the sake of obtaining perfect participation in divine goodness, for they will have this by glory, but they will move to demonstrate the power of the soul. Through the movement of the heavenly bodies, however, the only power that could be demonstrated is what these bodies have for moving lower bodies in generation and corruption, which does not belong to that state, as is clear from what has been said; and so the argument does not proceed.
Reply Obj. 4: Local motion diminishes nothing of the firmness of the soul made firm in God, since it is not a motion according to anything intrinsic to a thing, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: The proper place assigned to each glorified body according to its own degree of dignity pertains to the reward of special distinction; nevertheless, it is not necessary that any movement out of this place diminish any of the reward, for that place does not pertain to the reward as actually containing the body in that place, since it contributes nothing to the glorified body, but rather receives splendor from it. Instead, that place pertains to the reward as something due for merits; and this is why the joy over such a place remains even in someone who is outside that place.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that concerning this there are many opinions.
For some people say that the glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through a medium, just as the will is transferred from one place to another without passing through a medium, and this is why a glorified body’s movement can be in an instant, like the will’s. But this cannot stand: for a glorified body will never attain the nobility of a spiritual nature, just as it will never stop being a body. And furthermore, when the will is said to be moved from one place to another, it is not transferred essentially from place to place, for it is contained in neither of these places essentially, but is directed to one place after it was directed by intention to another; and hence it is said to be moved toward a place.
And so others say that a glorified body possesses the property of its own nature by which it is a body, that it pass through a medium, and such that it moves in time. But by virtue of its glory, which possesses a certain infinity above the power of nature, it is able to not pass through a medium, and thus to move in an instant. But this cannot be: for it implies a contradiction in itself, which is evident in this way. Let there be a certain body that is moved from A to B, and let the body moved be Z. It is evident that as long as Z is entirely at A, it is not moving; likewise neither when it is entirely at B, for then it has been moved. Therefore, if it is moving at some time, it is necessary that it be neither entirely at A, nor entirely at B. Therefore, when it is moving, either it is nowhere, or it is partly at A and partly at B, or entirely in some other middle place, let us call it C, or it is partly at C and partly at A or at B. But it cannot be held that it is nowhere, for then there would be a certain dimensive quantity that did not have a place, which is impossible. Nor can it be held that it is partly at A and partly at B, and not in the middle in any way, for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow, with a middle lying between, the part of Z that is in B would not be continuous with the part that is in A. Therefore, it remains that the whole is either in C, or part is in it and part in another place, which is considered a middle between C and A, let us call it D, and so on with the others. Therefore, it is necessary that Z does not reach from A to B without first being in all the middle places; unless it were said that it reaches from A to B and is never moved, which implies a contradiction, for the very succession of places is local motion. The same account applies to any change that has two contrary terms, of which either one is something positive. However, it is different with those changes that have only one positive term while the other is pure privation, for between affirmation and negation or privation there is no determinate distance. This is why what is in negation can be closer to or farther from affirmation, and vice versa, by reason of something that causes one of them or disposes to it; and thus even while what is moving is entirely under negation, it is changing to affirmation, and vice versa. Therefore in them too changing precedes being changed, as is proved in the Physics 6. (That is, everything that is in motion must have been in motion before. See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 6, ch. 6, 236b32–237a4.) Nor is it the same with the movement of the angels, for being in a place is said equivocally of a body and an angel, as was said in Book I, Distinction 37, Question 3, Article 1. And so it is clear that in no way can any body reach from one place to another unless it passes through everything in between.
And therefore others grant this; but they still say that the glorified body moves in an instant. But from this it follows that a glorified body is in the same instant in two or more places, namely, in the end terminus, and in all the places in between; which cannot be. But for this they say that although it is the same instant according to reality, nevertheless it differs in reason, like the point at which different lines terminate. But this does not suffice, for an instant measures what is in an instant according to reality, not according to what is considered; therefore, a different consideration of an instant does not make an instant able to measure those things that are not together in time, just as neither could a different consideration of a point make places that are distant in placement be contained under one point.
And therefore others say more probably that the glorified body is moved in time, but imperceptibly because of its quickness, and that nevertheless one glorified body can cross the same space in less time than another, for time is infinitely divisible, no matter how small an amount is taken.
Reply Obj. 1: What is lacking little seems as if it lacks nothing, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 5, 197a30.) And this is why we say, “I will do this immediately,” for what is done after a little time; and it is through this manner that Augustine says that wherever the will is, the body will be there immediately. Or it could be said that the will will never be out of order in the blessed, and therefore they will never wish their bodies to be anywhere at an instant in which it could not be there. And this is how the body will be in that place that the will determines at whatever moment the will determines.
Reply Obj. 2: Some have contradicted that proposition which the Philosopher states in that part, as the Commentator mentions in the same place, saying that there need not be a proportion of whole motion to whole motion according to the proportion of the resistant medium to another resistant medium, but it is necessary that a proportion of slowing be found that arises in the movements from the resistance of the medium according to the proportion of the mediums through which it passes. For any movement has a determinate measure of speed and slowness from the mover’s overcoming the moved, even if nothing resists on the part of the medium, as is seen in the case of heavenly bodies, in which nothing is found that obstructs their movement, and yet they are not moved in an instant, but in a time determined according to the proportion of the moving power to the moved. And so it is clear that even if something is considered to be moved in a vacuum, it will not be necessary that it be moved in an instant, but that nothing is added to the time that is due to the movement from the aforesaid proportion of mover to moved, because the movement is not slowed.
But this argument, as the Commentator says in the same place, proceeds from a false imagination, in which a person imagines that the slowness that is caused by the resistance of a medium is some part of motion added to the natural motion, which has a quantity according to the proportion of the one moving to the moved object, as one line is added to a line, by reason of which it happens in lines that there does not remain the same proportion of the whole to the whole as there was of the lines added to each other. And so too there would not be the same proportion of whole sensible motion to whole sensible motion as there is of the slowings happening from the resisting mediums. This indeed is a false imagination, for every part of the motion has as much speed as the motion, but no part of a line has as much dimensive quantity as the whole line. For this reason the slowness or speed added to a motion applies to every part of it, which is not the case with lines, and so the slowness added to a motion does not make another part of the motion, as happened with lines, that what was added is a part of the whole line.
And therefore to understand the Philosopher’s proof, as the Commentator explains in the same place, it should be known that the whole must be taken as one, namely, the resistance of the mobile object to the moving force, and the resistance of the medium through which it is moved, and of anything else that resists, so that the amount of slowness of the whole motion is taken according to the proportion of the moving force to the moving object resisting in any way, either of itself, or from some other extrinsic factor. For a moving object must always resist the mover in some way, since the mover and the moved, the agent and the patient, as such, are contraries. Now sometimes the moving object is found to resist the mover of itself, either because it has a force inclining it to the contrary, as is seen in violent motions; or at least because it has a place contrary to the place that is intended by the mover, which is the kind of resistance even found between heavenly bodies and their movers. But sometimes the moving object resists the force of the mover only from some other factor, and not of themselves, as is seen in the natural motion of heavy things and light things; for by their very forms they incline to this kind of movement, for the form is the impression of the one generating, which is the per se mover of heavy and light things. Now on the part of the matter no resistance is found, whether from a force inclining to a contrary movement or to a contrary place, for place is only due to matter insofar as, consisting under dimensions, it is perfected by natural form. Therefore, there can only be resistance on the part of the medium, which resistance indeed is connatural to their movement. But sometimes there is resistance from both, as is seen in the movement of animals.
Therefore, when there is no resistance in the movement except on the part of the thing moved, as happens in heavenly bodies, then the time of the motion is measured according to the proportion of mover to moved object, and in these cases the argument of the Philosopher does not proceed, for even with the medium entirely removed, their motion still remains in time. But in those motions in which there is resistance on the part of the medium alone, the measure of time is taken according to the impediment that exists from the medium alone. Therefore, if the medium were entirely removed, no impediment will remain; and thus it will either be moved in an instant, or it will be moved in equal time according to empty and full space, for given that it is moved in time through a vacuum, that time will be related in a certain proportion to the time in which it is moved through a vacuum.
Now, it is possible to imagine a different body in the same proportion, more subtle than the body with which the space was filled, which, if a different space were equally filled by it, would be moved in as short a time through a full space as the first body moved through a vacuum, for the more is added to the subtlety of a medium, the more is taken away from the amount of time, and the more subtle it is, the less it resists. But in other motions in which there is resistance from the moved object itself and from the medium, the amount of time should be taken according to the proportion of the moving power to the resistance of the moving object and medium together. Therefore, given that the medium is entirely removed or does not impede, it does not follow that the motion will be in an instant, but that the time of the motion will be measured from the resistance of the moving object alone. Nor will it be unfitting, if it is moved through something empty and something full in the same time, when some very subtle body is imagined, for the greater the determinate subtlety of the medium is, the less it is bound to cause slowness in a movement. Therefore, so much subtlety can be imagined that it will be bound to cause less slowness than does the resistance of the moving object; and then the resistance of the medium will add no slowness to the movement.
Therefore, it is clear that although the medium does not resist glorified bodies according as they are able to be with another body in the same place, nevertheless their motion will not be in an instant, for the moving body itself resists the moving force by the fact that it has a determinate placement, as has been said about the heavenly bodies.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the power of the glorified soul exceeds inestimably the power of the non-glorified soul, nevertheless it does not exceed it infinitely, for both powers are finite. Therefore, it does not follow that it moves in an instant. If, however, it were of infinite power, it would not follow that it would move in an instant, unless the resistance that is on the part of the moving object were entirely overcome. Now, although the resistance with which a moving object resists the one moving it by the contrariety that it has to such a movement, by reason of its inclination to the contrary movement, could be overcome completely by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless, the resistance that it makes from the contrariety that it has toward the place that the mover intends by the motion cannot be entirely overcome, unless being in such a place or in such a position were removed from it. For just as something white resists black by reason of its whiteness, and the more its white is distant from blackness, the more it resists; in the same way a body resists a certain place by the fact that it has an opposite place, and the greater its distance, the greater its resistance. This is why as long as it remains in the nature of a body, in no way can it be moved in an instant, no matter how great the moving force. But the glorified body never loses its corporeality; and so it will never be able to be moved in an instant.
