D. 45 - Before the general judgment
After the Master has examined those things that pertain to the resurrection, here he begins to consider those things that pertain to the reward or punishment of those who will rise, and this is divided into two parts: for in the first, he considers the reward and punishment that will precede the general judgment; in the second, those things that will follow the general judgment, at Distinction 47: it is also usual to ask how the sentence of judgment shall be given out. (Sententiae VI, 47.1 (270). 1.)
Now the first is divided into two parts: in the first part, he considers the reward and punishment of souls before the day of judgment and the resurrection; in the second, he shows how it will be dispensed according to the justice and mercy of God, at Distinction 46: but it is here asked concerning the very evil. (Sent. VI, 46.1 (265).1.)
The first part is divided into two: first, he shows how souls will have different places for their reception after death for the diversity of their merits; in the second, he considers how souls dispersed after death to certain places can be helped by the prayers of others, at: and Augustine says that “it is not to be denied that the souls of the dead are relieved by the piety of their living friends.” (Sent. VI 45.2 (260). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 110.)
And this part is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the dead are aided by the suffrages of the living; in the second, he inquires how the living are helped by the prayers of the deceased saints, at: but perhaps you ask: do [the saints] hear the prayers of supplicants? (Sent. IV, 45.6 (264). 1.)
Now the first is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers when suffrages benefit those dead for whom they are done; in the second, he inquires whether they benefit others for whom they are not done, at: it is usual to raise the question of two men. (Sent. IV, 45.4 (262). 1.)
The first is divided into two parts; in the first, he tells what things done by the living benefit the dead; in the second, the things that do not benefit them, at: as to the pomps of obsequies, the same Augustine speaks as follows. (Sent. IV, 45.3 (261). 1.)
It is usual to raise the question of two men. Concerning this he does two things: first, he inquires about those for whom no suffrages are made during the state of the present Church; second, about those for whom they are made when the present Church has passed away, at: but again it is asked regarding someone moderately good. (Sent. IV, 45.5 (263). 1.)
But perhaps you ask: do [the saints] hear the prayers of supplicants? Here he shows how the suffrages of the deceased holy ones benefit the living; and concerning this he does three things: first, he proposes what he intends; second, he confirms the proposition through a resemblance to the angels, at: for just as our petitions are known to the angels in the Word of God which they contemplate, so also they are known to the saints who are with God; (Sent. IV, 45.6 (264). 2 citing Phil. 4, 6.) third, he concludes what he intended, at: but if the angels learn from God through his Word what our petitions are . . . why may we not believe that the souls of the saints, who contemplate the face of God also perceive in his truth the prayers of men? (Sent. IV, 45.6 (264). 6.)
Here three questions arise. First, the place of the reception of souls after death. Second, the suffrages of the dead. Third, the prayers of saints.
Question 1
Places for souls’ reception
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
first, whether after death there are any places assigned to the reception of souls;
- second, the differences between places of reception;
- third, their number.
- Article 1
Whether after death there are any places assigned to the reception of souls
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that places are not assigned to the reception of souls after death. For just as Boethius says in the book On the Hebdomads: (Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint (‘De hebdomadibus’) (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart et al.), p. 40, l. 18.) the common conception of the soul held by the wise is that incorporeal things are not in a place; which agrees with what Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12: I will answer swiftly that the soul is not borne to a physical place except with some body. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426).) But the separated soul does not have any body, as Augustine says in the same place. Therefore, it is ridiculous for any place to be assigned for the reception of separated souls.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that has a determinate place belongs more to that place than any other. But, like all spiritual substances, separated souls are related indifferently to every place; for it cannot be said that since they go with certain bodies, they also differ from others, since they are completely removed from all physical conditions. Therefore, they are not to be assigned to determinate places of reception.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing is assigned to separated souls after death except what is bestowed as a punishment or reward. But a physical place cannot be a punishment or reward to them, since they receive nothing from their bodies. Therefore, no certain place of reception should be assigned to them.
On the contrary (1), the empyreal heaven is a physical place, and yet it was filled with holy angels soon after being made, as Strabus says. (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:68.) Therefore, since the angels are incorporeal, like separated souls, it seems that certain places of reception should also be assigned to separated souls. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (2), this is evident by the fact that Gregory tells in his Dialogues 4 (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 42.) that the souls after death have been led to different corporeal places; as is seen in the case of Paschasius, whom Germanus, the bishop of Capua, found in the baths; and the case of King Theodoric’s soul, which he says had been taken to Gehenna. (Ibid., ch. 31.) Therefore, souls have certain places of reception after death.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no souls are led to heaven or hell immediately after death. (Parallels: ST I, q. 64, a. 4, ad 3; ST I-II, q. 4, a. 5; ST III, q. 59, a. 5, ad 1; In II Sent. d. 6, a. 3, ad 5; d. 11, q. 2, a. 1; Super II Cor. 5, lec. 2; Super Heb. 11, lec. 8; SCG IV, ch. 91; Super Ioan. 19, lec. 5.) For, commenting on the text: yet a little while and the wicked will be no more (Ps 37 [36]:10), the Gloss says (From Augustine, Explanation of the Psalms (CCSL 38), Ps 36, sermon 1, par. 10.) that the saints are freed at the end of life. Nevertheless, after this life they will not be where the saints are to whom it will be said: come, O blessed of my father (Matt 25:34). But those saints will be in heaven. Therefore, there are saints who will not immediately ascend to heaven after this life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 29.) that the time that occurs between the death of a person and the final resurrection contains souls received in hidden places, as each is deserving of rest or affliction. But these hidden places cannot be understood as being heaven and hell, for souls will also be in those places with their bodies after the final resurrection; therefore, nothing would distinguish the time before the resurrection from after the resurrection. Therefore, they will not be in hell or in heaven until the day of judgment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the glory of the soul is greater than the glory of bodies. But the glory of bodies is rendered to all people at the same time, so that the happiness of individuals will be greater from the common joy, as is clear from Hebrews 11:40: since God had foreseen something better for us, about which the interlinear Gloss comments: so that in the common joy of all the joy of each one might become greater. Therefore, much more should the glory of souls be deferred until the end, so that it may be rendered to all at the same time.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the punishment and reward that are rendered by the sentence of judgment should not precede the judgment. But the fire of hell and the joy of paradise will be given to men by the sentence of Christ the Judge in the last judgment, as is clear from Matthew 25. Therefore, before the day of judgment no one will ascend to heaven or descend to hell.
On the contrary (1), it is said in 2 Corinthians 5:1: if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed . . . we have a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Therefore, once the flesh has dissolved, a person shall have a dwelling place that will be kept for him in heaven.
Furthermore (2), the Apostle says: my desire is to depart and be with Christ (Phil 1:23); from which Gregory argues thus in the Dialogues 4: (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 26.) therefore, whoever does not doubt that Christ is in heaven should neither deny that Paul’s soul is in heaven. But it cannot be denied that Christ is in heaven, since it is an article of faith. Therefore, neither is it to be doubted that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That some may also descend into hell immediately after death is also evident from Luke 16:22–23: the rich man also died and was buried in hell.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that souls existing in paradise or hell are not able to leave. (Parallels: ST I, q. 89, a. 8, ad 2; In II Sent. d. 6, a. 3, ad 5.) For Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead: if the souls of the dead are admidst the affairs of the living, so that I may be silent about other things, my pious mother would not have left me for a night, who followed me over land and sea so that she might live with me; (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, ch. 13, par. 16 (CSEL 41:647).) and by this he concludes that the souls of the dead are not admidst the affairs of the living. But they could be among us if they could leave their places of reception. Therefore, they do not leave their places of reception.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said in Psalm 27 (26):4: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life; and in Job 7:9: he who goes down to Sheol does not come up. Therefore, neither the good nor the wicked shall go out of their places of reception.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was said, places of reception are given to souls after death as a reward or punishment. But after death neither the rewards of the saints nor the sufferings of the damned will be diminished. Therefore, they shall not leave their places of reception.
On the contrary (4), there is what Jerome says against Vigilantius, (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, par. 6, PL 23:359.) speaking to him thus: for you say the souls of the apostles and martyrs have either been seated in the bosom of Abraham, or in a place of refreshment, or beneath the altar of God, nor can they be present at their tombs when they wish; and in this way you place laws on God, you throw chains on the apostles, so that until the day of judgment they are held prisoner, nor are they with their Lord, about whom it was written: “they follow the Lamb wherever he goes” (Rev 14:4). But the Lamb is everywhere. Therefore, also those who are with the Lamb are believed to be everywhere. Therefore, it is ridiculous to say that the souls of the dead do not depart from their places of reception.
Furthermore (5), Jerome (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, par. 6, PL 23:359.) argued in the same place this way: since the devil and demons wander the whole world, and are present everywhere with utmost swiftness, will the martyrs be shut up and buried after the shedding of their blood and shall they not be able to depart from there? From which it can be concluded not only about the good, but also the wicked, that they sometimes leave their places of reception, since they do not have greater damnation than the demons, who go about everywhere.
Furthermore (6), the same thing can be proved by Gregory throughout the Dialogues 4, where he tells about many of the dead who have appeared to the living.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, although spiritual substances do not depend upon a body for their own being, nevertheless corporeal things are governed by God by means of spiritual ones, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 3, (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 3, ch. 4.) and Gregory says in his Dialogues 4. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 6.) And so there is a certain fittingness of spiritual substances to corporeal substances through a certain congruency, so that namely the more worthy bodies are appropriated to the more worthy substances; hence even the philosophers have settled on the order of separated substances according to the order of things that move. (See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 12, ch. 8.) However, although to souls after death there are not assigned particular bodies, of which they might be the forms or determinate movers, nevertheless certain corporeal places are determined to them by some congruence according to the degrees of their dignity, in which they exist as if in a place, in the same way in which incorporeal things can exist in a place, according as they approach more closely to the first substance (to which the higher place is assigned by congruence), namely, God, whose seat is declared to be heaven by Scripture. And therefore we consider the souls that are in perfect participation of the divinity to be in heaven, but the souls that are prevented from this participation we say have been consigned to the opposite place.
Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are not in a place in any way known and customary to us, in the way we say that bodies are properly in a place. However, they are in a place in a manner befitting spiritual substances, which cannot be fully manifest to us.
Reply Obj. 2: A commonality or likeness can exist in two ways. One way is through participation in the same quality, as hot things have heat in common with each other; and a commonality like this cannot exist between incorporeal things and corporeal places. The other way is through a certain proportionality, according to which metaphors of corporeal things are transferred to spiritual things in Scripture, as when God is said to be the sun, (See Mal 4:2; cf. Jn 8:12, Jn 1:4–9, 9:5; 1 Jn 1:5; 2 Pet 1:19; Rev 22:16.) because he is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun is of physical life. And, according to this commonality, certain souls are better suited to certain places, as spiritually illuminated souls with luminous places, but souls overshadowed by guilt with dark places.
Reply Obj. 3: A separated soul receives nothing directly from the physical places after the manner of bodies, which are maintained by their places. But the souls themselves, by the fact that they know themselves to be assigned to such places, bear joy or sorrow within themselves; and this is how the place contributes to their punishment or reward.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that just as there is heaviness or lightness in bodies by which they are borne to their own place, which is the end of their movement, so too there is merit or demerit in souls, by which souls attain their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their actions. This is why just as a body is borne immediately to its place by its heaviness or lightness unless it is prevented, so too a soul, as soon as the bond of the flesh is dissolved by which it is detained in the state of a wayfairer, obtains its reward or punishment unless something impedes it, as sometimes the reward’s obtainment is impeded by venial sin, which must be purged beforehand, with the consequence that the reward is delayed. And since the place is assigned to souls according to its fittingness with the reward or punishment, immediately when the soul is released from the body it is either sunk into hell or taken up into heaven, unless it is prevented by some guilt that delays it such that the soul must be purged first. And the authorities of canonical Scripture manifestly attest to this truth, along with the writings of the holy fathers. Therefore, the contrary is to be held as heresy, as is clear from the Dialogues 4, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 28.) and in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas. (Gennadius, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 46, PL 42:1220.)
Reply Obj. 1: The Gloss explains itself, for where it says: they will not yet be where the saints will be, it explains immediately, adding: that is, they will not have the double garment that the saints will have in the resurrection.
Reply Obj. 2: Hell and Paradise, in which certain souls are contained before the resurrection, should also be counted among those hidden places of reception of which Augustine speaks. But the time before and after the resurrection is distinguished in that before the resurrection they are there without a body, but afterward they will be there with a body; and because in some of the places of reception there are now souls where there will not be after the resurrection.
Reply Obj. 3: Men have a certain continuity with each other through their bodies, for what is said in Acts 17:26 is true as regards the body, that he made from one every nation of men. But he fashioned souls individually, which is why there it is not as fitting that all men be glorified at the same time in soul, as that they be glorified at the same time in body. And furthermore the glory of the body is not as essential as the glory of the soul; therefore, it would be a greater detriment to the saints if the glory of their souls was delayed than from the fact that the glory of the body is delayed. Nor could this detriment to glory be compensated by deepening the joy of the individuals from the common joy.
