D. 50 - Separated souls and the damned

After the Master has considered the glory of the saints after the general judgment, here he considers the punishments of the wicked. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he pursues the issue at hand. In the second, he lays out the epilogue of the whole work: it suffices . . . to have remembered these things concerning the feet of the One who sits upon a high throne.

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he considers punishments of the damned as regards their effect. In the second, he determines their punishments as regards knowledge or intellect: here it may be asked why that darkness, by which the wicked will be surrounded in hell, is called outer. (Sententiae IV, 50.2 (285). 1 citing Mt. 8, 12.)

And this part is divided into three parts. In the first, he shows how they are excluded from the knowledge of God through being in external darkness. In the second, he shows how their knowledge is related to what goes on in this world: moreover, it is usual to ask whether the souls of the reprobate, which are now tortured in hell, have knowledge of those things which are done in this life concerning their people. (Sent. IV, 50.3 (286). 1.) In the third, he shows how it is related to knowing what goes on with the saints: it is also usual to ask whether those who are in hell and those who are in glory can see each other. (Sent. IV, 50.5 (288). 1.)

The second part is divided into two parts. In the first, he inquires whether the dead know what goes on here. In the second, he raises a certain question from what was said: if anyone should ask how to understand what we read concerning Lazarus and the rich man, let him hear the response of Augustine. (Sent. IV, 50.4 (287). 1.)

The third part is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows how the good and the wicked see each other. In the second, he inquires as to what happens to the saints from their vision of the damned: but since the saints see the wicked in their torments, are they not moved by some compassion toward them?

And this part is divided into two parts. In the first, he inquires whether the saints suffer out of compassion for the damned when they see their misery. In the second, whether from the fact that they see the damned their glory is lessened: finally, it is asked whether the sight of the punishment of the reprobates tarnishes the glory of the blessed. (Sent. IV, 50.7 (290). 1.)

Here two questions arise. First, on the natural knowledge of the separate soul. Second, on the punishment of the damned.

Question 1

The knowledge of separated souls

Concerning the first, four questions arise:

first, whether the soul can understand anything when separated from the body;

• second, whether it can understand through the species that it received from the senses when it was joined to the body;
• third, whether the separated soul knows singulars;
• fourth, whether local distance impedes its knowledge.
• The question of whether it uses the senses was considered above (Distinction 44). Article 1

Whether the soul can understand anything when separated from the body

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 89, a. 1; ST I-II, q. 67, a. 2; In III Sent. d. 31, q. 2, a. 4; De veritate, q. 19, a. 1; SCG II, ch. 81; De anima, a. 15; Quodl. III, q. 9, a. 1.) It seems that the soul can understand nothing when separated from the body. For, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b18–31.) when something internal is corrupted it puts an end to understanding and contemplating. But what is internal on the part of the body is corrupted by death. Therefore, after death the soul cannot understand or contemplate anything.

Obj. 2: No action common to the body and the soul can remain in the soul when the body is corrupted. But understanding is an action common to body and soul, as are weaving and building, as is clear in On the Soul 1. (Ibid., 408b12–18.) Therefore, when the body is corrupted the soul cannot understand.

Obj. 3: Without the potential intellect, the soul can understand nothing. But this intellect is corruptible, as it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 5, 430a25.) however, it is only corrupted when the body is corrupted. Therefore, the soul separated from the body cannot understand anything.

Obj. 4: As it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 5.) phantasms are to the intellective soul as colors are to sight. But if colors were destroyed, sight could see nothing. Therefore, when phantasms are destroyed the soul will not be able to understand anything. But phantasms do not remain in the separated soul, since they exist in the imagination, which has a bodily organ. Therefore, the separated soul cannot understand anything.

Obj. 5: The soul has more perfect being in the body than separated from the body, just as a part is more perfect in the whole than by itself. But the intellective soul, when it is in the body, cannot understand without phantasms, as is clear in On the Soul 1 and 3. (In the passages already cited.) Therefore, neither will it be able to understand without them when separated from the body. And so the same follows as before.

Obj. 6: The human intellect was made like a blank slate on which nothing is written, as it says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429b30–430a2.) Therefore, the soul at its creation does not have any forms co-created with it. If, then, it understands something, it must understand through forms received from the senses, since all knowledge occurs through a form that is a likeness of the thing known. But the souls of children who die in their mother’s womb do not have any forms received from the senses. Therefore, at least the souls of these children cannot understand anything, since they do not possess any intelligible forms.

Obj. 7: The soul is said to be joined to the body for the purpose of being perfected in knowledge and virtues. Therefore, before it has been perfected in knowledge in the body, it cannot understand anything. Otherwise it would be joined to the body in vain. But the souls of children as mentioned above have not been perfected by any knowledge in the body. Therefore, the same follows as before.

On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 2 (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 286a8.) that each thing is for the sake of its activity. Hence while the thing remains, its activity remains. And this is what Damascene (In fact, Averroes, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, ch. 1.) says when he says that no substance is without work. If, then, the soul remains after the body, as the faith asserts, its activity must remain. For, as it says in On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 403a4–15.) if no activity of the soul is proper to it without the body, it cannot be separated. But understanding more than anything else is its proper activity. Therefore, the soul separated from the body can understand something.

Furthermore (2), as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract 3, ch. 8.) freedom from matter is the reason that a substance is intellective. But the soul separated from the body is more free from matter than when joined to the body, since then it is not the act of any matter as it now is. Therefore since the soul understands now, all the more will it understand when separated from the body.

Furthermore (3), Avicenna says in On Natural Things 6 (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 5, ch. 3.) that the soul does not need the imagination and other sensible powers except only in the beginning and later on only a little. And so, once it progresses and takes on strength it works its own actions absolutely by itself alone. And in this way the soul needs the senses as a man needs a beast of burden and its equipment to reach the place he plans to go, and once he arrives there, he will no longer need it. Therefore, the soul does not always need the body to understand and so will be able to understand when separated.

I answer that, for those who hold that the intellect differs from the sensitive powers, it is necessary to hold that the intellect is an incorruptible substance, because it is necessary to hold that it is immaterial and not dependent on matter for its being. But any substance like this must be incorruptible. For inasmuch as matter can be the subject of privation and form, it is the cause of corruption in material things. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 408b18–19.) that the intellect seems to be a kind of substance and seems not to be corrupted.

Some, however, said that this incorruptible intellect is not part of the human soul but is rather a substance altogether separate from the body, whereas the human soul is only called intellective by a kind of participation in intellectuality from the separated intellect’s shining upon it. Thus when the body is destroyed the human soul would neither remain nor be able to understand anything. But this seems to be contrary to the Philosopher’s understanding. For in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 414b16ff.) he says, speaking of the intellect, that the intellect seems to be another genus of soul, and that it can only be the case that it is separated as the perpetual from the corruptible. In the Metaphysics 12, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 12, ch. 3, 1070a24–27.) too, he says that the soul has such a disposition that it can be separated, not the whole thing, but the intellect. From this it is clear that he believes that the intellect, which is part of the soul, can be separated from the body. And thus an intellective soul, which the human soul is, must remain after the body, as the faith asserts. And, consequently, it is necessary for it to understand, since understanding is its proper activity. But different people have different ways of explaining how it understands.

For some say that the soul receives knowledge from things when separated as it does now. But this opinion seems totally unreasonable. For the human soul separated from the body cannot use the sensitive powers, as said above in Distinction 44, Question 3, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 2, since the acts of these powers must be carried out through bodily organs. Thus the soul will not be able to use anything except the potencies of the intellective part. But the intellect was not made to receive knowledge from sensible things directly but rather by the mediation of the sensitive powers, since there must be a kind of agreement between the receiver and the received. Now the species existing in the senses agree both with the intellect, in that they are without matter, and with material things, in that they are with the conditions of matter. And this is how the senses fittingly receive from material things and the intellect from the senses, while the intellect does not receive directly from material things. And thus we cannot hold that the separated soul receives knowledge from material things. Nor is it sufficient to posit in it only knowledge that was received from the senses when it was in the body, on account of the souls of children who die in their mothers’ wombs, which have not received knowledge from the senses.

And thus others say that just as an angel has with it the innate forms of the causes of the order of the universe, so too does the soul from its creation, but while it is in the body it is oppressed by the body such that it cannot use these forms for understanding. Rather, it uses the forms that it receives from the senses or even the innate forms themselves, according to those who believed that learning was nothing other than remembering. But after the soul is separated from the body, it will use the innate forms. But this contradicts the opinion of the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 430a1.) who says that the human intellect is like a slate on which nothing is written. It also contradicts the experience we have of not being able to understand anything unless we are gently led from what we have already received from the senses to understanding. Nor would it be probable that, since the soul is naturally united to the body, it would be totally impeded by being joined to the body from using the innate forms. But this would seem to agree with the opinion of those who held that the soul is created before the body and later joined to the body in an incidental way. For things that are naturally in one and the same thing are not related such that one of them totally impedes the other. Otherwise, there would be something useless in nature.