Reply Obj. 4: One must understand Augustine’s words about equal speed as meaning that the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the time of the whole movement is also imperceptible.
Reply Obj. 5: Although after the resurrection there will not be a time that is the number of the motion of the heavens, nevertheless there will exist a time arising from the number of before and after in any given movement.
Article 4
About the clarity of glorified bodies
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, q. 4, a. 5, qa. 3; ST III, q. 45, a. 2; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 6; SCG IV, ch. 86.) It seems that clarity does not belong to the glorified body. For as Avicenna says in On Natural Things 6, (See Avicenna, De Naturalibus, Bk. 6, pt. 1, ch. 2.) every luminous body is constituted from transparent parts. But the parts of the glorified body will not be transparent, since earth will predominate in some of the parts, like the flesh and bones. Therefore, glorified bodies will not shine.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every shining body hides what is behind it, which is why one lamp is eclipsed by another, and a flame of fire prevents what is behind it from being seen. But glorified bodies will not obscure what is contained within them, for commenting on Job 28:17, gold and crystal will not equal it, Gregory says: there (namely, in the heavenly homeland), the corporeality of the members will not hide anyone’s mind from the eyes of another, and even the very harmony of the body will be evident to bodily eyes**. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 48.) Therefore, those bodies will not shine.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, light and color require contrary dispositions in the subject, for light is the extremity of the transparent in an unbounded body, but color is in a bounded body, as is clear in the book Sense and Sensibilia. (Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, ch. 3, 439a29–34.) But glorified bodies will be colored, for as Augustine says in the City of God 19, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 19, n. 2.) the beauty of a body is the fittingness of the parts with a kind of attractiveness of color. But beauty will not be lacking from glorified bodies. Therefore, glorified bodies will not shine.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if there is clarity in glorified bodies, it is necessary that it be equal in all parts of the body, just as all parts will have the same impassibility, subtlety, and agility. But this is not fitting, for one part has more disposition to clarity than another, like the eyes more than the hands, and the spirit more than the bones, and bodily fluids more than flesh or nerves. Therefore, it seems that those bodies should not be shining.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Matthew 13:43: the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father; and Wisdom 3:7: the just will shine forth, and will run like sparks through the stubble.
Furthermore (2), it says in 1 Corinthians 15:43: it is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory; which pertains to clarity, as is clear from what follows, where he compares the glory of the risen bodies to the brightness of the stars. Therefore, the bodies of the saints will rise shining.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the clarity of the glorified body could not be seen by the non-glorified eye. (Parallel: In III Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 2.) For there has to be a proportion of the visible to sight. But the non-glorified eye is not proportionate to seeing the clarity of glory, since it is of a different genus than the clarity of nature. Therefore, the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by the non-glorified eye.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the brightness of the glorified body will be greater than the brightness of the sun now, for at that time even the brightness of the sun will be greater than now, as is said, and the brightness of the glorified body will be much greater than it, for the sun and the whole world will receive greater brightness because of it. But the non-glorified eye cannot look at the sun in its disk because of the magnitude of its brightness. Therefore much less will it be able to look at the clarity of the glorified body.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, something visible that is before the eyes of the one seeing must be seen, unless there is some injury to the eye. But the clarity of the glorified body before non-glorified eyes need not be seen by them, which is evident from the disciples, who saw the body of the Lord after the Resurrection without seeing its clarity. Therefore, that clarity is not visible to non-glorified eyes.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Philippians 3:21, to be like his glorious body, the interlinear Gloss says, we will be assimilated to the clarity that he had in the Transfiguration. But that clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore, the clarity of the glorified body will also be visible to non-glorified eyes.
Furthermore (2), the wicked will be tormented in the judgment by seeing the glory of the righteous, as is evident from what is said in Wisdom 5. But they would not plainly see their glory unless they could look at the clarity of their bodies. Therefore, etc.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the glorified body will necessarily be seen by non-glorified bodies. (Parallels: ST III, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2; In III Sent. d. 21, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 2; In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 3.) For glorified bodies will shine. But a shining body reveals itself and other things. Therefore, glorified bodies will necessarily be seen.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every body that obscures the other bodies standing behind it is necessarily perceived by sight by the fact that the other things that are behind it are hidden. But the glorified body will hide other bodies behind it from sight, for it will be a colored body. Therefore, it will necessarily be seen.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as there is a quantity to the things that are in the body, so too there is a quality by which it is seen. But quantity is not subject to the will, such that the glorified body could be of greater or lesser quantity. Therefore, neither is the quality by which it is visible, such that it could be not seen.
On the contrary (1), our bodies will be glorified in conformity with Christ’s body. But Christ’s body after the Resurrection was not necessarily seen, but instead, it disappeared from the eyes of the disciples in Emmaus (Luke 24:31). Therefore, the glorified body will also not necessarily be seen.
Furthermore (2), there the body will be obedient to the soul in the highest degree. Therefore, the body will be able to be seen or not to be seen according to the soul’s will.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, it is necessary to hold that the bodies of the saints will be shining after the resurrection, because of the authority of Scripture which promises this. But some people have attributed the cause of this clarity to the fifth essence, which will then predominate in the human body. But since this is absurd, as has often been said, it is better that it be said that the clarity will be caused by an overflow of glory from the soul into the body. For what is received into something is not received in the mode of what flows in, but in the mode of what receives it; and thus the clarity that is in the soul as something spiritual is received into the body as something corporeal. And thus as the soul will have greater clarity according to greater merit, so too will there be a difference in the clarity of the body, as is evident from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 15:41–42. And in this way the glory of the soul will be made known in the glorified body, just as in the case of crystal the color of a body that is contained in a crystal vessel is made known, as Gregory says when commenting on Job 28:17: gold and crystal will not equal it.
Reply Obj. 1: Avicenna is speaking about that body that has clarity from the nature of its components. However, the glorified body will not have clarity in this way, but rather from the merit of virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold and crystal; gold because of clarity, crystal because of the fact that they will be translucent, which is why it seems that they will be bright and transparent at the same time. For when something bright is not transparent, arises from the fact that the body’s brightness is caused by the density of shining parts, for density is opposed to transparency. But that clarity will be caused by another cause, as was said. Now, the density of the glorified body will not take away its transparency, just as crystal’s density does not remove the transparency from crystal. Nevertheless, some people say that they are compared to crystal not because they are transparent but because of this likeness, that just as what is enclosed in crystal appears, so too the soul’s glory, which will be enclosed in the glorified body, will not be hidden. But the first reason is better, for it preserves more the dignity of the glorified body and agrees more with the words of Gregory.
Reply Obj. 3: The glory of the body does not take away its nature, but perfects it. For this reason the color that is due to the body from the nature of its parts will remain in it, but the clarity from the soul’s glory will be superadded, just as we also see bodies that are colored in their own nature shine in the sun’s radiance, or from some other extrinsic or intrinsic cause.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as the clarity of glory overflows from the soul into the body according to its own mode, and there it has another mode than it has in the soul, so too it will overflow into every part of the body according to their own modes. This is why it is not unfitting that different parts have clarity differently, according as they are differently disposed to it by their own nature. Nor is it similar to the body’s other gifts, in regard to which the parts of the body are not found to have different dispositions.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that some people have said that the clarity of the glorified body cannot be seen by a non-glorified eye, except perhaps by a miracle. But this cannot be, unless clarity were being said equivocally, for light, according to what it is, is bound to move vision, and vision, according to what it is, is bound to receive light, just as the true is related to the intellect and the good to the affections. Therefore, if there were some vision that could not perceive any light at all, either the vision would be so named equivocally, or the light would be; which cannot be said in the case at hand, for then saying that glorified bodies will shine would mean nothing to us, just as someone who says there is a dog in the sky (Referring to Sirius, the “Dog Star.”) makes nothing known to someone who only knows the dog that is an animal. And therefore it should be said that the clarity of the glorified body can naturally be seen by a non-glorified eye.
Reply Obj. 1: The clarity of glory will be of a different kind than the clarity of nature in its cause, but not in its species. Therefore, just as the clarity of nature is proportionate to vision by reason of its species, so will be the glorified clarity.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the glorified body cannot suffer anything by the passivity of nature, but only by the passivity of the soul, so too from the property of glory it will not enact anything except by the action of the soul. Now, intense brightness does not offend the sight insofar as it acts by an action of the soul, but according to this it delights more. However, it does offend when it acts by the action of nature in heating and dissolving the organ of sight and dispersing the spirits. And thus the brightness of the glorified body, although it exceeds the brightness of the sun, nevertheless does not from its own nature offend sight, but soothes it; which is why that clarity is compared to the brightness of jasper (Rev 21:11).
Reply Obj. 3: The clarity of the glorified body arises from the merit of the will, and so it is subject to the will, so that it is seen and not seen according to its command. And it will be in the power of the glorified body to show its clarity or to hide it. And this was the opinion of Praepositinus.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the visible is seen according as it acts on vision. Now, from the fact that something acts or does not act on something extrinsic, there is no change in it, which is why without change to any property that belongs to the perfection of the glorified body, it can happen that it is seen or not seen. Therefore, it will be in the power of the glorified soul that its body be seen or not seen, just as also every other action of the body will be in the power of the soul, otherwise the glorified body would not be an instrument perfectly obedient to its principal agent.
Reply Obj. 1: That clarity will be obedient to the glorified body, so that it can display it or hide it.
Reply Obj. 2: The color of a body does not impede its transparency, except inasmuch as it changes sight, for sight cannot be changed at the same time by two colors so that it sees both perfectly. Now the color of the glorified body will be in the power of the soul, so that through it vision will change or not change. And therefore it will be in its power to hide a body that is behind it or not to hide it.
Reply Obj. 3: Quantity is inherent in the glorified body, nor can quantity be changed at the soul’s command without an intrinsic change in the glorified body, which would be opposed to its impassibility. And therefore quantity and visibility are not similar; for even that quality by which it is visible will not be able to be taken away at the soul’s command, but the action of that quality will be suspended and so the body will be hidden at the soul’s command.