Reply Obj. 4: Gregory brings up the same objection, and resolves it in the Dialogues 4: if the souls of the saints are now in heaven, what is it that they receive for the repayment of their righteousness on the day of judgment? (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 26.) And he answers: in the judgment this undoubtedly grows for them, for now the souls rejoice in the reward of their glory alone; but afterward they will enjoy too the beatitude of bodies, so that they may rejoice in it too, in which they have borne sorrows and tortures for the Lord. And the same thing should be said about the damned.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are two ways someone could be understood to have left heaven or hell. In one way, such that he simply goes out from there, so that his place is no longer heaven or hell. And in this way no one definitively consigned to heaven or hell can leave them, as will be said in the following distinction, Question 2, Article 3. In the other way it can be understood such that someone goes out for a time, and in this one must distinguish between what befits them according to the law of nature, and what befits them according to the order of divine justice, for Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Given to the Dead: the limits of human things are one way, the signs of divine powers are another; the first which exist naturally, the second which are done miraculously. (Augustine, On the Care to be Given to the Dead, ch. 16, par. 19 (CSEL 41:653).)
Therefore, according to the natural course, separated souls consigned to proper places of reception are completely segregated from dwelling with the living. For according to the course of nature humans living in mortal flesh are not directly joined to separated substances, since all knowledge arises from the senses; nor would it befit them to leave their places of reception for the sake of anything other than being among the living. But according to the disposition of divine providence sometimes separated souls are displayed in the sight of men outside their places of reception, as Augustine tells in the book mentioned about Felix the Martyr, who appeared visibly to the citizens of Nola when they would have been attacked by the barbarians. And it can also be believed that sometimes this happens to the damned, that they are permitted to appear to the living to instruct and terrify men, or even to beg suffrages for those who are in purgatory, as is clear from many things that are related in the Dialogues 4.
But there is this difference between saints and the damned: the saints can appear to the living when they wish, but the damned cannot. For just as the saints while living in the flesh receive through the gift of gratuitous grace the power to accomplish signs and healings, which does not happen except miraculously by divine power (and which signs indeed cannot be accomplished by others lacking this gift); so too it is not unfitting that by virtue of glory some power be given to the souls of the saints by which they can miraculously appear to the living when they wish, which others could not do unless permitted on occasion.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine, as is clear from what follows, speaks according to the common course of nature; nor, however, does it follow that even if the dead are able and wish to appear to the living, they should appear as many times as the living appear in the flesh. For separated from the flesh, either they are entirely conformed to the divine will such that it is only permitted to them to consider coming together according to the divine disposition; or they are so oppressed by punishments that they rather sorrow over their own misery than undertake to appear to others.
Reply Obj. 2: Those authorities address the fact that no one can leave paradise or hell simply speaking, and not that they cannot leave for a time.
Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from what has been said in the final article of the preceding distinction, Question 3, the place of the soul contributes to punishment or reward according as the soul is affected by being assigned to such a place either by rejoicing or grieving. But this joy or this sorrow arising from being assigned to such places remains in the soul even when it is outside the places mentioned, just as when it is given to the pontiff to sit in the cathedra in the Church for his honor, his glory does not diminish when he steps away from the cathedra, for even if he is not actually sitting there, nevertheless that place is allotted to him.
Reply Obj. 4: Those things that are objected to the contrary must also be answered. To the first of them it is said that Jerome speaks about the apostles and martyrs according to what arises in them from the power of glory, and not as befitting them from what is due to nature. However, when he says that they are everywhere, it should not be understood that they are simultaneously in several places or everywhere, but that they can be wherever they wish.
Reply Obj. 5: To the second it should be said that the case of demons and angels is not like the souls of the saints and the damned. For good and bad angels are assigned this office so that they may be present to men, either for their protection or training, which cannot be said of the souls of men. But nevertheless according to the power of glory it befits the souls of the saints that they can be wherever they wish; and this is what Jerome meant.
Reply Obj. 6: To the third it should be said that although sometimes the souls of the saints or the damned are present where they appear, nevertheless it is not to be believed that this always happens. For sometimes apparitions like this happen either in sleep or waking by the action of the good or bad spirits for the instruction or destruction of the living, as also living men sometimes appear to others and say many things to them in dreams, although it is still obvious that they are not present, as Augustine proves by many examples in his book On the Care to be Taken of the Dead.
Article 2
The differences between places of reception
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 52, a. 2, ad 4; In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 2, expos. text.) It seems that limbo is not the same as the bosom of Abraham. For as Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 33. (CSEL 28.1:429).) in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12: I have not yet found anywhere the Scripture that describes hell as good. But the bosom of Abraham is taken for a good place, as Augustine adds in the same place, saying this: I do not know whether anyone could hear that the bosom of Abraham was not to be taken for a good place, and that rest to which the faithful poor man was borne by the angels. Therefore, the bosom of Abraham is not the same as limbo.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, those dwelling in hell do not see God. But God is seen in the bosom of Abraham, as is clear from Augustine, Confessions 9, (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 9, ch. 3.) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: wherever is that place that is called the bosom of Abraham, there my Nebridius lives; and further: now no longer turning his ears to my mouth, but a spiritual mouth to your fountain, and he happily drinks with eagerness as much wisdom as he can without end. Therefore, the bosom of Abraham is not the same as limbo.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Church does not pray for anyone to be led out of hell. However, she prays that the angels conduct the soul of one deceased to the bosom of Abraham. (In the Burial Service, at the meeting of the body, the traditional Roman liturgy prays in the Suscipiat te Christus: ”May Christ receive thee who has called thee, and may the angels lead thee into Abraham’s bosom.” In another prayer, the angels are called upon to lead the soul to “the fatherland of paradise” (patria paradisi).) Therefore, it seems that the bosom of Abraham is not the same as limbo.
On the contrary (1), the bosom of Abraham is said to be where the beggar Lazarus was led. But he was led to hell, as, commenting on Job 30:23: where the house of the living God is established, the Gloss says: hell was the house of all the living before the coming of Christ. Therefore, the bosom of Abraham is the same as limbo.
Furthermore (2), Jacob tells his sons: you will bring down my gray hairs in sorrow to hell (Gen 44:29). Therefore, Jacob knew he would be transported to hell at his death. Therefore, by the same reasoning Abraham was transferred to hell after death; and so the bosom of Abraham seems to be some part of hell.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of the damned. (Parallel: In III Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2.) For Christ is said to have bitten hell, (See Hosea 13:14: “O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite.”) not to have swallowed it, for he released some people from there, but not all. However, he would not have been said to have bitten hell, if those whom he freed had not been a part of the multitude contained in hell. Therefore, since those whom he freed were contained in the limbo of hell, the same ones were contained in limbo and in hell; therefore limbo is the same as hell, or a part of hell.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ is said in the Creed to have descended into hell. But he only descended to the limbo of the patriarchs. Therefore, the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as hell.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says: into the depths of hell all my things descend (Job 17:16). But Job, since he was a holy and just man, descended into limbo. Therefore, limbo is the same as the depths of hell.
On the contrary (1), there is no redemption in hell. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore, limbo is not the same as hell.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12: how we may believe that the rest that Lazarus received was in hell, I do not see. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 33 (CSEL 28.1:429).) But the soul of Lazarus descended into limbo. Therefore, limbo is not the same as hell.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the patriarchs. (Parallel: In III Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2.) For punishment should correspond to guilt. But the patriarchs and children were detained in limbo for the same guilt, namely, for the guilt of original sin. Therefore, the place of punishment should be the same for both.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in the Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity: the punishment of children who die with only original sin is the slightest. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (CCSL 46), ch. 23: “mitissima sane omnium poena erit eorum qui, praeter peccatum quod originale traxerunt, nullum insuper addiderunt; et in ceteris qui addiderunt, tanto quisque ibi tolerabiliorem habebit damnationem quanto hic minorem habuit iniquitatem.”) But there is no slighter punishment than that which the holy patriarchs had. Therefore, the place of punishment is the same for both.
On the contrary, just as temporal punishment for actual sin is due in purgatory, and eternal punishment is due in hell, so too the temporal punishment for original sin was due in the limbo of the patriarchs, and eternal punishment in the limbo of children. Therefore, if hell and purgatory are not the same, it seems that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo of the patriarchs the same. But whether hell and purgatory are the same place was inquired into above in Distinction 21, Question 1, Article 1, Quaestiuncula 2.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, after death the souls of men cannot attain to rest except by the merit of faith: for whoever would draw near to God must believe (Heb 11:6). However, the first example of belief among men is given in Abraham, who first separated himself from the company of unbelievers and received a special sign of faith. (I.e., circumcision.) And therefore that rest that is given to men after death is called the bosom of Abraham, as is evident from Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12. (See Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, par. 34.) But after death the souls of the saints did not have the same resting place in every age, for after the coming of Christ they had full rest and enjoyed the divine vision, but before the coming of Christ they had a certain rest through their immunity from suffering, but they did not have the rest from desire through the obtainment of the end. And so the state of the saints before the coming of Christ can be considered both according as it possessed rest, and then it is called the bosom of Abraham; and it can be considered according as it lacked rest, and then it is called the limbo of hell. Therefore, before the coming of Christ the limbo of hell and the bosom of Abraham were one, but incidentally and not essentially; and so nothing prevents the bosom of Abraham from being completely different from limbo after Christ’s coming, for things that are one incidentally can be separated.
Reply Obj. 1: As to what the state of the holy patriarchs contained of good, it was called the bosom of Abraham; but as to what it contained of defect, it was called hell. And this is why neither the bosom of Abraham is taken as bad, nor is hell taken as good; although in a certain way they are one.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the rest of the holy patriarchs was called the bosom of Abraham before the coming of Christ, so too after Christ’s coming, but differently then: for since before Christ’s coming the saints’ rest contained a defect joined to the rest, the same thing was called both the bosom of Abraham and hell, from the fact that God was not seen there. But because after Christ’s coming the saints’ rest was complete, since they see God, such rest is called the bosom of Abraham, and not hell; and it is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays the faithful be led.
Reply Obj. 3: And thus the answer to the third is clear; and this is how a certain Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:316.) is to be understood about Luke 16:22: the poor man died and was carried . . . to Abraham’s bosom, which says: the bosom of Abraham is the rest of blessed paupers, to whom belong the kingdom of heaven.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the resting places of souls after death can be distinguished in two ways: either according to how they are situated or according to the quality of the places, namely, as in certain places souls receive punishments or rewards. Therefore, if the limbo of the patriarchs and hell were considered according to this quality, then there is no doubt that they are distinct, both because there is sensible suffering in hell, which did not exist in the limbo of the patriarchs; and also because in hell there is eternal suffering, but in the limbo of the patriarchs holy men were detained only temporarily. But if they were considered as to the situating of the place, then it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or joined to one another somehow, such that some higher part of hell is called the limbo of the patriarchs. For those dwelling in hell are doomed to diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, and so according as the damned were entangled in worse sins they occupy a darker and deeper place in hell. This is why the holy patriarchs, in whom the account of guilt was very slight, held the place that was highest and least dark of all.
Reply Obj. 1: According as hell and limbo are the same in situation, Christ is said to have bitten hell and descended into hell when he released the patriarchs from limbo by his descent.
And by this the solution to the second objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 3: Job did not descend into the hell of the damned, but the limbo of the patriarchs, which indeed is called the deepest place, not in relation to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other places, for every place of punishment is included under the same one. Or it could be said, as Augustine resolves it in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 33 (CSEL 28.1:429).) saying the same thing about Jacob: what Jacob says to his sons: you will lead my old age with sadness to hell: he seemed to have feared this most that he would be disturbed by so much sadness, that he would not go to the rest of the blessed, but to the hell of the damned. And likewise the word of Job can be explained by the same argument, as if the word were more an expression of fear than an assertion.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the limbo of the patriarchs and the limbo of children undoubtedly differ according to the quality of the reward or the punishment, for children do not have the hope of the blessed life that the patriarchs had, in whom the light of faith and grace shone too. But as to the situation, it is believed probably that they were both in the same place, except that the rest of the blessed was still in a higher place than the children’s limbo, just as was said about limbo and hell.
Reply Obj. 1: Original sin is not related to patriarchs and children in the same way. For original sin was expiated in the patriarchs according as it infected the person, but it remained an impediment on the part of the nature, which had not yet been fully satisfied for. But among children there is an impediment on the part of the person and on the part of nature; and this is why different resting places are assigned to children and to patriarchs.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the punishments that are due to someone under the aspect of his own person, among whom those who are only weighed down with original sin have the slightest punishment. But there is a still slighter punishment of those whom no defect of the person impedes from the reception of glory, but only a defect of nature, such that the very delay of glory may be called a kind of punishment.
Article 3
Their number
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that the places of reception should not be distinguished. For just as after death the places of reception are due to souls for sin, so too for merit. But only one resting place is due for merit, namely, paradise. Therefore, there is only one place of reception due to sinners.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the places of reception are assigned to souls after death by reason of their merits or demerits. But it is not the place in which they merit or demerit. Therefore, only one place should be assigned them after death.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the places for punishment should correspond to the sins themselves. But there are only three kinds of sin: namely, original, venial, and mortal. Therefore, there should only be three places of reception for punishment.
On the contrary (4), it seems that there should be many more than are assigned. For darkened air is the prison of the demons, as is clear from 2 Peter 2:4. (This is the only verse that corresponds somewhat to Thomas’s point: “For if God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but cast them into hell and committed them to pits of nether gloom to be kept until the judgment” (2 Peter 2:4).) But it is not counted among the five places of reception that are assigned by some people. Therefore, there are more than five places of reception.
Furthermore (5), the earthly paradise is one thing and the heavenly paradise is another. But after the state of this life some people were taken to the earthly paradise, as is said of Enoch and Elijah. Therefore, since the earthly paradise is not counted among the five places of reception, it seems that there are more than five.