And thus we should say instead, that the soul at its creation has no concrete forms and for it to understand after separation from the body no forms received from things are required either then or before. Rather, it will understand, speaking of natural knowledge, through an inpouring from higher substances, namely God or angels. And I am speaking of a natural inpouring, as is clear in the following way: Our intellect is a mean between intelligible substances and corporeal things. This is why in the Book of Causes the intellective soul is said to be created on the horizon of eternity. (Book of Causes, prop. 2.) And it says this because the soul attains to intelligible substances through the intellect, while as the act of the body it comes into contact with corporeal things. Now in the case of every mean, the more it approaches one of the extremes, the more it withdraws from the other. And the more it withdraws from one, the more it approaches the other. Therefore, since our soul in the wayfaring state is closest to the body, being its act, it only relates to intelligible things by some bodily contact. And for this reason the soul in the wayfaring state does not receive an influence from higher substances unless it knows under species received from the senses. This is why Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, n. 2, PG 3:122.) says that it is not possible for a ray of the divine light to shine upon us in this life other than with a variety of sensible forms. And thus, even in this life, the more the soul is withdrawn from the body, the more it receives an influx of knowledge from spiritual substances. And this is how people know certain hidden things when sleeping and in mental transport, when the soul is withdrawn from the body’s senses. For this reason when the soul will actually be separated from the body, it will be most ready to receive an inpouring from separated substances, namely God or angels. And so by this influence it will have greater or less knowledge according to the mode of the soul’s natural capacity. And so, too, the Commentator, (Averroes, commenting on Aristotle’s On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 5.) who claims that the potential intellect is a separated substance, though he errs in this, is right when he says that what is posited as being a separated substance is related to other higher spiritual substances such that it understands them. But it is not joined to higher substances in respect to the way it is related to our body in receiving species from phantasms.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the act of the intellect whereby we understand now in the wayfaring state, by abstracting from phantasms. For this act ceases when phantasms are destroyed in the soul’s separation from the body.

Reply Obj. 2: Understanding, insofar as it proceeds from the intellect, is not an action common to the soul and body (for the intellect does not understand by the mediation of a bodily organ). Rather, it is common to soul and body on the part of the object, inasmuch as we understand by abstracting from phantasms, which are in a bodily organ. And this is the mode of understanding not possessed by the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The passive intellect of which the Philosopher is speaking is not the potential intellect but instead the particular reason, which is called the cogitative power, which has a determinate organ in the body, namely a small medial segment in the head, as the Commentator says on the same passage. And without this the soul cannot understand anything. But it will understand in the future when it will not need to abstract from phantasms.

Reply Obj. 4: This relationship is understood of the intellective soul on the part of its being joined to the body, not as intellective simply. For the intellect as such does not have to do with phantasms, as is seen in the case of the angelic intellect.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul has more perfect being in the body than separated inasmuch as it is a form, not inasmuch as it is an intellect, unless perhaps it is joined to the sort of body that is completely subject to the soul, drawing the intellect away in no respect, as will be the case with the glorious body: a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent burdens the thoughtful mind (Wis 9:15).

Reply Obj. 6: The souls of children, though they do not have innate or acquired forms, will have some intelligible forms from the inpouring of the divine light with the cooperation of the angels’ ministry.

Reply Obj. 7: From the fact that the soul was perfect in the body of the knower it will also understand more when separated, as will be said below. It does not follow, however, that if it was not perfect in knowledge it will not understand at all.

Article 2

Whether it can understand through the species that it received from the senses when it was joined to the body

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 89, a. 6; ST I-II, q. 67, a. 2; In III Sent. d. 31, q. 2, a. 4.) It seems that the soul, after separation, will not understand anything through the species that it now abstracts from the body. For such species will have the same character in the separated soul as they have now. But now the soul cannot understand through them without phantasms, as is clear from the fact that if the organ of the imagination is harmed, the soul is impeded in the consideration of things that it previously received from the senses. Therefore, neither will the separated soul be able to understand through these species, since there will be no phantasms in it.

Obj. 2: Similar habits are left by similar acts. But we now acquire habits of knowledge from the act of understanding by which the soul abstracts from phantasms. Therefore, a habit of acquired knowledge only inclines to similar acts. Therefore since in the separated soul there cannot be an act of understanding of this sort, namely by receiving from phantasms, it seems that the separated soul cannot understand anything through knowledge acquired here or through species received from the senses here.

Obj. 3: In the works of nature nothing is superfluous, nor does nature do through two things what it can do through one. But the separated soul will be able to understand through an inpouring from higher substances, as said above. Therefore, it will not understand through any species received from the senses.

Obj. 4: It is impossible for there to be two forms of the same species in the same subject. But the separated soul will receive some intelligible forms from the influence of a higher substance, through which it will be able to understand. Therefore, intelligible forms of the same things received from the senses cannot remain in it.

Obj. 5: Our intellect actually understands from the fact of that the intelligible forms exist in it. Therefore, after it has ceased actually understanding the intelligible form does not remain in it. And so it seems that no intelligible forms received from the senses, through which it can understand, remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 6: For someone to consider what he previously came to know seems to pertain to memory or recollection. But when the body is destroyed the soul has no recollection, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 and 3. (It seems that Aristotle says the opposite of this in Book I, at any rate; but the position Thomas gives could be drawn from Book III, chs. 4–5 and 7.) Therefore, the separated soul does not understand through species received from the senses in this life.

On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says that the soul is the place of species, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a27.) speaking of the intellective part. But a place keeps what is located in the place. Therefore, species received from the senses are preserved in the intellective part. And so it seems that through them the soul can understand when separated from the body just as it can now.

Furthermore (2), the end remains even when what is directed toward the end is withdrawn. But the senses are ordered to the knowledge of the intellective soul as to an end, inasmuch as it receives knowledge from the senses. Therefore, the knowledge that the soul receives from the senses remains in it even when the body’s senses have been destroyed, as will be the case when the soul has been separated from the body.

Furthermore (3), what is received in something is received in it after the mode of the receiver. But the soul is incorruptible and perpetual. Therefore, what is received in it is received as able to be preserved perpetually in it. Therefore, intelligible species that it receives from the senses remain in it after separation from the body. But they would remain in vain if through them it did not understand forms previously received from the senses.

I answer that, concerning this there are two opinions.

One is occasioned by the opinion of Avicenna, (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 5, ch. 15.) who says that our potential intellect does not preserve any forms after it ceases actually to understand, because the intelligible forms can only be in the potential intellect as in the power apprehending. For it does not use a bodily organ in such a way that something can be in the intellect for its part and not actually in the power apprehending; this is the way that something is in the powers of the sensitive part, and these powers are called store houses, such as the memory and imagination. But the potential intellect, when it turns itself to the agent intellect, which he posits is separated, receives intelligible species by its operation, which is to abstract forms from phantasms and place them in the potential intellect. And when it ceases to turn itself to the agent intellect, these forms cease to be in it, just as a visible form ceases to be in the eye when the eye ceases to turn itself toward the thing seen. Now, if the potential intellect wishes to consider again what it considered previously, it must turn itself anew to the agent intellect and receive intelligible species anew. And in this regard some who follow Avicenna say that in our soul no intelligible species are preserved that it could use for understanding after death. And so they also say that knowledge acquired here in no way remains whether actually or habitually.

But this opinion does not seem fitting. First, because it is manifestly contrary to the Philosopher’s view, who states that the soul is the place of species, which means that these species must be preserved in it. Second, because the very fact that species are impressed upon the potential intellect makes it improbable that they are effaced, unless some cause has corrupted them, since it is much more noble for intelligible forms to be received in the potential intellect than sensible forms in prime matter. Third, because Augustine (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 14, ch. 12.) holds that memory is part of the mind and that in it intelligible species are preserved. Fourth, because granted that no intelligible species remained in the separated soul, it would not on this account be taken away such that no habit of knowledge would remain, even according to Avicenna’s opinion. For his opinion is that although the intelligible species do not remain in the potential intellect when it does not actually understand, a certain aptness does remain in it such that it more easily turns itself to receive intelligible species from the agent intellect. This is the reason why a person does not always need to labor to understand something as when he had newly learned it or come upon it. And so in the separated soul such a aptness will also remain, namely, so that a soul that was perfected in this world by a habit of knowledge will be more ready to receive knowledge from the influence of a higher substance than another soul that lacked such a habit.