Question 3
The conditions of the damned
Next, those things that pertain to the damned should be inquired about. And here three questions arise:
first, about the quality of their bodies;
- second, about the fire in which they will be tormented;
- third, about the condition of their souls after they have been separated.
- Article 1
About the quality of their bodies
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 89; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 2; Comp. theo. 176.) It seems that the bodies of the damned will rise with their own deformities. For what was imposed as a punishment for sin should not end unless the sin is forgiven. But the lack of members that happens by mutilation was imposed as a punishment for sin, and likewise all the other physical deformities. Therefore, in the resurrection they will not be taken away from the damned, who have not received the remission of sins.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the resurrection of the saints will be for their ultimate perfection, so too the resurrection of these people will be for their ultimate misery. But nothing is taken away from the risen saints that can pertain to their perfection. Therefore, neither will anything be taken away from the risen wicked that would pertain to their defect or misery. But deformities are among these. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as deformity pertains to the defect of a passible body, so does its slowness. But slowness will not be removed from the bodies of the damned who rise, for their bodies will not have agility. Therefore, by the same argument neither will deformity be removed.
On the contrary (1), on the verse the dead will be raised imperishable (1 Cor 15:53), the interlinear Gloss says: the dead, that is, sinners, or generally all the dead, shall rise incorrupt, that is, without any diminution of their members. (The Vives edition attributes this quotation also to Ambrosiaster.) Therefore, the wicked will rise without deformities.
Furthermore (2), among the damned there will not be anything that would impede the sensation of pain. But sickness impedes the sensation of pain, inasmuch as sense organs are weakened by it. Likewise, the lack of a member would prevent pain from being universal in the body. Therefore, the damned will rise without these kinds of defects.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 89; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 1; Resp. de Art. 36, a. 20; Resp. de Art. 42, a. 25; Comp. theo. 177.) For everything composed from contraries must necessarily be corrupted. But the bodies of the damned will be composed out of contraries, even as they are now; otherwise they would not be of the same species, and as a result, the same in number. Therefore, they will be corruptible.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, this will not be by nature, since they will be of the nature that they now are, nor will it be by grace or glory, for they will be entirely without those. Therefore, there is no way that they will be incorruptible.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to take away the greatest punishment from those who are in the highest misery seems unfitting. But the greatest punishment is death, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 6, 1115a24–27.) Therefore, death should not be removed from the damned who are in the greatest misery; and so their bodies will be corruptible.
On the contrary, it says: and in those days men will seek death and not find it; they will long to die, and death will fly from them (Rev 9:6). Furthermore, the damned will be punished in soul and body with perpetual suffering: these shall go into everlasting punishment (Matt 25:46). But this could not be if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore, their bodies will be incorruptible.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they will be impassible. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 11, ad 3 & 5; In IV Sent. d. 50, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3; SCG IV, ch. 89; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 1; Quodl. VIII, q. 8, a. un.; Resp. de Art. 36, a. 21; Resp. de Art. 42, a. 26; Comp. theo. 177.) For according to the Philosopher in the Topics 6, chapter 6, every passion, done more, wears away at the substance. (Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 6, ch. 6, 145a3–4.) But if something finite is worn away, it will necessarily be consumed in the end, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 187b22 et seq., in the refutation of Anaxagoras. Cf. Bk. 3, ch. 5.) Therefore, if the bodies of the damned are passible, and always suffering, at some time they will be depleted and corrupted, which has been shown to be false. Therefore, they will be impassible.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every agent makes what it acts upon like itself. Therefore, if the bodies of the damned were acted upon by fire, fire would assimilate them to itself. But fire does not consume bodies in any other way but by dissolving them while assimilating them to itself. Therefore, if the bodies of the damned will be capable of being acted upon by fire, at some point they will be consumed; and so the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, animals that are said to live in fire without corruption, as is said about salamanders, are not afflicted by the fire, for an animal is not afflicted with pain in the body unless the body is injured in some way. Therefore, the bodies of the damned can remain in the fire without consumption, like the animals mentioned, as Augustine seems to say in On the City of God, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 2.) that they will endure no affliction there, which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if the bodies of the damned are passible, the anguish that arises in them from their suffering should exceed all present anguish of their bodies, just as the enjoyment of the saints will exceed all present enjoyment. But sometimes it happens in the present state that a soul is separated from its body because of the immensity of the suffering. Therefore, if those future bodies are passible, much more will the soul be separated from the body by the immensity of suffering, and so the bodies will be corrupted, which is false. Therefore, those bodies will be impassible.
On the contrary (1), it says: and we shall be changed (1 Cor 15:52); on which the Gloss comments: we, the good only, shall be changed into the glory of immutability and impassibility. Therefore, the bodies of the damned will not be impassible.
Furthermore (2), just as the body cooperates with the soul in meriting, so too the body works with it in sinning. But because of this cooperation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore, in the resurrection the bodies of the damned will likewise be punished, which would not be the case if they were impassible. Therefore, they will be passible.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, there can be two kinds of deformity in the human body. One is from the lack of a member, as we say that the mutilated are ugly, for due proportion to the whole is lacking in them. And as to a deformity like this, there is no doubt that it will not exist in the bodies of the damned, for all bodies, whether of the good or the wicked, will rise whole, as was said above when the integrity of the risen body was discussed. The other kind of deformity happens from an improper disposition of parts, or improper quantity or quality or placement, which a due proportion of the parts to the whole does not allow. And concerning these deformities and similar defects, just as there are fevers and illnesses which are sometimes the causes of deformities, Augustine leaves the question undetermined and doubtful in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Love, as the Master says in the text.
But among modern teachers there are two opinions about this. For some say that deformities and defects like this will remain in the bodies of the damned, for these teachers are considering their damnation, by which they are consigned to the highest misery, from which no discomfort should be taken away. But this does not seem to be reasonably said, for in the restoration of the risen body the perfection of nature is sought more than the condition that it had before. Therefore, also those who die before reaching complete maturity will rise in the stature of a youthful age, as was said above. Therefore, those who had any natural defects in their body or deformities arising from them would also be restored in the resurrection without those defects or deformities, unless the due reward of sin prevented it. And so, if someone with defects or deformities rises, this will be part of his punishment; however, the manner of his punishment is according to the measure of fault. Yet it may happen that a certain damned sinner, subject to minor sins, has deformities or defects that someone else who would be damned for more serious sins did not have. Therefore, if the one who had deformities in this life rose with them, but the other person, who should be more gravely punished but did not have them in this life, rose without them, the manner of punishment would not correspond to the amount of fault, but rather a person would seem to be punished for punishments that he suffered in this world, which is absurd.
And therefore other people say more reasonably that the author who composed nature will restore the nature of the body integrally in the resurrection. Therefore, whatever defect or ugliness was in the body either from the corruption or weakness of nature or the principles of natural things, will be entirely removed in the resurrection, like fever, eye infection, and the like. But the defects that happen naturally in the human body from natural principles, like heaviness, passibility, and the like, will exist in the bodies of the damned, while the glory of the resurrection excludes these defects from the bodies of the elect.
Reply Obj. 1: Since punishment in any arena is inflicted according to the condition of that arena, the penalties that are inflicted in this temporal life for a certain sin are temporal, and they do not extend beyond the end of this life. And therefore although damned do not have their sins forgiven, nevertheless it is not necessary that they endure the same punishments there that they suffered in this world. But divine justice requires that they be eternally tormented by graver punishments there.
Reply Obj. 2: The account of the good and the wicked is not the same, by the fact that anything can be purely good, but not purely evil. Therefore, the ultimate happiness of the saints requires that they be thoroughly immune from every evil; but the ultimate misery of the wicked does not exclude every good; for evil, if it is integral, corrupts itself, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 5, 1126a11–12.) Therefore, it is necessary that the misery of the damned be underlain by the good of their nature, which is the work of the perfect builder, who will restore nature itself in the perfection of its own species.
Reply Obj. 3: Slowness is among those defects that naturally follow from the principles of the human body, but deformity is not; and therefore the account of them is not the same, as is clear from what has been said.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that since in every motion there must be some principle of movement, a given movement or change can be removed from a moving object in two ways. One way by the fact that it lacks its principle of movement; in another way by the fact that the principle of movement is impeded. Now corruption is a kind of change; therefore, there are two ways it can happen that a body that has corruptibility from the condition of its own principles, is rendered incorruptible.
In one way, when the principle moving it to corruption is entirely taken away; and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the sky is the first agent of alteration by its own local motion, and all other secondary agents act in virtue of it, and as though moved by it, it is necessary that once the movement of the heavens ceases, there will be no agent that can change a body away from its own natural property by any alteration. And therefore after the resurrection, when the movement of the heavens ceases, no quality will be sufficient that the human body may be changed from its own natural quality. Now corruption is one terminus of alteration, just as generation is; and so the bodies of the damned could not be corrupted; and this serves divine justice that while they live forever, they should be punished forever, which divine justice requires, as will be said below; just as now the corruptibility of bodies serves divine providence, through which, from certain things being corrupted, others are generated.
In another way it happens from the fact that the principle of corruption is impeded, and this is the way the body of Adam was incorruptible [before the Fall], for the contrary qualities existing in a man’s body were restrained by the grace of innocence from being able to work to the dissolution of the body. And much more will they be restrained in glorified bodies, which will be entirely subject to the spirit; and thus, after the general resurrection in the bodies of the blessed, these two ways of incorruptibility will be united.
Reply Obj. 1: The contraries that bodies are composed from are two principles acting for corruption. For the first acting force is the movement of the heavens, and thus when the movement of the heavens is supposed, it is necessary that a body composed from contraries be corrupted, unless there is some more powerful cause impeding it. But when the movement of the heavens is removed, the contraries from which the body is composed are not sufficient for bringing about corruption even according to nature, as is clear from what has been said. But the philosophers did not realize that the motion of the heavens would cease; therefore, they held as infallible that a body composed from contraries would be corrupted according to nature.