Furthermore (6), there should be some place of punishment to correspond to each state of sinners. But if we posit that someone has died in original sin with only venial sin, none of the places of reception allotted would befit him, for it is clear that he would not be in paradise, since he lacks grace. But by the same reasoning he would not be in the limbo of the patriarchs; likewise, not in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment in the limbo of children, which would be due to such a person by reason of his venial sin. Likewise, neither would he be in purgatory, for there is only temporal punishment there, but perpetual punishment would be due to this person; likewise, not in the hell of the damned, for he lacks mortal sin. Therefore, it would be necessary to posit a sixth place of reception.
Furthermore (7), the amount of the rewards and punishments are different according to the differences in guilt and merit. But the degrees of guilt and merit are infinite. Therefore, infinite places of reception would have to be distinguished, in which people are punished or rewarded after death.
Furthermore (8), souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as is evident from what Gregory says in the Dialogues 4. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 55.) But they sinned in the place where we live. Therefore, this place should be counted among the places for their reception, especially since some are punished in this world for their sins, as the Master said above in Distinction 15.
Furthermore (9), just as some people who died in grace have certain things for which they deserve punishment, so too those who died in mortal sin have certain good things for which they would deserve reward. But a certain place of reception is assigned to those dying in grace with venial sins, namely, purgatory, where they are punished before they receive their reward. Therefore, by the same argument the reverse should be true of those who die in mortal sin with some good works.
Furthermore (10), just as the patriarchs were held back from the full glory of the soul before the coming of Christ, so too, they are held back now from the glory of the body. Therefore, just as the saints’ place of reception before the coming of Christ is distinguished from the one where they are now received, so should their current place of reception be distinguished from the one where they will be received after the resurrection.
I answer that, the places of reception for souls are distinguished according to their different states. Now a soul joined to a mortal body has the state of meriting, but once stripped of its body, it is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits. Therefore, after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or it is in a state where it is impeded from this. Now, if it is in the state of receiving its final recompense, this happens in two ways: either as to good, and then it is paradise; or as to evil, and then it is hell for actual sin, while it is the limbo of children for original sin. Now, if it is in the state of being impeded from obtaining its final recompense, either this is because of a defect of the person, and then it is purgatory, where souls are detained from obtaining their reward immediately because of the sins they have committed; or else it is because of a defect of nature, and this is the limbo of the patriarchs, where the patriarchs were detained from obtaining glory because of the guilt of human nature, which had not yet been expiated.
Reply Obj. 1: Good happens in one way, but evil happens in many ways, as is evident from Dionysius in the Divine Names 4 (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, PG 3:730.) and from the Philosopher in the Ethics 2. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 4.) And because of this it is not unfitting if there is one place of reward but many places for punishment.
Reply Obj. 2: The state of meriting or demeriting is one state, since it belongs to the same to be able to merit or demerit. And therefore one place is appropriately due to all. But there are different states for those who receive the recompense for their merits. And so it is not similar.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways that a person can be punished for original sin, as is clear from what has been said: either by reason of the person, or by reason of the nature alone; and so the two limbos correspond to the two kinds of guilt.
Reply Obj. 4: That dark air is not assigned to the demons as the place in which they receive retribution for their merits, but as suited to their office, inasmuch as they are deputed to us for our training. And this is why it is not counted among the places of reception that we are now discussing, for first the fire of hell is allotted to them, as is evident from Matthew 25. (”Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels” (Matt 25:41).)
Reply Obj. 5: Earthly paradise has more to do with the state of a wayfarer than the state of one receiving the reward for his merits; and that is why it is not included among the places of reception that we are now discussing.
Reply Obj. 6: That situation is impossible, as was said in Distinction 2. However, if it were possible, such a person would be punished eternally in hell. For the fact that venial sin is punished for a time in purgatory happens to someone inasmuch as he has grace joined to him. This is why if he is joined to mortal sin, because he is without grace, he will be punished with eternal punishment in hell. And since the person who dies with original sin has venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting if we hold that he is punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 7: The difference of degrees in punishments or rewards does not cause a difference of state, according to which the places of reception would be distinguished; and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 8: The fact that separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we live does not mean that this place is their proper place of punishment, but this happens for our instruction, so that when we see their punishments we will withdraw from sins. However, the fact that souls still in the flesh are punished here for their sins does not relate to the matter at hand, for that kind of punishment does not draw a person out of the state of meriting or demeriting. Moreover, we are now discussing the places of reception that are due to a soul after the state of merit or demerit.
Reply Obj. 9: Evil cannot exist purely without any admixture of good, just as the highest good is without any admixture of evil. And so those who are to be transformed into beatitude, which is the highest good, should be purified from every evil. For this reason there must be a place where they are purified, if they depart from here not entirely purified. But those who are cast into hell will not be free from every good, and so it is not similar, for those remaining in hell can receive the reward of their own good deeds inasmuch as their past good deeds avail to the reduction of their penalty.
Reply Obj. 10: The essential reward consists in the soul’s glory, but all the body’s glory, since it overflows from the soul, consists in the soul originally. And so the soul’s lack of glory changes its state, but not the body’s lack of glory. And for this reason the same place, namely, the empyreal heaven, is due both to holy souls stripped of their bodies, and to those joined to glorified bodies. But the same place is not due to the souls of the patriarchs before the reception of glory in their souls and after its reception.
Question 2
On suffrages
Next, suffrages for the dead are considered; and here four questions arise:
first, whether the suffrages that are made by one person can benefit another;
- second, whom they benefit;
- third, which suffrages are beneficial;
- fourth, how much good they do.
- Article 1
Whether the suffrages that are made by one person can benefit another
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 4.) It seems that suffrages made by one person cannot benefit another: whatever a man sows, that he will also reap (Gal 6:7). But if one person receives the fruit of another’s suffrages, he would reap someone else’s sowing. Therefore, no one obtains the fruit of another’s suffrages.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it belongs to God’s justice to compensate each person for his merits: thou dost requite a man according to his work (Ps 62 [61]:12). But it is impossible for the justice of God to fail. Therefore, it is impossible that one person be assisted by the works of another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a work is meritorious and praiseworthy, according to the same reason, namely, inasmuch as it is voluntary. But one person is not praised for the work of another. Therefore, neither can the work of one person be fruitful and meritorious for another.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it belongs to divine justice to render good for good deeds and bad for bad deeds. But no one is punished for the bad deeds of another; rather, as it says: the soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:20). Therefore, neither shall one be helped by the good deeds of another.
On the contrary (1), Psalm 119 [118]:63 says: I am a companion with all those who fear thee.
Furthermore (2), all the faithful, united by charity, are members of the Church’s one body. But one member is helped by another. Therefore, one man can also be helped by the merits of another.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the dead cannot be helped by the works of the living. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 5, qa. 3, ad 2.) First, because of what the Apostle says: we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body. (2 Cor 5:10). Therefore, from the things that are done after a man’s death, when he is outside the body, nothing could be added to him by any deeds.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing is seen from what is held in Revelation 14:13: blessed are the dead who die in the Lord; and under it: for their works follow them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it only belongs to someone still wayfaring to advance by his works. But people after death are no longer wayfarers, for what is written of Job is understood of them: he has walled up my way so that I cannot pass (Job 19:8). Therefore, the dead cannot be helped by anyone’s intercession.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one is helped by the work of another unless there is something common between them. But there is no sharing of the dead with the living, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 11.) Therefore, the suffrages of the living do not benefit the dead.
On the contrary (1), it is held in 2 Macc 12:45: it is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins. But this would be useless unless it helped them. Therefore, the suffrages of the living benefit the dead.
Furthermore (2), Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead: the authority of the universal Church is not small, which shines in this custom, that in the prayers of the priest that are poured out to the Lord God at his altar, a commendation of the dead may also have its place. (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, ch. 1, par. 3 (CSEL 41:623).) Indeed, this custom originates with the apostles themselves, as Damascene says (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in Faith, PG 95:250.) in a certain sermon on suffrages for the dead: the sacred apostles and the disciples of the Savior privy to his mysteries sanctioned a memorial to be made in those awesome and life-giving mysteries, of those of the faithful who had fallen asleep. This is also clear from Dionysius in the last chapter of On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, (Inasmuch as editions of Aquinas say On the Celestial Hierarchy, they are in error; Pseudo-Dionysius treats of funerals and prayer for the dead in the last chapter of On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, pt. 2.) where he commemorates the rite which in the early Church was prayed for the dead; also, where Dionysius asserts that the suffrages of the living benefit the dead. Therefore, this is to be believed undoubtingly.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that suffrages done by sinners do not benefit the dead. (Parallels: ST III, q. 82, a. 6; In II Sent. d. 40, a. 4, ad 5; In IV Sent. d. 5, a. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, ad 2; d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2, ad 4.) For as it says: God does not listen to sinners (John 9:31). But if their prayers benefitted those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore, suffrages done by them do not benefit the dead.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says in his Pastoral Care: (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care (CCSL 141), pt. 1, ch. 10.) when someone who displeases is sent to intercede, an angry spirit is provoked to worse things. But any sinner displeases God. Therefore, God is not turned to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and so other suffrages do no good.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone’s work seems to be more beneficial to the one doing it than to another. But a sinner merits nothing for himself by his works. Therefore, much less can he merit for another.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, every meritorious work must be living, that is, informed by charity. But the works done by sinners are dead. Therefore, the dead cannot be helped by those things that are done on their behalf.
On the contrary (5), there is the fact that no one can know for certain whether another person is in a state of sin or grace. Therefore, if only those suffrages are beneficial that are done by those who are in grace, a person could not know whose intercession he should seek for his dead relatives; and so many would be hampered from procuring suffrages.
Furthermore (6), as Augustine says in the text, one of the deceased is helped by suffrages to the extent that when he lived he merited to be helped after death. Therefore, the strength of the suffrages is measured according to the conditions of the one for whom they are made. Therefore, it seems that it does not matter whether they are made by good men or bad men.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the suffrages that are made for the dead by the living do not benefit those who offer them. For, if someone paid a debt for another, according to human justice he would not be absolved from his own debt. Therefore, by the fact that someone offering suffrages pays the debt of the one for whom he offers them, he is not absolved by this from his own debt.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, each person should do whatever he does in the best way that he can. But it is better to help two people than one. Therefore, if whoever pays the debt of a dead man through his suffrages for him is freed from his own debt, it seems that a person should never make satisfaction for himself, but always for someone else.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if one person’s satisfaction for another person benefited the one making satisfaction as much as the one he satisfied for, by the same reasoning it will equally benefit a third person if he makes satisfaction for him at the same time; likewise, also for a fourth person and so on. Therefore, with one act of satisfaction one person can make satisfaction for all, which is absurd.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Psalm 35 (34):13: my prayer turned back into my bosom. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the suffrages that are done for others benefit those who do them.
Furthermore (2), in his sermon on those who sleep in the faith, Damascene says: just as someone wishing to rub a sick person with ointment or another holy oil, takes of the ointment first, and then this is how he anoints the one laboring; in this way whoever struggles for his neighbor’s salvation, helps himself first, and then his neighbor. (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in the Faith, PG 95:263.) And this is how it is held in the question proposed.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, our acts can bring about two things. First, acquiring a certain state, as a man acquires the state of beatitude by his meritorious work. Second, something resulting from the state, as a man by a certain state merits some incidental reward, or the remission of punishment. Now, our acts can bring about either of these things in two ways; in one way by the way of merit, in another way, by the way of prayer. And there is a difference between these two ways, as was said in Distinction 15, for merit depends on justice; but someone who prays obtains what he asks only by the generosity of the one to whom he prays.
Therefore, it should be said that in no way can the work of one person have efficacy for obtaining a state for another by the way of merit, namely in such a way that someone else should merit eternal life by those things that I do, for final glory is rendered according to the measure of the one receiving it. Moreover, each person is disposed by his own acts, and not those of another; and I mean the disposition of worthiness for the reward. But by the way of prayer one person’s work can also have efficacy for obtaining the state for another, while he is still on the earthly pilgrimage; just as one person begs the first grace for another. For since obtaining something through prayer is according to God’s generosity, it can be extended to whatever things are ordered under divine power. But as to what results from or is accessory to that state, one person’s work can be valid for another not only by the way of prayer, but also by the way of merit.
This can happen in two ways. Either because of sharing in the root of the work, which in meritorious works is charity; and then all those who are united in charity draw a certain benefit from each other’s works, although each according to his own state, because in heaven, each person will rejoice in the good deeds of each other; and this is why the communion of saints is held as an article of faith. In another way, by the intention of the one doing the work, who does certain works especially so that they will benefit certain people; and this is why these works are effective in some way for those for whom they are done, as conferred on them by the person who does them. And this is how these deeds can avail them for making complete satisfaction or something like that, which does not change their state.
Reply Obj. 1: That reaping is the obtainment of eternal life, as we have in John 4:36: he who reaps . . . gathers fruit for eternal life. However, the final obtainment of eternal life is only given to someone for his own deeds, for even if someone prayed for another that he be brought to eternal life, this would still never happen except by means of the other’s own works, namely when grace is given in response to someone’s prayers, through which grace eternal life is merited.
Reply Obj. 2: A work that is done for someone else is effective for the one it is done for, and likewise the work that belongs to someone who is one with me is in some way also mine. Therefore, it is not against divine justice if one person receives the fruit of the works done by someone who is one with him in charity, or from works done for his sake. This also happens according to human justice, that the satisfaction of one person is accepted for another.