And thus it seems that we must hold, in keeping with others, that intelligible species as well as a greater aptness to receive from the agent intellect remain in the soul after it has actually ceased to understand. And both of these will remain in the separated soul, and it will be able to use both of these in understanding, though it will use them in a different manner than when it is joined to the body. For when it is joined to the body its intellect can only consider a thing, whether through acquired species or through the influx of a higher substance, by turning itself to phantasms, since on account of its perfect union with the body, its intellective potency does not know anything except what is received through the body, from which it acquires phantasms as the objects it looks at. But when it is separated from the body it will understand after another manner, as said above, namely not by looking at phantasms.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though intelligible species, speaking per se, have the same character when they are in the soul joined to the body and when they are in the separated soul, accidentally they have a different character, inasmuch as the soul in which they exist stands differently with regard to being united to or separated from matter. And thus the soul joined to matter only understands through these species by turning itself toward phantasms, but when it has been separated it will understand through them even without turning to phantasm.

Reply Obj. 2: Acts are specified not by the starting terminus but rather by the ending terminus. Hence whitening is the same movement in species whether someone goes from black to white or whether he goes from red to white. And so, too, understanding is not differentiated specifically by whether a thing is understood by abstraction from phantasms or not by abstraction, as long as what is understood and how it is understood are of a single mode. And for this reason a habit of knowledge acquired here by the acts of the intellect receiving from phantasms inclines to the act of understanding in which it does not look to phantasms. And therefore our understanding according to this current state is in accord with phantasms enlightened by the light of the agent intellect. Consequently, it has the same character as does the knowledge of a separated soul, which takes place through an influx of light from a higher substance, at least as regards this enlightenment, although not as regards the phantasms.

Reply Obj. 3: From these intelligible species preexisting in the potential intellect, the potential intellect is rendered more ready to more perfectly receive knowledge from the influence of a higher substance. Therefore, it does not follow that it is vain for such species to remain in the separated soul that understanding may be had through them.

Reply Obj. 4: Received intelligible forms do not have entirely the same character as the forms that come directly from the divine influence. For different impressions are left from different imprinters. So, too, a habit of acquired virtue does not have the same character as a habit of infused virtue. Therefore nothing prevents both forms from remaining in the separated soul. And nothing prevents the forms then received from the influence of a higher substance from being formal and complementary with regard to the forms acquired from the senses.

Reply Obj. 5: Intelligible forms remain in our intellect, even after it ceases from actual understanding; nor in this opinion do we follow Avicenna. Now such intelligible forms remain in the potential intellect when it is not actually understanding, not as in a complete act but in an act that is a mean between pure potency and perfect act. This is also how a form in the process of becoming exists.

Reply Obj. 6: The Philosopher is speaking of memory and recollection as a part of the sensitive soul, whose act cannot remain when the body is corrupted. This is what we need at present in order to understand what we have previously understood. For this reason we must turn to phantasms that sometimes must be brought out from the store house of memory. But memory, as considered by Augustine to be in the mind, will remain in the soul after death.

Article 3

Whether the separated soul knows singulars

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 89, a. 4; De veritate, q. 19, a. 2; De anima, a. 20.) It seems that the separated soul does not know singulars. (This term could also be rendered “particular things” or “individuals.”) For the separated soul will not use the sensitive powers. But singulars are only known by the soul through the sensitive powers, since a singular is a given thing when it is sensed, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Categories of Aristotle (PL 64), Bk. 1, ‘substance.’) Therefore, the separated soul will not know singulars.

Obj. 2: The separated soul’s intellect will be more withdrawn from matter than the intellect of the soul joined to the body. But the soul joined to the body cannot know singulars with the intellect due to the intellect’s immateriality. Therefore, neither will it know them when separated from the body.

Obj. 3: The difference between the senses and the intellect lies chiefly in the fact that the senses know something here and now whereas the intellect abstracts from both of these. If, then, the intellect of the separated soul can know singulars, its knowledge will in no way differ from the senses, which is unfitting.

Obj. 4: Just as in the wayfaring state we know particulars through the senses, so also we know universals through the intellect. But the senses can never arrive at knowing universals. Therefore, neither can the intellect arrive at knowing singulars.

Obj. 5: The soul has the same nature when separated as when joined to the body. But by the nature of the intellective soul, forms that are received in the intellect while it is joined to the body do not lead to the knowledge of singulars. For they are in it after its mode. Therefore, they will exist in the same mode in it after it has been separated from the body. And so they will not lead to the knowledge of singulars.

On the contrary (1), it is said that the rich man in hell, existing as soul alone, said: I have five brothers (Luke 16:28). From this it is clear that separated souls know singulars.

Furthermore (2), the intellect of the soul that is joined to the body knows singulars. This is clear from the fact that it can form a proposition whose predicate is universal and whose subject is singular and can compose a syllogism whose minor premise is singular. Therefore, the soul will also know singulars through the intellect when separated from the body.

Furthermore (3), no one can arrange for what he is ignorant of. But the soul in the body makes arrangements about things to be done concerning singulars. Therefore, the soul in the body also knows singulars through the intellect. Since, then, the intellect remains whole in the separated soul, it seems that the separated soul knows singulars.

I answer that, since all knowledge is through forms by which the knower is assimilated to the things known, there will be two ways of knowing: one through forms received from things, and the other through the forms that are the causes of things or received from the causes of things. For in order for two things to be similar, one must be the cause of the other or both must proceed under the same cause, since unity of effect indicates unity of cause. Therefore in the knowledge through forms received from things, the things themselves are the cause of the knowledge through their action. Therefore, since all action is through a form, but form precisely as form is universal, a person cannot arrive at knowledge of singular things through this sort of way of knowing. For in this way matter, which is the principle of individuation, is only known in the universal, namely, inasmuch as it has definite relationship to a universal form, as one who knows ‘snub’ knows the nose inasmuch as it is the subject of ‘snub,’ except when forms are individually received in the knower as they are in things outside the soul, as happens in cognoscitive powers through a corporeal organ. But in the knowledge through forms that are the causes of things or their impressions, we arrive even at singulars, even though forms of this sort are altogether immaterial. This is so because the first cause of a thing is that which gives an influx of being to things, and being regards matter and form in common. And so this kind of form leads directly to knowledge of both, namely of matter and of form, and consequently through such knowledge things are known both in the universal and in the singular.

Therefore the soul, when joined to the body, only knows through forms received from things. And thus through the cognoscitive power in which forms are received from things in a manner altogether immaterial, it does not know singulars directly but only through the powers connected to organs. Indirectly, however, and through a kind of reflection, it does know singulars even through the intellect, which does not use an organ. That is to say, it knows them as it returns from its proper object to knowledge of its own act and from this act returns to the species that is the principle of understanding. And from this species it proceeds to consider the phantasms from which such a species was abstracted. And in this way through the phantasms it knows the singular. The separated soul, however, uses both kinds of knowledge. For it knows both through species received from the senses and through species received from higher substances. These species are the impressions of causes, that is, of the ideal concepts existing in God. And thus in the manner by which it knows through species received from the senses, it does not directly know singulars. But in the manner by which it knows from the influence of a higher substance, it can know singulars for the same reason that the angels can, about whose knowledge we have spoken in Book II, Distinction 3, Question 2.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul in the wayfaring state only knows singulars directly through the sensitive powers, since it only knows through forms received from things. These, since they reach the intellect, in which they are received in a manner altogether immaterial, cannot be the principle of knowing the singular. But when it has been separated from the body, it will have another mode of knowing, by which it will be able to know singulars, as said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that the separated soul is in a certain way more immaterial than when joined to the body, it is closer to higher substances, which are altogether immaterial, and more ready to receive their influx. And, consequently, it is more ready to understand in the way that they understand.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect that knows the singular knows it in a manner different from the senses. For the senses know the singular through the form as in a certain way material. Hence through the form their knowledge cannot extend beyond the singular. But the intellect knows the singular through the form as immaterial, which is able to be the principle of knowing both the universal and the singular. And so this difference between the senses and the intellect still remains.

Reply Obj. 4: The sensitive power is lower than the intellective power. Hence the intellect is more able to extend to what belongs to the senses than the senses are able to extend to what belongs to the intellect.

Reply Obj. 5: The form is received in the same manner in the intellect of the separated soul as in the intellect of the soul joined to the body, namely in an immaterial manner, but even so the form in the separated soul will have a higher character and power, namely, inasmuch as it flows from higher substances, as was said in the body of the article.

We should concede the first objection to the contrary. But we must reply to the other two because they conclude that the intellect of the soul joined to the body knows singulars.

Reply Sed Contra 2: In the wayfaring state our intellect uses singulars in composing propositions and forming syllogisms inasmuch as it turns back toward the powers of the sensitive part, as was said, and in a certain way is continuous with them, to the extent that their motion and activities are terminated in the intellect, insofar as the intellect receives from them.

Reply Sed Contra 3: In order for the practical intellect to make arrangements concerning singulars, as it says in On the Soul 3, (See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 11, 434a17–21.) it needs the particular reason, by the mediation of which it applies a universal opinion (which is in the intellect) to a particular work. And this is the way that a syllogism comes about, whose major premise is the universal, which is the opinion of the practical intellect, whereas the minor premise is singular, which is an estimation of the particular reason, also called by the name ‘cogitative.’ Then, the conclusion consists in the choosing of the work.