Reply Obj. 2: That incorruptibility will be by nature, not that there is any principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but through a lack of the principle that moves toward corruption, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: Although simply speaking death is the greatest of punishments, nevertheless, nothing prevents death from being in a certain respect a remedy for punishments, and consequently the removal of death may be an increase of punishment. For to live, as it says in the Ethics 5, seems to be delightful to all people, by the fact that all things desire to be. (The Vives edition sends us to Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 9, but there seems to be nothing in Book 5 that is pertinent. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 9; Bk. 8, ch. 4.) However, it is not necessary, as it says in the same place, to accept a bad life, nor a corrupt one, nor one that is plunged in sadness. Therefore, just as living is delightful simply speaking, but not the life lived in sadness, so too, death which is the deprivation of life is simply speaking penal, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it takes away the first good, namely, being, with which all others are taken away. But inasmuch as it takes away an evil life, and one that is plunged in sadness, it is the remedy of those pains which it ends. And consequently the removal of death is an increase of punishments, which it makes perpetual. However, if death were said to be penal because of the physical pain that the dying feel, there is no doubt that the damned will continuously experience much greater pain; which is why they are said to be in perpetual death, as was written in Psalm 49 (48):14: death shall feed on them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the principal reason why the bodies of the damned are not consumed by fire will be divine justice, for their bodies are consigned to perpetual punishment. But the natural disposition on the part of the suffering body and on the part of those acting also serves divine justice, for since suffering is a kind of receiving, there are two modes of being passive, according as something can be received in two ways. For a given form can be received by some other materially according to natural being, as heat is received in the air from fire; and according to this mode of reception there is one mode of passivity, which is called the passion of nature. In the other way something is received in another spiritually by the mode of a certain intention, as the likeness of white is received in the air and in the pupil. And this reception resembles that reception by which the soul receives the likenesses of things; therefore, according to this mode of reception there is another mode of passion, which is called the passion of the soul. Therefore, since after the resurrection, when the movement of the heavens has ceased, no body will be able to be altered from its natural quality, as was said, no body will be able to suffer by the passion of nature. Therefore, as to this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible, just as they will be incorruptible. But once the motion of the heavens ceases, the passion that is by the mode of the soul will still remain, for air will also be illuminated by the sun, and will convey to sight the differences of colors. Therefore, in this way of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. And since the senses are perfected in this kind of passion, therefore the sense of pain will exist in the bodies of the damned without change to their natural disposition. But the glorified bodies, even if they receive something and are somehow passive in sensing, nevertheless they will not be passible, for they will receive nothing as afflictive or wounding, as the bodies of the damned will receive those things on account of which they are said to be passible.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking about that passion in which the one experiencing it is changed away from his own natural disposition. But this kind of passion will not exist in the bodies of the damned, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: A likeness of the agent can be in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way that it is in the agent, as is the case with all univocal agents, as heat makes heat, and fire generates fire. Second, in a way different from the way in which it exists in the agent, as it is in all equivocal agents, in which sometimes it happens that a form exists spiritually in an agent, which is received materially in the patient, as the form that is in the house made by the craftsman exists materially in it, and spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. But sometimes vice versa, it exists materially in the agent, and is received spiritually in the patient: as whiteness is materially in a wall, from which it is spiritually received into the pupil, and into the medium conveying it. And it is similar in the case at hand: for the species that exists materially in fire is received spiritually in the bodies of the damned; and thus fire will assimilate to itself the bodies of the damned, yet it will not consume them.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the book On the Properties of the Elements, no animal can live in fire. (See De proprietatibus elementorum, ch. 1. This work is a Medieval Arabic treatise on geology, probably written in the ninth or tenth century by an author claiming to be Aristotle. It was influential in the Middle Ages due to the twelfth-century translation by Gerard of Cremona, which St. Albert the Great (among others) utilized in his scientific writings. Its Arabic authorship was discovered in the Renaissance.) For Galen, in his book On Simple Drugs, says that no body exists that will not be consumed by fire in the end, although certain bodies exist that may remain for an hour in fire without harm, as is seen in the case of ebony. Therefore, what is cited about the salamander is not entirely the same, for it could not ultimately persevere in fire without corruption, as the bodies of the damned will in hell. Nor, however, is it necessary that since the bodies of the damned are not injured by the fire of hell through any corruption, they are not afflicted by the fire on this account, for what is sensible is not only such as to delight or afflict the senses according as it acts by the action of nature strengthening or corrupting the sense organ, but also according as it acts with a spiritual action. For when the sensible is in due proportion to the one sensing, it delights, but just the reverse when it is applied in superabundance or defect; which is why neutral colors and harmonious voices are delightful, and unharmonious ones offend the hearing.
Reply Obj. 4: Pain does not separate the soul from the body according as it remains only in the power of the soul where the pain is, but according as the body is changed to the passion of the soul from its natural disposition, according to the way we see that the body is heated by anger, and chilled by fear. But after the resurrection, the body will not be changed from its natural disposition, as is clear from what has been said, which is why, no matter how great the pain is, it will not separate the soul from the body.
Article 2
About the fire in which they will be tormented
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: De veritate, q. 26, a. 1; SCG IV, ch. 90; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 3; De anima, a. 21.) It seems that the fire of hell in which the bodies of the damned will be tortured is not a physical fire. For Damascene says at the end of Book 4: the devil, along with his demons, and his man, namely, the Antichrist, and the wicked and sinners, will be handed over into eternal fire—not a material fire, as is the one that we have, but as God knows indeed. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 4, ch. 27, PG 94:1227.) But everything physical is material. Therefore, the fire of hell will not be physical.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the souls of the damned will be cast into the fire of hell separate from their bodies. But Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 32 (CSEL 28.1:427).) I judge it to be a spiritual place, namely, where the soul is cast after death, not a physical one. Therefore, that fire is not physical.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, physical fire’s manner of action does not align with the measure of fault in the one who is burned in the fire, but rather with the measure of moisture or dryness, for we see the same physical afflict the righteous and the wicked. But hell fire’s manner of action does align with the measure of fault in the one who is punished. This is why Gregory says in the Dialogues 4: there is one fire of Gehenna indeed, but not only one way that it will torment all sinners, for the pain will be felt by each person in proportion to his fault. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 45.)
On the contrary (1), it says in the Dialogues 4: I do not doubt that the fire of Gehenna is a physical fire, in which it is certain that bodies will be tortured. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 30.)
Furthermore (2), it says: creation will join with him to fight against the madmen (Wis 5:21). But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were to be punished only with a spiritual punishment, and not a physical one. Therefore, they will be punished in a physical fire.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that that fire will not be of the same species as the physical fire that we see. For Augustine says, and it is quoted in the text: of what kind is the eternal fire, and where it will be in the world or in creation, I adjudge that no man knows, except perhaps for him to whom the divine Spirit reveals it. But all people, or nearly all, know the nature of our fire. Therefore, that fire is not of the same nature or species as ours.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, explaining Job 20:26: a fire not blown upon will devour him, Gregory says in Book 15 of his Morals: a physical fire, to be strong enough to exist, needs physical tinderwood; nor will it be strong enough to continue unless it is kindled, and unless it is fed. But conversely, the fire of Gehenna, although it is physical, and bodily burns up the reprobate cast into it, is not kindled by human skill, nor nourished with wood, but once created it will endure unquenchable; and it needs no renewing, and lacks no heat. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 15, par. 29.) Therefore, it is not of the same nature as the physical fire that we see.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is eternal and what is corruptible do not have the same account, since they do not even share in a genus, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 10, ch. 10.) But our fire is corruptible, while that one will be eternal: depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire (Matt 25:41). Therefore, they are not of the same species.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is the nature of the fire that we have, that it shines. But the fire of hell does not shine, which is why it says: is not the light of the wicked put out? (Job 18:5). Therefore, it is not of the same nature as our fire.
On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher in the Topics 1, all water is the same species as all other water. (Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 103a14–25.) Therefore, by the same reasoning, all fire is the same in species as all other fire.
Furthermore (2), it says: one is punished by the very things by which he sins (Wis 11:16). But all men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they be punished by the same things.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that that fire is not below the earth. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 6, a. 3, ad 2; In IV Sent. d. 48, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4 and expos. text.) For it is said about a damned person: he is driven out of the world (Job 18:18). Therefore, that fire in which the damned are punished is not beneath the earth, but outside the world.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no violent or incidental thing can be everlasting. (This follows from the very definition of the violent, which moves against what is according to nature and therefore presupposes it, and of the per accidens, which rests upon that which is per se.) But that fire will exist in hell everlastingly. Therefore, it will not be there by violence, but naturally. But there cannot be any fire under the earth except by violence. Therefore, the fire of hell is not under the earth.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the fire of hell all the bodies of the damned will be tormented after the day of judgment. But those bodies will fill that place. Therefore, since there will be the greatest multitude of the damned, for the number of fools is infinite (Eccl 1:15), there will need to be the greatest amount of space to contain that fire. But it seems unfitting for there to be so much empty space below the earth, since the parts of the earth are naturally drawn to the middle. Therefore, that fire will not be under the earth.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it says: one is punished by the very things by which he sins (Wis 11:16). But the wicked sinned upon the earth. Therefore, the fire punishing them must not be below the earth.
On the contrary (1), it says: Sheol beneath is stirred up to meet you when you come (Isa 14:9). Therefore, the fire of hell is below us.
Furthermore (2), Gregory says in his Dialogues 4: I do not see anything that prevents hell from being believed to be below the earth. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 44.)
Furthermore (3), commenting on Jonah 2:3: thou didst cast me into the deep, into the heart of the seas, the interlinear Gloss says: that is, into hell; for which it says in the Gospel, in the heart of the earth (Matthew 12:40), for as the heart is in the center of an animal, so is hell held to be at the center of the earth.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, there are many positions on the fire of hell.