Reply Obj. 3: Praise is only given to someone according to his own ordering to an act, which is why praise is relative to something, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 12, 1101b13–25.) And since no one is made or shown to be well-disposed or badly-disposed to something by someone else’s deed, this is why no one is praised for another’s deeds except incidentally, according as he is in some way the cause of those works, by offering help or counsel or by inducing someone to do them, or in any other fashion. But a work is meritorious to someone not only when his disposition is considered, but also with respect to anything following from his disposition or state, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 4: To take away from someone something that is owed him is directly opposed to justice. But to give to someone something that is not owed him is not contrary to justice, but exceeds the bounds of justice, for it belongs to liberality. Now, no one can be harmed by the bad deeds of another unless something of his own is taken away from him. And consequently it does not happen that someone is punished for the sins of another, as he might gain an advantage from another’s good deeds.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, does not only extend to the living, but also to the dead who die in charity, for charity does not end with the life of the body: charity never perishes (1 Cor 13:8). In the same way, too, the dead live in the memory of living men; and so the intention of the living can be directed toward them. And this is how the suffrages of the living can benefit the dead in two ways, just as they benefit the living: both because of the union of charity, and because of the intention directed toward them. However, the suffrages of the living should not be believed to be so strong that they could change the state of the deceased from misery to happiness or vice versa. But they are strong enough for the diminishment of punishment or something like that, which does not change the state of the dead.
Reply Obj. 1: When a man lived in the body, he merited that these things avail him after death; and so if he is helped by them after this life, nevertheless this proceeds from the things that he did in the body. Or it could be said that according to John Damascene in the sermon mentioned, this should be understood as to the recompense that will be made at the final judgment, which will be for eternal glory or eternal misery, in which everyone will receive only according to what he himself did in the body. However, meanwhile they can be helped by the suffrages of the living.
Reply Obj. 2: That authority is speaking expressly about the consequences of eternal retribution, which is clear from the fact that he says first: blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. Or it could be said that the works done for their sakes are also in some way theirs, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: Although after death souls are not simply in the state of earthly pilgrimage, nevertheless in a certain respect they are still wayfaring, namely, inasmuch as their progress is still delayed from final recompense. Thus their path is walled off simply speaking, so that they can no longer change their state of happiness or misery. But it is not walled off in this respect, that while they are delayed from final recompense, they can be helped by others; for in this respect they are still wayfaring.
Reply Obj. 4: Although between the dead and the living there can be no sharing of civil works, which the Philosopher is speaking of, for the dead are outside civil life, nevertheless there can be sharing with respect to the works of the spiritual life, which is through charity toward God, to whom the spirits of the dead are alive.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that in the suffrages that are made by the wicked, two things can be considered. First, the work itself that is done, like the sacrifice of the altar: and since our sacraments have efficacy on their own apart from the work of the one doing them, which efficacy they fulfill equally no matter who performs them, in this respect suffrages offered by wicked men do benefit the dead. In another way, as to the work of the person doing it, and then a distinction must be made. For the action of a sinner offering suffrages can be considered in one way as it belongs to him; and then it cannot be meritorious either for him or for another.
In another way, it can be considered as belonging to the other, which happens in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as a sinner offering suffrages bears the person of the whole Church, like the priest when he says the funeral rites for the dead in the church. And since someone in whose name or place something is done, is the one understood to do it, as is clear from Dionysius in On the Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter 13, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13, n. 3, PG 3:299.) this is why the suffrages of such a priest, although he is a sinner, benefit the dead.
In another way, when he acts as the instrument of another. For the work of a minister belongs more to the principal agent. Therefore, although the one who acts as the instrument of another is not in the state of meriting, neverthless his action can be meritorious by reason of the principal agent, as if a servant in a state of sin does some work of mercy by the command of his master, who has charity. Therefore, if someone who dies in charity should command that suffrages be made for him, or someone else having charity should command it, those prayers would benefit the dead, even if those people by whom they are done remain in sin. However, they would be worth more if they were in charity, for then those works would be meritorious on both accounts.
Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes a prayer made by a sinner is not the sinner’s prayer but another’s prayer, and thus, in this respect it is worthy of being heard by God. However, God sometimes also hears the prayers of sinners, namely when sinners ask something acceptable to God; for God provides good things not only to the just but also to sinners, as is clear from Matthew 5:45, yet not according to their merits but from his own clemency. And this is why the Gloss on God does not hear sinners (John 9:31) says that the speaker is someone unanointed, that is, who does not yet see plainly.
Reply Obj. 2: Although on the part of the one who displeases, the prayer of a sinner is not accepted, nevertheless, by reason of the other, in whose place or power it is done, it can be accepted by God.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a sinner performing suffrages in this way receives no benefit happens because such a person is not capable of such progress because of his own indisposition. And yet for someone else who is not indisposed, it can have some effect, as was said.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the work of a sinner is not living insofar as it is his work, nevertheless it can be living insofar as it is someone else’s, as was said.
But because the arguments given in opposition seem to conclude that it makes no difference whether someone obtains the intercession of the good or the wicked, we must therefore also answer them.
Reply Obj. 5: Although someone cannot know for certain whether another person is in a state of salvation, nevertheless he can guess with probability from those things that he sees outwardly in that person: for the tree is known by its fruit, as is said in Matthew 7:18.
Reply Obj. 6: For intercessory prayer to benefit someone, a capacity for this benefit is required also on the part of the one for whom it is done, and a person acquires this by his own works that he performed in life. And this is how Augustine is speaking. Nevertheless, a quality is required in the deed that is supposed to be beneficial: and this does not depend on the person for whom it is done, but rather on the one who does it either by commanding it or carrying it out.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the work of a suffrage that is done for another can be considered in two ways. In one way as it is expiative of punishment in the manner of a kind of recompense, which is expected in satisfaction; and in this way a work of suffrage, which is regarded as though it belonged to the one for whom it is done, so absolves him from the debt of punishment that it does not absolve the one doing it from the debt of his own punishment; for in such recompense the equality of justice is considered. However, that work of satisfaction can be so adjusted to the guilt of one person that it is not equal to another. For the guilt of two sinners requires more satisfaction than the guilt of one. In another way, it can be considered as it is meritorious of eternal life, which it is to the extent that it proceeds from charity as its root; and in this respect it is not only beneficial to the one for whom it is done, but even more to the one who does it.
And through this the solutions to the objections are clear. For the first arguments concerned the work of intercessory prayer as it is a work of satisfaction, but the others as it is meritorious.
Article 2
Whom they benefit
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 5; ST III, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3; In I Sent. d. 43, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5; In IV Sent. d. 45, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6; Super I Cor. 15, lec. 4.) It seems that suffrages benefit those in hell, by what we have in 2 Macc 12:40: under the tunic of every one of the dead they found sacred tokens of the idols of Jam′nia, which the law forbids the Jews to wear; and yet later it is added that Judas sent to Jerusalem twelve thousand drachmas of silver to be offered for the sins of the dead (2 Macc 12:43). However, it is clear that those people had sinned mortally by acting against the law, and therefore they died in mortal sin, and so had been borne off to hell. Therefore, intercessory prayers benefit those dwelling in hell.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the text we have from the words of Augustine that for those whom suffrages help, they bring about either full remission, or that their damnation be more tolerable. But only those who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore, suffrages also benefit those who are in hell.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the last chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius says: if the prayers of the just work here and according to this life by sacred orations in some way, how much more will they work after death in those who are worthy? (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, p. 2, n. 6, PG 3:562.) From this it can be taken that intercessory prayers benefit the dead even more than the living. But they also benefit those who are living in mortal sin, since the Church prays every day for sinners, that they be converted to God. Therefore, suffrages also avail those who died in mortal sin.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, we read in the Lives of the Fathers what John Damascene (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in the Faith, n. 10, PG 95:255.) also refers to in his sermon, that Macarius, having found in the road the skull of some dead person, uttered a prayer, asking whose head it was, and the head gave an answer, that it had belonged to a noble priest who was damned in hell, and yet he confessed that by Macarius’ prayer he and others had been aided. Therefore, the suffrages of the Church also benefit those dwelling in hell.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Damascene recounts in the same sermon (Ibid., n. 16, PG 95:262.) that Gregory, offering a prayer for Trajan, heard a voice borne to him by divine power: I have heard your voice, and I give forgiveness to Trajan; of which matter, as Damascene says in the sermon mentioned, all the east and the west are witness. But it is clear that Trajan was in hell: for he commanded the bitter slaying of many martyrs, as Damascene says in the same place. Therefore, suffrages also avail those in hell.
On the contrary (1), Dionysius says in Chapter 7 of Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: the highest priest does not pray for the unclean, for in this he would be turned away from the divine order; (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, p. 3, n. 7, PG 3:563.) and the Commentator says, in the same place that he does not pray for remission for sinners, for he would not be heard on their behalf. Therefore suffrages do no good for those who are in hell.
Furthermore (2), Gregory says in the Morals 34: the reason is the same why people damned to eternal fire will not be prayed for then, namely, after the day of judgment, and why we do not now pray for the devil and his angels damned to eternal suffering; which is also the reason that the saints do not pray now for wicked and unbelieving dead men: since for those at any rate whom they know to be damned to eternal torment, they shun that the merit of their prayer should be brought to naught in the sight of the just judge. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 35, par. 19.) Therefore, suffrages do no good to those damned in hell.
Furthermore (3), in the text we have from the words of Augustine: those who depart from the body without faith working through love and the sacraments of it, these offices are offered in vain for them by their loved ones. But all the damned are such as these. Therefore, suffrages do no good to the damned in hell.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that neither do they benefit those in purgatory. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 45, expos. text.) For purgatory is a certain part of hell. But in hell there is no redemption; and Psalm 6:5 says: in Sheol who can give thee praise? Therefore, suffrages do no good to those who are in purgatory.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore, if some of the punishment is forgiven through intercessory prayers, the prayers could be multiplied so much that all of it was taken away, and then the sin would remain completely unpunished, which seems to be opposed to divine justice.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, souls are detained in purgatory in order to be purified there, so that they may arrive pure in heaven. But a soul cannot be purified unless something is done to it. Therefore, suffrages done by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, if suffrages availed those in purgatory, the ones that would seem to benefit them the most are those that were done at their command. But these do not always do good, like when someone dying arranges so many suffrages to be done for him, that if they were done they would suffice to efface his whole punishment. Therefore, assuming that suffrages like this are delayed until he has completed his punishment, these suffrages did him no good. For it cannot be said that they benefit him before they have been done; while, after they have been done, he does not need them, for he has already escaped punishment. Therefore, suffrages do not benefit those in purgatory.
On the contrary (1) is what is said in the text, taken from the words of Augustine, that suffrages benefit those who are moderately good or bad. But that is the kind of person who is detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (2), Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Chapter 7, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 7, p. 2, n. 6, PG 3:562.) that the divine priest praying for the dead prays for those who lived in a holy way, and yet had some stains contracted through human weakness. But this is the kind of person detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that suffrages benefit children in limbo. For they are detained only for the sin of another. Therefore, it is most fitting that they be helped by the suffrages of others.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the text we have from the words of Augustine that the suffrages of the Church propitiations for those who are not extremely bad. But children are not counted among the extremely wicked, since their punishment is the least. Therefore, the suffrages of the Church help them.
On the contrary, in the text we have from Augustine that suffrages do not benefit those who departed from here without faith working through love. But children departed in this way. Therefore, intercessory prayers do not benefit them.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that they benefit in some way the saints in heaven, by the fact that we have in the collect of the Mass: as they, namely, the sacraments, benefit your saints to glory, so may they provide a remedy for us. (In the comprehensive catalog of orations called the Corpus orationum, this exact phrasing appears nowhere. However, something quite similar is found in the postcommunion for the feast of St. Andrew on November 30: “Sumpsimus, Domine, divina mysteria, beati Andreae festivitate laetantes: quae, sicut tuis Sanctis ad gloriam, ita nobis, quaesumus, ad veniam prodesse perficias.”) But among other suffrages, the sacrament of the altar is preeminent. Therefore, suffrages benefit the saints who are in heaven.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacraments bring about what they represent. But the third part of the host, namely, the one dropped into the chalice, represents those who lead the happy life in heaven, as was said above in Distinction 12, Question 1, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 3, reply to the fourth objection. Therefore, the suffrages of the Church benefit also those in heaven.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the saints rejoice not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others. This is why it says in Luke 15:10: there is joy among the angels of God over one sinner who repents. Therefore, by the good works of the living, the joy of the saints who are in heaven grows, and so too our suffrages benefit them.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in the Faith, n. 6, PG 95:251.) in his sermon On Those Who Sleep quotes the words of Chrysostom: for if the gentiles, he says, with those who have departed, burn all their things, how much more fitting is it to send you, a member of the faithful, with a believer’s belongings, not so that they may become ashes like those things, but so that hence you may encompass greater glory; and if there were some sinner who had died, that you might release some of his sins; but if he were a just man, an addition might be made of reward and recompense. And so, the same as before.
On the contrary (1), there is what we have in the text from the words of Augustine: it is injurious to pray in the Church for a martyr, to whom we should be commended for prayers.
Furthermore (2), the person who needs help is the one to be helped. But the saints in heaven are without any need. Therefore, they are not helped by the intercession of the Church.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, concerning those damned in hell, there are two opinions.