Article 4

Whether local distance impedes its knowledge

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 89, a. 7.) It seems that local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge. For the soul as it exists here knows what is going on here. But when existing in the dwelling place due to it it does not know what is going on here. Hence Augustine says in On the Care to be Taken of the Dead: the souls of the departed are where they cannot know what is going on here. (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead (CSEL 41), ch. 13.) Therefore, local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge.

Obj. 2: The natural knowledge of the separated soul is not greater than a demon’s natural knowledge. But demons do not know what is absent by natural knowledge. Hence Augustine says in On the Divination of Demons: they also rapidly bear to us what is happening elsewhere by the swiftness of their motion such that they seem, as it were, to predict what we will know later on when human beings announce it. (Augustine, On the Divination of Demons (CSEL 41), chs. 3 and 5.) But this swiftness of motion would be for nothing if they could know what is absent when they are here with us. Therefore, the separated soul does not know what is absent. And so its knowledge is impeded by local distance.

Obj. 3: Everyone who knows a thing as here and now knows what is here in one way and what is elsewhere in another. But the separated soul knows things as here and now, since it knows singulars, as has been said. Therefore, it knows what is near in one way and what is far in another. And so the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 4: Something distant in time is like something distant in place. But the separated soul cannot know what is distant in time, for example, future things. For this belongs to God alone, as is clear through what is found in Isaiah 41:23: tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods. Therefore, neither can it know what is distant in place.

Obj. 5: Activity does not go beyond the substance of the one acting. This is why Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 3, PG 94:870.) says that the angels are where they operate. But the separated soul is in a place, since a physical place is assigned it as a dwelling place. Therefore, the separated soul’s activity cannot extend beyond that place. And so it cannot know what is distant in place.

On the contrary (1), the saints are at the greatest distance from the damned, even with regard to place. But the damned see the blessed, as is clear from the rich man, who amid torments saw Abraham and Lazarus (Lk 16:23). Therefore, local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul.

Furthermore (2), no activity is impeded by distance of place unless it is a positional activity. For near and distant in place seem to pertain to position. But the separated soul has no other knowledge than intellective knowledge, since it does not use the sensitive powers. But intellective knowledge is in no way positional, since it does not occur through bodily instruments. Therefore, nearness or distance of place has no impact on the separated soul’s knowledge.

Furthermore (3), intelligible light is greater than any sensible light. But the sensible light of the sun is not impeded from its activity by any local distance, since it illuminates the whole world. Therefore, neither is the intelligible light of the soul impeded from its knowledge by any physical distance.

I answer that, as has been said, some hold that the separated soul knows by receiving from things. If this were true, local distance would doubtlessly impede the separated soul’s knowledge by the fact that the actions of sensible things do not extend equally to near and far, since they are moved to what is distant through what is near. And so in what is remote the power of the first agent is gradually diminished. And so it is that we cannot sense what is not close to us.

But if we posit that the separated soul knows through forms, whether co-created or received from higher substances, then its knowledge cannot be impeded by the distance of a thing. For it will not know through such forms inasmuch as things act on the soul or the soul acts on things, such that the physical medium through which the action is accomplished could impede knowledge. Rather, this knowledge is brought to perfection from the mere fact that the forms in the soul represent things that are outside the soul, which they represent equally whether they are near or distant, as the image of Hercules represents Hercules equally, wherever Hercules may be. Hence, too, the cognoscitive powers, which know things through forms received from the things, as long as they do not know them only while they are receiving them, know equally things that are distant and things that are near, as our intellect in the wayfaring state knows the sun and moon equally and our imagination equally imagines a man who is near and one who is distant. But because the knowledge of the senses is brought to perfection in the fact that the senses are moved by the sensible, the result is that sensitive knowledge is impeded by local distance. If, then, the knowledge of the separated soul does not come about by receiving forms from sensible things, as we established above, then in no way will local distance be able to impede its knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though some souls of the departed in their dwelling places are ignorant of what is going on here, this does not occur because of local distance but rather because of some other cause, as, for example, because they are strongly affected at what they undergo in those dwelling places, or even because the influence of a higher substance, although it perfects them for the knowledge of some things, does not do so for everything, but rather only for those things that belong to it in accord with its own mode.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine frequently makes use of the position that holds that demons have bodies united to them, as is apparent also in the little book cited. If this were the case, then we would have to posit that they have a sensible body and receive knowledge from things through the senses. And in this case their knowledge would be impeded by local distance. Hence it would not be like the separated soul, which does not know in this manner.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument would make sense if the separated soul knew what is here and now by receiving from things that are here and now, as happens in the senses. But this was said to be false. Hence the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Things that are distant in time, namely future things, fall short of being because the existence of a thing is measured by time. Thus since things are knowable insofar as they have being, since knowledge is of what exists, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 1, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, PG 3:586.) future things are unknowable in themselves. But what is distant in place does not fall short of being, for place does not measure the existence of a thing but rather measures things that exist. Hence just because things are distant does not mean they are any less knowable in themselves, though they may be less knowable from the perspective of some who know the things themselves by undergoing something from the things, which is not the case in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 5: Activity, as a kind of accident having being in a subject, does not extend beyond its subject. But as compared to the object it does extend beyond its subject, just as we now, through a soul that is still in a body, know things that are in heaven. And so nothing prevents the separated soul from knowing what is distant in place.

Question 2

The punishments of the damned

Next, we must inquire about the punishments of the damned; and here four questions arise:

first, concerning their punishments as regards their effect;

• second, as regards the intellect;
• third, as regards the body;
• fourth, concerning their punishments in comparison to what the blessed observe.
• Article 1

On their punishments as regards their effect

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 64, a. 2; ST I-II, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 2; SCG IV, ch. 93; De anima, a. 17, ad 7; Comp. theo. 174; De veritate, q. 24, a. 10; De malo, q. 16, a. 5.) It seems that not everything the damned will is evil. For, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23, PG 3:726.) the demons desire the goods, even the great goods, of being, living, and understanding. Since, then, damned men are not in a worse condition than demons, it seems that they, too, can have a good will.

Obj. 2: Evil, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32, PG 3:731.) is altogether involuntary. Therefore, if the damned will anything, they will it as good or as apparent good. But the will that is, in itself, ordered to the good is good. Therefore, the damned can have a good will.

Obj. 3: Some will be damned who, when they were in this world, acquired some habits of virtue—for example, the gentiles who had political virtues. But habits of virtue call forth a praiseworthy will. Therefore, a praiseworthy will can exist in some of the damned.

On the contrary (1), the obstinate will can only be turned to evil. But men who are damned will be obstinate, just as demons are. Therefore, their will can never be good.

Furthermore (2), as the will of the blessed is to the good, the will of the damned is to evil. But the blessed never have an evil will. Therefore, the damned never have a good will.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned never repent of the evils they have done. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 13, a. 4; ST III, q. 86, a. 1; In IV Sent. d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 4; Super Heb. 12, lec. 3; Comp. theo. 175.) For Bernard (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs (Bernardi Opera, vol. 1, ed. Leclercq et al.), Sermon 35.) says in On the Song of Songs that one who is damned always wills the iniquity he has done. Therefore, he never repents of the sin he committed.

Obj. 2: To will oneself not to have sinned is a good will. But the damned will not have a good will. Therefore, the damned will never will that they had not sinned. And so it follows the same as before.

Obj. 3: According to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4, PG 94:878.) what the fall is to angels death is to men. But after their fall, the will of an angel is unchangeable in such a way that it cannot withdraw from the choice whereby it previously sinned. Therefore the damned, too, are unable to repent of the sins they have committed.

Obj. 4: The damned in hell will have a greater perversity than do sinners in this world. But there are some sinners in this world who do not repent of the sins they have committed, either because of mental blindness, as in the case of heretics, or because of obstinacy, as in the case of those who rejoice in doing evil and delight in the perverseness of evil (Prov 2:14). Therefore, neither will the damned in hell repent of their sins.

On the contrary (1), it is said of the damned: they will speak to one another in repentance (Wis 5:3).

Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b13–24.) that the depraved are filled with repentance, for they are subsequently saddened at what they previously took delight in. Therefore, the damned, since they are most depraved, repent all the more.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned cannot will their own non-existence with a right and deliberative reason. (Parallels: ST I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3; De veritate, q. 22, a. 1, ad 7; Super Matt. 26.) For Augustine says in On Free Choice of the Will: consider how great a good being is, which both the blessed and the wretched will. For it is better to be and to be wretched than not to be at all. (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (CCSL 29), Bk. 3, ch. 7.)

Obj. 2: In the same place Augustine (Ibid., ch. 8.) argued as follows. Preference supposes choice. But non-being cannot be chosen, since it does not have the appearance of good, since it is nothing. Therefore, non-being cannot be more desirable to the damned than being.