For some philosophers, like Avicenna, not believing in the resurrection, believed there was punishment after death for the soul alone; and because it seemed unfitting to them that the soul, since it is incorporeal, should be punished by a corporeal fire, they denied that there was a physical fire in which the wicked would be punished, desiring that whatever is said about the future punishment of souls through corporeal things after death be said metaphorically. For just as the enjoyment and pleasure of good souls will not exist in any physical thing, but only a spiritual delight in the obtainment of their end, so too the affliction of the wicked would be only spiritual; namely, in the fact that they would grieve that they are separated from the end, which they naturally desire. Therefore, just as all the things that are said about the pleasure of souls after death that seem to pertain to physical pleasure, like that they will be refreshed, that they will laugh, and so forth, so too any of those things said about affliction that seems to sound like physical punishment should be understood as a similitude, like that they will burn in the fire, or be afflicted by the stench, and other things like this. For spiritual pleasure and sorrow, since they are unknown to the multitude, must be made known figuratively through physical pleasures and sorrows, so that people will be moved more to desire or fear. But since in the punishment of the damned there will not only be the pain of loss, which corresponds to the turning away that happened in their sin, but there will also be the pain of the senses, which corresponds to what they turned toward, therefore, the manner of punishment described above is not enough. And so even Avicenna himself added another manner of punishment, saying that the souls of the wicked after death will be punished not through their bodies, but through the likenesses of their bodies, as in dreams, because of these likenesses existing in the imagination, it seems to a person that he is tortured by different pains. And Augustine also seems to posit this manner of punishment in his Commentary on Genesis 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 32.) as is apparent in the same place.
But this seems to be said inappropriately. For the imagination is a certain power that uses a physical organ; therefore, it cannot be that imaginative visions happen in a soul separated from a body, as they do in the soul of someone sleeping. Hence even Avicenna, to avoid this inappropriateness, said that souls separated from bodies used as their organ a certain part of a heavenly body, which the human body must be like for the perfection of the rational soul, which is like the movers of a heavenly body; in this following in some way the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who held that souls returned to similar stars. But this is completely absurd according to the teaching of the Philosopher, for the soul uses a particular physical organ as an art uses particular tools. Therefore, it cannot pass from one body into another body, which Pythagoras held, as it says in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 3, 407b14–26.)
Now the way that Augustine’s statement should be answered will be said below. But whatever may be said about the fire that torments separated souls, nevertheless, concerning the fire in which the bodies of the damned will be tormented after the resurrection, one must say that it is corporeal; for only corporeal things can be appropriately adapted for punishing for the body. Therefore, Gregory in the Dialogues 4 (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 29.) proves that the fire of hell is physical from the fact that the reprobate will be driven into it after the resurrection. Augustine, too, in the text, clearly confesses that fire in which bodies will be tormented to be bodily; and this is what the present question is about. But how the souls of the damned will be punished by that physical fire will be said below in Distinction 50, Question 2, Article 3.
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene does not simply deny that that fire is material, but that it is not material in the way that ours is, by the fact that it is distinguished from our fire by certain properties. Or it could be said that because that fire does not materially alter bodies, but acts by a certain spiritual action in them for punishment, as is clear from what was said, therefore it is called non-material, not as to its substance, but as to the effect of its punishment in the bodies, and much more in the souls.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine’s statement can be taken as meaning that the place into which souls are cast after death is non-physical to this extent, that a soul does not exist in it corporeally, namely, in way in which bodies exist in a place, but in another spiritual way, as angels exist in a place. Or it could be said that Augustine is offering an opinion, not settling a question, as he frequently does in that book.
Reply Obj. 3: That fire will be the instrument of divine justice as it punishes. But an instrument does not only act in its own virtue, and by its own mode, but also in virtue of its principal agent, and according as it is regulated by it. Therefore, although fire according to its own virtue is not able to torment people more or less according to the measure of their sin, nevertheless it has this according as its action is modified by the order of divine justice; just as the fire of an oven is modified by the skill of the craftsman in his action as befits the effect of his art.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that because fire has the greatest power in acting among all the elements, it has other bodies for its matter, as it says in Meteorology 2. (This would appear to be a reference to Aristotle, Meteorology, Bk. 4, ch. 1: “Everything, except fire, is liable to putrefy; for earth, water, and air putrefy, being all of them matter relatively to fire” (379a15–16).) Therefore, fire is also found in two ways: namely, in its proper matter, as it exists in its own sphere; or in foreign matter, whether that be earthly, as in the case of charcoal, or airy, as is seen in flames. Now whichever way fire is found, it is always the same in species as regards the nature of fire. However, there can be diversity in species as to the bodies that are the matter of fire; for example, flames and glowing coals differ in species, and likewise a wood fire and smelted iron. Nor does it make a difference in this regard whether they were lit by violence, as appears in the case of iron, or from a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulfur. Therefore, as to what it possesses of the nature of fire, it is manifest that the fire of hell is of the same species with the fire that we have. But whether that fire exists in its own matter, or in some foreign matter, and if in foreign matter, what material that might be, is unknown to us; and accordingly it can be a different species from the fire that we have, considered materially. Nevertheless, it does have certain different properties from our fire, like the fact that it does not need to be kindled, nor is it fed with wood. But those differences do not show a difference in species as regards what pertains to the nature of fire.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks about what is material in that fire, not about the nature of fire.
Reply Obj. 2: The fire that we have is fed with wood and ignited by man, for it introduced into a foreign material artificially and by violence. But that fire does not need wood to be kindled, for either it subsists in its proper matter, or it exists in a foreign material not by violence but by nature from an intrinsic principle, which is why it was not lit by man, but by God, who established its nature. And this is what it says in Isaiah 30:33: the breath of the Lord, like a stream of brimstone, kindles it.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species that they now are, although now they are corruptible, but then they will be incorruptible by the order of divine justice, and because of the stilling of the movement of the heavens; so is it also with the fire of hell, where those bodies will be punished.
Reply Obj. 4: Light does not parallel fire in every mode of existing, for it does not shine when it exists in its own proper material; hence it does not shine in its own sphere, as the philosophers say. Similarly, fire existing in some foreign matter does not shine either, as when it is in some dark earthly matter, like sulfur. And it is similar when its brightness is darkened by thick smoke. Therefore, the fact that the fire of hell does not shine is not a sufficient argument that it is not of the same species.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that as Augustine says, and as is found in the text, in what part of the world hell exists, I judge that no one knows, unless someone to whom the divine Spirit has revealed it. Therefore too Gregory answers this question in the Dialogues 4, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 44.) I do not dare to rashly define this thing. For in fact many have believed that hell was in some part of the lands, while others deemed it to be under the earth. And he shows that the second opinion is more probable in two ways. First, by reason of the name itself, as he says: if we call it the “Inferno,” the lower place, on this account, that it lies inferiorly, then what earth is to the sky, hell should be to the earth. Second, however, from what is said in Revelation 5:3: And no one in heaven or on earth or under the earth was able to open the scroll, so by the fact that it says in heaven, it refers to the angels; by saying, on earth, it refers to men living in the body; by saying, under the earth, it refers to souls dwelling in hell. Augustine, too, in his On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 34, n. 66.) seems to give two reasons why it would be fitting for hell to be under the earth. One is that because the souls of the deceased sinned by love of the flesh, there is applied to them what is customarily applied to dead flesh itself, namely, that it be hidden away under the earth. The other is that just as there is heaviness in bodies, so there is sadness in spirits; and merriment is like lightness; therefore, just as according to the body, if they held the order of their weight, all the heavier ones would be lower, so too according to the spirit, all the sadder ones are lower: and so just as the appropriate place for the joy of the elect is the empyreal heaven, so the fitting place for the sadness of the damned is the lowest part of the earth. Nor should it disturb us that Augustine says in the same place that hell is said to be or believed to be under the earth, for in his book of Retractions, (Augustine, Retractations (CCSL 57), Bk. 2, ch. 24.) he retracts this, saying: it seems that I should have said that hell is under the earth, rather than give reasons why it is said to be or believed to be under the earth.
However, some philosophers held that the place of hell will be under the terrestrial orb, yet above the surface of the earth, on a part opposite from us. And Isidore (Cf. Isidore’s Sentences, Bk. 1, ch. 28, sent. 2 (CCSL 111:86).) seemed to have thought so when he said that the sun and moon will stay in the order in which they were created, so that the wicked, sunk in their torments, may not profit from their light; which would be no reason, if hell were said to be within the earth. Nevertheless, how these words could be explained will be made clear below at Distinction 48. But Pythagoras located the place of punishments in the sphere of fire, which he says is in the middle of the whole world, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 13, 293a19–22.) But it fits more with those things that are said in Scripture that it be said to be under the earth.
Reply Obj. 1: Those words of Job, God has driven him from the world, are to be understood of the circle of lands, that is, this world; and this is how Gregory explains it, saying: he is obviously driven from the world, when at the appearance of the highest judge he is removed from this world, in which he glories perversely. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 14, par. 22.) Nor should one understand ‘world’ here as meaning ‘universe’, as if the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.
Reply Obj. 2: In that place a fire is kept eternally by the order of divine justice, although according to its own nature no element could endure forever outside its own place, particularly while the state of generation and corruption remained in things. However, there that fire will be of the most blistering heat, for its heat will be pressed in from every side because of the earth’s coldness encompassing it in every direction.
Reply Obj. 3: Hell will never lack room, so that it would not suffice for holding the bodies of the damned, for in Proverbs 30:16, hell is listed among the three insatiable things. Nor is it unfitting that by divine power so great an empty space should be kept in the bowels that it could hold all the bodies of the damned.
Reply Obj. 4: The saying one is punished by the very things by which he sins (Wis 11:16) need not be taken to apply to anything but the chief instruments of sinning. For since a person sins in body and soul, he is punished in both, but it is not necessary that he be punished in the very same place where he sinned, since a different place is due to wayfarers and to the damned. Or it could be said that this is understood as applying to the penalties by which a man is punished in life, according as some of his guilt has punishment joined to it, as any disordered mind is a punishment to itself, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 1, ch. 12.)
Article 3
About the condition of their souls after they have been separated
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 77, a. 8; De anima, a. 19; Super Metaphys. 12, lec. 3.) It seems that the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says so in his book On the Spirit and the Soul: the soul withdraws from the body drawing all things with it, namely, sense, and imagination, and reason, and understanding, intelligence, concupiscibility, and irascibility. (In fact, a 12th-century compilation often attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux, On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15, PL 40:791. As we see below in the reply, as well as later in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas suspected that this book was not by Augustine and did not consider it much of an authority (cf. ST I, q. 79, a. 8, ad 1).) But sense and imagination and the irascible and concupiscible powers are sensitive powers. Therefore, the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in his book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas: we believe man alone to have a substantive soul, which lives stripped of the body, and holds on to its natural character and senses vigorously. (In fact, Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 14, PL 42:1216.) Therefore, the soul stripped of the body has sensitive powers.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the powers of the soul are either in it essentially, as some people say, or at least natural properties of it. But what is in something essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is any subject deserted by its natural properties. Therefore, it is impossible that a soul separated from its body lose any powers.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what has any part lacking from it is not an integral whole. But the powers of the soul are called its parts. Therefore, if the soul loses any powers after death it will not be a complete soul after death; which is unfitting.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the soul’s powers are more related to merit than even the body is, since the body is only an instrument of action, while the powers are the principles of acting. But it is necessary that the body be rewarded together with the soul because of its cooperation in merit. Therefore, much more is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it; therefore, the separated soul does not lose them.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, if the soul, when it is separated from the body, loses a sensitive power, that power would have to pass into nothingness, for it cannot be said that it is resolved into any matter, since it does not have matter as a part of it. But what passes entirely into nothingness is not repeated the same in number, as was said above. Therefore, the soul will not have the same sensitive powers in number in the resurrection. But according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412b23–24.) as the soul is related to the body, so are the powers related to the parts of the body, for example, sight to the eyes. But if it were not the same soul that returned to the body, it would not be the same person. Therefore, by the same reasoning neither would the eye be the same in number, if it did not have the same power of sight; and by the same argument, neither would any other part rise the same in number, and consequently the whole man would not be the same in number. Therefore, it cannot be that the separated soul loses its sensitive powers.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, if the sensitive powers were corrupted when the body was corrupted, they would have to be weakened when the body was weakened. But this does not happen, for as it says in On the Soul 1: if an old man received the eye of a young man, he would certainly see as well as a young man. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b21–22.) Therefore, neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body corrupts.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in his book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas: man consists of two substances: the soul alone and the flesh; the soul with its own reason, and the flesh with its own senses. (Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 19, PL 42:1216.) Therefore, the sensitive powers pertain to the flesh. Therefore, when the flesh is corrupted, sensitive powers do not remain in the soul.
Furthermore (2), the Philosopher, speaking about the separation of the soul in the Metaphysics 12, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 12, ch. 3, 1070a24–27, where, however, modern translations read rather differently from the Latin in Aquinas.) says this: however, if anything remains, we should ask about it in the end: for it is not impossible with certain things. For instance, if the soul is of such a disposition, not as a whole, but the intellect (for the whole would be impossible), we should ask about this. From this it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body, but only the intellective powers, for the sensitive or vegetative are not.
Furthermore (3), in On the Soul 2, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 413a4–7.) the Philosopher says, speaking about the intellect: it happens that only this is separated, as something perpetual from something corruptible; however, it is evident from these that the remaining parts of the soul are not separable, as some people say. Therefore, the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the separated soul the acts of the sensitive powers also remain. (Parallels: ST I, q. 77, a. 8; SCG III, ch. 81, ad 5; Quodl. X, q. 4, a. 2.) For Augustine says in his book On the Spirit and the Soul: the soul withdrawing from the body is affected according to its merits by these things, namely, imagination, concupiscibility, and irascibility, for delight or sorrow. (Alcher of Clairvaux (attr.), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15, PL 40:791.) But imagination and the concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore, the separated soul will be affected in the sensitive powers, and thus the soul will be in some act according to these powers.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 24.) that the body does not feel, but the soul feels through the body, and further on: but certain things, the soul, not the body, feels entirely without the body: such as fear, and the like. But what applies to the soul without the body can exist in souls separated from the body. Therefore, at that time the soul will be able to feel in act.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, to look at the likenesses of physical things, as happens in sleep, pertains to imaginative vision, which exists in the sensitive part. But the separated soul looks at these kinds of likenesses of physical things, as happens in sleep. For example, Augustine says thus, in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12: nor do I see why the soul should hold the likeness of its body, since, as the body lies without its senses, but it is not entirely dead, it sees such things as many who returned from that withdrawal to the living have described; and it may not hold it, since when death is thoroughly completed, it will depart from the body. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 32.) For this cannot be understood as meaning that the soul only holds the likeness of something corporeal according as it looks at it; which is why he prefaced his conclusion with a remark about those lying prostrate without their senses, that they bear a certain likeness to their bodies, by which they can be borne to corporeal places, and false things, such as they see, they can put to the test in the likenesses of the senses. Therefore, the separated soul can accomplish an act of the sensitive powers.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, memory is a power of the sensitive part, as is proved in the book On Memory and Reminiscence. (Aristotle, On Memory and Reminiscence, ch. 1, 450a13–25.) But the separated soul will actually remember those things that it performed in this world: which is why it is also said to the rich reveler: remember that you received good things in your lifetime (Luke 16:25). Therefore, the separated soul will accomplish an act of the sensitive power.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3, (See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 9.) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But in the irascible and concupiscible powers are joy and sadness, love and hatred, fear and hope, and affections like these which according to our faith we hold to exist in separated souls. Therefore, the separated soul will not be without the acts of the sensitive powers.
On the contrary (1), whatever is common to the soul and the body cannot remain in the separated soul. But all the activities of the sensitive powers are common to soul and body, which is evident from the fact that no sensitive power has any act except through a physical organ. Therefore, the separated soul will be without the acts of the sensitive powers.
Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the book On the Soul: when the body has corrupted the soul neither remembers nor loves; (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b25–27.) and the same reasoning applies to all the other acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore, the separated soul does not perform any act of any sensitive power.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the separated soul cannot suffer from physical fire. (Parallels: ST I, q. 64, a. 4, ad 1; De veritate, q. 26, a. 1; SCG IV, ch. 90; De spir. creat., a. 1, ad 20; De anima, a. 6, ad 7, and a. 21; Quodl. VII, a. 5, a. 3; Quodl. II, q. 7, a. 1; Quodl. III, q. 10, a. 1; Comp. theo. 180.) For Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12: those things by which souls stripped of their bodies are affected whether well or badly are not corporeal things, but like corporeal things. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 32.) Therefore, a separated soul is not punished by corporeal fire.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in the same book (Ibid., ch. 16.) that what acts is always nobler than what is acted upon. But it is impossible for something corporeal to be nobler than a separated soul. Therefore, it cannot suffer from any corporeal thing.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 324a33–324b8.) and according to Boethius (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart et al.), ch. 6.) in his book On the Two Natures, only those things that share in matter can act and be acted acted upon by each other. But the soul and corporeal fire do not share in matter, for there is no shared matter for spiritual and corporeal things: this why they cannot be changed into each other either, as Boethius says in the same book. Therefore, the separated soul does not suffer from physical fire.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is acted upon receives something from the agent. Therefore, if a soul is acted upon by physical fire, it will receive something from it. But everything that is received in something exists in it in the mode of the receiver. Therefore, what is received into the soul from fire is not in it materially, but spiritually. But the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are perfections of it. Therefore, even if it were held that the soul is acted on by corporeal fire, this would not be to its punishment, but rather to its perfection.
Obj. 5: If it be said that the soul is punished by fire in the very fact it sees fire, as Gregory seems to say in his Dialogues 4, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 29.) then to the contrary. If a soul sees the fire of hell, it can only see by intellectual vision, since it does not have the organs by which sensitive or imaginary vision are completed. But it does not seem that intellectual vision could be a cause of sadness, for according to the Philosopher there is no sadness contrary to the delight that exists in considering something. Therefore, the soul is not punished by such vision.
Obj. 6: If it be said that the soul is acted on by corporeal fire because it is bound by it, as now it is bound by the body while it lives in the body, then to the contrary. While the soul lives in the body it is bound by the body inasmuch as one thing is made from it and the body, as from matter and form. But the soul will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore, it will not be able to be bound by that fire in the way described.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, every corporeal agent acts through contact. But there can be no contact between the soul and corporeal fire, for contact happens only between corporeal things that have their extremities together. Therefore, the soul is not acted on by corporeal fire.
Obj. 8: Furthermore, an organic agent does not act from a distance unless it acts through what is in the middle; which is how it can act through a determinate distance proportionate to its own power. But souls, or at least demons, to whom the same argument applies, are sometimes outside the place of hell, and sometimes even appear to men in this world, yet they are not immune to punishment. For just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned; nevertheless, we do not see that all the things in between suffer from the fire of hell; nor again is it believable that something corporeal of the nature of an element would be of such great strength that it could diffuse its own action over such a distance. Therefore, it does not seem that the punishments that the souls of the damned will undergo, they shall suffer from physical fire.
On the contrary (1), the argument is the same for separated souls as for demons, that they will be able to suffer from corporeal fire. But demons are acted upon by it when they are punished by that fire into which the souls of the damned will be thrown after the resurrection, which must be corporeal. And this is evident from the sentence of the Lord: depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41). Therefore, separated souls can also suffer in corporeal fire.
Furthermore (2), punishment should correspond to fault. But the soul subjects itself to the body by its fault through wicked concupiscence. Therefore, it is just that in its punishment it is subjected to a corporeal thing by suffering.
Furthermore (3), the union of form to matter is greater than that of agent to what is acted on. But the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not prevent the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore, it does not prevent it from being able to suffer from a corporeal thing.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, there are many opinions about this.
For some people, believing that all the powers exist in the soul in the way that color is in a body, say that the soul takes all its powers with it when it is separated from the body. For if anything were lacking from it, the soul would have to be transformed according to the natural properties which cannot be varied while the subject remains. But the belief described is false. For since a power is that according to which we are said to be capable of acting or being acted upon, but it belongs to the same thing to act and to be able to act, it is necessary that the power belong to the same thing as the subject that is is acting or being acted upon. This is why the Philosopher says, at the beginning of On Sleep and Wakefulness, (See Aristotle, On Sleep and Wakefulness, ch. 1, 454a4–18.) that what a power belongs to, the action belongs to. However, we see manifestly that certain activities, whose principles are the powers of the soul, do not belong to the soul, properly speaking, but to the composite, for they are not fulfilled without the mediation of the body, like seeing, hearing, and so on. Therefore, it is necessary that those powers belong to the composite as subject, but to the soul as inflowing principle, as the form is principle of the properties of the composite. But certain activities are exercised by the soul without physical organs, like understanding, considering, and willing. Therefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles of these will not only belong to the soul as principle but as subject. Therefore, since while its proper subject remains, its proper passions must also remain, and be corrupted when it corrupts, those powers that do not use a bodily organ in their acts must remain in the separated soul; but those that do use one must be corrupted when the body corrupts; and all the powers that belong to the sensible and vegetable soul are like this.
And because of this some people make a distinction between sensible powers of the soul, for they say that there are two kinds: some that are the acts of organs which overflow from the soul into the body, and these are corrupted with the body; others originate these and are in the soul, since through these originating acts the soul makes the body sense by seeing and hearing and the like. And these originating powers remain in the separated soul. But this does not seem to be said fittingly. For the soul, by its own essence, not by means of any other powers, is the origin of those powers that are the acts of the organs, just as any form, by the very fact that it informs its matter by its very essence, is the origin of the properties that naturally occur in the composite. For if it were necessary to hold that in the soul there were other powers by means of which the powers that perfect the organs overflowed from the essence of the soul, by the same reasoning it would be necessary to posit other powers, by means of which those middle powers would flow from the essence of the soul, and so on infinitely; for if it stops anywhere, it is better that it stop in the first.
This is why others say that the sensitive powers and others like them do not remain in the separated soul except in a certain respect, namely, as in the root, by that mode in which things that come from a principle exist in their principles. For in the separated soul there remains the efficacy of influencing again powers of this kind if it were united to the body. Nor is it necessary that this efficacy be something superadded to the very essence of the soul, as was said. And this opinion seems more reasonable.
Reply Obj. 1: That statement of Augustine should be understood as meaning that the soul takes with it certain of those powers in act, namely, intelligence and intellect, but others in root, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: The senses that the soul takes with it are not those external senses, but interior ones, namely, which pertain to the intellective part; for the intellect is sometimes called the ‘sense’, as is seen in Basil’s Commentary on Proverbs 1:8, and in the Philosopher in the Ethics 6. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, ch. 5.) Or if one understands it as being about external senses, then it should be answered as the first objection.
Reply Obj. 3: As is already clear from what has been said, sensitive powers are not related to the soul like natural passions to a subject, but to an origin; therefore, the argument does not proceed.
Reply Obj. 4: The powers of the soul are not called integral parts of it, but potential parts of it. Now it is the nature of this kind of whole that all the power of the whole exists in one of the parts perfectly, and in others partially; as in the soul the power of the soul perfectly exists in the intellective part, but in others partially. Therefore, since the powers of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, they will remain whole, not diminished, although the sensitive powers do not remain in act; just as neither does the power of the king remain diminished in his dead general who participated in his power.
Reply Obj. 5: The body cooperates toward merit as an essential part of the man who merits, but the sensitive powers do not cooperate in the same way, since they are in the genus of accidents; and so it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are not said to be acts of the organs as though they were their essential forms, except by reason of the soul that they belong to. But they are their acts as perfecting them for proper activities, like heat is the act of fire perfecting it to heat things. Therefore, just as the numerically same fire would remain if also a numerically different heat were in it, as is seen in the coldness of water, which does not return numerically the same after the water is heated, yet the water remains numerically the same, so too the organs will be numerically the same, although the powers are not numerically the same.
Reply Obj. 7: The Philosopher is speaking about powers like these according as they exist in root in the soul; which is clear from the fact that he says that old age does not exist in the soul suffering it, but in that in which it is, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b22–24.) namely, the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither weakened nor corrupted because of the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that some people distinguish two kinds of acts of the sensitive powers: some are external, which it exercises through the body, and these do not remain in the separated soul; but some are internal, which the soul exercises through itself, and these will exist in the separated soul. But this position seems to come down from the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul was joined to the body as a certain perfect substance, depending on the body for nothing, but only as the motor of something moveable, which is clear from the theory of reincarnation that he held. Now because according to him nothing moved unless it was moved, and lest this should lead to an infinite regression, he said that the first mover moves himself, and he held that the soul was the mover of itself. And according to this were the two kinds of movement of the soul: one in which it was moved by itself, another in which the body was moved by it. And in this way the soul had the act that is seeing, first in itself, according as it moved itself, and second in the physical organ, according as it moved the body. But the Philosopher destroyed this position in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 3 in its entirety.) showing that the soul does not move itself, and that in no way is it moved according to those activities that are seeing, sensing, and the like, but that those activities are only movements of the composite. Therefore, it is necessary to say that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in no way in the separated soul, unless perhaps in their remote root.
Reply Obj. 1: Some people deny that that book is by Augustine, for it is said to have been by a certain Cistercian who compiled it from some sayings of Augustine, and added others of his own. (In other words, Alcher of Clairvaux—whose authorship has, however, been contested more recently.) Therefore, what is written there is not to be taken for an authority. However, if its authority had to be upheld, one must say that it should not be understood as saying that the separated soul is affected by the imagination and other powers like it, as if that very affection were the act of the powers mentioned; but that in the future the soul will be affected either for good or for bad based on the things that it committed through the imagination and other powers like it; so that in this way the imagination and powers like it are not understood to have brought forth that affection, but to have brought forth in the body the merit of that affection.
Reply Obj. 2: The soul is said to sense through the body, not as though the act of sensing belonged to the soul in itself, but because it belongs to the whole composite by reason of the soul, by the same manner of speaking by which we say that heat heats. (Instead of saying concretely that the hot object heats in virtue of its heat, one can speak abstractly and say “heat heats.” Aquinas in pointing out that it is more accurate to say that the living body senses rather than the soul senses. See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b2–18.) But what is added below, that a soul senses without a body, like fear and things like that, is to be understood as meaning without an external motion of the body, which happens in the acts of the proper senses. For fear and passions like it do not happen without a bodily motion. Or it can be said that Augustine speaks according to the opinion of the Platonists, who held this view, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Here Augustine speaks in inquiry, not as determining a question, as perhaps he does throughout that whole book. For it is clear that the soul during sleep does not have the same account as the separated soul. For the soul of one sleeping uses the organ of imagination, in which physical likenesses are imprinted, which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or it could be said that the likenesses of things are in the soul both as to sensitive power and the imaginative and intellective, according to the greater and less abstraction from matter and material conditions. Therefore Augustine’s likeness holds as to the fact that as the likenesses of corporeal things are in the soul of someone dreaming, or the excess of a suffering mind, as images; so too they are in the separated soul intellectually, but they are not in the separated soul as images.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book I, Distinction 3, Question 4, Article 1, reply to the second objection, memory is taken in two ways. Sometimes, as it is a power of the sensitive part, namely, according as it concerns past time, and in this way the act of memory will not exist in the separated soul. This is why the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b27.) that once the body is corrupted, the soul does not remember. In the other way, memory is taken as a part of the imagination belonging to the intellective part, namely, according as it abstracts from every difference of time, since it is not only of past things, but also present and future things, as Augustine says; and with this kind of memory the separated soul will remember.
Reply Obj. 5: As was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 2, love, joy, sadness and the like, are taken in two ways. Sometimes indeed according as they are sensitive appetitive passions; and they will not exist in the separated soul like this, for in this way they will not be accomplished without a determinate motion of the heart. The other way is according as they are acts of the will, which is in the intellective part, and in this way they will exist in the separated soul, as will delight, which is in some way a passion of the sensitive part. According to the second way of taking it, the Philosopher posits it of God, saying in the Ethics 7 that God rejoices by one simple operation. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154b26.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that supposing, from what has been said, that the fire of hell is not said metaphorically, nor is it imaginary fire, but true corporeal fire, it must be said that the soul suffers punishment from corporeal fire, since the Lord says that a fire has been prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41), who are incorporeal, like the soul is. But there are many ways to explain how it can suffer.
For some have said that the very fact of seeing the fire is the soul’s suffering by fire; which is why Gregory says in the Dialogues 4, the soul suffers the fire by the very fact that it sees it. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 30.) But that does not seem sufficient, for by the fact that any sight is seen, there is a perfection of the one seeing. Therefore, it cannot pass into someone’s punishment to the extent it is seen, but sometimes it is punitive or saddening incidentally, namely inasmuch as it is apprehended as harmful. Therefore, it is necessary that besides the fact that the soul sees that fire, there is a certain relation of the soul to it, according to which the fire hurts the soul.
Therefore others have said that although corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, nevertheless the soul apprehends it as harmful to it; and for such apprehension it is affected by fear and sorrow, so that what Psalm 14 (13):5 says is fulfilled: they trembled with fear, where there was no fear. For example, Gregory says in the Dialogues 4 that because the soul beholds itself being burned, it is burned. (Ibid.) But this again does not seem to be sufficient, for according to this the suffering of the soul from fire would not be according to the truth of reality, but according to appearance alone. For, although a true passion of sadness or sorrow could exist from some false imagination, as Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 32.) nevertheless, it cannot be said that according to that passion it is truly acted upon by a thing, but by a likeness of the thing that it conceives. And again, this way of suffering would depart more from real suffering than the suffering that is brought about by imaginary visions, since the latter is said to exist through true images of things, which the soul carries with itself; but the former happens by false conceptions that the soul concocts by mistake. And again it is not probable that separated souls or demons, which have influence by the subtlety of their cunning, would think corporeal fire could harm them, if they were in no way weighted down by it.
This is why others say that it is necessary to hold that the soul also suffers from corporeal fire in reality. Therefore Gregory too says in the Dialogues 4: we can gather from the Gospel sayings that the soul suffers fire not only by seeing, but also by experience. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 30.) But they hold that this happens in this way. For they say that that corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it is a certain corporeal thing, and in this way it is not able to act on the soul; in another way, according as it is the instrument of divine justice exacting vengeance, for the order of divine justice requires that the soul that subjected itself to corporeal things in sinning should also be subject to them in punishment. However, an instrument does not only act by its own power, but also by the power of the principal agent, as was said above in Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 4. And so it is not unfitting if that fire, when it acts in the force of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of man or demon, in the way that the sacraments also were said to, (Distinction 1.) when they sanctify the soul. But that too does not seem sufficient: for every instrument in what it works instrumentally has a proper action connatural to it, and not only the action by which it acts in the power of the principal agent, but rather by exercising the first action it is necessary that it effect this second one, as water while washing the body in baptism sanctifies the soul, and a saw cutting wood brings about the form of a house. Therefore, it is necessary to give fire a certain action in the soul that is connatural to it for it to be the instrument of divine justice exacting vengeance.
And so it should be said that a corporeal thing cannot naturally act on the spirit, nor harm nor oppress it, unless according as it is united to a body in some way, for thus we find that a perishable body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). But the spirit is united to the body in two ways. In one way, as the form of matter, so that one thing is made out of them simply; and in this way the spirit is united to the body and gives life to the body, and it is weighted down in some way by the body; but the spirit of a man or demon is not united with corporeal fire in this way. In the other way, as the mover that moves something moveable, or as something placed in a place, in the way that incorporeal things are in a place; and according to this, created incorporeal spirits are delimited by place, so that those existing in one place are not in another. But although a corporeal thing by its own nature is able to delimit an incorporeal spirit by place, nevertheless it is not by its nature able to detain an incorporeal spirit in a definite place, so that it is so bound to that place that it cannot turn to other things, since spirit does not so naturally exist in a place that it is subjected to place. But this is superadded to corporeal fire, as it is an instrument of divine justice exacting vengeance, that it so detains the spirit and in this way becomes penal, holding it back from carrying out what it wills, so that namely it cannot operate where it wills, and as it wills; and this is the way that Gregory suggests in the Dialogues 4. (Ibid.) For, explaining how the soul suffers in experiencing fire, he says this: when the truth presents the rich sinner as condemned to fire, what wise man would deny that the souls of the reprobate are bound by flames? And Julian also said this, as the Master says: if the incorporeal soul of a living man is held in a body, why would it not also be held by corporeal fire after death? Augustine, too, says in the City of God 21 (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 10.) that just as the soul is joined to the body in the condition of a human as what gives life to it, although the former is spiritual and the latter physical, and by that union it conceives a deep love for the body, in the same way it is tied to fire, as receiving punishment from it; and it conceives a horror from this conjunction.
Therefore all the ways mentioned must be collected into one, so that it is perfectly seen how the soul suffers from physical fire; so that namely we may say that fire according to its own nature is able to be united with an incorporeal spirit, as something located in a place is united with the place. But inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine justice, it is able to retain it as bound in some way. And that fire is truly harmful to the spirit in this, and that is how the soul, seeing the fire as something harmful to it, is tormented by fire; and so Gregory in the Dialogues 4 touches on all these things in order, as is clear from his statements.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking in inquiry; which is why he also sets down another way as a determination in his book on the City of God, as is clear from what has been said. Or it should be said that Augustine understands that those things by which the soul is closely affected for sorrow or sadness, are spiritual things; for it would not be afflicted, unless it apprehended fire as something harmful. Therefore, the apprehension of fire is the proximate thing afflicting, but corporeal fire existing outside the soul afflicts remotely.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is simply speaking nobler than fire, nevertheless fire is nobler than the soul in a certain respect, namely, as it is an instrument of divine justice.
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking about that action by which what is acted upon is transformed into the nature of the agent. However, the action of fire on the soul is not like this; and because of this the argument does not conclude.
Reply Obj. 4: Fire in the soul does not act in the manner of something flowing in, but in the manner of something that detains, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore the argument is not to the point.
Reply Obj. 5: In intellectual vision there is no sadness from the very fact that something is seen, since what is seen in no way could be understood to be contrary to the intellect, insofar as it is seen. However, in sensing what is seen, the very action by which it acts on sight so that it is seen can be corruptive of sight incidentally, inasmuch as it corrupts the harmony of the organ. But nevertheless intellectual vision can be saddening, inasmuch as what is seen is apprehended as harmful, not as though it hurts in the very fact that it is seen, but in any other way; and this is how the soul is afflicted by seeing the fire.
Reply Obj. 6: It is not similar in all respects, but in some respect, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 7: Although there is no physical contact between the soul and the body, nevertheless there is between them a certain spiritual contact, as for example, since the mover of the sky is spiritual, he touches the sky by spiritual contact, moving it in the way that something saddening is said to touch, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1; (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 6, 323a32.) and this way suffices for action.
Reply Obj. 8: The spirit of one damned is never outside of hell unless by a divine dispensation, either for instruction or for the training of the elect. However, wherever they may be outside of hell, they still always see the fire of hell as prepared for them in punishment. Therefore, since that vision is immediately afflicting, as was said, wherever they are they are afflicted by the fire of hell; just as prisoners still outside the prison are afflicted in a certain way by the prison, when they see themselves condemned to prison. Therefore, just as the glory of the elect is not diminished at all whether as to the essential reward, or as to special distinctions, if sometimes they are outside the fiery heaven, which in a certain way contributes to their glory; so too the punishment of the damned is not at all diminished if they are placed outside of hell by divine dispensation for a time; and this is what, commenting on James 3:6, the tongue . . . sets on fire the cycle of nature, the Gloss of Bede says: wherever the devil is, whether under air, or under earth, he bears with himself the torments of his flames. Moreover, the objection proceeds as if corporeal fire afflicted spirits immediately, as it afflicts bodies.
Exposition of the Text
Whether all will rise again in the same age and size. (Sententiae IV, 44.1 (251). 1.) This is to be understood not as to the measure of the body, but as to the perfection of the body.
The age of Christ . . . was thirty-two years and three months. (Sent. IV, 44.1 (251). 2.) This is to be understood according to that opinion that holds that Christ was baptized in the beginning of his thirtieth year, not having completed it. But according to the opinion of Chrysostom, who held that Christ, when he was baptized, was thirty years old, and had begun his thirty-first, it is necessary to say that Christ lived thirty-three years and three months; for he preached for three years and about three months.
”But it is not right to say that at the resurrection a body will acquire a largeness of body which it did not have here.” (Sent. IV, 44.1 (251). 2 citing Lk. 21, 18.) But this seems contrary: dwarfs and giants will rise in the size that they had here. And it should be said that this is to be understood of the size that they had here or that they would have had if nature had not failed by excess or defect.
“But into whatever dust and ashes it may be resolved.” (Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 88.) It should be known that these resolutions that are referred to in the text are distributed in this way: first it takes the things into which the human body is resolved last; and so as to the large and earthly parts he includes dust and ashes; so that it is said to be resolved into dust, inasmuch as it is dried out by the freezing of moisture from the action of coldness; but in ashes, inasmuch as it is dried out by the extraction of moisture from the action of heat. But as to the fine and airy parts, he puts breath and breezes; so that breath is referred to the moist vapors, which evaporate from the human body, while breeze refers to the dry fumes that are the matter of the wind, which is properly called breeze. And next he places those things into which it is first resolved. But these things are either sensible or insensible. If insensible, then he refers to the elements in the fact that he says: “into whatever substance of other bodies”; (Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 88.) and the elements in the fact that he says: “into the elements themselves.” (Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion. ch. 88.) But if they are sensible, then he touches on other animals and men in saying: “into whatever food and flesh of beasts or even of men it may have been transformed;” *(Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 88.)*so that food pertains to what is in the way of transformation of the human body into the substance mentioned; but what he calls flesh pertains to the end of the transformation described.
“It returns in a moment of time to that soul which first animated it, and caused it to become human, and to grow and live.” (Sent. IV, 44.2 (252). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 88.) First should be explained not only as what is first in time, but what is most principal, as is clear from what has been said. Otherwise, it would be necessary to say that the rib from which the woman is formed would rise again in Adam, whose soul was brought to life first; whereas it will rise in Eve, for it was more principal in her, so that namely it pertains to the perfection of the individual, not only to the perfection of the species, as it did in Adam.
“And so the bodies of the saints will rise again without any defect,” (Sent. IV, 44.3 (253). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 89.) etc. Those things that are listed here differ in this way, that vice pertains to the intemperance of the humors, or the indisposition of the lower parts, while deformity pertains to the disposition of the external parts; but corruption, to the diminution, as if bodies should rise without a certain member; while burden pertains to the indisposition of the organs with respect to the motive power; but difficulty pertains to the weakening of the power itself.
“And will torment the bodies of the damned, whether men or devils.” (Sent. IV, 44.6 (256). 1 citing Augustine, The City of God, Bk. 21, chs. 2–5.) Augustine says this according to the opinion that holds that demons have bodies naturally united to them.
“Whoever refuses to profess that the soul can have a likeness to the body and to all bodily members, may deny that it is the soul which he sees in dreams as it moves about, or sits,” (Sent. IV, 44.7 (257). 2 citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, Bk. 12 ch. 33 n. 62.) etc. This is not to be understood as though the separated soul has the likeness of a body and its members in reality, as Apollinarius suggested, but only by the mode of apprehension, whether intellective or even imaginary, as some people wish.
“The souls of the reprobate . . . do not feel nothing.” (Sent. IV, 44.7 (257). 3 citing Julian of Toledo, Prognosticon, bk. 2, ch. 15; cf. John Cassian, Conlationes 1, ch. 14.) This can be explained so that ‘feel’ is not taken for the act of the external senses, but for the act of the intellect, according to which the intellect sometimes is is called a ‘sense’.
“It may be very carefully asked and disputed by learned men when a human person begins to live in the womb.” (Sent. IV, 44.8 (258). 2 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 86.) Concerning this certain things were said in Book III, Distinction 3, where the conception of the Lord’s body was discussed.
“Far be it from us to think that one man with two sets of limbs shall rise again, and not two distinct men, as would have happened, if twins had been born.” (Sent. VI, 44.8 (258). 3 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 87.) Augustine did not say this, because by the fact that it had two times the principal members, like two heads and two hearts, it was clear that there were two souls in it, and so there were two men, but united through an error of nature.
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