For some have said that there must be a twofold distinction made here. In one way, as to time, saying that after the day of judgment no one in hell will be helped by any suffrage, but before the day of judgment, some are helped by the suffrages of the Church. In the other way, they made a distinction between persons detained in hell, among whom they said there were some who were extremely bad, namely, those who had died without the faith and sacraments of the Church; and the suffrages of the Church cannot help those who were not of the Church, whether by merit or by number. But others are not extremely bad, namely, those who were of the number of the Church and had faith, and were instructed in the sacraments, and did certain works that were generically good; and for these the suffrages of the Church should be beneficial. But a certain disturbing doubt occurred to them, namely, that since the punishment of hell is finite according to intensity, although it exists infinitely in duration, it seemed to follow from this that this punishment could be taken away by multiplying suffrages, which is the error of Origen. And then they tried to avoid this unsuitable conclusion in several ways. For Praepositinus said that the suffrages for the damned can be multiplied so much that they are rendered completely exempt from punishment, although not simply speaking, as Origen held, but for a time, namely, until the day of judgment. For then their souls joined to their bodies would be once again forced into the sufferings of hell without hope. But that opinion seems opposed to divine providence, which leaves nothing disordered in things. But guilt cannot be ordered except by punishment; therefore it cannot be that the punishment is taken away unless the fault is first expiated. And so since fault remains continuously in the damned, their punishment will in no way be cut short.
And so the followers of Gilbert of Poitiers found another way, by saying that the reduction of punishment through suffrages proceeds like the division of lines, which, although they are finite, nevertheless can be infinitely divided, and never consumed by the division, provided that subtraction happens not according to the same quantity, but according to the same proportion, just as if first a quarter of the whole is removed, and second a quarter of that quarter, and again a quarter of that quarter, and so on infinitely. And likewise they say that some part of the punishment is diminished by the first intercessory prayer, and by the second some part of the remainder according to the same proportion. But this way is found defective for many reasons. First, because an infinite division, which is applicable to continuous quantity, does not seem able to be transferred to spiritual quantity. Second, because there is no reason why the second act of intercession should diminish the punishment less than the first, if it is of equal value. Third, because the punishment cannot be diminished unless the fault is also diminished, as neither can it be taken away unless the fault is taken away. Fourth, because in the division of a line one arrives finally at something that is not sensible, for a sensible body is not infinitely divisible. And thus it would follow that after many acts of intercession, the punishment remaining would not be sensed because of its smallness, and so there would be no punishment.
And therefore others have found another way. For Remi of Auxerre said that intercessory works benefit the damned not in fact by diminishing or cutting short their punishments, but by strengthening them in their suffering, as if a man should carry a heavy burden, and water were poured over his face. For in this way he would be strengthened to carry it better, although his burden would be made no lighter. But this again cannot be the case: for as Gregory says, a person is burdened more or less with eternal fire according as his guilt merits. And this is the reason some people are tortured more and some less by the same fire, which is why, since the guilt of someone damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he bear a lighter punishment. Nevertheless, the opinion described is also presumptuous, inasmuch as it is contrary to the statements of the saints; and flimsy, being supported by no authority; and irrational as well: both because the damned in hell are outside the bond of charity, according to which the works of the living are extended to the dead, and because those receiving final retribution for their merits have reached the end of wayfaring, like the saints who are in heaven.
For what still remains of punishment or glory for the body does not confer on them the nature of a wayfarer, since glory is essentially rooted in the soul, just as is also the misery of the damned. And so their punishment cannot be diminished, just as neither can the glory of the saints be increased, with respect to the essence of the reward. But nevertheless there is a way suggested by some to benefit the damned, which could be sustained in a certain way: if it were said that intercessory acts like this do not benefit them in diminishing or cutting short their punishment, or in diminishing the sensation of the punishment, but by taking away some matter of sorrow, which could be the case for them, if they regarded themselves as so outcast that the living had no care for them; which matter of sorrow is taken away from them, when suffrages are offered for them. But that too cannot be the case according to the common rule: for, as Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead: (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, ch. 13, par. 16 (CSEL 41:649).) the spirits of the dead are there where they do not see whatever they do or whatever happens in this life of men (which is particularly true of the damned); and so they do not know when suffrages are done for them, unless outside the common rule this remedy is divinely granted to some of the damned; which is an entirely uncertain claim. And so it is safer to say simply speaking that suffrages do not benefit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as is apparent from the authorities cited.
Reply Obj. 1: The tokens of idols were not found among the dead such that a sign could be taken from them that they had fallen into revering idols, but they had taken them as victors take what was owed to them by the law of war; and yet they did sin venially by avarice. This is why they were not damned to hell, and how the suffrages were able to benefit them. Or it could be said that according to some people, when they saw themselves in imminent danger in the fight, they repented of their sin, as it says: when he slew them . . . they sought God earnestly (Ps 78 [77]:34). And this can be guessed with probability; and it is why the offering was made for them.
Reply Obj. 2: ‘Damnation’ in those words is taken broadly for any punishment, and so it includes the punishment of purgatory as well, which sometimes is expiated completely by the suffrages, but sometimes is not, but only diminished.
Reply Obj. 3: In this respect intercessory prayer is accepted more for a dead person than for a living one, because he needs it more, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But in another respect the living person is in a better condition, for he can be transferred from the state of mortal guilt into the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead; and so there is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.
Reply Obj. 4: That aid did not consist in their punishment being diminished, but in this alone, as it says in the same place, that by his praying it was granted to them to see each other; and in this they had some joy that was not true but imaginary, while what they were longing for was fulfilled; just as the demons also are said to rejoice when they lure people into sin, although their punishment is not at all lessened by this, just as neither is the joy of the angels lessened by the fact that they are said to suffer in compassion for our evils.
Reply Obj. 5: Concerning Trajan’s actions it can be probably guessed that by the prayers of blessed Gregory he was recalled to life, and then obtained the grace by which he gained the remission of his sins, and consequently was freed from punishment, just as also it appears among all those who were miraculously revived from death, many of whom it was obvious had been idolaters and damned. About all of them it must be said likewise, that they were not consigned to hell as a last end, but according to the present justice of their own merits; but according to higher reasons, by which they were predestined to be recalled to life, it was to be arranged otherwise for them.
Or it could be said according to some people that Trajan’s soul was not simply absolved from liability to eternal punishment, but his punishment was suspended for a time, namely, until the day of judgment. However, it is not necessary that this be done commonly through suffrages, for there are some things that happen by the common rule of things, and others that are granted individually to a few by a privilege, just as the limits of of human things are one thing and the signs of divine strength another, as Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Taken of the Dead.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the punishment of purgatory is for the completion of the satisfaction that was not fully completed in the body. And this is why, as is clear from what has been said and what was said above in Distinction 20, since the works of one person can help make satisfaction for another, either living or dead, there is no doubt that suffrages offered by the living benefit those dwelling in purgatory.
Reply Obj. 1: That authority speaks about the hell of the damned, in which there is no redemption for those who are consigned to such punishment finally. Or it could be said, according to Damascene in his sermon On Those Who Sleep, that statements like this are to be explained according to secondary causes, namely, according to what is required by the merit of those who are consigned to hell. But according to divine mercy, which overcomes human merit, for the prayers of the just it is sometimes arranged differently than the judgment contained in the authorities mentioned. Now God changes judgments, but not counsel, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 16, par. 10.) Hence Damascene (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in the Faith, n. 14, PG 95:262.) gives the examples of the Ninivites, Ahab, and Hezekiah, (See Jonah 3:10; 1 Kings 21:29; 2 Kings 20:5.) in whom it appears that the sentence divinely handed down against them was commuted by divine mercy.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting if the punishment of those in purgatory is wiped out by the multiplication of suffrages: for it still does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, since the punishment undertaken by one is counted for another.
Reply Obj. 3: The purification of a soul by the sufferings of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that prevents his reception of glory. And since by the suffering that one person undertakes for another the guilt of the other can be expiated, as was said, it is not unfitting if one person is purified by the satisfaction done by another.
Reply Obj. 4: Suffrages get their strength from two things, namely, the work being done by this person, and the work itself performed. And I say that the work performed is not only the Church’s sacrament, but the incidental effect of this work, just as collecting alms results in the relief of the poor, and their prayer to God for the dead. Likewise, the work being done by this person can be taken on the part of the principal agent or on the part of someone who carries it out. Therefore, I say that as soon as someone dying arranges for suffrages to be done for him, he obtains the reward of these acts fully, even before they are done, as to the efficacy of the suffrage, which was from the work being done by the principal agent. But as to the efficacy of the suffrages that comes from the works themselves, or from the work being done by the one performing it, he does not obtain the fruit before the suffrages are done, and if it should happen that he is first purified by suffering, in this regard he will be cheated of the fruit of the suffrages, which will redound upon those by whose fault he was cheated. For it is not inappropriate that someone be cheated by the fault of another in temporal matters; and the suffering of purgatory is temporal, although as to retribution no one can be cheated except by his own fault.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that unbaptized children are detained in limbo only because they lack the state of grace. This is why, since the status of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as to meriting the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot benefit children consigned to limbo.
Reply Obj. 1: Although original sin is the kind of thing in which someone can be helped by another, nevertheless the souls of children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be helped, because the afterlife is not a time for acquiring grace.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks about those who are not extremely bad, but who were nonetheless baptized; which is evident from what he says a little before: therefore when sacrifices, either of the altar or of any amount of alms, are offered for all the baptized.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that by their very notion suffrages convey a certain assistance, which does not apply to someone who is not suffering from a defect, for being helped only applies to someone inasmuch as he is needy. Therefore, since the saints who are in heaven are free from all need, saturated by the abundance of the house of God, being helped by intercessory acts does not apply to them.
Reply Obj. 1: Statements like this are not to be understood as though the saints in glory profit because we celebrate their feasts, but that it profits us who celebrate their glory more solemnly; just as when we know or praise God, his glory grows in us in a certain way, but nothing is added to God but only to us.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the sacraments effect what they represent, nevertheless they do not bring about their effect with regard to everything that they represent: otherwise, since they represent Christ, they would bring about something in Christ himself, which is absurd. But for the one receiving the sacrament they have an effect by virtue of what is represented by the sacrament. And so we do not read that the sacrifices offered for departed members of the faithful benefit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints who are commemorated or represented in the sacrament, they benefit others for whom they are offered.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the saints who are in heaven rejoice in all our good deeds, nevertheless it does not follow that by the multiplication of our joys their joy is increased formally, but only materially. For every passion is formally increased according to the rationale of its object. Now, regardless of what they rejoice in, the reason for joy in the saints is God himself, whom they cannot rejoice in more and less because then their essential reward, which consists in rejoicing in God, would be altered. This is why, since their reason for rejoicing in good deeds is God, it does not follow that when good deeds are multiplied, they rejoice any more intensely, but that they rejoice in more things; and so it does not follow that our works help them.
Reply Obj. 4: It should not be understood as though any addition is made to the reward or recompense for that blessed person by the suffrages done by someone else, but there is for the person who does them. Or it could be said that by suffrages the reward can be applied to the deceased blessed, inasmuch as while he was living he arranged for suffrages to be done for him, which was meritorious.
Article 3
Which suffrages are beneficial
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that the souls of the dead are not only helped by the Church’s prayers, the sacrifice of the altar, and almsgiving, nor are they especially helped by these things. For a penalty must be repaid by penalty. But fasting is more penal than almsgiving or prayer. Therefore, fasting would be more beneficial in suffrages than any of the things listed.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory counts fasting with the three things mentioned, as we have in Cause 13, Question 11: the souls of the dead are released in four ways: either by the oblations of the priests, or prayers of the holy ones, or the almsgiving of those dear to them, or the fasting of their relatives. (Decretals, Cause 13, ch. 22, qu. 11, PL 187:948. According to the Vives edition, these words are not found verbatim in Gregory.) Therefore, the three things listed are insufficiently enumerated by Augustine.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptism is the most powerful of the sacraments, especially as to its effect. Therefore, baptism or other sacraments should be as beneficial to the dead, or more so, than the Sacrament of the Altar.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, this is seen from what we have in 1 Corinthians 15:29: if the dead are not raised at all, why are people baptized on their behalf? Therefore, baptism is also effective as suffrage for the dead.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is the same Sacrifice of the Altar in different Masses. Therefore, if the sacrifice is counted among suffrages, but the Mass is not, it seems that it would be equally beneficial for any Mass to be said, whether the votive Mass of the Blessed Virgin, or the Holy Spirit, or any other; which would seem to be against the regulations of the Church, which has established a special Mass for the Dead.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, in his sermon on those who sleep, Damascene (John Damascene, Homily on Those Who Sleep in the Faith, n. 19, PG 95:266.) teaches that beeswax and oil and the like should be offered for the dead. Therefore, not only the offering of the Sacrifice of the Altar but also other oblations should be counted among the intercessory acts for the dead.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the indulgences that the Church grants also benefit the dead. First, by the Church’s custom which causes a crusade to be preached, so that a person might have an indulgence for himself and two or three others, and sometimes for ten souls of both the living and the dead. But this would be a deception if it did not benefit the dead. Therefore, indulgences do benefit the dead.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than the merit of one person. But personal merit is offered as a suffrage for the dead, as is evident in the bestowing of alms. Therefore, the merit of the Church, which indulgences are derived from, would be even stronger.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Church’s indulgences benefit those who are of the Church’s forum. But those who are in purgatory are of the Church’s forum, otherwise the intercession of the Church would not benefit them. Therefore, it seems that indulgences benefit the dead.