Obj. 3: The more evil something is, the more one must flee it. But non-being is the greatest evil, since it takes away the good completely, by the fact that it leaves nothing. Therefore, one must flee from non-being more than from being wretched. And so the same follows as before.

On the contrary (1), it is said: in those days men . . . will long to die, and death will fly from them (Rev 9:6).

Furthermore (2), the misery of the damned surpasses all the misery of this world. But some desire to die so as to avoid the misery of this world. Hence it is said: O death, how welcome is your sentence to one who is in need and is failing in strength, very old and distracted over everything; to one who is contrary, and has lost his wisdom (Sir 41:2). Therefore, much more is non-being desirable to the damned in accord with deliberate reason.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned in hell would not wish for others who are not damned to be damned. (Parallel: Quodl. VIII, q. 7, a. 2.) For it is said of the rich man that he prayed for his brothers that they might not come to the place of torments (Lk 16:28). For the same reason, therefore, other damned persons would at least not wish that their friends in the flesh be damned.

Obj. 2: Disordered affections are not taken away from the damned. But some who are damned inordinately loved others who are not damned. Therefore, they would not wish evil on them, which is what being damned would be.

Obj. 3: The damned do not desire an increase of their punishment. But if more were damned, the punishment of the damned would be greater, just as the multiplication of those who are good magnifies their joy. Therefore, the damned would not wish those who are saved to be damned.

On the contrary (1), on the passage: it raises from their thrones (Is 14:9), a Gloss says: the wicked find solace in having many who share their punishments.

Furthermore (2), envy reigns supreme among the damned. Therefore, they are pained at the happiness of the good and desire their damnation.

Quaestiuncula 5

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned do not hate God. (Parallels: ST I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5; ST II-II, q. 34, a. 1; De veritate, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3.) For, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, PG 3:725.) the good and the beautiful, which causes all good and beauty, is lovable to all. Now this is God. Therefore, he cannot be hated by anyone.

Obj. 2: No one can hate goodness itself, just as no one can will evilness itself. For evil is altogether unable to be willed, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, PG 3:732.) But God is goodness itself. Therefore, no one can hate God.

On the contrary, it is said: the pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually (Ps 74 [73]:23).

Quaestiuncula 6

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned demerit. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 13, a. 4, ad 2; In I Sent. d. 48, a. 3, ad 2.) For the damned have an evil will, as it says in the text. But by the evil will they had here they demerited. Therefore, if they did not demerit there, then they would gain an advantage from their damnation.

Obj. 2: The damned are in the same condition as the demons. But the demons demerit after their fall; for example, God inflicted a punishment on the serpent who induced man to sin, as is said in Gen 3:14–15. Therefore, the damned also demerit.

Obj. 3: An inordinate act proceeding from free will is not excused being demeritorious, even if some self-imposed necessity is present. For a drunk person merits two beatings if he commits another sin out of drunkenness, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 5, 1113b29–33.) But the damned imposed their obstinacy on themselves, which obstinacy leads to a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore, since their inordinate act proceeds from free will, it is not excused from demerit.

On the contrary (1), punishment is contradistinguished from fault. But the perverse will in the damned proceeds from obstinacy, which is their punishment. Therefore, perverse will in the damned is not a fault such that they demerit by it.

Furthermore (2), after the final terminus no motion or progress in good or in evil remains. But the damned, most of all after the day of judgment, will reach the final terminus of their damnation, since then the two cities will possess their end, as Augustine says. (See Augustine, Explanations of the Psalms (CCSL 40), Ps. 136, and Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 111.) Therefore, after the day of judgment the damned will not demerit by perverse will because in that case their damnation would increase.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, we can consider two kinds of will in the damned: deliberative will and natural will. They do not have a natural will from themselves but from the author of nature, who has placed in nature the inclination that is called natural will. For this reason, since nature remains in them, in this respect the natural will in them can be good. But they have deliberative will from themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined through an affection toward this or that. And this kind of will in them is only evil, because they are perfectly turned away from the last end of an upright will, and a will can only be good by being ordered to this end. Therefore, even if they will something good, they do not will this good well, such that their will can thereby be called good.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius’s statement is understood of natural will, which is the inclination of nature to some good. But even so, this natural inclination is corrupted by their malice inasmuch as they desire this good, which they naturally desire, under certain evil circumstances.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil precisely as evil does not move the will. Rather, it moves the will inasmuch as it is considered good. But this itself is a result of their malice, namely that they consider what is evil to be a good. And thus their will is evil.

Reply Obj. 3: The habits of the political virtues do not remain in the separated soul, because these virtues perfect the soul only in civil life, which will not exist after this life. But if they did remain, they would never proceed into act, as if bound by the mind’s obstinacy.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a person can repent of sin in two ways: in one way per se, in the other way accidentally. One repents of sin per se who finds sin precisely as sin abhorrent, whereas one repents of sin accidentally who hates it by reason of something connected to it, such as punishment or some other such thing. The wicked, therefore, will not repent of their sins, speaking per se, since the will of sin’s malice remains in them. They will, however, repent accidentally, inasmuch as they will be afflicted by the punishment they bear for sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The damned desire iniquity but flee punishment, and in this way they repent accidentally for the iniquity they have committed.

Reply Obj. 2: To will oneself not to have sinned on account of the vileness of wrongdoing is a good will, but the damned do not have this will.

Reply Obj. 3: That the damned repent of their sins will happen without the will’s turning away from sin. For what they will flee in their sins is not what they previously desired but rather something else, namely punishment.

Reply Obj. 4: In this world men, no matter how obstinate, repent of their sins accidentally if they are punished for them. For in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, Augustine says: we see that even the most ferocious beasts abstain from the greatest pleasures because of the pain of punishments. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Questions (CCSL 44A), qu. 36.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that non-being can be considered in two ways. In one way, it can be considered in itself. And in this way it can in no way be desirable, since it does not have any character of the good but is, rather, a pure privation of the good. In the other way, it can be considered inasmuch as it is something that takes away punishment or life’s misery, and in this way non-being takes on the character of a good. For to lack evil is a kind of good, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b8–9.) And in this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be wretched. This is why Matthew 26:24 says: it would have been better for that man if he had not been born. And, commenting on Jeremiah 20:14: cursed be the day on which I was born, Jerome’s Gloss says: it is better for someone not to exist than to exist in an evil way. And in this regard the damned can prefer non-being in accord with deliberative reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine’s statement should be understood as meaning that non-being is not capable of being chosen for itself, but it can be chosen accidentally, namely, inasmuch as it puts an end to misery. For the statement that being and living are naturally desired by everyone need not be taken as regards an evil and corrupt life or one that is enveloped in sorrows, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b2ff., as well as ch. 9.)

Reply Obj. 2: Non-being cannot be chosen for itself but only accidentally, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Non-being, though it is most evil inasmuch as it deprives one of being, is very good inasmuch as it takes away misery, which is the greatest of evils. And this is the way in which non-being is chosen.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that just as in heaven there will be the most perfect charity in the blessed, so also there will be the most perfect hatred in the damned. Hence just as the saints will rejoice at all goods, so also the wicked will be pained at all goods. And so, too, when they consider the saints’ happiness it will afflict them most of all; thus it is said: let the envious peoples see and be ashamed, and let fire consume thy adversaries (Is 26:11). Therefore, they would wish for all the good to be damned.

Reply Obj. 1: There will be such great envy in the damned that they will envy the glory even of their relatives, since they are in utmost misery themselves, for this is what happens even in this life when envy grows. But even so, they will envy their relatives less than others. And their punishment would be greater if all their relatives were damned and others saved than if some of their relatives were saved. And so it was that the rich man begged for his brothers to be rescued from damnation, for he knew that some people would be so rescued. Still, he would have preferred his brothers to be damned with all the rest.

Reply Obj. 2: Love that is not founded on what is upright is easily withdrawn, especially among wicked men, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, chs. 4 and 12.) Hence the damned will not preserve friendship with those whom they inordinately loved. But their will will remain perverse in the fact that they still love the cause of their inordinate love.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though the punishment of individuals increases on the basis of the total number of the damned, such great hatred and envy grows even more, to the point that they would rather be tortured more with many than tortured less by themselves.

Response to Quaestiuncula 5

To the fifth question, it should be said that the affections are moved by good or evil as apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways: in himself, as the blessed apprehend him, since they see him in his essence; and through his effects, as we and the damned apprehend him. Therefore, since he is goodness in his essence, he cannot be displeasing to any will in himself. For this reason, anyone who saw him in his essence could not hate him. But some of his effects are repugnant to the will inasmuch as they are contrary to something it wills. And in this regard someone can hate God, not in himself but by reason of his effects. Therefore, the damned, perceiving God in the effect of his justice, which is punishment, hate him as they hate the punishments they bear.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius’s statement should be understood of natural appetite, though in the damned this is perverted through what is added by deliberate will, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument would proceed if the damned perceived God in himself, inasmuch as he is essentially good.

Response to Quaestiuncula 6

To the sixth question, it should be said that we must distinguish between the damned before the day of judgment and the damned after the day of judgment. For all commonly confess that after the day of judgment there will be no merit or demerit. And this is the case because merit or demerit is ordered to a good or evil to be obtained later on, but after the day of judgment the final consummation of goods and evils will arrive, such that there will be nothing of good or evil to add. Hence the good will in the blessed will not be merit but reward, and the evil will in the damned will not be demerit but only punishment. For the activities of virtue exist especially in happiness, and their contraries exist especially in misery, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 10, 1100b9–21.) But before the day of judgment some say both that the blessed merit and that the damned demerit. But this cannot be with respect to the essential reward or the principal punishment, since in this regard both groups have arrived at the terminus. It can, however, be the case with respect to accidental reward or secondary punishment, which can be increased up till the day of judgment. And this is especially the case in the demons or the good angels, by whose intervention some are drawn to salvation, from which the good angels’ joy grows, or to damnation, from which the demons’ punishment grows.

Reply Obj. 1: To have reached the height of evils is the supreme disadvantage, which is the reason why the damned cannot demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from sin.

Reply Obj. 2: It does not pertain to the role of damned men to draw others to damnation as it pertains to the role of demons such that they would demerit as regards secondary punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: They are not excused from demerit because they sin out of necessity but because they have reached the height of evils. However, when we bring on ourselves a necessity of sinning, this excuses from fault inasmuch as it is a kind of necessity, since every sin must be voluntary, but it does not excuse inasmuch as it arose from the preceding will. And so the whole demerit of the consequent fault seems to pertain to the first fault.

Article 2

Punishments in the intellect

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that the damned cannot use knowledge that they possessed in this world. For there is the greatest delight in the consideration of knowledge. But we cannot suppose any delight in them. Therefore, they cannot use knowledge previously possessed according to any consideration. (Notitia and scientia appear to be treated interchangeably in this objection.)

Obj. 2: The damned are enveloped in punishments greater than any of this world’s punishments. But in this world when someone is enveloped in the greatest torments he cannot consider any intelligible conclusions, abstracting himself from the punishments he is suffering. Therefore, much less will this be the case in hell.

Obj. 3: The damned are subject to time. But length of time is the cause of forgetfulness, as it says in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, ch. 12, 221a30-b2.) Therefore, the damned will forget what they knew here.

On the contrary (1), it is said to the rich man who was damned: remember that you in your lifetime received your good things (Lk 16:25). Therefore, they will consider what they knew here.

Furthermore (2), the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as said above. If, then, they could not use them, they would remain in them in vain.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they will sometimes think about God. For only what is thought about can be actually hated. But the damned will hate God, as it says in the text. Therefore, they will think about God sometimes.

Obj. 2: The damned will have remorse of conscience. But conscience suffers remorse for acts against God. Therefore, they will think about God sometimes.

On the contrary, the most perfect thought of a man is that by which he thinks about God. But the damned will be in the most imperfect state. Therefore, they will not think about God.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned do not see the glory of the blessed. (Parallel: Quodl. VIII, q. 7, a. 1.) For the glory of the blessed is more distant from them than what goes on in this world. But they do not see what goes on concerning us. Therefore, commenting on Job 14:21: his sons come to honor, and he does not know it, Gregory in Moralia 12 says: just as those who are still alive are ignorant of the place where the souls of the dead are, so also the dead who lived in the flesh are ignorant of how the life of those in the flesh is carried out after them. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 12, par. 21.) Therefore, much less can they see the glory of the blessed.

Obj. 2: What is granted to the saints in this life as a great gift is never granted to the damned. But to Paul it was granted as a great gift that he should see the life wherein the saints eternally live with God, as it is said in a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 12. Therefore, the damned will not see the glory of the saints.

On the contrary, it is said (Luke 16:23) that the rich man in torments saw Abraham as well as Lazarus in his bosom.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, just as there will be nothing that is not matter for joy among the saints on account of their perfect beatitude, so also there will be nothing among the damned that will not be for them the matter and cause for sorrow. Nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their misery will be consummate. Therefore, the consideration of certain things known introduces joy in some respect, either on the part of the knowable objects inasmuch as they are loved, or on the part of the knowledge itself inasmuch as it is fitting and perfect. There can also be reason for sorrow both on the part of knowable objects that are such as to sadden one, and on the part of the knowledge itself, insofar as its imperfection is considered. This happens, for example, when someone considers the fact that he falls short in the knowledge of some thing whose perfection he would desire. Therefore, in this way there will be in the damned the actual consideration of the things they previously knew as the matter of sorrow, not as the cause of delight. For they will consider both the evils they did, for which they were damned, and the goods they loved and have lost. And they will be tortured by both. Likewise, too, they will be tortured by the fact that they will consider that the knowledge that they had of speculative matters is imperfect and that they have lost the utmost perfection of it which they could have acquired.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the consideration of knowledge is delightful in itself, it can be the cause of sorrow for an incidental reason, as has been said, and this is how it will be in the damned.

Reply Obj. 2: In this world the soul is joined with a corruptible body; thus the soul’s consideration is impeded through the body’s being afflicted. But in the future the soul will not be dragged down by the body in this way. Rather, however much the body is afflicted, the soul will always consider with greatest lucidity those things that can cause it to grieve.

Reply Obj. 3: Time is the cause of forgetfulness accidentally inasmuch as motion, which time is the measure of, is the cause of change. But after the day of judgment there will be no motion of the heavens, and consequently there will be no possibility of forgetfulness due to the passage of time, however long it may be. And before the day of judgment, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition through motion.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that God can be considered in two ways. In one way, he can be considered in himself and according to what is proper to him, namely, to be the principle of all goodness. And in this way he is not able to be thought of without delight; and therefore the damned will not think about him at all. In the other way, he can be considered with respect to what is, as it were, accidental to him in his effects, such as, to punish or something like that. And in this regard consideration of him can lead to sorrow. This is the way in which the damned will think about him.

Reply Obj. 1: The damned, as has been said, only hate God by reason of his punishing and forbidding, which does not agree with their evil will. Therefore, they will only consider him as someone who punishes and forbids.

And in this way the solution of the second objection is clear, since conscience only brings remorse for sin inasmuch as it is contrary to divine precept.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that as it says in the text, before the day of judgment the damned will see the blessed in glory, not in such a way that they will know their glory as it is, but only that they will know the blessed are in some kind of inestimable glory. And this fact will trouble them, both because of envy, since they are saddened at the happiness of the good, and because they have lost such glory. Hence it is said of the impious: when they see him, they will be shaken with dreadful fear (Wis 5:2). But after the day of judgment they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed. Nor will this lessen their punishment but will, rather, increase it. For they will possess the memory of the blessed’s glory that they saw at the judgment or before the judgment. And this will be a torment for them. But, afterwards, they will be afflicted in that they will see that they are reckoned as unworthy even to see the glory that the saints merit to possess.

Reply Obj. 1: What goes on in this life would not afflict the damned if it were seen as does the perception of the glory of the saints. Hence what happening here is not shown to the damned, as is the saints’ glory, although even of the things that go on here what can increase their sorrow is shown to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Paul perceived the life in which the saints live with God by experiencing it and by hoping for it more perfectly in the future. This characteristic does not pertain to the damned and thus the case is not similar.

Article 3

Punishment in the body

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 2; Quodl. VIII, q. 8; De anima, a. 21, ad 18.) It seems that the damned in hell are afflicted only with the punishment of fire. For in Matthew 25:41, to express their damnation mention is made only of fire, when it is said: depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire.

Obj. 2: Just as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial sin, so also the punishment of hell is due to mortal sin. But in purgatory there is only said to be fire, as is clear from the fact that 1 Cor 3:13 says: the fire will test what sort of work each one has done. Therefore in hell, too, there will be only the punishment of fire.

Obj. 3: Variation of punishments affords refreshment, as when going from hot to cold. But we can posit no refreshment among the damned. Therefore, there will not be different punishments, but the punishment of fire alone.

On the contrary (1), Psalm 11:6 says: fire and brimstone and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup..

Furthermore (2), Job 24:19 says: they shall pass from snow waters to exceeding heat.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the worm by which the damned are afflicted is a physical worm. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 90; De potentia, q. 5, a. 9, ad 13; Quodl. VII, q. 5, a. 3; Resp. de Art. 42, a. 41; Comp. theo. 175.) For flesh cannot be afflicted by a spiritual worm. But the flesh of the damned will be afflicted by the worm: fire and worms he will give to their flesh (Jud 16:17), and the punishment of the ungodly is fire and worms (Sir 7:19). Therefore, that worm will be physical.