On the contrary (1), for indulgences to avail someone, an appropriate reason is required for granting the indulgences. But no reason like this can exist on the part of someone who is dead, for he cannot do anything to the benefit of the Church, which is the chief reason that indulgences are granted. Therefore, it seems that indulgences do not benefit the dead.
Furthermore (2), indulgences are determined according to the will of the person granting the indulgences. Therefore, if indulgences could benefit the dead, it would be in the power of the one granting indulgences to free a dead person from all punishment; which seems absurd.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the observance of funeral rites benefits the dead. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1.) For in his sermon on those who sleep, Damascene (Ibid.) quotes the words of Athanasius who says thus: although anyone who has ended in faithfulness has been taken up into the air, do not fail to light oil and beeswax in his tomb, calling upon the Lord; for these things are acceptable to God and receive much reward from him. But these things belong to the observance of funeral rites. Therefore, the observance of funeral rites does benefit the dead.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Augustine says in Book 1 of the City of God: the funeral offices of ancient just men were undertaken in piety, and funeral rites were celebrated, and tombs were supplied; and when they lived they gave orders to their children about burials, and how their bodies should be borne. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 1, ch. 13.) But they would not have done this unless burial and the like conferred something on the dead. Therefore, these things do benefit the dead.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one does almsgiving for another person unless it benefits him. But to bury the dead is counted among the works of almsgiving, which is why, as Augustine says in the City of God 1: by an angel’s witness Tobias is commended to have deserved well of God for burying the dead. (Ibid.) Therefore, burial rites like these do benefit the dead.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is unfitting to say that the devotion of the faithful is in vain. But people arrange to have themselves buried in a religious place out of devotion. Therefore, burial rites do benefit the dead.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, God is more inclined to have mercy than to punish. But being buried in a sacred place is harmful to people if they are unworthy. For example, Gregory (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 52.) says: the bodies of those whom grave sins weigh down are placed in churches to a greater heap of damnation rather than to their forgiveness. Therefore, much more should it be said that rites of burial benefit those who are good.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, ch. 18, par. 22 (CSEL 41:658).) in his book On the Care to be Taken of the Dead: acts devoted to the human body are no guard for eternal salvation, but offices of humanity.
Furthermore (2), Gregory says, writing to archbishop Boniface: the office of funeral rites, the establishment of tombs, the pomps of funeral processions, are more for the solace of the living than the relief of the dead. (Gregory is citing Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, ch. 2, par. 4 (CSEL 41:626).)
Furthermore (3), the Lord says: do not fear those who kill the body and after this have nothing more they can do (Matt 10:28). But after death the bodies of the saints can be forbidden a burial, as in church history we read was done to some of the martyrs of Lyons, France. Therefore, it does not harm the dead if their bodies remain unburied; therefore, neither do burial rites benefit them.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, the intercessory prayers of the living benefit the dead according as they are united to the living in charity, and according as the intention of the living is directed toward the dead. And therefore the works that are especially of a nature to assist the dead are those that pertain the most to the sharing of charity, or to the directing of one’s intention to another. Now, the sacrament of the Eucharist pertains to charity preeminently, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, containing that in which the whole Church is united and solidified, namely, Christ. This is why the Eucharist is like a kind of origin or bond of charity. But among the effects of charity is especially the work of almsgiving; and so these two things are especially offered for the dead on the part of charity, namely, the Church’s sacrifice and almsgiving. But on the side of the intention being directed toward the dead, prayer is especially effective, for prayer by its very nature does not only regard the one doing it, like the other works do, but more directly what is being prayed for. And therefore these three are listed as being particular helps to the dead, although whatever other good works are done out of charity for the dead should be believed to benefit them.
Reply Obj. 1: In someone who makes satisfaction for another, for the effect of the satisfaction to reach another person, the way that the satisfaction of one person passes to another should be considered even more than the suffering in that satisfaction; although the suffering does more to expiate the guilt of the one making satisfaction, inasmuch as it is like a remedy. And this is why the three things mentioned benefit the dead more than fasting would.
Reply Obj. 2: Fasting can also benefit the dead by reason of the charity and the intention directed toward the dead, but nevertheless fasting of its own account does not contain anything that pertains to charity or to the directing of an intention, but these things are somewhat extrinsic to it. And this is why Augustine did not include it, but Gregory (As noted above, the text has not been found in Gregory’s works.) includes fasting among suffrages for the dead.
Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is a certain spiritual regeneration. This is why, just as in generation no one acquires being except the one generated, in the same way baptism has no efficacy except for the one baptized, with regard to the work performed; however, by the work being done by the one baptizing or the one baptized it can benefit others, just as can the rest of the meritorious works. But the Eucharist is a sign of the union of the Church, and for this reason its efficacy can be transferred to another by the very performance of the work itself, which does not happen with the other sacraments.
Reply Obj. 4: The Gloss (See Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:547.) explains this authoritative text in two ways. In one way, like this: if the dead do not rise, nor has Christ risen, why are they baptized for them? That is, for sins, since they are not forgiven if Christ did not rise: for in baptism not only is the Passion of Christ at work, but also his resurrection, which is somehow the cause of our spiritual resurrection. In another way, like this: there were some ignorant people who were baptized for those who departed this life without baptism, believing it would benefit them; and according to this the Apostle is only speaking according to the error of certain people in those words.
Reply Obj. 5: In the office of the Mass there is not only a sacrifice, but there are also prayers. And therefore the Mass as a suffrage contains two things that Augustine lists here, namely, prayer and sacrifice. Therefore, on the part of the sacrifice offered, the Mass benefits the dead equally, no matter who says it; and this is the main thing that happens in the Mass. But on the part of the prayers, it benefits most whatever the prayers were determined to. But nevertheless this defect can be compensated by greater devotion either of the person who says the Mass, or of the one who causes it to be said, or even by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is implored in the Mass.
Reply Obj. 6: An offering of candles or oil like this can benefit the dead, inasmuch as they are a kind of almsgiving, for they are given for the Church’s worship, or for the use of the faithful.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that indulgences can benefit someone in two ways: in one way, principally; in the other way, secondarily. Principally, it benefits someone who receives an indulgence, namely, the one who does what the indulgence is given for, like whoever visits the entrance of a certain holy place. For this reason, since the dead cannot do any of those things for which indulgences are given, indulgences cannot benefit them directly. However, secondarily and indirectly, they benefit the person for whom someone does whatever is the reason for the indulgence, which, as was said in Distinction 10, Question 1, Article 5, Quaestiuncula 3, response to the second objection, sometimes can happen, although sometimes it cannot, according to the different forms of indulgences.
For if the form of the indulgence is thus: whoever does this or that will have an indulgence of so much, then the one who does it cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another person, for it does not belong to him to apply to something else the Church’s intention, by which shared suffrages are communicated, which is how indulgences gain their force. However, if the indulgence is done under this form: whoever does this or that, he and his father or anyone related to him who is detained in purgatory will have an indulgence of so much, then this kind of indulgence would benefit not only the living person but also the deceased. For there is no reason that the Church could transfer its common merits, which indulgences depend on, to the living but not to the dead. However, it does not follow that the one in charge of the Church can free souls from purgatory at his own will, for in order for an indulgence to have value, a fitting reason for granting indulgences is required, as was said above in Distinction 20.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that burial was devised for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be offended by the disgrace of corpses, and their bodies be infected by the stink. And this has to do with the body, but it benefits the living spiritually as well, inasmuch as faith in the resurrection is bolstered by it. But it benefits the dead in that those who see their tombs keep the deceased in memory, so that they may pray for them. This is why tombstones take their name from memory. For a tombstone is called a ‘monument,’ because it reminds the mind, as Augustine (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken of the Dead, ch. 4, par. 6 (CSEL 41:630).) says in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead. However, it was an error of the pagans that burial benefitted the dead such that their souls would receive rest, for they did not believe the soul could receive rest before the body was given a burial, which is in every way ridiculous and absurd. But that burial in a consecrated place benefits the deceased is not at all by the work itself performed, but rather from the work of the person doing it, namely, when either the deceased person himself or someone else arranges for his body to be entombed in a sacred place, he commits him to the protection of a certain saint, by whose prayers he is believed to be helped, and also to the protection of those who serve in the sacred place, who pray often and particularly for those buried near them.
But those things that are displayed for the decoration of tombs do benefit the living as a source of comfort for the living. But they can benefit the dead too; not indeed in themselves, but incidentally; namely, inasmuch as by things like this men are inspired to compassion and consequently to prayer; or inasmuch as from the costs of the burial either the poor gain the proceeds or the church is adorned; for this is how burial is counted among other modes of almsgiving in Wisdom 4.
Reply Obj. 1: Oil and beeswax brought to the tomb of someone deceased benefit that person incidentally, either inasmuch as they are offered to the Church or given to the poor, or inasmuch as such things are done in reverence for God. This is why it is added to the words quoted: for oil and beeswax are a holocaust.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason the holy patriarchs took care that their bodies were buried was so that they might show that the bodies of the dead belong to the providence of God; not that any feeling remained in dead bodies, but for the sake of bolstering faith in the resurrection, as is clear from Augustine in the City of God 1. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 1, ch. 13.) This was also why they wished to be buried in the promised land, where they believed the Christ would be born and die, whose resurrection is the cause of our resurrection.
Reply Obj. 3: Since flesh is part of the nature of man, a man has a natural affection toward his own flesh, according to Ephesians 5:29: no man ever hates his own flesh. Therefore, according to this natural affection there is a certain solicitude in anyone living forwhat will happen concerning his body even after death, and he would be pained if he foresaw that anything shameful would happen to his body. And therefore those who love a person, from the fact that they are conformed to the affection of the one they love, devote humane care to his flesh. As Augustine (Ibid.) says in the City of God 1: if a father’s garments, or a ring of his, or anything like this is so much dearer to his descendents the greater their love for their parents, then in no way are their bodies to be despised, which we wear more closely and more intimately than any clothing. Therefore, inasmuch as it satisfies someone’s affections when he buries a man’s body, since the man himself cannot satisfy himself in this regard, it is said to be an act of almsgiving to him.
Reply Obj. 4: The devotion of the faithful who provide tombs for their loved ones in sacred places, as Augustine (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken of the Dead, ch. 4 (CSEL 41:630).) says in the book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, is not in vain inasmuch as they commit their dead to the suffrage of the saints, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Burial in a sacred place does not harm someone wicked who has died, except to the extent that he procured this tomb for himself unworthily for the sake of human glory.
Article 4
How much good they do
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the intercessory acts that are done for someone deceased do not do more for him than for any other people. For spiritual light is more communicable than physical light. But physical light, like that of a candle, although it may be lit for one person, nevertheless benefits equally all those who abide together with him, even if the candle was not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, even if they are done for one person in particular, they do not work more for him than for others dwelling in purgatory.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the text, suffrages benefit the dead according as, when they were alive, they merited for themselves that afterward they should benefit. But some people merited such that suffrages would benefit them more than those for whom they are done. Therefore, they benefit them more; otherwise their merits would be in vain.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, not as many suffrages are done for poor people as for the rich. Therefore, if suffrages done for people benefited only them, or benefited them more than others, poor people would be in a worse condition, which is against the words of the Lord: blessed are you poor, for yours is the kingdom of God (Luke 6:20).
On the contrary (1), human justice follows the example of divine justice. But in human justice, if someone pays a debt for another, only that person is released from the debt. Therefore, since someone who performs suffrages in a certain way pays the debt of the one for whom he does them, it will only benefit that person.
Furthermore (2), just as a man doing suffrages in a certain way makes satisfaction for a dead man, so too sometimes someone can make satisfaction for a living man, as was said above in Distinction 20, Question 1, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 3. But when someone satisfies for a living man, that satisfaction only counts for the one for whom it was done. Therefore, when someone performs suffrages, that too benefits only the one for whom it is done.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that suffrages done for many people are worth as much as if they were done for each person individually. For we see that from the reading that is read to one person, nothing is lost if it is read to others at the same time. Therefore, by the same argument, nothing is lost to someone for whom a suffrage is done, if someone else is included with him. And so if it were done for several people, it would be worth as much for each one as if it had been done for each person individually.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the common use of the Church, we see that when Mass is said for a certain deceased person, at the same time prayers are also added for others of the dead. But this would not be done if the deceased for whom the Mass is said suffered any loss by it. Therefore, the same as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, suffrages, especially of prayers, depend on divine power. But for God, just as it does not differ whether he helps through many people or through few, so it does not differ if he helps many or few. Therefore, as much as one person may be helped by one prayer if it were done for him alone, many individuals will also be helped if the same prayer were said for many.
On the contrary (1), it is better to help many rather than one. Therefore, if a suffrage done for many were worth as much to each as if it had been done for one person alone, it would seem that the Church should not have established that a Mass or prayer be said for anyone individually, but that it would always be said for all the faithful departed; which is evidently false.
Furthermore (2), a suffrage has a finite efficacy. Therefore, when distributed over many people, it does less good for them individually than it would do for one person alone.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that general suffrages work for those for whom they are not specifically done, as much as they do for those for whom they are done both specifically and generally. (Parallel: Quodl. VIII, q. 5, a. 2.) For in the future it will be rendered to each person according to his proper merits. But someone for whom suffrages are not done merited to be helped after death as much as someone for whom they were specifically done. Therefore, he will be helped as much by general suffrages as another person would be by specific and general ones.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, among the Church’s suffrages, the Eucharist is preeminent. But since the Eucharist contains the whole Christ, it has in some way an infinite efficacy. Therefore, the one offering of the Eucharist that is done generally for all men avails for the full liberation of those who are in purgatory. And in this way general suffrages alone help as much as specific and general ones together.
On the contrary, two goods should be chosen over one alone. Therefore, general and specific suffrages are more beneficial to the person for whom they are done than general ones alone.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, there are two opinions about this.
For some people, like Praepositinus, have said that suffrages done for one certain person do more good not to the one for whom they are done, but to those who are more worthy; and he gave the example of a candle that is lit for a rich person, which does not benefit less the others who are with the rich man, and perhaps benefits them more, if they have clearer eyes. And also the example of reading, which does not benefit the one for whom it is read more than the others who hear it along with him, but perhaps it benefits the others more, if they are more apt for understanding. And if it were objected to these people that according to this the Church’s ordinances, which establish prayers specifically for certain people, would be in vain, they would say that the Church does this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are quicker to do specific suffrages than general ones, and they also pray more fervently for their own loved ones than for strangers. Others have said the contrary, that suffrages do more for those for whom they are done.
However, both opinions contain truth in a certain respect. For the value of the suffrages can be thought about from two sides. For they have value in one way from the virtue of charity, which makes all good things common; and according to this it is true that they are worth more for the one who is more filled with charity, even if they are not especially done for him. And this is how the value of the suffrages counts as more according to a certain interior consolation, as one person who has charity enjoys the good deeds of another after death, as to the diminishment of punishment; for after death there is no place for acquiring or increasing grace, for which others’ works avail us in life by the virtue of charity. In another way intercessory deeds have value from the fact that by one person’s intention they are applied to another person. And this is how the satisfaction of one person is counted for another, and in this way there is no doubt that they are worth more for the person for whom they are done; on the contrary, in this way they benefit him alone. For satisfaction is properly directed to the remission of punishment. Therefore, as to the remission of punishment a suffrage works particularly for the one for whom it is done; and according to this the second opinion contains more truth than the first.
Reply Obj. 1: Suffrages are beneficial in the way that light is insofar as they are received by the dead, who receive a certain consolation from them, which is greater the more they are endowed with charity. But according as acts of intercession are a kind of satisfaction by the doer’s intention of transferring them to another, they are not like light, but rather like the payment of a debt. But it is not necessary that if one person’s debt is paid, the debts of others should be paid by it.
Reply Obj. 2: The merit by which they merit for themselves is conditional, for for the merited in such a way that suffrages would beneft them if they were done for them, which was nothing other than making themselves suited to receiving it. Therefore, it is clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but by their prior merits they made themselves capable of receiving the fruits of these suffrages. And therefore it does not follow that their merit would be in vain.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a rich man from being of a better condition than the poor in one respect, for example, regarding the expiation of punishment. But this is almost nothing compared to the possession of the kingdom of heaven, in which the poor are shown to be of a better condition by the authority cited.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that if the value of the acts of intercession were considered according as they derive worth from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church, then the suffrages done for many benefit each individual as much as if they had been done for one person alone; for charity is not reduced if its effect is divided among many, but rather it is increased; and similarly too joy becomes greater when it is shared by more people, as Augustine (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 8, ch. 4.) says in his Confessions 8. And this is how many people in purgatory do not rejoice less than one over one good deed. However, if the value of the suffrages were considered as they are certain acts of satisfaction transferred to the dead by the doer’s intention, then a suffrage that is done for someone individually is worth more for that person than what is done for him and many others in general. For the effect of a suffrage is divided by divine justice among those for whom the acts are done. Therefore, it is clear that this question depends on the first; and from this it is also clear why it was instituted that specific acts of intercession be done in the Church.
Reply Obj. 1: As acts of satisfaction, suffrages do not do good in the manner of an action, as teaching does, which, like all other actions, has its effect according to the disposition of the receiver; but they work by the mode of the paying of a debt, as was said; and so it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 2: Because suffrages done for one person also benefit others in some way, as is clear from what has been said, for this reason when a Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting that prayers also be made for others. For the other prayers are not said so that the satisfaction of one suffrage would be determined to others principally, but so that the prayer specifically poured out for them would be beneficial for them.
Reply Obj. 3: Prayer may be considered on the part of the one praying or on the part of the one who is prayed to, and its effect depends on both. And therefore, although it is not any more difficult for divine virtue to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of someone praying in this way is not as satisfactory for many as for one.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the answer to this also depends on the answer to the first question. For if suffrages done specifically for one person benefit everyone indifferently, then all suffrages are common. And then someone for whom they were not specifically done will be aided as much as the one for whom they are done, if he is equally worthy. However, if suffrages done for one person do not benefit everyone indifferently, but benefit most those for whom they were done, then there is no doubt that common suffrages and specific ones are worth more together than common ones alone. And thus the Master touches on two opinions in the text. One says that common and specific suffrages equally benefit the rich man, and common ones alone benefit a poor man; for although one may be helped by more things than the other, nevertheless he is not helped more. However, he refers to the other opinion when he says that the person for whom the specific suffrages are done obtains faster forgiveness, but not fuller forgiveness: for either person will finally be freed from all punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from what has been said, the help of suffrages does not fall directly and simply under merit, but it is conditional, as it were; and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the power of Christ, which is contained under the sacrament of the Eucharist, is infinite, nevertheless the effect to which that sacrament is ordered is determinate. Therefore it is not necessary that all the punishment of those who are in purgatory be expiated by one Sacrifice of the Altar, just as neither by one sacrifice that a certain man offers is he freed from all satisfaction due for his sins. This is also why sometimes many Masses are enjoined as satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, it is credible that by divine mercy, if something from specific suffrages exceeds those for whom they are done, such that in fact those people do not need them, they may be dispensed to others for whom they were not done, if those others do need them. And this is clear from what Damascene says in his sermon On Those Who Sleep: God, as he is just, proportions possibility to the powerless, and as he is wise, manages the exchange of defects, which management indeed is seen in that fact that what one person lacks, another supplies.
Question 3
Prayers and the saints
Next must be considered the prayers of the saints which they pray for us. And here three questions arise:
first, whether the saints are aware of our prayers;
- second, whether we should bother them all to pray for us;
- third, whether their prayers offered for us are always heard.
- However, whether we can pray to the saints and whether the saints who are in heaven pray for us has already been treated in Distinction 15. Article 1
Whether the saints are aware of our prayers
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 89, a. 8; ST II-II, q. 4, a. 2; In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 4, a. 5, qa. 1, ad 3; De veritate, q. 8, a. 4, ad 12.) It seems that the saints are not aware of our prayers. For Augustine’s gloss, commenting on thou art our Father, though Abraham does not know us and Israel does not acknowledge us (Isa 63:16), says that the dead and the saints are not aware of what the living do, even their own children. And it is taken up by Augustine (Augustine, On the Care to be Taken for the Dead (CSEL 41), ch. 13.) in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, where he cites this authority. And these are the words of Augustine in the same place: if such great patriarchs were unaware what was happening among the people procreated by them, how could the dead be bothered by knowing and assisting the affairs and actions of the living? Therefore, the saints cannot be aware of our prayers.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said to King Josiah, on that account, namely, that you have wept before me, I will gather you to your fathers . . . and your eyes shall not see all the evil which I will bring upon this place (2 Kgs 22:20). But this would in no way have been relieved through Josiah’s death, if after his death he had been aware of what was happening to his nation. Therefore, the holy dead are not aware of our acts, and thus they do not understand our prayers.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more perfect someone is in charity, the more he assists his neighbor in danger. But while they live in the flesh, the saints clearly both counsel and aid their neighbors in dangers, and especially those closely connected with them. Therefore, since after death they have much greater charity, if they knew our deeds, they would counsel and help much more those dear to them in their needs, which they do not seem to do. Therefore, it does not seem that they know our acts and prayers.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the saints after death gaze upon the Word, so do the angels, about whom it says: their angels always behold the face of my Father (Matt 18:10). But angels do not know all things because of their seeing the Word, since the lower ones are purified from ignorance by the higher ones, as is clear from Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, n. 3, PG 3:210.) in the Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter 7. Therefore, although the saints behold the Word, they do not also know in him our prayers and the other things that are being done around us.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, God alone is the searcher of hearts. But prayer particularly exists in the heart. Therefore, it belongs to God alone to know prayers; therefore, the saints do not know our prayers.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Job 14:21, his sons come to honor, and he does not know it; they are brought low, and he perceives it not, blessed Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 12, par. 21.) says, this is not to be understood about the holy souls, for concerning those who gaze upon the brightness of the omnipotent God, in no way should it be believed that there is anything abroad that they are ignorant of. Therefore, they do know the prayers made to them.
Furthermore (2), Gregory (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 260), Bk. 2, ch. 35.) says in his Dialogue 2: to the soul beholding the Creator, all creation is shrunk. For no matter how much of the Creator’s light it has gazed upon, all that was created becomes small. But this would seem most of all to impede the souls of the saints from knowing our prayers and all else that is happening to us, namely that they are distant from us. Therefore, since that distance does not impede it, as is evident from the authority mentioned, it seems that the souls of the saints are aware of our prayers and the things that are happening here.
Furthermore (3), if they were not aware of the things that happen to us, they would also not pray for us, for they would be unaware of our lacks. But this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, PL 23:344.) says in his letter against him. Therefore, the saints know the things that are happening to us.
I answer that, the divine essence is a sufficient means for knowing all things, which is evident from the fact that God gazes upon all things by seeing his own essence. However, it does not follow that whoever sees God’s essence would know all things, but only someone who comprehends his essence; just as neither does it follow from knowing a certain principle that one will know all things that result from that principle, unless the whole power of the principle were comprehended.
Therefore, since the souls of the saints do not comprehend the divine essence, it does not follow that they know all things that can be known through the divine essence. For this reason too the lower angels are taught by the higher ones about certain things, although all of them see the divine essence. But it is necessary that any member of the blessed see in the divine essence as much of other matters as the perfection of beatitude requires, so that a man has whatever he wishes, nor does he wish for anything inordinate, as we say below in Distinction 49, Question 2, Article 5. However, anyone with a right will wills that he know those things that pertain to him; therefore, since no rectitude is lacking from the saints, they will to know those things that pertain to them. And therefore it is necessary that they know those things in the Word. Now, it pertains to their glory that they provide assistance for salvation to those in need; for this is how they are made cooperators with God, than whom there is nothing more divine, as Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3, n. 2, PG 3:166.) says in the Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter 3. Therefore, it is evident that the saints have the knowledge of those things that are required for this. And so it is clear that in the Word they know the wishes and prayers of people who appeal to their aid.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine’s words should be understood to be about the natural knowledge of separated souls, and indeed this knowledge is not clouded in holy men, as it is in sinners. However, he is not talking about their knowledge in the Word, which it is manifest Abraham did not have at the time those things were said by Isaiah, since no one attained to the vision of God before Christ’s Passion.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if after their lives the saints know what is happening here, nevertheless it should not be believed that they are affected by sorrows when they learn about the trials of those whom they loved here in the world. For they are so filled with the joy of beatitude that sorrow finds no place in them. Therefore, if after death they were aware of the misfortunes of their loved ones, nevertheless their sorrow is taken care of, if they are taken away from this world before these misfortunes. But perhaps non-glorified souls would feel a certain sorrow if they perceived the troubles of their own loved ones. And since Josiah’s soul was not immediately glorified when it left his body, in this respect Augustine endeavors to conclude by this reasoning that the souls of the dead do not have knowledge of the deeds of the living.
Reply Obj. 3: The souls of the saints have wills fully conformed to the divine will, even in their desire. And this is why although they retain the affection of charity for their neighbors, nevertheless they do not offer them any help other than as they see it arranged by the divine will. And yet it should be believed that they do offer much aid to their neighbors by interceding before God on their behalf.
Reply Obj. 4: Although those who look upon the Word do not necessarily see all things in the Word, nevertheless they do see those things that pertain to the perfection of their beatitude, as was said.
Reply Obj. 5: God alone knows through himself the thoughts of the heart; but nevertheless others can know as much as is revealed to them either through their vision of the Word or in any other way.
Article 2
Whether we should bother them to pray for us
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: In II Sent. d. 27, a. 6, ad 2.) It seems that we should not pray to the saints to intercede for us. For no one troubles someone’s friends to make a request on his behalf, except insofar as he believes he will obtain their favor more easily. But God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and so his will is more easily inclined to hearing us than the will of any saint. Therefore, it seems superfluous to establish saints as mediators between us and God, such that they intercede for us.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if we should trouble them to pray for us, this is only because we know that their prayer will be accepted by God. But the holier someone is among the saints, the more acceptable his prayer is to God. Therefore, we ought always to make higher saints our intercessors before God, and never lesser ones.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as man, Christ is called the ‘holy of holies,’ (For the symbolic background, see (inter alia) Lev 6:25 and 6:29, and Heb 9:3.) and it is proper to him as man to pray. But we never ask Christ to pray for us. Therefore, neither should we ask other holy ones to pray for us.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone who intercedes for another at that other’s request represents his prayers to the one with whom he intercedes for him. But it is superfluous to represent anything to the one to whom all things are evident. Therefore, it is superfluous for us to make the saints our intercessors before God.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, something is superfluous when it is done for the sake of something else which would have happened or not happened in the same way without it. But the saints would pray or not pray for us in the same way whether we prayed to them or not, because if we are deserving of their prayers for us, they would pray for us even if we are not praying to them. However, if we are undeserving, even if we ask them, they will not pray for us. Therefore, to trouble them to pray for us seems entirely superfluous.
On the contrary (1), it says in Job 5:1: therefore, call if there is anyone who would answer you, and turn to one of the saints. But for us to call, as Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 5, par. 43.) says in the same place, is to beseech God with a humble prayer. Therefore, since we wish to pray to God, we should turn to the saints so that they would pray for us to God.
Furthermore (2), saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than in the state of wayfaring. But we should make holy people in this life intercessors for us toward God, after the example of the Apostle, who said, I appeal to you, brethren, by our Lord Jesus Christ and by the love of the Spirit, to strive together with me in your prayers to God on my behalf (Rom 15:30). Therefore, much more should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us with their prayers to God.
Furthermore (3), this is the general custom of the Church, which asks the prayers of the saints in its litanies. (Most commonly, at the Easter Vigil, on the Rogation Days, and during Ordinations.)
I answer that, this is the order that is divinely instituted in things, according to Dionysius, that the farthest things are led back to God by intermediaries. Therefore, since the saints who are in heaven are the closest to God, the order of divine law requires that we, who while we remain in the body are estranged from God, are led back to him by the saints as intermediaries, which is what happens when the divine goodness diffuses its effects through them. And since our return to God must correspond to the procession of his goodnesses toward us, so, as by means of the saints’ suffrages God’s benefits reach us, it is fitting for us to be led back to God such that we obtain his benefits again through the mediation of the saints. And this is why we make them intercessors and mediators, as it were, for us before God, when we ask them to pray for us.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not because of a defect in divine power that it works through the mediation of secondary causes, but it is for the greater fullness of the universal order and so that his goodness may be diffused in things in more ways, seeing as things do not only receive their own goodnesses from it but, over and above that, they become causes of goodness to others. In the same way, too, it is not because of a defect of his mercy that it is necessary to knock at the door of his clemency through the prayers of the saints, but it is for the sake of preserving in things the order described.
Reply Obj. 2: Although higher saints are more acceptable to God than the lower ones, nevertheless it is also useful to pray to lower saints sometimes; and this is for five reasons. First, from the fact that at times someone has a greater devotion to a lesser saint than to a greater one, and the effect of prayer depends mostly on devotion. Second, to take away boredom, for exclusive attention to one thing breeds boredom, while by the fact that we pray to different saints new fervor of devotion is excited with each one. Third, because it is given to some saints to be particular patrons in certain special causes, like Saint Anthony with hell-fire. (This is doubtless a reference to St. Anthony of the Desert, who was relentlessly attacked by demons and visions of hell.) Fourth, so that due honor may be shown to all of them. Fifth, because sometimes something is obtained by the prayers of many that would not be obtained by the prayers of one person.
Reply Obj. 3: Prayer is a kind of act, but acts belong to particular supposita. And so if we said, Christ, pray for us, unless something were added, we would seem to refer this to the person of Christ, and so it would seem to agree with the error of Nestorius, who distinguished the person of the Son of Man from the person of the Son of God in Christ; or the error of Arius, who held that the person of the Son was lesser than the person of the Father. So to avoid these errors, the Church does not say, Christ, pray for us, but Christ, hear us, or have mercy on us.
Reply Obj. 4: As will be said below, the saints are not said to represent our prayers to God as though they revealed something unknown to him; but because they ask God to grant them, or they consult the divine truth about them, namely, what should be done according to his providence.
Reply Obj. 5: A person becomes deserving of a saint’s prayers for him by the very fact that he turns to him in his need with a pure devotion; and so it is not superfluous that we pray to the saints.
Article 3
Whether their prayers offered for us are always heard
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that the saint’s prayers poured out to God on our behalf are not always heard. For if they were heard, the saints would be heard most of all concerning things that pertain to them. But they are not heard concerning these matters, which is why it says in Revelation 6:10–11 that it is said to the martyrs seeking vindication for those who are on the earth that they would remain still a little while until the number of their brothers was filled up. Therefore, much less are they heard concerning matters that do not pertain to them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my heart would not turn toward this people (Jer 15:1). Therefore, the saints are not always heard, when they pray to God for us.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the saints in heaven are considered to be equal to the angels of God, as is clear from Matthew 22:30. But angels are not always heard in the prayers that they pour out to God, which is clear from what we have in Daniel 10:12–13, where it says: I have come because of your words. But the prince of the kingdom of Persia withstood me twenty-one days. Now the angel who was speaking only came to Daniel’s aid by asking God for their liberation, and the fulfillment of this prayer was not obtained. Therefore, the other saints who pray for us are also not always heard by God.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone who obtains something by prayer merits it in some way. But those who are in heaven are not in the state of meriting. Therefore, they cannot obtain anything from God for us by their prayers.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, saints conform their wills to the divine will in everything. Therefore, they do not will anything except what they know God to will. But no one prays except as he wills. Therefore, they do not pray for anyone except as they know God wills. But what God wills would happen even without their prayers. Therefore, their prayers are not efficacious for obtaining anything.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, if the prayers of the whole heavenly court can obtain anything, they would be more efficacious than all the suffrages of the present Church. But if the suffrages of the present Church were multiplied for someone in purgatory, he would be completely absolved from punishment. Therefore, since the saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory just as they also obtain something for us, by the same reasoning their prayers would completely absolve from punishment those who are in purgatory; which is false, for then the Church’s suffrages for the dead would be superfluous.
On the contrary (1), it says in 2 Maccabees 15:14: here is the one who prays much for the people and for the whole city, Jeremiah, the prophet of God. And it is evident that his prayer is heard by what follows, that Jeremiah extended his right hand and gave a sword to Judas, saying: take this holy sword, a gift from God, with which you will strike down your adversaries (2 Macc 15:16).
Furthermore (2), Jerome (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, PL 23:344.) says in his epistle against Vigilantius: you say in your booklet that we can pray for each other while we live, and afterward he rejects this, saying thus: if apostles and martyrs still remaining in the body can pray for the rest when they should still be concerned for themselves, how much more will they after crowns, victories, and triumphs.
Furthermore (3), it is the custom of the Church frequently to ask to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.
I answer that, the saints are said to pray for us in two ways. In one way by the prayer being expressed, when they strike the ears of divine clemency with their wishes for us; in another way, by an interpretive prayer, namely, by their merits, which existing in God’s sight not only contribute to their glory, but are also a kind of suffrage and prayer for us; just as also the blood of Christ poured out for us is said to ask forgiveness for us. (See Heb 12:24.) However, in either way the prayers of the saints are, as far as in them lies, efficacious for obtaining what they request; but on our part there can be a defect, that we do not gain the fruit of their prayers, according as they are said to pray for us by the fact that their merits benefit us; but according as they pray for us by requesting something for us by their express prayers, they are always heard, for they do not wish anything but what God wills, nor do they ask anything but what they wish to be done. Now, what God wills simply is fulfilled, unless we are speaking about his antecedent will, according to which he wills that all people be saved, which is not always fulfilled. Therefore, neither is it astonishing if also what the saints will in this manner of willing is sometimes not fulfilled.
Reply Obj. 1: That prayer of the martyrs is nothing other than their desire of obtaining the garment of the body and the society of the saints who are to be saved, and their consent by which they consent to divine justice punishing the wicked. This is why the Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:722.) commenting on O Sovereign Lord . . . how long before thou wilt judge and avenge our blood (Rev 6:10), says, they desire a greater joy and company of the saints, and they consent to God’s justice.
Reply Obj. 2: The Lord is speaking there about Moses and Samuel according to the state they were in during this life. For we read that by praying for the people they made restitution to God’s wrath, as the interlinear Gloss says. And yet if they had existed at that time, they could not have placated God with their prayers for the people because of the wickedness of that people; and this is understood from the text.
Reply Obj. 3: A fight between the good angels is not to be understood in the sense that they poured out opposing prayers before God, but rather that they referred the contrary merits of their petitions, looked at from different angles, to the divine consideration, awaiting the divine judgment thereupon. And this is what Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 17, par. 12.) says when he explains Daniel’s words: for the lofty Spirits that are princes to those nations never fight on behalf of those that act unjustly, but justly judge and try their deeds. And when either the guilt or guiltlessness of each separate nation is brought into the trial of the Court Above, the ruling Spirit of that nation is said to have won in the conflict or not to have won; the one identical victory of all of whom, however, is the Supreme Will of their Maker above them, and while they ever have this Will before their eyes, what they cannot obtain they do not desire. Hence neither do they pray for it. And from this it is also clear that their prayers are always heard.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the saints are not in the state of meriting for themselves after they are in heaven, they are nevertheless in the state of meriting for others, or rather helping others by their previous merit. For while they lived they merited before God that their prayers would be heard by him after their death. Or it could be said that prayer is merited by one person, and it obtains by another person. For merit consists in a certain correspondence of an act to the end for the sake of which it exists, which is rendered to it like a reward. But the obtainment of a prayer depends on the generosity of the one who is asked. For a person sometimes begs something which he did not merit from the generosity of the one asked; and so although the saints are not in the state of meriting, nevertheless it does not follow that they are not in the state of obtaining.
Reply Obj. 5: Just as is clear from the authority of Gregory cited, neither saints nor angels will anything but what they see in the divine will, and so neither do they ask anything else. However, their prayer is not fruitless, for as Augustine (Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, n. 60, PL 45:1029.) says in his book On the Gift of Perseverance, the prayers of the saints benefit those who are predestined, for perhaps it is pre-ordained that they shall be saved by the prayers of those who intercede for them. And so God also wills that what the saints see him to will shall be fulfilled by their prayers.
Reply Obj. 6: The suffrages of the Church are for the dead like certain satisfactions of the living for the sake of the dead; and this is how they absolve the dead from the punishment that they have not paid. But the saints who are in heaven are not in the state of satisfying; and so it is not the same with their prayers as with the suffrages of the Church.
Exposition of the Text
“But when the resurrection has taken place, the joy of the good will be greater.” (Sententiae IV, 45.1 (259). 1 citing Augustine, In Ioannem, tr. 49 n. 10.) This is to be understood materially, for they shall rejoice over more things, but not formally, for they shall not rejoice more, as has been said. But concerning this more will be said in Distinction 49.
“Indeed, for those who left their bodies without that faith which works by love, and without the sacraments of that faith, their friends offer these offices of piety in vain.” (Sent. IV, 45.2 (260). 3 citing Augustine, Sermo 172, ch. 2 n. 2.) According to this, it seems that the suffrages of the Church do not benefit the catechumens who die in the faith of the Church, while yet they are in the state of salvation, as is clear from what was said above in Distinction 4. And it should be said that although they had not received the sacraments of the Church in act, they did however receive them in desire, which is counted for the deed, since the ability is lacking to them.
Those things which the Church offers for the dead are of help: for those who are moderately evil. (Sent. IV, 45.2 (260). 4.) These words are explained in different ways by different people. For those who say the Church’s suffrages benefit those dwelling in hell say that some are moderately good and others moderately bad. For they say that the extremely wicked are those who died without the Church’s faith and sacraments; and these they say no suffrages benefit. But the moderately bad are those who died with the Church’s faith and sacraments, but in mortal sin. And according to them, suffrages do benefit these people to the mitigation of their penalty, but not to its full cancellation. But they call the extremely good those who died without sin, and went straight to heaven, who do not need suffrages; but the moderately good, those who carry with them something to be burned, and who are detained in purgatory. And they say that suffrages benefit them to the point of complete absolution. But those who say that suffrages do not benefit those who are in hell, say that the moderately good and moderately bad are the same. For they call all those who are in hell extremely bad, but those in heaven extremely good, while those who are in purgatory they call moderately good, inasmuch as they fell short of the perfection of goodness, but also the moderately bad, inasmuch as they fell short of complete wickedness, which is mortal sin. Now suffrages sometimes benefit them to the mitigation of punishment, and sometimes to complete absolution, according to the different amounts of what needs to be burned and of suffrages. And this explanation is more fitting.
“It is wrong to pray in the Church for a martyr.” (Sent. IV, 45.2 (260). 4 citing Augustine, Sermo 172, ch. 2 n. 2.) This seems against what was said above, that the prayers for the extremely good are acts of thanksgiving. And it should be said that the above authority is speaking about when it is uncertain to us whether the ones prayed for are the extremely good. But Augustine is speaking here about when it is certain who are the extremely good; for then whoever prays for them represents in some way that they need it, and thus he does them injury.
I adjudge that he, passing as if through a fire. (Sent. IV, 45.5 (263). 2.) Here two helps are offered, one of which will assist as a means of satisfaction those who are found living at the end of the world, namely, the fire by which the face of the earth will be purified. For it could be that the intensity of the punishment would make up for whatever is lacking from the shortness of the time; and particularly since it is probable that they will have little to be burned, inasmuch as they were purified by the terror of the judge coming, through the signs previously shown forth. However, the other is by the force of charity, namely, the merits and intercessions of the saints, which speak on their behalf in virtue of charity.
“Or by seeking what he ought to do.” (Sent. IV, 45.6 (264). 5 citing Augustine, Epistola 140 (ad Honoratum), ch. 29 n. 40.) That consulting is nothing other than their turning to God, so that they receive illumination from him concerning what must be done.
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