Obj. 2: Augustine says in the City of God 21: both, i.e., fire and the worm, will be the flesh’s punishment. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 9.) And so the same follows as before.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the City of God 20: among the punishments of the wicked, the unquenchable fire and the worm that cannot die have been explained in various senses by others. Some have referred both to the body. Others have referred both to the soul. Still others have referred the fire properly to the body and the worm figuratively to the soul. This latter seems more credible. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 20, ch. 22.)

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the weeping among the damned will be physical. (Parallels: SCG IV, ch. 90; Quodl. VII, q. 3, a. un.; Resp. de Art. 42, a. 40.) For on Luke 13:28, a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:305.) says that the true resurrection of bodies can be proven through the weeping that the Lord threatens to the reprobate. This would not be the case if that weeping were only spiritual. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: The sorrow that is a punishment corresponds to the delight that there was in fault, according to the passage: as she glorified herself and reveled in delights, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning (Rev 18:7). But in offending sinners took both internal and external delight. Therefore, they will have external weeping as well.

On the contrary, physical weeping occurs through the shedding of tears. But the bodies of the damned cannot give rise to a perpetual shedding of anything, since nothing in them will be renewed by food. For every finite thing is used up if something is continuously taken away from it. Therefore, there will not be physical weeping in the damned.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the damned are not enveloped in physical darkness. (Parallel: above, d. 48, q. 2, a. 4, ad 3.) For commenting on Job 10:22: the land of gloom and chaos, Gregory says in the Moralia 9: even though the fire there does not shine for consolation, it shines that in some regard it may torture them more, for the reprobate will see by the flame’s light the followers they have dragged down with them from the world. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 9, par. 66.) Therefore, there will be no physical darkness there.

Obj. 2: The damned will see their own punishment: this is for them an increase of their punishment. But nothing is seen without a light. Therefore, there is no physical darkness.

Obj. 3: The damned will possess there the power of sight after they receive their bodies again. But this would exist in them in vain if they did not see anything. Therefore, since nothing is seen except in a light, it seems that they are not completely in darkness.

On the contrary (1), it is said: bind him hand and foot, and cast him into the outer darkness (Mt 22:13). On this passage Gregory says in the Moralia 9: if that fire had light, it would never be said that they are cast into exterior darkness. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 9, par. 65.)

Furthermore (2), commenting on Psalm 29 (28):4: the voice of the Lord flashes forth flames of fire, Basil says that the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power to burn by the power of God such that the brightness will yield joy for the saints and the fire’s burning will yield torment for the damned. Therefore, the damned will have physical darkness. Now some other things pertaining to the punishment of the damned have been determined above in Distinction 44.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, according to Basil, (The Parma ed. indicates Basil, Homilies on the Psalms, Ps. 28, PG 29:298, but the text appears to be rather from Symeon the Metaphrast, On the Future Judgment, PG 32:1299.) in the final purification of the world a kind of separation will take place in the elements such that whatever is purified and noble will remain above for the glory of the blessed, while whatever is ignoble and filthy will be cast into hell for the punishment of the damned, so that just as every creature of God is a matter of joy for the blessed, so also torment accrues to the damned from all creatures, in accordance with the passage: creation will join with him to fight against the madmen (Wis 5:20). It also belongs to the divine justice that just as those who withdrew from the One through sin set their end among material things (which are many and empty), they will also be afflicted in many ways and by many things.

Reply Obj. 1: Because fire afflicts the most due to its abundance of active power, by the name ‘fire’ we denote every affliction insofar as it as vehement.

Reply Obj. 2: The punishment of purgatory is not principally for the sake of affliction but for purification. This is why that punishment should be administered through fire alone, since fire has the greatest purifying power. But the punishment of the damned is not ordered to purification. Therefore, the case is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: The damned will pass from the most vehement heat to the most vehement cold without any refreshment arising in them. For their suffering from external things will not occur by a change of the body from its original natural disposition such that the contrary passion will cause relief by a return to equilibrium or a temperate state, as happens now. Rather, it will be through spiritual action, according as sensible things act through the senses, for they are sensed by impressing these forms on an organ according to spiritual being, not material being, as was said above in Distinction 44.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that as was said above in Distinction 48, after the day of judgment in the renewed world there will remain no animal or mixed body, except the body of man alone, since that body alone has no order to corruption, and after that time there will be no generation or corruption. Hence the worm that is said to be in the damned should not be understood as being a material worm but rather a spiritual one, namely, the sting of conscience. This is called a worm inasmuch as it arises from the filth of sin and afflicts the soul, just as a physical worm arises from filth and afflicts by biting.

Reply Obj. 1: The very souls of the damned are called their flesh by virtue of the fact that they were subject to the flesh. Or we may say that the flesh, too, is afflicted by the spiritual worm insofar as the soul’s passions overflow into the body, and this will also happen in the future.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking by way of a kind of comparison. For he does not mean to assert simply that the worm is material but instead that it would be better to assert that the fire and worm should be understood materially [as well as spiritually] than that both should be understood only spiritually. For then the damned would suffer no corporeal punishment. This is clear by looking at the broader context of what he says in the same passage.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that we find two elements in physical weeping. One of these is the shedding of tears. And in this regard there cannot be physical weeping in the damned. For after the day of judgment, when the motion of the prime mobile comes to a rest, there will not be generation and corruption or the alteration of bodies. But in the shedding of tears there must be a generation of the fluid that runs down in the tears. Hence in this regard corporeal weeping will not be able to exist in the damned. The other element we find in physical weeping is a kind of shaking and disturbance of the head and eyes. And in this regard corporeal weeping will be able to exist in the damned after the resurrection. For the bodies of the damned will be afflicted not only from without but also from within to the extent that the body is changed in accord with the soul’s passion for good or bad. And in this weeping is a sign of the resurrection of the flesh and corresponds to the delight in offending that existed in soul and body.

And by this the reply to the objections is clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that the disposition of hell will be such as most greatly befits the misery of the damned. And accordingly, light and darkness will exist there precisely as they most augment the misery of the damned. Now, vision in itself is delightful. For as it says in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 980a22–28.) the sense of the eyes is the most desirable because we know more things through it. But it can happen incidentally that sight brings affliction inasmuch as we see what is harmful to us or repugnant to our will. Thus, too, the place of hell should be arranged for seeing through the interplay of light and darkness in such a way that nothing there is seen clearly but only what can strike the heart with affliction is seen in a shadowy way. Thus, simply speaking, the place is dark, but by the divine disposition there is some light there, as much as suffices for seeing what can torture the soul. And the natural location is quite enough for this, since in the middle of the earth, where hell is thought to be, fire can be only filthy, turbid, and sort of smoky. Some, however, assign the cause of this darkness as due to the bodies of the damned being packed in and pressed together, which because of the multitude will so fill the place of hell that no air will remain there. And in this way there will not be anything transparent that could be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be shrouded in darkness.

And in this way the reply to the objections is clear.

Article 4

On their punishments as related to what is seen by the blessed

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the blessed in heaven will not see the punishments of the damned. For there is a greater distance between the damned and the blessed than between wayfarers and the blessed. But they do not see the deeds of wayfarers. Thus, commenting on Isaiah 63:16: Abraham does not know us, a Gloss says: the dead, even the saints, do not know what the living do, even their children. Therefore, much less do they see the punishments of the damned.

Obj. 2: The perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b14–20.) that the most perfect activity of a sense belongs to the sense best disposed to the most beautiful thing that falls under that sense. Therefore, conversely, the vileness of the visible object redounds to the imperfection of vision. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore, they will not see the miseries of the damned, in which there is utmost vileness.

On the contrary, it is said: they shall go forth and look on the dead bodies of the men that have rebelled against me (Is 66:24). A Gloss adds: the elect will go out with understanding or manifest vision that they may be more enkindled for the praise of God.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the blessed have compassion for the miseries of the damned. (Parallel: In II Sent. d. 11, q. 1, a. 5.) For compassion proceeds from charity. But there will be most perfect charity in the blessed. Therefore, they will have the greatest compassion for the miseries of the damned.

Obj. 2: The blessed will never be as far removed from suffering as God is. But God in a certain way has compassion on our miseries. This is why he is called merciful. The angels are, too, in a similar way. Therefore, the blessed will have compassion on the miseries of the damned.

On the contrary, whoever has compassion on another becomes in a certain way a sharer in his misery. But the blessed cannot be sharers in any misery. Therefore, the blessed do not have compassion on the miseries of the damned.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the blessed do not rejoice at the punishments of the wicked. (Parallels: Quodl. VIII, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1; Super Ps. 36.) For to rejoice at evil pertains to hatred of another. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore, they will not rejoice at the miseries of the damned.

Obj. 2: In heaven the blessed will be conformed to God to the utmost degree. But God does not take delight in our punishments. Therefore, neither will the blessed take delight in the punishments of the damned.

Obj. 3: What is reprehensible in a wayfarer can in no way take place in a comprehensor. But in a man in the wayfaring state it is most reprehensible for him to relish the punishments of others and most commendable for him to be saddened at their punishments. Therefore, the blessed in no way rejoice at the punishments of the damned.

On the contrary (1), Psalm 58 (57):10 says: the righteous will rejoice when he sees the vengeance.

Furthermore (2), Isaiah 66:24 says: and all flesh shall be sated with the vision of them. But satiety denotes refreshment of mind. Therefore, the blessed will rejoice at the punishments of the wicked.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, nothing that pertains to the perfection of their beatitude should be taken from the blessed. But any given thing is better known from the activity of its contrary. For the contraries stand out more clearly when placed side by side. And thus, so that the beatitude of the saints may be more pleasing to them and that they may give richer thanks to God for it, it is granted to them to perceive perfectly the punishment of the wicked.

Reply Obj. 1: This Gloss is speaking about the saints who have died with regard to what is possible for nature. For it need not be the case that they know everything that goes on with the living by natural knowledge. Rather, the saints who are in heaven know clearly everything that goes on both with wayfarers and with the damned. Hence Gregory in the Moralia 12 says of the holy souls: we should not hold this opinion (namely, what Job says: his sons come to honor, and he does not know it) for in the case of those who have the clarity of God within we can in no way believe that there is anything outside that they are ignorant of. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 12, par. 21.)

Reply Obj. 2: Even though visible beauty yields perfection of vision, visible vileness can exist without imperfection of vision. For the species of things in the soul, through which contrary things are known, are not themselves contrary. Hence, too, God, who has the most perfect knowledge, sees everything beautiful and unsightly.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that we can find mercy or compassion in someone in two ways: in one way, after the manner of passion; in the other way, after the manner of choice. Now in the blessed there will be no passion in the lower part except as following on the choice of reason. Hence there will only be compassion or mercy in them in accord with the choice of reason. But mercy or compassion arises from choice when someone wills to remove the evil of another. Hence in the case of things that according to the judgment of reason we do not will to be removed we cannot have this kind of compassion. Now as long as sinners are in this world they exist in such a state that without prejudice to the divine justice they can be transferred to beatitude from the state of misery and sin. And thus the compassion of the blessed toward them has a place both in accord with the choice of the will, as God, the angels, and the blessed are said to have compassion on them by willing their salvation, and in accord with compassion, just as good men in the wayfaring state have compassion on them. But in the future they will not be able to be removed from their misery. Hence there will be no possibility of compassion toward their miseries in accord with right choice. And thus the blessed in glory will not have any compassion toward the damned.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is the principle of compassion when out of charity we can will the removal of some malice. But the saints cannot will this for the damned out of charity, since it is opposed to the divine justice. Thus, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: God is said to be merciful inasmuch as he comes to the aid of those whom it befits to be freed from misery in accord with the order of his wisdom and justice, not that he has mercy on the damned, except, perhaps, by punishing them less than they deserve.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that something can be the matter of joy in two ways. In one way, something can be the matter of joy per se, namely, when one rejoices in something precisely as that thing. And in this way the saints will not rejoice at the punishments of the wicked.

In the other way, something can be the matter of joy incidentally, that is, by reason of something connected with it. And in this way the saints will rejoice at the punishments of the wicked by considering in them the order of the divine justice and their own escape, in which they will rejoice. And in this way the divine justice and their own liberation will be the cause of the joy of the good per se, but the punishments of the damned will be their joy incidentally.

Reply Obj. 1: To take joy in the evil of another as such does pertain to hatred, but taking joy in another’s evil by reason of something connected with it does not. In this way, a person sometimes takes joy in his own evil as when someone rejoices in his own afflictions insofar as they profit one for the merit of life: count it all joy, my brethren, when you meet various trials (Jas 1:2).

Reply Obj. 2: Although he does not delight in punishments precisely as punishments, he does delight in them inasmuch as they have been ordered through his justice.

Reply Obj. 3: In a wayfarer it is not praiseworthy to delight in the punishments of others in themselves, but it is praiseworthy if one delights in them in connection with something else. Still, the case is different between a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For in a wayfarer passions frequently arise without the judgment of reason. Yet, such passions are sometimes praiseworthy insofar as they indicate a good disposition of mind, as is clear in the case of shame, mercy, and penitence at evil. In comprehensors, however, there can only be passion following on the judgment of reason.

Exposition of the Text

Nor the ability to do so in the wicked. (Sententiae IV, 50.1 (284). 1.) ’Sinning’ here is taken not as regards the disorder of the act but as regards the demerit of the fault.

“What is it to be wholly outside God, if not to be in the deepest blindness?” (Sent. IV, 50.2 (285). 2 citing Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 6, 8, n. 8.) The reprobate are said to be outside of God not because God’s providence does not extend to them but because they do not delight in him, and only consider him to their own sorrow, and again because their mind is totally turned away from God.

“Where they shall see none of the light of God, to whom they may confess.” (Sent. IV, 50.2 (285). 4 citing Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 6, 5, n. 6.) Not that they do not know any truth but rather because knowledge of the truth will be cause not for confession but for tribulation and hatred.

“But it is better to be in doubt about hidden things than to fight about uncertain ones.” (Sent. IV, 50.4 (287). 1 citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, Bk. 8 ch. 5 n. 9.) Not that we need to doubt about whether the separated soul has a corporeal tongue but because the separated soul’s state cannot be certain to us.

“They shall go out, that is, the elect, and the see the corpses of the men who have transgressed.” (Sent. IV, 50.7 (290). 2 citing Is. 66, 24 and interlinear gloss.) They will go out, not in place but in understanding, as the Gloss on Isaiah says. (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:1316.) By ‘corpses,’ however, as Augustine says in the City of God: the evident punishment of bodies is signified, even though only flesh bereft of its soul is usually called a corpse. But those bodies will be animated, for otherwise they would not be able to sense any torments. They can be called corpses without absurdity if only, perhaps, because they will be the bodies of the dead, that is, of those who will fall into the second death. Hence the same prophet also said what was given above: the land of the impious will fall (Is 26:19), (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 21, n. 4.) where we have you bring the land of giants to ruin. But who does not see that cadavers take their name from falling? (That is, Augustine says that the noun cadaver derives from the verb cadere.)

It suffices . . . to have remembered these things concerning the feet of the One who sits upon a high throne. (Sent. IV, 50. 7(290). 3.) Here the Master, at the end of his work, touches on a vision of Isaiah, for Isaiah 6:1–2 says: I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the seraphim; each had six wings: with two he covered his face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two he flew. Jerome (Jerome, On Isaiah, Bk. 3, PL 24:92–94.) explains this vision allegorically, being of the opinion that the one sitting on the high throne signifies Christ, that the throne high and elevated signifies the angels, on whom God is seated, as Psalm 99:1 says: he sits enthroned upon the cherubim, that the higher temple signifies the Church Triumphant, which is filled with God’s majesty, and that the lower temple signifies the Church Militant, which is being perfected by lower gifts and does not see the majesty of the divine essence.

But Dionysius (See, e.g., Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13.) says that the one sitting on the throne signifies God himself, that the high throne signifies the eminence of the divine nature, that the higher temple signifies those created beings that are more excellent and closer to God, which represent his majesty more fully, and that the lower temple signifies lower creatures, namely corporeal creatures, which participate in the divine goodness in the lower world.

Now the face of such a one sitting upon the throne denotes the divine essence itself and the things that were in eternity before the world was established. The feet, then, denote what will be after the world in the glory of the blessed and the punishments of the damned. The middle, finally, denotes what goes on in the middle course of time. The seraphim are therefore said to veil the face and feet of the one sitting upon the throne because the mysteries of the eternal deity and future beatitude and misery are not revealed to us in full. They were flying with two wings, however, because we are instructed about what goes on in the midst of time, as far as necessary, by the ministry of angels, among whom the seraphim hold the primacy. Thus their flight demonstrates the course of their revelation to us, which Dionysius also calls their straight motion in On the Divine Names 4. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 8, PG 3:703.)

And so, having taken his starting point in this book from God, i.e., beginning from the face of the one who sits upon the throne, that is, from the Trinity of divinity, which was treated in Book I; proceeding through the intermediate things that go on while this world lasts, such as creation and sins, which Book II dealt with; or reparation and virtues, which Book III dealt with; and the sacraments of the Church, which he dealt with in the first part of Book IV; led by Christ, who is the way, the Master has finally arrived at the feet.

This is to say that he arrived at the things which will be carried out at the world’s end and afterwards, such as the resurrection of bodies, the punishment of the damned, and the glory of the blessed consisting in the vision of God. The Master proceeded in this way so that his teaching, beginning from God, would also end in God, who is the principle from which all things are and the end to which all things are ordered. To him be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen.