D. 49 - The rewards of the blessed
After the Master has considered what pertains to the general judgment, in this part he begins to consider the rewards and punishments that follow the general judgment. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines the rewards of the good. In the second, the punishments of the wicked, at Distinction 50: here a question arises. (Sententiae IV 50.1 (284). 1.)
Now the first part is divided into three parts. In the first, he describes what will be the quality of the beatitude, or blessedness, of the saints, which will be given to them as a reward after the general judgment. In the second, he shows how every human appetite tends to its attainment: concerning blessedness, it is also usual to ask whether all wish it. (Sent. IV 49.1 (280). 3.)
In the third, how those who possess beatitude participate in it in different ways: it is usual to ask whether someone of greater merit, such as Peter, will know something concerning God which someone of lesser merit, such as Linus, will not know. (Sent. IV, 49.2 (281). 1.)
Concerning this he does three things. First, he shows the differentiation that will occur in the saints’ beatitude on the part of knowledge. Second, on the part of joy or delight: it is also usual to ask whether they are unequal in joy. (Sent. IV, 49.3 (282). 1.) Third, he inquires about the increase of beatitude that will occur from the resumption of the body: it is usual to ask next whether the blessedness of the saints will become greater after the judgment than in the meantime. (Sent. IV, 49.4 (283). 1.)
Here five questions arise. First, concerning beatitude. Second, concerning the vision of God, in which beatitude principally consists. Third, concerning delight, which completes beatitude formally. Fourth, concerning the “dowries,” which are included in beatitude. Fifth, concerning the crowns of special distinction, (Aquinas uses aureola, “little crown,” to express an added distinction or honor awarded to some of the blessed in addition to the aurea, “golden crown” or “halo,” which represents the essential prize of beatitude.) whereby beatitude is perfected and adorned.
Question 1
Beatitude
Concerning the first, four questions arise:
first, where beatitude should be sought;
- second, what it is;
- third, whether all desire it;
- fourth, whether all participate in it equally.
- Article 1
Where beatitude should be sought
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. (Parallels: cf. similar discussions at ST I-II, q. 2, aa. 1–5; SCG III, chs. 28–32; Sent. Eth. I, lec. 5.) It seems that beatitude (Beatitudo can be also translated as “blessedness” or “happiness.”) consists in goods of the body. For it is impossible that what is asserted by most people is totally false, as the Commentator says in the book On the Soul; and the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7, a saying generally expressed among the people never dies completely. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 13, 1153b27.) But the greater number of people are inclined to seek physical pleasures and bodily goods as their end. Therefore, the end of human life consists in bodily goods. But we call the end of human life beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should be sought in goods of the body.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the more final an end is in order of attainment, the more prior it is in intention and desire. But man desires bodily good before he desires spiritual good, since we are led, as by the hand, from the love of bodily things to the love of invisible things, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 11, n. 1 (CCSL 141:74).) Therefore, bodily good is our ultimate end. But such an end is beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should be sought in bodily goods.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more common a good is, the more divine it is, as is clear from the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 1094b6–10. In context, this statement is not set down as a general principle but is asserted to be true of the state or political society.) But bodily good is more common than spiritual good, because bodily good extends itself even to plants and brute animals, while spiritual good does not. Therefore, bodily good is superior to spiritual good; and so beatitude is to be sought more in bodily goods than in spiritual ones.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, beatitude is held by all to be virtue’s end. But virtue has its end not only in spiritual goods, but also in bodily ones; for through the virtue of temperance and other such virtues, man is preserved from harmful things even in regard to his body. Therefore, beatitude is to be sought not only in spiritual goods but also in bodily ones.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 197b4.) happiness and fortune seem to have to do with the same things. But the goods of fortune are bodily goods. Therefore, the goods in which beatitude and happiness consists (Though Thomas mentions both beatitudo et felicitas, he uses a singular verb, consistit, as if the two were meant to be synonymous.) are bodily.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, man is constituted of soul and body. Therefore, man’s good ought to be common to soul and body. But spiritual good cannot be shared by the body, whereas bodily good can be shared by the soul, inasmuch as the soul takes pleasure in bodily things. Therefore beatitude, which is man’s good, consists more in bodily goods than in spiritual ones.
On the contrary (1), what belongs to man according to his body can be common to him and to the other animals. But the other animals cannot possess beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should not be sought in goods of the body.
Furthermore (2), beatitude is man’s highest good. Therefore, it is to be sought among the foremost goods of man. But goods of the soul are nobler than goods of the body, just as the soul is nobler than the body. Therefore, beatitude is to be sought in goods of the soul.
Furthermore (3), the ultimate measure is the one that is not measured in any way. Therefore, whatever cannot be good without being measured cannot be the ultimate measure in human things, nor can it be the ultimate end, which is beatitude, since the end is the measure that imposes the proper mode on things ordered to an end. But bodily goods are neither praiseworthy nor good except insofar as they are measured with the measure of virtue, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 1104a11–18.) Therefore, beatitude cannot be found in bodily goods.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that beatitude consists more in things belonging to will than in things belonging to intellect. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 3, a. 4; ST I, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; SCG III, ch. 26; Quodl. VIII, q. 9, a. 1; Comp. theol. I, ch. 107.) For beatitude is the highest good. But good, precisely as good, is the object of will, not of intellect. Therefore, beatitude consists more in an act of will than an act of intellect.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, delight is required for beatitude, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 13, 1153b9–21.) this is why in Greek the word for beatitude is taken from the word for joy. But delight is in the will or affection. Therefore, so is beatitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1177a11.) happiness or beatitude consists in the act of the noblest virtue. But charity is the most excellent of all virtues, as is clear from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13. Therefore, since charity is in the will, that is where one should look for beatitude.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the soul commands the body, so does the will command the intellect, and, consequently, it is superior to it. But beatitude is considered to reside more in goods of the soul than in those of the body, because the soul is superior to the body. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it should be considered to reside more on the side of will than on the side of intellect.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, man’s beatitude consists in perfect union with God. But man is united to God more perfectly by will than by intellect. This is why when commenting on the phrase mobile and acute (the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 7), Hugh of St. Victor says: love towers above knowledge, and is greater than understanding. For God is more loved than understood; love enters in, where knowledge remains outside. (Hugh of St. Victor, Commentary on The Celestial Hierarchy of Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, Bk. 6, exp. of ch. 7, PL 175:1038. When Thomas cited this text earlier (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 10) the wording follows what is found in the PL ed.: Plus enim diligitur quam intelligitur. Here, at least in the Parma ed., the wording differs: Plus enim Deus diligitur quam intelligatur.) Therefore, beatitude consists in love more than in knowledge, and in will more than in intellect.
On the contrary (1) is what it says in John 17:3: this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. But eternal life is beatitude itself. Therefore, beatitude consists in knowledge.
Furthermore (2), commenting on 1 Corinthians 15:24, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power, a Gloss (Derived from Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 1, ch. 10 (CCSL 50:56).) says: this means, when he has conducted the faithful to the contemplation of God the Father, in which is found the end of all, everlasting rest and joy. But this is a description of beatitude. Therefore, beatitude consists in intellectual contemplation.
Furthermore (3), the Philosopher in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, chs. 7–8, 1177a11ff.) shows that man’s beatitude consists in the act of a contemplative virtue. But this pertains to intellect. Therefore beatitude consists most of all in understanding.
Furthermore (4), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 1097b14–16.) the good in which there is sufficiency per se is happiness or beatitude. But this is found in knowledge, as is clear from John 14:8: Lord, show us the Father, and we shall be satisfied. Therefore, the same as above.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that beatitude consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative intellect. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 3, a. 5; Sent. Eth. X, lec. 10–12.) For the more common a good is, the more divine it is, as is clear from the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 1094b6–10.) But the good of the speculative intellect belongs solely to the one who contemplates, whereas the good of the practical intellect can be shared by many. (Through the execution of a practical plan.) Therefore beatitude consists more in the practical than the speculative intellect.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, beatitude is man’s ultimate perfection. But when something’s perfection is the cause of something else, it is greater than when it exists perfect in itself. This is why in Chapter 3 of the Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius says that of all things the most godlike is to be made a coworker with God in the governing of others. (In this line, reductio has to be taken as broadly as possible, to include the three tasks of purification, illumination, and perfection that Pseudo- Dionysius argues to be the work of God in creation and the work he shares with creatures capable of undertaking it. See The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3, 165D–168A.) Now, through the speculative intellect a man has perfection in himself, whereas the practical intellect is the cause of others being perfected. Therefore, beatitude consists more in the practical than in the speculative intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, the end is like those things that are for the sake of the end. But beatitude is the end and reward of virtue, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 9, 1099b16–17.) Now virtues consist more in activity than in knowledge, because merely knowing does little or nothing for virtue, as is clear from the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 1105b6.) Hence beatitude consists more in the practical intellect than in the speculative.
Obj. 4: Further, man’s beatitude consists in what is noblest in man. But the practical intellect is nobler than the speculative, since it lays down the law for the speculative intellect; for it is by the law-maker’s prudence that it is ordained how someone should learn the speculative disciplines, as is clear from the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 1094a27–b1.) Therefore, beatitude resides more in the practical intellect than in the speculative.
On the contrary (1), since beatitude is the ultimate end, it is sought for its own sake, not for the sake of something else. But practical knowledge is ordered to something other than itself as its end, namely to a given work, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 993b20–23.) Now it is not so with speculative knowledge, which is sought for its own sake, as is clear from the Metaphysics 1. (Thomas may not have a single text in mind but more the general perspective of the first book, which concerns the distinctively human quest for answers to wonder-born questions: Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1 (980a22–27, 981b14–24); ch. 2 (982a14–16, 982a30–b8, 982b11–28).) Therefore, beatitude resides more in the speculative than in the practical intellect.
Furthermore (2), our beatitude consists in being joined to God. But we are joined to God not through the practical intellect, but through the speculative. Therefore, beatitude consists more in the speculative than in the practical intellect.
Furthermore (3), the notion of beatitude includes permanence, sufficiency, and delight. But in the act of the contemplative intellect man is more sufficient in himself than in the act of the practical intellect, for which he requires many exterior aids. Nor is there an action in which man is able to persist so long as in contemplation, because it is so far removed from corporeal instruments, whose weakness brings about weariness. Nor is there any delight so pure as that of contemplation, because no contrary is mixed in with it; for it does not even have a contrary. Therefore, beatitude most of all consists in an act of the speculative intellect.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that beatitude can be had in this life. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 43, a. 1, qa. 1; ST I-II, q. 5, a. 3; SCG III, ch. 48; Sent. Eth. I, lec. 10 and 16.) For Matthew 5:3 says: blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and similarly: blessed are they who suffer persecution; and other sayings of this kind. But all these things can be had in this life. Therefore, there is beatitude in this life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if beatitude could not exist in this life, no one would know about it unless he had some knowledge of the other life. But many philosophers completely ignorant of the future life have treated of beatitude. Therefore, beatitude is possible even in this life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, man’s present life is more perfect than the present life of any other animal. But the present life of other animals includes the attainment of their ultimate end. Therefore, man’s present life, too, includes beatitude, which is man’s end.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, each and every thing naturally desires its end. But from the desire for the end arises a desire for the things that lead to the end. Now, those things without which one cannot attaind the end are especially ordered to the end. But man’s death would be ordered to beatitude this way, if man could not have beatitude in this present life. Therefore, man would naturally desire death; which is perceived to be false by experience, and contradicts the authority of the Apostle, who says in 2 Corinthians 5:4: not that we wish to be unclothed, but further clothed. Therefore man’s beatitude exists in this life.
On the contrary (1), no one can be blessed who does not have what he does well to desire. (i.e., as he ought to will it.) But every blessed person well and ordinately wills never to be able to be deprived of his beatitude. Therefore, anyone who does not have this security is not truly blessed. But no one in this life has such security, since the very happiness that one can have in this life must be taken away at least by death. Therefore, beatitude cannot be had in this life.
Furthermore (2), no one has already arrived at the ultimate degree of life if there remains anything left for him to desire, since beatitude possesses sufficiency in itself, as even the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 1097b14–16.) But no matter how perfect someone in this life may be in knowledge or virtue or any other perfection, there still remains something for him to desire, such as knowing many things that he does not know; indeed, even the goodness of his present perfection, as long as this life goes on, cannot be certain, since even the wisest and most perfect men may end up in madness through bodily infirmities. Therefore, beatitude cannot be had in this life.
Furthermore (3), everyone holds that beatitude is the greatest good. But the greatest good is what is thoroughly unmixed with evil. Therefore, since regardless of how much someone is wise and perfect in virtue, this life cannot be without evils (as is manifestly apparent when one looks at the various accidents and misfortunes that befall man), it seems that beatitude cannot exist in this life.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, since it is what is naturally desired by all men, ‘beatitude’ designates the ultimate end of human life. Now the end of anything is its proper activity, or it arrives at its end through its proper activity. Now, since the principle of something’s proper activity is its proper form, and the proper form of man as man is the rational soul, it necessarily follows that man’s beatitude consists either in the very acts of the rational soul, or in those things that man is related to through the acts of the rational soul. But these things are called goods of the soul, which is why even according to the pagan philosophers it is necessary to locate beatitude in goods of the soul. However, that some people located their beatitude in goods of the body arises from the fact that they were ignorant of what they themselves really are; for they did not recognize what was better in them, which formally completed their being, but they only saw in themselves what appeared on the outside; (viz., the bodily aspect.) and accordingly they sought their beatitude in external goods.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not necessary that the opinion of many be true simply speaking, but only that it be true in part. And indeed, the multitude of men who located their beatitude in goods of the body do have a true opinion in this respect: whatever they judge best for themselves, they consider their beatitude to be; and their opinion is true to this degree, namely that the best for man is man’s beatitude. However, their opinion need not be true when it comes to locating of beatitude in goods of the body, since this opinion proceeds from a false root, because they judge themselves to be chiefly what they are as regards the body.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that physical good is desired before spiritual good only happens incidentally. For our knowledge proceeds from the more general to the particular, as is clear from the Physics 1; (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 184a16–b13.) and so in the beginning of our lives we know nothing about the end of man except something general—that it is a certain best thing to aim for. And as we know, so do we desire. Thus, we judge that good to be among those goods that first come within range of our knowledge. However, the first things in our knowledge are sensible things; this is why in the beginning we judge sensible goods as the highest goods, but eventually, when our knowledge is more mature, we come to have a distinct knowledge of man’s end, by discerning it clearly from others; and at that point we hunger for the highest good where it is truly to be found, namely in spiritual realities. But the argument proceeded as though appetite for bodily good preceded appetite for spiritual good due to the nature of these things. (Rather than due to our knowing bodily good before spiritual good.)
Reply Obj. 3: Something can be said to be common in two ways. In one way, by predication; but what is common in this way is not found numerically the same in the different things [to which it is common]; and this is how the body’s good has commonality. In another way something is common according to a participation of numerically one and the same thing; and in this way a more common good is more divine. And this commonality can most of all be found in those things that pertain to the soul, since what is the common good of all things, namely God, is touched through the soul; and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of ends: an activity’s end and an intention’s end. So, then, the body’s good can be the end of virtue, in the sense of a certain terminus or effect of virtuous activity; but it cannot be the end on which virtue’s intention rests. The reason is that virtue is a perfection of the soul, which is nobler than the body, and nothing acts for the sake of what is baser than itself; thus it cannot be that the intention of virtue rests in the body’s good.
Reply Obj. 5: Happiness and fortune are said of something in two ways. In one way, as of a subject; and in this way happiness and fortune pertain to the same thing, because neither can exist except in rational beings. In another way, as of an object or matter; and taken this way it is impossible that happiness and fortune pertain to the same thing, because fortune has to do with things done for the sake of something, when something unintended happens, whereas happiness or beatitude is intended by all, and it is not ordered to any thing else. This is why, although bodily things are called goods of fortune with respect to its matter, it does not follow that happiness consists in bodily goods.
Reply Obj. 6: Although a human being consists of soul and body, he has his specific being from the soul, not from the body, because the form of anything whatsoever is the principle of its specific being. For this reason man’s beatitude consists, both chiefly and in point of origin, in goods of the soul. For just as the body is for the sake of the soul as for an end, and matter for the sake of form, as is clear from On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415b15–20.) so too goods of the body are ordered to goods of the soul as to an end; consequently, beatitude cannot chiefly consist in goods of the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that beatitude is in the will can be understood in two ways. In one way, it can be understood to mean that beatitude is the will’s object; and this way beatitude—since it is indeed the ultimate end, and the notion of the good is gathered from the end, which is the will’s object—must be held to be in the will. In another way, it can be understood to mean that beatitude is an act of the will; and in this way, beatitude cannot be in the will, for beatitude implies man’s ultimate end. Now man’s ultimate end can be taken in two ways: an end within himself, and an end outside himself. Within him, as a thing’s activity is said to be its end, since every thing exists for the sake of its activity. On the other hand, the end outside him is what he attains through his activity.
Now, it is not just any activity that can be called an end, but that one which first unites the agent to the end outside of it; and I say this is so whenever a thing has its end outside itself, for then it is necessary that the end within be ordered to the end outside, so that the end outside is as the ultimate end; and the end within, which is activity, is ordered to that, even as we see that natural things, through the activities they have, attain (according to a certain assimilation) to the divine goodness, which is their end outside.
But it is not possible that the very action of the will be anything’s ultimate end, for since the will’s object is the end, this very action (namely, to will), and any other act of will, is nothing other than to order some things to an end; therefore it presupposes another end. Consequently, if the willing itself be said to be willed, one must presuppose that something is willed before this. For one cannot understand there to be in any power reflection upon its own act unless its own act, in which this reflection happens, has first found its terminus in its proper object, which is something else than the very act of that power; otherwise it would be necessary to proceed to infinity. For if the intellect understands itself to understand, it must understand itself to understand something; and if you say that it understands itself to understand the act of understanding itself, it will be necessary to posit still another act of the same sort, and so on to infinity. It is evident, therefore, that the very act of understanding cannot be the intellect’s first object, and for the same reason, neither can the very act of willing be the will’s first object. Since, therefore, the will’s first object is the ultimate end, it is impossible that any act of will be the will’s ultimate end.
Nor can it even be said that the attainment of the end outside is directly through an act of will; for there is understood to be an act of will before the attainment of the end, as a certain motion toward the end, and an act of will after the attainment, as a certain resting in the end. But the only way the will can now be at rest in the end toward which it was previously tending is that the one willing has a different relation to the end than he previously did, or vice versa. (i.e., the end changes relative to the will.) Therefore, what causes the person willing to relate to the end in such a way that the will rests in it is the ultimate end within, which first brings about union with the end outside—for example, if someone’s end outside is money, the end within will be possession of money, through which the man stands related to the money such that his will is at rest in it. Since, therefore, the ultimate end, quasi-external, of the human will is God, no act of will can be the end within; but what will be the ultimate end within is that act by which a man first stands related to God in such a way that the will is at rest in him. But this is the vision of God according to intellect, because through this vision there comes to be a sort of quasi-contact between God and the intellect—since every object of knowledge is in the knower insofar as it is known—[and thus it brings the will to rest in him,] even as physical contact with a pleasant corporeal thing brings desires to rest. And therefore man’s ultimate end is in an act of the intellect; and so beatitude, which is man’s ultimate end, consists in the intellect.
Nevertheless, that which is on the side of the will—namely, its being at rest in the end, which can be called delight—is a quasi-formal completion of the notion of beatitude, as being something additional to, yet consequent upon, vision, in which the substance of beatitude consists; thus to the will is attributed both the first stance toward the end, insofar as it desires the attainment of the end, and the last, insofar as it is now at rest in the end attained.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument shows that beatitude is in the will as the will’s object, but not as if beatitude were an activity of will.
Reply Obj. 2: Delight is required for beatitude as a quasi-form that completes beatitude, because delight perfects activity as a sort of supervening end, like the beauty that lies over young people, and which adorns their youthfulness, as is said in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b31–33.)
Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be a virtue higher than others in the wayfaring state to the extent that it is charity that orders all of them to God; and also, the ultimate resting in God in heaven will belong to charity. Nevertheless, this fact does not make charity’s act the very substance of beatitude, but either a certain inclination to beatitude, as in the wayfaring state, or the resting in beatitude, as in the heavenly state.
Reply Obj. 4: An action of the body cannot reach the level of attaining a good of the soul, but the act of intellect can reach the level of attaining the good which the will desires; and therefore it is not the same.
Reply Obj. 5: Man is more perfectly united to God through affection than through intellect, inasmuch as the union that occurs through affection comes as an addition to the perfect union that occurs through intellect, perfecting it and adorning it; yet nevertheless the first union must always be through intellect. Nonetheless, love inclines one to seek the perfect union before intellect perfectly unites, though not before intellect knows the union in some way, because one cannot desire something entirely unknown. It is in this sense that Hugh says knowledge remains outside, where love enters in.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said, as is clear from what was said just above, that man’s beatitude resides in an act of intellect because through this act is the first union of man to his ultimate end outside himself, which the intellect is joined to insofar as it knows it. Now, what is known by the practical intellect cannot be the ultimate end outside man because the knowledge of the practical intellect is ordered to what it knows as cause to effect. The effect of something cannot be its ultimate end, however, because the perfection of a cause does not depend on its effect, but vice versa. And so, beatitude cannot consist in an act of the practical intellect, but only in an act of the speculative intellect, This is why all practical knowledge is pursued for the sake of some other desirable thing, whereas speculative knowledge is desired rather for its own sake.
Reply Obj. 1: The good that the speculative intellect is joined to by knowledge is more common than the good that the practical intellect is joined to, insofar as the speculative intellect is more separated from the particular than the practical intellect, whose knowledge is perfected in activity, which has to do with singulars. But it is true that the attainment of the end, which the speculative intellect arrives at, is, as such, (i.e., as that act of knowing by which the intellect is united to the object that it knows.) proper to the one attaining it, whereas the attainment of the end intended by the practical intellect can be proper as well as common, inasmuch as someone by practical intellect directs both himself and others to an end, as is evident in the governor of a multitude. But from the simple fact that someone contemplates, he directs himself individually to the end of his contemplation. However, the end of the speculative intellect itself so far surpasses the good of the practical intellect that its individual attainment exceeds the common attainment of the good of the practical intellect; and therefore the most perfect beatitude consists in the speculative intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: It is more perfect to have a perfection and to pour it from oneself into another than only to have it in oneself. For the comparison of these perfections cannot be understood in another way, because something cannot have the perfection of being a cause unless at the same time it has in itself that perfection of which it is the cause. It happens, however, that something is of greater perfection insofar as it is perfect in itself than according to its being a cause of another, when it either does not communicate to another the same perfection that it has, or communicates the same perfection but not to the same extent as it has it, just as the perfection in God as he exists in himself, is considered greater than his perfection as he is the cause of others; and so, the perfection of the contemplator, inasmuch as he is perfect in himself in contemplating, is greater than that of a craftsman inasmuch as he makes a knife. But the one who, by his contemplating, would establish other contemplatives equal to himself, would be more perfect than someone who could only contemplate by himself alone.
Reply Obj. 3: An end and the things ordered to an end do not need to be alike as if they were of a single genus; but there must be between them a conformity of proportion, such that the things ordered to an end be proportioned to leading one into the end; and in this way the virtues are conformed to beatitude, since they lead into beatitude by way of disposition and merit.
Reply Obj. 4: The speculative intellect is nobler, simply speaking, than the practical, since it exists for its own sake, whereas the practical is for the sake of its work; nor does the practical intellect set down a law for it, for the speculative intellect is not directed in judging the truth of things according to some law set down by the practical intellect; but the practical intellect sets down a law for the sake of the speculative intellect, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, ch. 1, 1138b26–28.) when it ordains how someone ought to arrive at the perfection of the speculative intellect; and by this very fact, the practical intellect is shown to be at the assistance of the speculative.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, as in natural things motion is related to its terminus, so in voluntary things appetite is related to its end, and things that are sought on account of an end are related to the attainment of the end. And so, just as when a natural thing arrives at its terminus, its motion ceases, so too with the will: when it has what it seeks, its desire ceases, having been converted into love or delight. Therefore, since it is the end to which all desires are referred, beatitude must be the kind of thing that, when one has it, nothing further remains to be desired. Now, everyone naturally desires to exist and to persist in the good that he has; and so everyone holds that beatitude is the kind of thing that unmoveably and perpetually.
But people have reached various conclusions about the immobility and perpetuity of human beatitude. For some said that absolute perpetuity was not included in the nature of human beatitude, but only a perpetuity with respect to man’s life. Nor should this perpetuity be considered as the immobility that takes away potentiality for being changed, but only that which takes away the act of being changed. And this was the opinion of Plato, as is touched upon in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 10, 1100a10ff.) For he argued that the man is blessed in this life, whose beatitude continued all the way to his death. But because the condition of a man, no matter how perfect, can be changed in this life, and we cannot have sure judgment of future contingents, therefore we cannot know of any man before his death whether his perfection would continue all the way to his death, but at the end of his life one would be able to know if it had been continued even to the end; and so, no one can be called blessed until his death.
However, the Philosopher disproves this position, (Ibid.) because it is unfitting to argue that someone ought to be called blessed when he no longer exists and that he cannot be called blessed when he does exist. Therefore, if beatitude is in this life, if someone is blessed, he is blessed while he is alive; but when he is dead, he will not be blessed; and thus he is more able to be called blessed when alive than when dead. Hence the Philosopher in the same passage states a different opinion concerning beatitude or happiness—namely that beatitude, in its perfect notion, has absolute perpetuity and immobility. But it is impossible for man to possess beatitude according to its perfect notion; what is possible is for a man to have some participation of it, however little, and owing to this participation, to be called blessed; and so, a blessed man need not be perpetually and immutably blessed, simply speaking, but only in keeping with the condition of human nature; this is why he adds: blessed, however, as men. Such immutability belongs to a man when the habits of virtues are firmly rooted in him, so that he cannot easily be deflected from acting virtuously.
But that position, too, does not seem to be reasonable. For it is commonly held by everyone that happiness, or beatitude, is a good of the rational or intellectual nature; and so where the rational or intellectual nature is found in its essence, and not only by participation, one must also posit beatitude in its essence, and not by participation. And so, since in man not only is there some overflow of intellect—as in the brute animals there is a certain overflow of reason inasmuch as they participate somewhat in prudence, as appears in their instincts —but there is also in him reason or intellect in its essence, it must be posited that at some time he can attain true beatitude, and not merely a participation of beatitude; otherwise the natural appetite of the intellectual nature that is in man would be frustrated. Now true beatitude cannot be posited in this life on account of the various inconstancies man is subject to; and so it is necessary for the beatitude that is the end of human life to be had after this life. And this, indeed, all philosophers conceded who held that the soul, which is the form of the human body, is an intellect in its essence; for they posited an immortal soul. But those who held that the soul, which is the form of the human body, is not an intellect in its essence, but rather a reflection of an intellect that is separate, and one common to all, hold that the soul, which is the form of the body, is corruptible, and does not arrive at perfect beatitude, but only to a participation of beatitude, of such a sort as was spoken of above. But this opinion is absurd, as was demonstrated in Book II, Distinction 17, Question 2, Article 1. And therefore we concede that man’s true beatitude, simply speaking, is after this life. Nevertheless, we do not deny that there can be some participation of beatitude in this life, according as man is perfect in the goods of reason—chiefly of speculative reason, secondarily of practical reason. It is about this earthly happiness that the Philosopher reaches his conclusions in the book of Ethics, neither asserting nor denying another happiness that is after this life.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said in Book III, (See In III Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 4.) the beatitudes in that passage designate acts of perfect virtues, according to which man has a certain participation and likeness of future beatitude, which is true beatitude.
Reply Obj. 2: Those philosophers who, speaking of beatitude, did not posit a future life were not speaking of true beatitude, but of a participation in beatitude, as was said.
Reply Obj. 3: The end of human life surpasses the end of the other animals’ life more than the one life surpasses the other life; and the life of man is nobler by the very fact that it is ordered to a nobler end. Hence human life need not include its ultimate end, as the life of other animals includes their end.
Reply Obj. 4: Although man naturally desires the end, nevertheless he does not naturally desire those things that lead to the end; but he desires these by rational appetite, by deliberating about them and choosing them. Nor is it unfitting for something in itself worthy of hatred to be desirable with a view to an end, even as the amputation of bodily members is desirable on account of health; (When it can only be preserved by that means.) and in this way death, from which everyone naturally flees, is desirable on account of beatitude, as is said in Philippians 1:23: my desire is to depart and be with Christ.
Article 2
What beatitude is
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that beatitude is something uncreated. First of all, because of what Boethius says in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3, (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. 3, Prose 10 (CCSL 94:54).) that beatitude is divinity itself; and for this reason he concludes that every blessed person is a god.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is said by way of superabundance applies only in one case. But God is the highest good, since he is the cause of all goodness; beatitude is also the highest good, since it is desired by all as the ultimate end. Therefore, beatitude is God himself alone.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is desirable for its own sake has the notion of the enjoyable, as is evident from Augustine. But beatitude is appetible for its own sake, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 1097a36.) Therefore beatitude is to be enjoyed. But God alone is to be enjoyed, as is evident from what Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 1. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32:9).) Therefore, God alone is beatitude.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it belongs to the notion of beatitude that there be sufficiency in it. But in God alone does human desire find sufficiency. For this reason Augustine says in the Confessions: our heart is restless until it comes to thee. (Inquietum est cor nostrum donec perveniat ad te—a slight misquotation of Augustine’s famous sentence, which ends: donec requiescat in te (Confessions, Bk. 1, n. 1 [CCSL 27:1]). Aquinas gets the line right in five other places in his writings where he quotes it, making it plausible that we are dealing here with a miscopy that a future critical edition will set to rights.) Therefore, God alone is beatitude itself.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that is in us is in us either essentially or accidentally. But beatitude is not of the essence of man, for in that case, every man would be blessed, and all the time. Therefore, if it is something in man, it will be an accident. But an accident cannot be the end of a substance, since substance is nobler than accident. Therefore, it is impossible that beatitude be something in us; and so it will be something uncreated.
On the contrary (1), just as by participation in justice men are called just, so by participation in beatitude men are called blessed, as is evident from Boethius in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. 3, Prose 10 (CCSL 94:54).) But justice is something created in us; therefore, beatitude is as well.
Furthermore (2), happiness with the addition of a number of goods is more choiceworthy than happiness alone, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 1097b16–19. This passage of Aristotle could be interpreted—and with greater plausibility—to be saying the opposite of what St. Thomas says here. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 2, 1172b27–35, and Magna Moralia, Bk. 1, chs. 2–4.) But no matter how much is added to God, he is no more choiceworthy. Therefore, happiness is something other than God; and so it is something created in us.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that happiness is not an act. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 3, a. 2 and q. 55, a. 2, ad 3; SCG I, ch. 100; Sent. Eth. I, lec. 10; In Metaphys. IX, ch. 8.) For, according to Boethius in On the Consolation of Philosophy III, (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. 3, Prose 2 (CCSL 94:38).) beatitude is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods. But ‘state’ does not name an act. Therefore, beatitude is not an act.
Obj. 2: Further, we are the cause of our own acts. If, therefore, beatitude consisted in an act of ours, we ourselves would be the cause of our own beatitude, which is absurd.
Obj. 3: Further, if anything in us is the ultimate end, it will be especially what is never sought on account of anything else. But delight is not sought on account of another, but only on account of itself. Therefore beatitude consists most of all in delight. But delight is not an act, but a passion. Therefore, happiness is not an act.
Obj. 4: Further, there can be different acts arising from one agent and according to a single habit. Therefore, if beatitude were an act, the same blessed person would have many different beatitudes, which is absurd.
Obj. 5: Further, the beatitude of the wayfaring state is a certain likeness of the beatitude of heaven. But the beatitude of the wayfaring state cannot be called an act, for if that were so, those who are sleeping would lose their beatitude. Therefore, the beatitude of heaven is not an act.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7 (1098a16–18) and ch. 13 (1102a5).) that happiness is an activity according to perfect virtue.
Furthermore (2), whatever a thing exists for is its ultimate end. But every thing exists for the sake of its own activity, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 286a8: “Everything which has a function exists for its function.”) Therefore, the activity proper to man is his ultimate end; and so his beatitude is a certain act.
Furthermore (3), a man is blessed through arriving at the greatest likeness to God. But man is most likened to God by actually acting, because in this way he is maximally in act and removed from potentiality. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists in an activity of his.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that man’s beatitude is not the same thing as eternal life. (Parallel: cf. ST I, q. 18, a. 2, esp. ad 2.) For as is said in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415b13.) for living things, to live is to be. But beatitude, according to the Philosopher, does not consist in mere being, but in activity. Therefore, man’s beatitude is not a life.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the notion of life consists in motion, as is evident from the Commentator on the Book of Causes. But beatitude includes in its notion unchangeability. Therefore, beatitude is not the same thing as eternal life.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, beatitude is something communicable to man. But eternity of life is not something that can be communicated to him, since what is made in time is not capable of being eternal. Therefore, eternal life is not the same thing as beatitude.
Obj. 4: Further, whatsoever endures perpetually participates, in a way, in eternity of life, if ‘eternal’ be taken in a broad sense to mean ‘perpetual.’ But the damned endure perpetually, sent into eternal fire, as is evident from Matthew 25:41. However, they have not beatitude, but the highest misery. Therefore, beatitude and eternal life are not the same thing.
On the contrary (1), whatever is the end of human life is beatitude. But eternal life is the end of human life, as is evident from Romans 6:22: the return you get is sanctification and its end, eternal life. Therefore, beatitude is eternal life.
Furthermore (2), man’s ultimate beatitude consists in the vision of God, as is evident from what was said above. But this is what eternal life consists in, as is evident from John 17:3: this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Therefore, beatitude is the same thing as eternal life.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that beatitude is the same thing as peace. (There are several texts on peace that could be listed as partial parallels, e.g., ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 4; Super Ioan. 14, lec. 7; Super Phil. 4, lec. 1.) First of all, because of what is said in Psalm 147:14: he establishes peace in your borders. (Ps. 147:3, iuxta Vulg. The Psalmist’s mention of fines (borders, boundaries) allows for reading the verse to be saying: God has established peace as the “end” of the city. Since the end is already known to be beatitude, peace must be referring to the same thing.) But the end of the city of God, which is being spoken of there, is beatitude. Therefore, beatitude is the same thing as peace.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says, in the City of God 19: we may say that the end of our goods is peace, just as we may say that it is eternal life. (Augustine, The City of God, Bk. 19, ch. 11 (CCSL 48:674).) But eternal life is the same thing as beatitude. Therefore, so is peace.
Obj. 3: Further, what is naturally desired by all and for the sake of which other things are done would seem to be man’s beatitude. But all desire peace, and do whatever they do for its sake, as Augustine says, (As there are many places where Augustine says that all things desire peace, it is by no means clear if Thomas has a specific text in mind.) and Dionysius. (See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 11 (PG 3:947ff.).) Therefore, peace is beatitude itself.
Obj. 4: Further, peace signifies a certain rest. But the end of every change is rest, as can be shown by examples among natural things. Therefore, peace is the end of the whole of our changeable life; and so peace is the same thing as beatitude.
On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 7 (1098a16–18) and ch. 13 (1102a5).) beatitude is a certain activity. But peace does not name an act, but only immobility. Therefore, peace is not the same thing as beatitude.
Furthermore (2), peace refers most of all to appetite or the will, because it is a certain resting thereof. But beatitude resides especially in the intellect, as was said above. Therefore, beatitude is not the same thing as peace.
Quaestiuncula 5
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that beatitude is not the same thing as the kingdom of God. (There is no exact parallel to this article. There are, of course, many discussions in Thomas’s writings of the political concepts he employs here.) For ‘kingdom,’ which is named from the rule of a king, seems to pertain to the governing that provides for things. But providence consists in the coordination of things that are directed toward the end. (And so, does not bear upon the end as such.) Therefore, ‘kingdom of God’ does not seem to pertain to beatitude, which is the ultimate end.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 12, n. 2 (PG 3:970).) says that the kingdom is the distribution of every end and law and order. But this distribution pertains not only to men but also to all created beings to which God distributes these things, whereas beatitude belongs solely to rational creatures. Therefore, beatitude is not the same thing as the kingdom of God.
Obj. 3: Further, ‘kingdom’ only implies a perfection in the person who rules. But there is only one who stands at the head in the ruling of a kingdom, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 10, 1160b1.) Therefore, the kingdom of God only designates a perfection in God himself. But beatitude names a perfection not only in God, but in all the blessed. Therefore, beatitude is not the same thing as the kingdom of God.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, beatitude does not suffer the admixture of any evil. But in the kingdom of God some evils can be present; hence it is said in Matthew 13:41 that at the end of the world the angels will gather up all scandals from the kingdom of God. Therefore, the kingdom of God is not beatitude itself.
On the contrary (1), is what Augustine says in Sermon 22 To the Fathers in the Desert (Pseudo-Augustine, Sermons to the Fathers in the Desert, Serm. 22 (PL 40:1272); cf. On the Sermon on the Mount, Bk. 2, ch. 10 (CCSL 35:126).) that the first three petitions in the Lord’s Prayer pertain to future beatitude. Now, one of these is thy kingdom come. Therefore, the kingdom of God pertains to beatitude.
Furthermore (2), beatitude is what is promised to the saints as their reward. But the kingdom of God is so promised, as is clear from Matthew 5:10: blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, the kingdom of heaven is beatitude itself.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, the good that all long for is being, as is evident from Boethius in On the Consolation of Philosophy. (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. 3, Prose 11 (CCSL 94:58–59).) Therefore, the ultimate object of desire for all things is perfect being, to the extent that it is possible in their nature. Now, everything that has being from another has the perfection of its being from another, since the more truly any thing is connected to the principle of its being, the more perfectly it receives being. Hence, lower bodies, owing to their great distance from the first principle, have corruptible being, as is clear from On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 10, 336b30.) And so everything that has being from another has two kinds of ultimate end: one outside itself, namely that which is the principle of the desired perfection; another within itself, namely its very own perfection, which is brought about by union to its principle. Thus, since beatitude is man’s ultimate end, there will be two kinds of beatitude: one that is within man himself, namely, that ultimate perfection of himself at which it is possible for him to arrive, and this is created beatitude. But the other is outside himself, and by his union with it, the created beatitude is caused in him; and this is uncreated beatitude, which is God himself.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as God himself is good by his essence, whereas all other things are goods by participation, as is said in the book On the Hebdomads, (Boethius, On the Hebdomads (PL 64:1311–14).) so too, God himself alone is beatitude by his essence, whereas others are blessed by participation. For this reason, created beatitude is a certain participation and likeness of uncreated beatitude. Yet it is not beatitude essentially, as if making men blessed by its essence; and thus is to be understood the citation from Boethius.
Reply Obj. 2: Created beatitude is not the highest good simply, but the highest good among human goods; but God is the highest good simply, and so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways something can be an object of love. An object can be loved in the manner of benevolence, when we will someone’s good on account of himself, as we love our friends, even if nothing should come to us from them. Otherwise, an object can be loved with the love of concupiscence; and this is either a good that is within us, or because something becomes a good for us from it, as we love pleasure, or wine inasmuch as it produces pleasure. Now whatever is loved with a love of concupiscence cannot be the ultimate object of love, since it is referred to the good of another (namely, the person who has concupiscence for it). But whatever is loved by a love of benevolence can be the ultimate object of love. Therefore, the created beatitude that is within us is loved only by a love of concupiscence; and so we refer the love of it to ourselves, and consequently we refer it to God, since we ought to refer even ourselves to God; and thus, it cannot be the ultimate object of love. Nevertheless, it is the ultimate object of concupiscence by the very fact that it is the greatest good that comes to us from union with God, and so it is said to be sought for its own sake or desired for its own sake; for either term indicates something ultimate among the things that are loved with a love of concupiscence. For although God himself is desired with a love of concupiscence, it is the same to desire God with a love of concupiscence and to desire the greatest of goods that come to us from God, just as it is the same to desire wine with a love of concupiscence and to desire the effect of wine in us, say, pleasure.
Reply Obj. 4: In God alone is found sufficiency as in the principle of every good that the appetite seeks; but in those to whom it is granted by God to have all goods sufficiently, a sufficiency is found by the divine gift.
Reply Obj. 5: Although every accident as such is less noble than a substance, nevertheless an accident can be worthier than a substance in some certain respect. For an accident may be considered in two ways. In one way, as it inheres in a subject, from which it derives the notion of being an accident; and in this way, every accident is less worthy than a substance. In another way, it may be considered in its order to something outside the subject; and in this way a certain accident can be nobler than a substance, inasmuch as through it a substance is joined to something nobler than itself; and this is how created beatitude, and grace, and other such things, are something nobler than the nature of the soul in which they inhere. There is also another consideration according to which an accident is nobler, namely, inasmuch as a substance is compared to an accident inhering in it as potency to act.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as is evident from what was said before, a thing’s ultimate end, taken as existing in the thing itself, is what joins a thing to its external end, which is its principle of perfection. Now things can be joined to God, who is their ultimate end, in two ways. In one way, by way of likening, so that a thing is said to be most of all joined to God when it is most of all like God; and in this regard, each thing’s ultimate end must be that in it according to which it is most likened to God. But each thing approaches likeness to God just insofar as it is in act, whereas it departs from that likeness insofar as it is in potency; and so that through which a thing is most in act is its ultimate end. In another way, things can be joined to God by reaching God himself—a union that, in fact, is possible only to the rational creature, who is able to be joined to God himself by knowledge and by love, precisely because God is the object of his activity but is not the object of any non-rational creature’s activity.
Now, no matter how one considers man’s ultimate perfection, which is his end, it must be located in the genus of act. For if we consider the manner of union with God that is common to all created things, since a thing is more in act insofar as it is acting than insofar as it is merely capable of acting, the ultimate perfection of each and every thing will be its perfect activity; hence, a thing is said to exist for the sake of its activity. Likewise, if we consider the union proper to the rational creature, man’s ultimate perfection consists in activity, for a habit is only united to its object through the mediation of an act; and therefore beatitude must be located in the genus of act. Nevertheless, this second consideration bears upon the consideration of beatitude more closely than the first, since beatitude belongs only to the rational creature.
Reply Obj. 1: In every order, all the things that are ordered toward an end work together for the ultimate end; hence, since the perfect activity of man is his ultimate end (as is the case with any given thing), all human goods work together for his perfect activity: for example, the habits by which his acts are informed work together for the perfect activity of man in this life, and other natural goods work together for the end as principles of acts, and external goods as instrumentally necessary for perfect activity. Thus, therefore, the collection of all goods is considered to be beatitude insofar as all goods collected together are at the service of the most perfect activity of man, which is essentially beatitude itself. All the goods named, too, are ordered to heavenly beatitude, inasmuch as we merit through their proper use; and while not all of them, endure in beatitude in themselves, nevertheless they remain in those perfections that replace them, just as vision replaces faith and a sufficiency of eternal goods takes the place of temporal riches.
Reply Obj. 2: In an act two things are to be considered: the substance of the act and its form, from which an act has perfection. Therefore, as regards the substance of an act, its principle is a natural potency; but as regards its form, its principle is the habit from which the act proceeds. If, therefore, that habit is an acquired one, we will be entirely the cause of our act; if, on the other hand, that habit is an infused one, the perfection of the act will be from the external cause that causes the habit. Now, an act of ours is not held to be our beatitude except by reason of its perfection, due to which it is most nobly joined to the end outside; and thus not we, but God is the cause of our beatitude.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of delight. One precedes the attainment of an end; and this is capable of being ordered to something else, for it can be ordered to perfect activity, insofar as we undertake more diligently what we delight in. The other delight is what follows upon the attainment of an end; and this is brought about by the activity that joins the agent to his end. Thus this latter delight is not beatitude itself, but a certain perfection and form of beatitude, (“A form of beatitude” in the sense of something completive, something that fills or rounds out the good of beatitude the essence of which consists, absolutely speaking, in a higher act of a nobler power.) as was said above.
Reply Obj. 4: A multitude of acts proceeding from the same habit with respect to the same object is only caused by the interruptions of time; and so in perfect beatitude, where there will be no interruptions but a continuous activity, there will be only a single beatitude.
Reply Obj. 5: As was said above, the beatitude of the wayfaring state is not perfect beatitude but a certain participation of it; and so it is not always in act, but sometimes is merely in habit. Hence, a person asleep cannot be called blessed as regards that which he has right at that moment, but only insofar as the activity itself is in him habitually. For in the way in which effects are present in their causes, so activities are present in their habits.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that ‘life’ may be said in two ways. In one way, as meaning the very being of living things; since, as is said in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415b13.) for living things, to live is to be. Now, something is said to be alive from the fact that it is able to move itself according to some action; hence, plants are said to live from the fact that they move themselves in regard to increase; and animals still more, in that they move themselves in regard to place and move themselves to sensing; and in man yet more, in that he is able to move himself to willing and to understanding. However, the perfection of any power is its act; thus, in the second place, the name ‘life’ is carried over to signify an activity to which something moves itself, as sensing is called animal life, and understanding is called human life; and according to this way of speaking, each thing considers its life that activity which it most of all intends, as if its entire being were ordered to that activity; and it is in keeping with this way of speaking that people say: “so-and-so leads such-and-such a life;” and thus it was that the Epicureans held beatitude to be a life of pleasures. Now, activity is not subject to the measure of time except insofar as it is bound up with motion, which is why activities that are not connected with motion but with the terminus of motion are not measured by time but in an instant, as is evident with illumination. And so, if there is an activity that altogether transcends motion, such an activity will not be measured by time, but by a measure above time.
Now, the vision of God, which is held to be man’s beatitude, cannot be an action measured by time in and of itself, since it is not successive. Nor can it be measured by time on the part of the one seeing or what is seen, since both are outside motion. For this reason, it can be measured neither by time nor by the instant, which is the terminus of time. It cannot even be measured by an age, (An “age” is an intermediate measure between time and eternity. For the full meaning of the term, see Book II, Dist. 2, Q. 2.) for an age, insofar as it is distinguished from eternity, pertains to immutable creatures, whereas this vision exceeds the natural power of created things, since no created being by its natural endowments is capable of arriving at it; and therefore its proper measure is eternity itself. And so, the vision of God, which is beatitude itself, is eternal life itself.
To the first, therefore, the response is evident from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Although life is first recognized by motion, since it is through motion that the living are first distinguished from the non-living, nevertheless the name ‘life’ is extended further to all activities that are not from some external mover, as willing, understanding, and other such things. This is why the name ‘motion,’ too, gets carried over to such activities, as when we call understanding a ‘movement of the intellect’ or willing a ‘movement of the will.’
Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is not communicable to man in such a way that it becomes an adequate measure of him, or of something within him, as the argument would prove. Still, it can be communicated to man according to a certain participation, so that, just as man is made a partaker of divine activity in seeing God, so he is made a partaker of eternity, by which the divine activity is measured; and it is thus that man’s very activity can be called eternal life.
Reply Obj. 4: The eternal life the saints will have is spoken of according to a participation of eternity, not only in the fact that it will not end (in which manner even the punishment of the damned is called ‘eternal’), but further with regard to the removal of all change, not only in act, which an ‘age’ too excludes, but even in potency. For by clinging to God, the saints will obtain such stability from the divine gift that they cannot be changed—a stability God has by his nature, by reason of which he is eternal.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said, as Augustine says in Book 19 of the City of God, (Augustine, The City of God, Bk. 19, ch. 13 (CCSL 48:679).) that the peace of all things is the tranquillity of order—from which it is clear that the notion of peace is taken from the fact that nothing impedes the right order; for tranquillity excludes the disturbance of an impediment. Now, peace especially regards that order by which the will is ordered to something. For this reason, we say that a man has peace only when there is nothing that impedes the order of his will to something he wants; and in like manner, we say that a city has peace when there is nothing that disturbs the city’s right order, which is from the will of the city’s governor; and to the extent that even inanimate things are said to have natural desire, we say that a given thing has peace when it is not impeded from following the inclination that it has to its end, which it naturally desires. Now, the activity in which beatitude consists must be an unimpeded activity; for any impediment would detract from its perfection. Hence delight, too, which follows upon perfect activity, is caused by an unimpeded activity, as is said in the Ethics 7; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12, 1153a13–15.) and thus peace is required for beatitude—not that it is the very essence of beatitude, but it is like a removal of whatever could impede beatitude. Now, from the very fact that one desires something, one’s appetite shuns its contrary; consequently, from the very fact that all naturally desire beatitude, they also naturally flee from impediments to beatitude, and this is what it means for them naturally to desire peace.
Reply Obj. 1: Peace is said to be the end of the city of God in the sense of being the nearest disposition to the end, which is inseparable from the end itself; and not as if it were the end per se.
To the second the response is the same.
Reply Obj. 3: All desire peace, not as an end, but as that without which the end cannot be possessed.
Reply Obj. 4: A thing’s ultimate end is not rest, but the thing’s activity, and this activity cannot be perfect unless the thing itself be perfect. Motion, however, is the act of an imperfect thing; and accordingly, rest, which motion terminates in, is nearer the end than motion itself. And thus, motion is ordered to rest as to an end.
Response to Quaestiuncula 5
To the fifth question, it should be said that the name ‘kingdom’ is taken from the rule exercised by a king. But ruling is an act of providence, which is why someone is said to have a kingdom when he has others under his providence. Thus, men are said to be ‘in the kingdom of God’ when they are perfectly subject to his providence. Now, it belongs to providence to order things to an end. But the things that are ordered to an end are both those that are distant from the end, insofar as they are led to it, and the things that have already attained the end, insofar as they are preserved in its possession. And since the end is the rule of providence, those are under providence perfectly who are already stationed in the very end; and therefore among them nothing can be foreign to the order of providence. Others, however, who stand at some distance from the end, are under divine providence more or less perfectly to the extent that they are nearer or further from the end; and those are nearest to the end who are on the way to the end. Now the way of arriving at the end is faith working through love. (An indirect citation of Gal 5:6.)
For this reason ‘kingdom of God’ is said antonomastically, in two ways: at times to mean the congregation of those who walk by faith, and in this way the church militant is called the kingdom of God; at other times to mean the company of those who are already established in the end, and in this way the church triumphant is called the kingdom of God. And according to this latter meaning, to be in the kingdom of God is the same thing as to be in beatitude. Nor is there any difference between the kingdom of God and beatitude taken this way, except as the common good of the whole multitude is distinguished from the singular good of each and every member.
Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude is under providence not as if it were ordered by providence to some end, but because other things are ordered by providence to it. (viz., beatitude.)
Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius sufficiently deals with the things that are required for a kingdom in the sense of a multitude governed by providence. For this activity, three things are required: namely an end, order to an end, and a rule of order. Now a rule of order exists in two ways: one in the person ordering (and this is law, from which the rectitude of order proceeds); the other in the one who is ordered, which makes him keep to the rectitude of order (and it is this rule that causes ordering to an end, whether the rule in question be a form, a virtue, or something else of the sort; and this is what Dionysius terms adornment). But although these four can pertain to all creation, since all things are ordered by God to an end according to the law of eternal wisdom, and to all things are given powers by which they tend to an end, still, in a special way, they pertain to rational creatures, who are made to arrive at the ultimate end itself in the most noble manner, and who know the notion of order and of end.
Reply Obj. 3: Kingdom implies perfection both in the one who sits at the head, and in the one who is subject. But it exists in the one who sits at the head as in the principle of perfection, because he imparts his rectitude to others; while it exists in the subject as one receiving perfection from another. However, the saints who are in heaven are subject to divine providence in this way: they are made providers either for themselves or even for others, inasmuch as all other things will be subject to them. And so they pertain to the kingdom of God not only as being under a king, but also as being kings, who yet will be under the one supreme king. This is why it says in Revelation 5:10: thou hast made them a kingdom and priests to our God, and they shall reign on earth.
Reply Obj. 4: In this passage ‘kingdom of God’ refers to the church militant, not to the church triumphant.
Article 3
Whether all desire beatitude
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 5, a. 8.) It seems that not all desire beatitude. (We have chosen to render appetunt as “desire” for the sake of elegance of language. However, this translation should not be taken as implying that St. Thomas is talking about emotions. The “appetite” for beatitude is a rational appetite, the appetite that follows not on sensory perception but on the perception of reason.) For no one wills what he is ignorant of, as is evident from Augustine in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 8, ch. 4 (CCSL 50:275).) and from the Philosopher, who says in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 433b10.) that the object of will is the apprehended appetible. But not all know beatitude, since many have gone astray in regard to beatitude. Therefore, not all desire beatitude.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever desires beatitude, desires beatitude essentially in itself. But beatitude itself is the vision of God, and not everyone desires this. Therefore, not all desire beatitude.
Obj. 3: Further, what cannot be apprehended cannot be desired. But that two contraries should exist at the same time cannot be apprehended, as is evident from Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 4, ch. 3, 1005b29.) Therefore, contraries cannot at the same time be objects of appetite. But some desire things contrary to beatitude, such as those who desire sins. Therefore, not all desire beatitude.
Obj. 4: Further, it is a sin to cling to changeable things, despising the unchangeable good. But beatitude is an unchangeable good. Therefore, a person who sins despises it; and thus, not all desire beatitude.
On the contrary (1) is what Boethius proves in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3: a longing for the true good is planted in the minds of all men. (In this instance the reference is indeed to the whole of Book 3 of Boethius’s On the Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94:37ff.).) But the true good is beatitude. Therefore, all desire beatitude.
Furthermore (2), to each thing its own end is appetible. But beatitude is the ultimate end of human life. Therefore, all men desire beatitude.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone can desire misery. (Parallels: The principle that no one can turn away willingly from beatitude, or willingly desire misery, is invoked numerous times by St. Thomas. In the Scriptum itself, see In II Sent. d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; In II Sent. d. 25, a. 2.) For every rational power extends to opposites. But the will is a rational power. Therefore, it extends to opposites. Now, misery is what is opposed to beatitude. Therefore, if someone can desire beatitude, he can also desire misery.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, if someone is not able to want misery, it is impossible for him to want it. Therefore, it is necessary for him not to want it. But necessity implies coercion or prohibition, as Anselm says. (Not Anselm, but Eadmer, in his De similitudinibus Anselmi, ch. 53, PL 159:631.) Therefore, the will would be coerced, which is opposed to its freedom.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as beatitude is appetible to all, so is being. But certain people want not to be, as is evident in those who kill themselves. Therefore, certain people are also able to want misery.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the will is concerned with the end, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 2, 1111b26.) But the end is the good or the apparent good, as is said in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 195a25.) Therefore, not only the good but also the apparent good can be desired. But what is evil can be an apparent good. Therefore, misery, no matter how evil it may be, could still be willed by someone.
On the contrary (1), Augustine shows in On Free Choice of the Will, (See Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. 1, ch. 14 (CCSL 29:231–32).) that no man is capable of wanting to be miserable.
Furthermore (2), the intellect is related to the first intelligible as the will is related to the first appetible. But the intellect is incapable of assenting to the contrary of the first intelligible, which is that an affirmation and a denial cannot be true at the same time, as is proved in the Metaphysics 4. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 4, chs. 4–8.) Therefore, the will is incapable of assenting to misery, which is contrary to its first appetible.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no one merits by desiring beatitude. (The principle used to solve the problem—namely, that since appetite for beatitude involves not only the general inclination of natural appetite but also a determinate act of rational appetite, it is therefore an act for which man is responsible, and so can be a meritorious act—is a principle of frequent occurrence in St. Thomas. It is, in some sense, reducible to the claim that whoever acts from charity gains merit, owing to the power of the divine gift already possessed in the will.) For by natural endowments we do not merit. But the appetite for beatitude is natural to man, otherwise it would not be common to all. Therefore, no one merits by desiring beatitude.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, since merit and demerit concern the same thing, no one merits in regard to what he is incapable of avoiding, just as neither does he sin, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. 3, ch. 18, n. 50 (CCSL 29:304).) But man is not capable of not having appetite for beatitude. Therefore, no one merits by having such an appetite.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one can merit eternal life by his own powers, as Pelagius held. But man can desire beatitude through his own powers. Therefore, he does not merit by desiring beatitude.
On the contrary (1), a person desires beatitude and God in the same way. If therefore no one merits by desiring beatitude, no one will merit by desiring God, which is absurd.
Furthermore (2), charity is the principle of meriting. But charity has to do chiefly with the end. Therefore by the motion of the will toward the ultimate end we merit the most; and so we merit in desiring beatitude.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not everything that a person wills is willed for the sake of beatitude. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 1, a. 6; ST I, q. 60, a. 2; SCG I, chs. 100–101.) For no one wants pleasure for the sake of anything else, as is said in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle expressly makes this point at Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 2, 1172b20–23; perhaps Thomas confused this text with Bk. 7, ch. 12, 1153a8–12, where it is stated that some pleasures are simply ends.) But pleasure is not beatitude itself, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore, not everything that someone wills does he will for the sake of beatitude.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what can be desired for the sake of beatitude is ordainable to beatitude. But many want some things that are not ordainable to beatitude, indeed that turn one away from it, as is the case with sinners. Therefore, not everything that someone wills does he will for the sake of beatitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, anything that has no appearance of good in itself cannot be desired with a view to beatitude. But at times something is desired that has no appearance of good, as is evident from Augustine in his Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, Bk. 2, ch. 4 and ch. 6 (CCSL 27:22–23).) where he says: I stole what I already had enough of, and indeed of better quality; nor did I want to enjoy the thing that I sought by theft, but I sought to enjoy the very theft and sin. . . . and so I look for what delighted me in the theft; and behold, there is no appearance of anything delightful. Therefore, something can be desired which is not desired for the sake of beatitude.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, death cannot be ordered to beatitude in any way, except perhaps with hope of a life to be gained after death, since beatitude only belongs to the living. But certain people have willed to suffer death whether at their own hand or from another, without any hope of a future life. Therefore, not everything that is willed is willed for the sake of beatitude.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, man’s will is shown to be right by the fact that it is ordered to the right end. Therefore, if whatever is desired is desired for the sake of beatitude, every human will is right—which is false.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, whatever someone actually wills something for the sake of, must have been actually thought about. If, therefore, whatever someone wills he wills for the sake of beatitude, in every desire beatitude will have to be actually thought about—which seems to be false. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary (1), in anything that is desired for its own sake, and never for the sake of another, the motion of desire comes to a halt. But whatever the motion of desire stops at is the ultimate end. If, therefore, something other than beatitude were desired for its own sake, and never for the sake of something else, something else than beatitude would be the ultimate end, which cannot be the case. Therefore, every other desired thing is referred to the desire for beatitude, whether mediately or immediately.
Furthermore (2), Dionysius (See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 11 (PG 3:947ff.).) says that all things desire peace, and do whatever they do for its sake. But peace is ordered to beatitude, as is evident from what was said before. Therefore, whatever is desired is desired for the sake of beatitude.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, in every order of moving things and movers, the secondary movers must be ordered to the end of the first mover through a disposition impressed on them by the first mover, as is evident when the soul moves the hand and the hand moves a stick, and the stick strikes, which is the end intended by the soul: the stick and the hand tend to an end intended by the soul owing to the fact that the soul impresses a disposition on them mediately or immediately. But there is this difference between natural motions and violent motions: in violent motions the impression left by the first mover in the secondary movers is beside their nature, and so the activity consequent upon such an impression is difficult and laborious for them. But in natural motions, the impression left by the first mover in secondary movers is a natural cause in them, and so the activity resulting from this impression is suitable and sweet (and so it is said in Wisdom 8:1 that God disposes all things sweetly). For every single thing, by the nature divinely implanted within it, tends to whatever it is ordered to by divine providence, according to the demands of the impression received. And since all things proceed from God insofar as he is good, as Augustine (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32:26).) says, and also Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694ff.).) therefore all created things, according to an impression received from the Creator, are, each according to its own mode, inclined by appetite to the good, so that a certain circularity is found in things: for, having gone forth from the good, they tend toward the good.
However, this circularity is brought to perfection in certain created beings, while in others it remains imperfect. For those creatures that are not ordered so as to attain the first good itself from which they proceeded, but merely to acquire some sort of likeness of it, do not perfectly exhibit this circularity. But only those created things that are able to attain, in some way, the first principle itself do; and this belongs solely to rational creatures, which are able to gain God himself through knowledge and love—in which gaining their beatitude consists, as is evident from what has been said. And therefore just as any other thing naturally desires its own good, so any rational creature naturally desires its own beatitude.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the visible is twofold—per se, like color, and per accidens, like a man (Who, having some color, is thus visible.)—so too the appetible, which is the object of will, can be taken in two ways: per se and per accidens. The per se object of will is the good; but the per accidens object is this or that good. And as the good taken generally is the per se object of will, so the highest good is the ultimate end of the will, speaking per se; but this or that good is designated as the ultimate end of the will and its chief object as though accidentally. Therefore, beatitude is known to all insofar as the chief per se object of the will lies in it, but it is not known to all as regards what is accidental to the per se object of the will. For all know the perfect good and desire it when they desire beatitude; but for this perfect good to be pleasure or riches, virtue, or something else, is per accidens; and so it is not not surprising if there are many errors concerning this matter.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the vision of God is beatitude itself, nevertheless it does not follow that whoever desires beatitude desires the vision of God; since beatitude, as such, implies the per se object of will, but not the very vision of God, just as someone may desire something sweet, yet not desire honey.
Reply Obj. 3: Although some desire things that are in reality contrary to beatitude, still, in their own estimation, these things are not contrary to it, but rather lead to it.
Reply Obj. 4: Someone who sins by clinging to changeable goods as his end takes the changeable things themselves as if they were the foremost appetible and the perfect good; and thus he clings to them out of desire for beatitude. For as it does not follow that someone, in desiring beatitude, desires that which is in reality beatitude, so too it does not follow that someone, in despising what beatitude is according to the truth of things, despises beatitude; just as it does not follow that one who does not recognize a man does not recognize white, although the man is white.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the activity of a secondary cause is always founded upon the activity of the first cause, and presupposes it; and so every activity of the soul must proceed on the supposition of what is implanted in the soul from the impression of the first agent, namely of God. And thus we see, on the side of the intellect, that the soul cannot proceed to understand anything except on the supposition of those things whose knowledge is innate to it; and on account of this it cannot assent to something that is contrary to these principles that it naturally knows. And it must be the same way on the side of the will. Therefore, since from the impression of the first cause, namely of God, the soul has within itself that it wills the good, and it desires the perfect good as ultimate end, it is impossible that its contrary should become an object of desire; and therefore no one is capable of wanting misery, or evil, except incidentally, which does happen whenever he desires something evil that he apprehends as a good.
Reply Obj. 1: A rational power extends to opposites as far as things subject to it are concerned, and these are those things that are determined by the power itself. It cannot, however, extend to the opposites of those things that are determined for it by another; and so the will cannot extend to the opposite of what is determined for it by divine impression, namely to the opposite of the ultimate end. However, it can extend to opposites in regard to things it determines for itself, like things that are ordered to the ultimate end, the choice of which pertains to the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Coercion, since it implies violence, and likewise prohibition, do not pertain to that necessity which is attendant upon a thing’s nature, since everything violent is contrary to nature; and so, since it is natural that the will is necessarily borne to beatitude, this necessity does not imply coercion in it, nor any diminishment of freedom.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents something that is desirable in itself from being non-desirable when something else is added on to it. For this reason, even being, which is desired by all, and is good in itself, is rendered evil and worthy of hatred due to something added on to it, such as being in sorrow or misery; and so, per accidens, non-being is desired—not indeed, insofar as it lacks being, but insofar as it takes away that evil which was rendering being hateful. Now, to be lacking an evil is itself a good; and so he who seeks non-being, desires it as a good. But misery can never be taken as a good, because ‘misery’ names the notion of complete evil; and therefore no one can want to be miserable. In contrast, ‘non-being’ does not name the very notion of evil, but only something that is evil; and so, something added to it that has the notion of good can make it desirable, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b11–13.) and from Jerome in the gloss on Jeremiah 20, verses 14–18. (Jerome, Commentary on Jeremiah, Bk. 4, n. 28 (CCSL 74:194–95).) But what Augustine says—that no one desires non-being—is to be understood as speaking per se.
Reply Obj. 4: One is incapable of judging that white is black, although one could judge that something that is white, say a man, is black; and similarly one can judge that something that is good, is an evil, but it is not possible to judge that goodness itself is badness, or that badness is goodness. And since misery implies in itself the notion of an evil, therefore it cannot be judged to be a good, and because of this it cannot be desired.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the good, which is the will’s object, is in things, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 6; (Implicitly in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 6, ch. 4, 1027b24–26; cf. Metaphysics, Bk. 4, ch. 4, 1008b3–31, and Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1013a17–22; On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 433a15–21, 433a26–31, 433b15–18.) and so the will’s motion must have its term in a thing existing outside the soul. Now, although a thing, so far as it is in the soul, may be considered according to a common notion prescinding from a particular notion, a thing outside the soul cannot exist according to a common notion alone, without the addition of a proper notion. (This means that while ideas in the mind can be abstract, things known outside the mind must be particular.) And thus, however much the will is borne to the good, it must be borne to some determinate good; and likewise however much it is borne to the highest good, it must be borne to the highest good under this or that notion. Now, although it belongs to the will by its natural inclination to be borne to beatitude according to a common notion, yet to be borne to such-and-such a beatitude comes not from natural inclination, but from the discernment of reason, which discovers that the highest good of man consists in this thing or in that; and so whenever someone desires beatitude, natural appetite and rational appetite are actually joined in that appetite for beatitude. And on the part of natural appetite there is always rectitude, while on the part of the rational appetite sometimes there is rectitude (namely, when beatitude is sought where it truly exists), and sometimes there is perversity (when it is sought where it does not truly exist); and thus, in desiring beatitude, someone can either merit (presupposing grace) or demerit, according as his desire is either right or perverse.
Reply Obj. 1: In the desire for beatitude, together with what is natural, there is always, in addition, something voluntary and not merely natural; and it is in this way that the notion of merit or demerit can exist there.
Reply Obj. 2: Although no one can avoid desiring beatitude in some way, still he can avoid desiring it in the way in which it is supposed to be desired; and thus he can merit or demerit.
Reply Obj. 3: Man by his own powers is insufficient when it comes to desiring beatitude with a perfect desire, such as would suffice for meriting; but he has this sufficiency from the gift of divine grace, as is evident from 2 Corinthians 5:5: he who has prepared us for this very thing is God, that is, he who makes us desire true glory, according to the Gloss.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 8, 1151a16–17.) the end stands in the order of desirable things as a principle stands in the order of intelligible things. Now, since what is first and greatest in any genus is the cause of those that are after it, so knowledge of the principles in speculative matters is the cause of the knowledge of all other such matters; and likewise, desire for the end is the cause of seeking all other things that are toward the end. Hence, since beatitude is the end of human life, whatever the will wants to bring about is ordered to beatitude. This is clear also from experience; for whoever desires something desires it insofar as it is judged a good. But by the very fact that someone has something that he judges good, he reckons himself nearer to beatitude, since the addition of a good to a good makes one approach nearer to the perfect good, which is beatitude itself. And therefore any and every desire is ordered to beatitude.
Reply Obj. 1: Pleasure is among those things that are required for beatitude, since it is a formal aspect of beatitude. And so someone’s very desire for pleasure is ordered to beatitude, insofar as the pleasure itself is some likeness, whether near or remote, of that delight that perfects beatitude.
Reply Obj. 2: Something may be ordered to beatitude through desire in two ways. In one way, as that which is sought so that through it a man may attain beatitude, as someone wants to undertake works of virtue so that through this he may merit beatitude. In another way, when someone wants something because it has some likeness to beatitude. For the result of the will’s seeking something is that it also desires whatever that thing’s likeness is found in, even if it cannot have the main thing desired; and in this way all who desire sins are still longing for beatitude and turning toward an imitation of God, as Augustine says in his Confessions 2, (Augustine, Confessions, Bk. 2, ch. 6, n. 13 (CCSL 27:23).) speaking thus: pride imitates your loftiness, since you, O exalted God, are the one above all; ambition, what does it seek except honor and glory, while you are deserving of honor before all; and he brings in the other vices in like manner.
Reply Obj. 3: In that theft, as Augustine says in the same place, (Ibid., n. 14 (CCSL 27:24).) there was something that had an appearance of good, namely acting against the law, in which a certain shadow of freedom appeared. This is why he says: what, therefore, did I love in that thievery, and how was I imitating you, my God, [though] viciously and perversely? And he answers, saying: or was it not pleasing to act against the law at least by trickery, since I could not do so by power, in order that I, being a slave, might imitate freedom by doing with impunity what was unlawful, in a dark likeness of omnipotence?
Reply Obj. 4: People who expose themselves to death without hope of a future life do so in two different ways. In one way, for the sake of the activity of virtue, as those who willingly chose (It is true that choice is already an act of will, but “willingly chose” brings out perhaps the emphasis in the verb praeelegerunt.) to undergo death in order to save their homeland or to shun an unworthy deed; and according to their judgment, they did indeed order this to beatitude—not a beatitude to be gained after death, but one that was to be achieved then, in the very work, because to do a perfect work of virtue, which was done by enduring death, was the thing they most of all desired, the thing in which they placed their beatitude. In another way, people expose themselves to death because they are weary of the misery that they endure, which they reckon they can evade by death. Now, to evade misery and to desire beatitude come to the same thing. And so it stands that the desire of those who want to undergo death is ordered to beatitude.
Reply Obj. 5: For the will to be right, two things are required. One is that it be aimed at a due end; the other, that what is ordered to the end be proportioned to the end. Now, although every desire has reference to beatitude, still it happens, in this or that way, that a desire may be perverse; since the very appetite for beatitude can be perverse, when it is sought where it does not exist, as is clear from what was said before; and if it is sought where it truly exists, it can also happen that what one desires on account of the end is not proportioned to the end, as when someone wants to steal in order to give alms, intending in this way to merit beatitude.
Reply Obj. 6: Just as with things understood it is not necessary that in all consequent demonstrations the first principles be employed in the sense of being actually thought about, but only in the sense that they are present by their power in what is actually thought about, so long as the demonstration is drawn from things that have credibility from the first principles; so, too, although every desire has reference to beatitude, it is not necessary that in every desire one should be actually thinking about beatitude, but the desire for beatitude is present by its power in all other desires, as a cause is present in its effects.
Article 4
Whether all participate in it equally
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the beatitude of the saints is not going to be greater after the last judgment than before. (This is the first text in Distinction 49 that has its “parallel” (q. 93, a. 1) in the Supplementum of the Summa theologiae, compiled, some have maintained, by Thomas’s socius Reginald (see Torrell, Person and Work, 147, with n. 14). For the most part, the compiler of the Supplement restrained himself to minor modifications, such as removing the cross-reference to “Distinction 44, above,” and supplying Augustine for the closing auctoritas instead of Jerome. Interestingly, he excises qa. 2, skipping from qa. 1 to qa. 3—evidently aware that Thomas has already treated the contents of qa. 2 earlier in the ST.) For the more something approaches to the divine likeness, the more perfectly it participates in beatitude. But the soul separated from the body is more like to God than the soul joined to its body. Therefore, its beatitude is greater before the resumption of the body than afterwards.
Obj. 2: Further, a unified power is more powerful than a diversified one. But the soul outside the body is more unified than when it is joined to the body. Therefore, its power is greater for acting; and so it participates more perfectly in beatitude, which consists in act.
Obj. 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative intellect, as is evident from what was said above. But the intellect in its act does not employ a bodily organ; and so, the body resumed will not make the soul understand more perfectly. Therefore, the beatitude of the soul will not be greater after the resurrection.
Obj. 4: Further, there cannot be anything greater than the infinite; and so, the infinite to which something finite is added is no greater than the infinite itself. But the blessed soul before the resumption of the body has beatitude owing to the fact that it rejoices in the infinite good, namely in God; and after the resumption of the body it will still not have joy in anything else, except perhaps the glory of the body, which is a certain finite good. Therefore, their joy after the resumption of the body will not be greater than before.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Revelation 8 (In fact, Rev. 6:9. Cf. Strabo, Glossa ordinaria on this verse (PL 114:722); Haimo, On the Apocalypse, Bk. 2, on 6:9 (PL 117:1029).) where it says, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God and for the witness they had borne, the Gloss says: presently the souls of the saints are existing “under,” that is, in a lesser dignity than will be theirs in the future. Therefore, their beatitude will be greater after death.
Furthermore (2), as beatitude is paid back to the good as a reward, so is misery paid back to the wicked. But the misery of the wicked after the resumption of their bodies will be greater than before, since they will be punished not only in soul but also in body. Therefore, too, the beatitude of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the body than before it.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems all will participate equally in beatitude. (Parallels: Among the many discussions of this question, see In I Sent. d. 44, a. 3, ad 5; ST I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4; q. 5, a. 2; q. 112, a. 4, esp. ad 2; SCG III, ch. 58; Super Ioan. 14, lec. 14; Super I Cor. 3, lec. 2. The compiler of the Supplement to the ST chose to omit this qa. in the “new” q. 93, aware that its subject-matter had already been treated.) For it is said in Matthew 20:9 that all shall receive a single denarius. Now the denarius there signifies something that all will have in common. But this is nothing other than beatitude. Therefore, each one will have just as much of beatitude as any other.
Obj. 2: Further, there is nothing beyond the ultimate. But beatitude is the ultimate of those things that can be desired by men. Therefore beyond the beatitude of one man there cannot be something in another man that somehow exceeds the first man’s beatitude; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Obj. 3: Further, as a good is desirable to anyone, so a greater good is more desirable. Therefore, if someone were more blessed than another who was less blessed, the first person’s beatitude would be more desirable to the other person, according to a right appetite; yet he would not have it. Therefore, he would not be blessed; since, as is said in the text, no one is called blessed unless he has all that he wants, and wants nothing evil.
On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 15:41, star differs from star in glory; so it is in the resurrection of the dead. Therefore, among those who rise, one will have more glory than another.
Furthermore (2), reward ought to correspond to merit. But some people have more excellent merits than others. Therefore, since beatitude is the reward of virtue, it seems that they will have a greater beatitude.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that these degrees of beatitude ought not to be called ‘dwelling places.’ (This qa. is brought over to Supplementum q. 93, a. 2, with no modification. A parallel, in some respects, is ST 1–2, q. 5, a. 2, esp. ad 1.) For beatitude carries with it the notion of reward. But dwelling place signifies nothing that pertains to reward. Therefore, different degrees of beatitude ought not to be called dwelling places. (“Dwelling places” translates mansiones. The King James and Douay-Rheims simply say “mansions,” while the RSV has “rooms” and the New American Bible, “dwelling places.” Any of these, it seems, would be acceptable translations, but since “mansion” in contemporary English refers only to an oversized domicile of the wealthy class, it seems odd to use this word, whereas etymologically “dwelling places” is closer to the root of mansio.)
Obj. 2: Further, ‘dwelling place’ seems to signify a place. But the place where the saints will be made blessed is not bodily but spiritual, namely God, who is one. Therefore, there is only one dwelling place; and so different degrees of beatitude cannot be called dwelling places.
Obj. 3: Further, as in heaven there will be people of diverse merits, so now they are in purgatory, and they were in the limbo of the fathers in former times. But in purgatory and limbo, no dwelling places are distinguished one from another. Therefore, neither in heaven ought dwelling places to be distinguished one from another.
On the contrary (1), there stands what is said in John 14:2: in my Father’s house are many rooms—which Augustine (See Augustine, On the Gospel of John 14:1–3, tract. 67, n. 2 (CCSL 36:495–96).) expounds as the various dignities of the rewards.
Furthermore (2), in any city there is an orderly distinction of dwelling places. But the heavenly homeland is compared to a city, as is clear from Revelation 21. Therefore, different dwelling places must be distinguished there, according to diverse degrees of beatitude.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that different dwelling places are not distinguished according to different degrees of charity. (Parallels: This qa. is brought over to Supplementum q. 93, a. 3, with no modification; cf. ST I, q. 12, a. 6 and q. 62, a. 9. The more general point that a saint’s subjective participation in God’s blessedness corresponds to his capacity or receptivity, which was co-determined by God’s grace and the saint’s exercise of charity in via, is a commonplace in Thomas’s works.) For it says in Matthew 25:15: he gave to each one according to his own power. But the power proper to anything is its natural force. Therefore, gifts of both grace and glory are distributed according to different degrees of natural power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Psalm 62 (61):12 it is said: thou dost requite a man according to his work. But what is rendered is the measure of beatitude. Therefore, the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according to a diversity of works, and not according to a diversity of charity.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the reward is owed to act, and not to habit; hence it is not the strongest who are crowned, but the ones who enter the fight, as is clear from the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 8, 1099a4.) and in 2 Timothy 2:5: he will not be crowned unless he strive lawfully. But beatitude is the reward. Therefore different degrees of beatitude are not according to different degrees of charity. (Which is a habit, but according to different degrees of active striving.)
On the contrary (1), the more joined someone will be to God, the more he will be blessed. But the measure of union with God follows the measure of charity. There will therefore be differences in beatitude according to differences in charity.
Furthermore (2), as one thing taken simply follows upon another taken simply, so a greater degree of the one follows upon a greater degree of the other. But having beatitude follows upon having charity. Therefore, having more beatitude follows upon having more charity.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, it is indeed manifest that the beatitude of the saints after the resurrection will increase as regards its extension, since then beatitude will be not only in the soul but also in the body; and even the beatitude of the soul itself will be increased as regards extension, insofar as the soul will rejoice not only over its own good, but over the good of the body.
It can also be said that the beatitude of the soul itself will be increased as regards intensity. For man’s body can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is perfectible by the soul; in another way, as there is in it something that resists the soul in the soul’s activities, as long as the body is not perfectly perfected by the soul. Now, according to the first way of considering the body, the union of body to soul adds a perfection to the soul, since a part, as such, is imperfect, and finds completion in its whole. Thus the whole stands to the parts as form to matter, and thus the soul is more perfect in its natural being when it is in the whole—namely in man compounded of soul and body—than when it is separate by itself. But the union of the body according to the second way of considering it impedes the perfection of the soul; and thus it is said in Wisdom 9:15 that a perishable body weighs down the soul. Therefore, if from the body everything were taken away through which it resists the soul’s action, simply speaking the soul would be more perfect existing in such a body than separate by itself. But the more perfect something is in being, the more perfect it can be in acting; and so the activity of a soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the activity of a separated soul. Now, this is the kind of body that the glorified body is, since it is altogether subject to the spirit, as was said above in Distinction 44.
For this reason, since beatitude consists in activity, the soul’s beatitude will be more perfect after the resumption of the body than before. For just as the soul separated from the corruptible body can act more perfectly than when it is united to it, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its activity will be more perfect than when it was separated. Now, every imperfect thing desires its own perfection, and so the separated soul naturally desires union with the body; and because of this desire proceeding from imperfection, its activity which is directed toward God is less intense; and this is what Jerome says: (In the Editiones Paulinae text of the ST, the quotation is attributed rather to Augustine, with the editors supplying a reference to On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, ch. 35, PL 34:483.) that due to desire for the body, the soul is held back from passing into that highest good with its whole intention.
Reply Obj. 1: The soul united to the glorified body is more like God than when it is separated from such a body, insofar as the composite has being more perfectly. For the more perfectly something exists, the more like God it is, as the heart, since the perfection of its life consists in motion, (Literally: “as the heart, the perfection of the life of which consists in motion,” etc. For St. Thomas’s thoughts about the crucial function of the heart’s motion in the animal’s life, see his opusculum De motu cordis (ed. Leon. 43:127–30).) is more like God when it is moving than when it rests, even though God himself never moves.
Reply Obj. 2: A power that by its nature belongs in matter is more powerful when existing in matter than when separated from matter, even though absolutely speaking a power that is separated from matter is more powerful.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the soul does not employ the body in the act of understanding, still the body’s perfection will in a way cooperate toward the perfection of intellectual activity, inasmuch as the soul, from its union with the glorified body, will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its activity. And in this respect the very good of the body will cooperate, as if instrumentally, toward that activity in which beatitude consists, even as the Philosopher states in the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 8, 1099a33, and ch. 9, 1099b27.) that external goods cooperate instrumentally toward happiness of life.
Reply Obj. 4: Although a finite added to an infinite does not make a greater, still it makes more, because the infinite and the finite are two, since the infinite, taken by itself, is one. Now, the extension of joy spoken of does not have reference to greater, but to more; hence joy will increase as regards extension, if one compares the joy taken in God and in the body’s glory, to the joy that was taken in God alone. The body’s glory will also contribute to the intensifying of the joy that is from God inasmuch as it is cooperating with a more perfect activity by which the soul is borne into God. For the more perfect a suitable activity is, the greater will be the delight in doing it, as is evident from what is said in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b19.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that since beatitude consists in activity, the level of beatitude is to be gauged according to the level of perfection in acting. Now, the perfection of activity in which happiness consists is evaluated on the basis of two factors: one on the side of the acting subject, the other on the side of the object. This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b18–20, and ch. 7, 1177a12–21.) that the most perfect activity is the one that is of the highest power perfected by the noblest habit (which is on the side of the acting subject) and with respect to the noblest object. Now, the object of the activity in which beatitude consists is altogether one and the same, namely the divine essence, from the vision of which all will be blessed; and so on its side there will not be any level in beatitude. But on the side of the acting subject, the activity of beatitude will not be perfect in the same way, since insofar as the habit that perfects this activity, namely the light of glory, will be more perfect in one than in another, to that extent this activity will be more perfect, and the delight greater; and from this vantage, all the blessed will not be in the same level of beatitude.
Reply Obj. 1: The denarius represents the one who will be commonly rendered to the blessed on the side of the object of beatitude itself, since God will show his essence to all; but each one will gaze on it in his own way.
Reply Obj. 2: As fire is the most subtle kind of body, and nevertheless one fire can be more subtle than another, so beatitude, considered according to its kind, is the ultimate of all things desirable to mankind; hence nothing prevents the beatitude of one from being more perfect than the beatitude of another. Moreover, the beatitude of each one is ultimate inasmuch as his desire is wholly terminated in it, even if it is not ultimate in the sense of existing in the ultimate degree of perfection.
Reply Obj. 3: In the blessed there will be perfect charity; thus anyone there will love God more than himself, and so he will more want what is more suited to God, than what would be better for himself. And thus he will more want divine justice to be preserved by his having less, which is more suited to God, than he will want to have more, which would be better for him. (The Parma ed.: et ideo magis volet divinam justitiam salvari in hoc quod ipse minus habeat, quod est deo convenientius, quam in hoc quod plus habeat, quod esset sibi melius. We are reading the in of in hoc quod plus habeat as a mistake caused by unconsciously making this clause correspond with the previous one. The content of the text makes little sense if one interprets the grammar as it stands. The reason why his having less is more suited to God, is precisely that the divine justice is thereby preserved. If the divine justice were preserved in his having more, there would be nothing more suited to God about his having less—none mentioned in the text, that is.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that since local motion is prior to all other motions, for this reason, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 8, ch. 9, 265b17.) the names ‘motion’ and ‘distance’ and everything of the kind are carried over from local motion to all other motions. Now the end of local motion is a place, (This works better in Latin: finis motus localis est locus.) where something remains at rest once it has arrived, and is preserved there; and so, in any motion, the very being-at-rest in the end of the motion we call ‘station’ (The term is collocatio. The meaning here basically refers to something being at rest or stable due to its position vis-à-vis other things, or the place itself in which it is at rest: station, resting place. Thomas seems to be almost equivocating on the usage of collocatio and mansio when referring to the being at rest (standing, dwelling) and the usage when referring to the place in which something is at rest (station, dwelling place).) or ‘dwelling’; and therefore since the name of motion is carried over to the act of appetite and of will, the very gaining of the end of appetitive motion is called a dwelling place, or station, in the end. And this is why different ways of obtaining the ultimate end are called different dwelling places, such that the one house corresponds to the one beatitude, which is on the side of the object, while the plurality of dwellings corresponds to the differences that are found in beatitude on the part of the blessed—as we also see in natural things that everything light tends to the same place up above, but the lighter something is, the closer it comes to that place; and thus they have diverse dwelling places according to differences in lightness.
Reply Obj. 1: ‘Dwelling place’ does imply the notion of end, as is evident from what was said, and so consequently implies the notion of reward, which is the end of merit.
Reply Obj. 2: Although there is one spiritual place, there are still different steps for approaching that place; and accordingly, diverse dwelling places are established.
Reply Obj. 3: Those who were in limbo or who are now in purgatory have not yet come to their end, and so in purgatory or in limbo dwelling places are not distinguished, one from the other; but this is done only in paradise and in hell, where we find the end of the good and of the wicked.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that there are two principles that distinguish heavenly dwelling places or degrees of beatitude: proximate and remote. The proximate principle is the difference of disposition that will be found in the blessed, out of which there arises among them a diversity of perfection in the activity of beatitude; but the remote principle is the merit by which they attained such beatitude. Now, in the first way, the dwelling places are distinguished according to the charity possessed in heaven—the more perfect it is in someone, the more it will render him receptive of the divine brilliance, and according to this increase the perfection of divine vision will be increased. But the second way the dwelling places are distinguished is according to charity possessed in the wayfaring state. For our actions in this life do not have their power of meriting from the very substance of the actions, but solely from the habit of virtue by which they are informed. Now, the power of meriting is in every virtue from charity, which has the ultimate end as its object; and so, any difference in meriting comes down completely to a difference in charity. And this is how the charity possessed in the wayfaring state will, by way of merit, differentiate heavenly dwelling places.
Reply Obj. 1: ‘Power’ here is not to be taken solely for natural capacity, but for natural capacity together with an effort toward having grace; and taken in this way, ‘power’ will be something like a material disposition to the measure of grace and glory received. But charity is what formally completes merit toward glory; and therefore a distinction of degrees in glory is taken according to levels of charity rather than according to levels in the power described. (i.e., natural capacity and effort.)
Reply Obj. 2: Works only have a claim on the recompense of glory insofar as they are informed by charity; and so there will be different degrees in glory according to different degrees of charity.
Reply Obj. 3: While the habit of charity (or of any virtue) is not the merit that the reward is owed to, it is nevertheless the principle and the whole rationale for meriting in any act; and therefore diverse rewards are distinguished according to its diversity—although a certain degree in meriting could also be considered by reason of the very genus of a certain act, not with respect to the essential reward, which is rejoicing in God, but with respect to an accidental reward, which is joy over a created good.
Question 2
The beatific vision
Next, we inquire about the vision of God; and here seven questions arise:
first, whether the saints will see God in his essence;
- second, whether they can see God with the eye of the body;
- third, whether by seeing God they comprehend him;
- fourth, whether some people will see God in his essence more perfectly than others;
- fifth, whether it is necessary for those who see the divine essence to see everything that God sees;
- sixth, whether any created being can arrive at seeing God in his essence from purely natural endowments;
- seventh, whether anyone can see God in his essence in the wayfaring state.
- Article 1
Whether the saints will see God in his essence
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 12, a. 1; ST I-II, q. 3, a. 8; De veritate, q. 8, a. 1; Super Matt. 5; SCG III, chs. 51, 54, and 57; Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 1; Quodl. X, q. 8, a. un.; Super Ioan. 1, lec. 11; Comp. theo. 104.) It seems that the human intellect cannot arrive at seeing God in his essence. For no one has ever seen God (Jn 1:18) is explained by Chrysostom (John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, Hom. 15, PG 59:97–98.) as meaning that not even the heavenly essences (I mean the Cherubim and Seraphim) were ever able to see him as he is. But men are promised nothing but equality with the angels: they are like the angels of God in heaven (Mt 22:30). Therefore, neither will the saints in heaven see God in his essence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in On the Divine Names 1, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1 (PG 3:586).) Dionysius gives the following argument. Knowledge is only of existing things. But every existing thing is finite, since it is determined to some genus. And so God, since he is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore, there is no knowledge of him; rather, he is above knowledge.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, ch. 1 (PG 3:998).) shows that the most perfect manner in which our intellect can be joined to God is inasmuch as it is joined to him as the unknown. But what is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in his essence.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle I to Gaius (PG 3:1066).) says that the darkness surrounding God, which is what he calls God’s abundance of light, is obscured from all light and hidden from all knowledge; and if anyone who sees God understands what he has seen, he has not seen him but rather something of the things that are his. Therefore, no created intellect will be able to see God in his essence.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Dionysius says in Letter 5 to Dorotheus: God exists as invisible due to his exceeding brightness. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle to Dorotheus (PG 3:1074).) But just as his brightness exceeds man’s intellect in the wayfaring state, so also it exceeds man’s intellect in heaven. Therefore, just as he is invisible in the wayfaring state, so also he will be invisible in heaven.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, since the intelligible is a perfection of the intellect, there must be a proportion between the intellect and the intelligible, between the visible and vision. But there cannot be a proportion between our intellect and the divine essence, since they are at an infinite distance. Therefore, our intellect cannot attain to seeing the divine essence.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, God is more distant from our intellect than a created intelligible object is from our senses. But the senses can in no way attain to seeing a spiritual creature. Therefore, neither can our intellect attain to seeing the divine essence.
Obj. 8: Furthermore, whenever the intellect understands something actually it must be informed by way of a likeness to what is understood, which is the principle of intellectual activity determined to such an object, just as heat is the principle of heating. If, then, the intellect understood God, this would have to occur through a likeness informing the intellect. But this cannot be the divine essence itself. For the form and the formed must have a single being, but the divine intelligence differs from our intellect in both essence and being. Thus the form by which our intellect is informed when it understands God must be a likeness impressed by God onto our intellect. But this likeness, since it is something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as the effect leads to the cause. Therefore, it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through his effect. But the vision of God through his effects is not the vision of God in his essence. Therefore, our intellect will not be able to see God in his essence.
Obj. 9: Furthermore, the divine essence is more distant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. But, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, Tract 3, ch. 8.) for an intelligence to be in our intellect is not for the essence of the intelligence to be in our intellect. For in this case the knowledge we have of intelligences would be a substance, not an accident. But this is for an impression of the intelligence to be in our intellect. Therefore God, too, is only in our intellect in such a manner as to be understood by us inasmuch as an impression of him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to knowledge of the divine essence. For since it is at an infinite distance from the divine essence, it would degenerate into another species much more readily than if the species of white were to degenerate into the species of black. Now, one in whose sight the species of white degenerates into the species of black, due to the indisposition of an organ, is not said to see white. So, too, our intellect, which understands God only through an impression of him, will not be able to see him in his essence.
Obj. 10: Furthermore, in things separated from matter, what understands and what is understood are the same, as is clear in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 5, 430a20; cf. ch. 7, 431a1.) But God is maximally separated from matter. Since, then, an intellect that is created cannot attain to becoming an uncreated essence, it will not be able to be the case that it sees God in his essence.
Obj. 11: Furthermore, in the case of every thing that is seen in its essence, what it is is known. But in the case of God, the intellect cannot see what he is but only what he is not, as Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, n. 3 (PG 3:870).) and Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 1 (PG 94:786).) say. Therefore, the intellect cannot see God in his essence.
Obj. 12: Furthermore, every infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown. But God is infinite in every way. Therefore, he is altogether unknown and thus will not be able to be seen in his essence by a created intellect.
Obj. 13: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Vision of God: God is invisible by nature. (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (also known as On the Vision of God), par. 15 (CSEL 44:311); cf. par. 7.) But the natural properties of God cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore, it cannot be the case that he is seen in his essence.
Obj. 14: Furthermore, every thing that exists in one way and is seen in another way is not seen in accord with what it is. But God exists in one way and is seen in another by the saints in heaven. For he exists after his own manner, but the saints will see him after their manner. Therefore, the saints will not see him in accord with what he is and so will not see him in his essence.
Obj. 15: Furthermore, what is seen through a medium is not seen in its essence. But in heaven God is seen through a medium, which is the light of glory, as is clear from Scripture: in thy light do we see light (Ps 35 [36]:10). Therefore, he will not be seen in his essence.
Obj. 16: Furthermore, in heaven God is seen face to face, as Scripture says (1 Cor 13:12). But when we see a man face to face, we see him through a likeness. Therefore, in heaven God will be seen through a likeness and so not in his essence.
On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 13:12: now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. But what is seen face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore, the saints will see God in his essence in heaven.
Furthermore (2), when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is (1 Jn 3:2). Therefore, we will see God in his essence.
Furthermore (3), commenting on 1 Corinthians 15:24: when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father, a Gloss says: where (i.e., in heaven) the essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit will be seen, which will be granted only to pure hearts, which is the height of beatitude. Therefore, the blessed will see God in his essence.
Furthermore (4), John 14:21 says: he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him. But what is manifested is seen essentially. Therefore, God will be seen essentially by the saints in heaven.
Furthermore (5), on the passage man shall not see me and live (Ex 33:20), Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 54.) disproves the opinion of those who said that in the realm of beatitude God can be perceived in his brightness but cannot be seen in his nature, since his brightness is not one thing and his nature another. But his nature is his essence. Therefore, he is seen in his essence.
Furthermore (6), the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. But the universal desire of the saints is to see God in his essence, as is clear: show me thy face (Ex 33:18), and show us the Father, and we shall be satisfied (Jn 14:8). Therefore, the saints will see God in his essence.
I answer that, just as we assert in accord with the faith that the last end of human life is the vision of God, so also philosophers posit that the ultimate happiness of man is to understand substances separate from matter according to their being. And thus, concerning this question, the same difficulty and diversity of opinion is found in the case of philosophers and theologians.
For some philosophers have posited that our potential intellect can never arrive at understanding separated substances, as Alpharabius asserts at the end of his Ethics, though he said the contrary in On the Intellect, as the Commentator relates, commenting on On the Soul 3. (Averroes, On the Soul 3, comment 36.) Likewise, some theologians have posited that the human intellect can never arrive at seeing God in his essence. And both are moved to this position by the distance between our intellect and the divine essence or other separated substances. For since the intellect in act is in a certain way one with the intelligible in act, for a created intellect in any way to become an uncreated essence seems to be a difficulty. Hence, too, Chrysostom (John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, Hom. 15, PG 59:98.) says: for how can what is subject to creation see what is uncreateable? And there is a greater difficulty in this for those who posit that the potential intellect is generable and corruptible as a power dependent on the body, not only with respect to the vision of God but also with respect to the vision of any separated substances.
But this position is totally unable to stand. First, because it is repugnant to the authority of canonical Scripture, as Augustine says in On Seeing God. Second, because of the fact that since understanding is man’s most proper activity, we must assign his beatitude on the basis of this activity, i.e., when this activity is perfected in him. But since the perfection of one who understands, precisely as understanding, is the intelligible object itself, if in the most perfect activity of his intellect man arrives not at seeing the divine essence but at something else, we will have to say that something other than God is what makes man himself blessed. And since the ultimate perfection of any thing is in connection to its principle, it follows that something other than God is man’s efficient principle. But this is absurd to us as well as to philosophers who posit that our souls emanate from separated substances such that in the end we are able to understand them.
Hence, on our terms, we must posit that our intellect does at some time arrive at seeing the divine essence, and, on the terms of the philosophers, we must posit that it arrives at seeing the essence of separated substances. Now how this can happen remains to be investigated.
Some, such as Alpharabius and Avempace, said that from the fact that our intellect understands all intelligible objects it attains to the vision of the essence of the separated substance. And they proceed to show this in two ways. The first of these is that just as matter is only specifically differentiated in different individuals to the extent that it is joined to individuating principles, so also the understood form of man is not differentiated to me and to you, except to the extent that it is joined to different imaginable forms. And thus when our intellect separates the form understood from the forms of the imagination, the understood quiddity remains, which is one and the same to different people who understand it. And such is the quiddity of a separated substance. Thus, when our intellect reaches the highest abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of a separated substance that is like it. The second way is based on the fact that our intellect was made to abstract quiddity from all intelligible objects that have quiddity. If, then, the quiddity it abstracts from this singular object having quiddity is a quiddity that does not have quiddity, then by understanding it, it will understand the quiddity of a separated substance that has this kind of disposition due to the fact that separated substances are subsisting quiddities that do not have quiddities. For the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, Tract 3, ch. 8.) But if the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible object is a quiddity that has quiddity, then our intellect was made to abstract it. And thus, since it cannot go to infinity, it will arrive at a quiddity that does not have quiddity, which is understood to be separated quiddity.
But this way does not seem to be sufficient. First, because the quiddity of a material substance abstracted by our intellect does not have the same character as the quiddities of separated substances. And thus, through the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material things and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of a separated substance, especially the divine essence, which differs in character most of all from every created quiddity. Second, because, even granted that they have the same character, when the quiddity of a composite thing is known, this does not entail that the quiddity of a separated substance is known, except on the basis of the highest-level genus, which is substance. But this knowledge is imperfect, unless one arrives at the proper characteristics of the thing. For one who knows man only inasmuch as he is an animal only knows him in a qualified sense and potentially. And much less does he know him if he only knows the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God or other separated substances in this way is not to see the divine essence or the quiddity of a separated substance. It is, rather, to know it through its effect and as if in a mirror. And thus another method for how we understand separated substances is laid out by Avicenna in his Metaphysics, namely, that separated substances are understood by us through the intentions of their quiddities, which are certain likenesses to them not abstracted from them, since they themselves are immaterial, but instead impressed by them on our souls.
But this way, too, does not seem to us to be sufficient to constitute the vision of God that we seek. For it is obvious that everything that is received in another is in it after the mode of the receiver. And thus a likeness to the divine essence imprinted by it on our intellect will be there after the mode of our intellect. But the mode of our intellect falls short of the perfect reception of the divine likeness. Now falling short of perfect likeness can occur in as many ways as unlikeness is found. In one way, a likeness falls short when it is participated in by a form with the same specific character but not with the same mode of perfection, as the likeness in what has a little whiteness falls short when compared with what has much. In another way, a likeness falls short even more when it does not attain the same specific character but only the same generic character, as in the case of a likeness between what is crimson in color and what is white in color. Another way, which is an even greater falling short, is when it attains to the same generic character but only by analogy, for example, the likeness of whiteness to man in the fact that both are a being. And this is the way in which the likeness received in a created being with respect to the divine essence falls short. But for the sight to know whiteness, a likeness of whiteness according to its specific character must be received in it, though not according to the same mode of being. For a form has being in one mode in the senses, and being in another mode in the thing existing outside the soul. For if the form of crimson is in the eye, it is not said to see whiteness. Likewise, for the intellect to understand a quiddity, there must be a likeness of the same specific character in it, though perhaps it is not the same mode of being in both cases. For the form existing in the intellect or the senses is not the principle of knowledge according to the mode of being that it has in both cases, but according to the character in which it shares with the external thing. And thus it is clear that in this way God’s essence cannot be understood to be seen immediately through any likeness received in a created intellect.
For this reason some others, holding that the divine essence is seen only in this way, said that the essence itself will not be seen but rather a kind of radiance, like a ray of the essence. Hence neither does this mode suffice for the vision of God that we seek.
And thus we must accept another mode, one also posited by some philosophers, namely Alexander and Averroes in On the Soul 3. For since in any act of knowing a form by which the thing is known or seen is necessary, the form by which the intellect is perfected for seeing separated substances is not a quiddity that the intellect abstracts from composite things, as the first opinion stated. Nor is it an impression left by the separated substance on our intellect, as the second opinion stated. Rather, it is the separated substance itself, which is joined to our intellect as a form in such a way that it itself is what is understood and that by which it is understood. And whatever the case may be for other separated substances, this is the mode we must accept for the vision of God in his essence. For no matter what other form might inform our intellect, our intellect could not be led through it to the divine essence. But this should not be understood as if the divine essence is the true form of our intellect or as if from it and our intellect one thing simply comes about, as occurs in natural things from natural form and matter. Rather, it should be understood that the proportion of the divine essence to our intellect is like the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things of which one is more perfect than the other are received in the same receptacle, the proportion of one of the two to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is like the proportion of form to matter, as when light and color are received in the transparent and of these light is related to color as form to matter. And thus since the intellective power is received in the soul as well as the in-dwelling divine essence, though not in the same mode, the divine essence will be related to the intellect as form to matter.
And in the following way it can be shown that this suffices for our intellect to be able to see the divine essence itself through the divine essence. For just as from the natural form by which something has being and from matter, one being simply comes about, so also from the form by which the intellect understands together with the intellect itself, one single thing in the act of understanding comes about. But among natural things, the thing subsisting as such cannot be the form of any matter if that thing has matter as part of itself, since it cannot be the case that matter is the form of something. But if the thing subsisting as such is only a form, then nothing prevents it from being made the form of some matter and becoming the whereby-it-is of the composite, as is clear in the case of the soul.
Now in the intellect we must understand the intellect itself in potency as being the matter and the intelligible species as being the form. And so the intellect understanding actually will be like the composite of both. Hence, if there is a thing subsisting as such that does not have anything in it besides what is intelligible in it, such a thing will be able to be the form by which the intellect understands. But any thing is intelligible to the extent that it partakes of act, not to the extent that it partakes of potency, as is clear in the Metaphysics 9. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 9, ch. 8; but this point is made multiple times throughout the book.) A sign of this is that we must abstract the intelligible form from matter and all the properties of matter. And thus, since the divine essence is pure act, it will be able to be the form by which the intellect understands. And this will be the beatific vision. And thus the Master says in Book II, Distinction 1, that the union of the soul to the body is a kind of analogue of the blessed union by which the spirit will be united to God.
Reply Obj. 1: This authority can be explained in three ways, as is clear from Augustine in On Seeing God. (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 5.) It is explained in one way as excluding corporeal vision, by which no one has seen or will see God in his essence, as will be said. In other way, it is explained as excluding the intellectual vision of God in his essence from those who live in this mortal flesh. In the third way, it is explained as excluding comprehensive vision from the created intellect. And this is how Chrysostom understands it. Hence he adds: the Evangelist calls the knowledge of this most certain and says that the comprehension is as much as the Father has of the Son. (John Chrysostom, Homilies on John, PG 59:359.) And this is the Evangelist’s understanding, for which reason he adds: the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known (Jn 1:18), intending to prove by way of his comprehensive vision that the Son is God.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as God, through his infinite essence, surpasses all existing things that have determinate being, so also the knowledge by which he knows is above all knowledge. Hence the proportion of our knowledge to created beings is the proportion of God’s knowledge to his essence. Now two things come together for knowledge: the knower and that whereby the thing is known. But that vision by which we will see God in his essence is the same as the vision by which God sees himself, on the part of that by which he is seen. For just as he sees himself through his essence, so also we will see him in his essence. But on the part of the knower, there is found a difference between the divine intellect and ours. Now, in the act of knowing, what is known follows on the form by which we know. For through the form of a stone we see the stone. But the efficacy in the act of knowing follows on the power of the knower, just as one who has stronger sight sees more acutely. And thus in that vision we will see the same thing that God sees, namely his essence, but not as efficaciously.
Reply Obj. 3: In this passage Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge by which we know God in the wayfaring state through a created form, by which our intellect is formed to see him. But, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 7.) God evades every form of our intellect, since in the case of any form that our intellect conceives, that form does not attain the character of the divine essence. And thus he himself is impenetrable to our intellect. But in the wayfaring state we know him most perfectly when we know that he is above everything our intellect can conceive of. And in this way we are joined to him as something unknown. But in heaven we will see him through the form that is his essence and will be joined to him as known.
Reply Obj. 4: God is light, as 1 Jn 1:5 says. Now brightness is the impression of light in what is illuminated. And because the divine essence belongs to a mode other than every likeness of it that is impressed on our intellect, he says that the divine darkness obscures all brightness, since the divine essence, which he calls darkness, remains unindicated by the impression on our intellect due to its surpassing splendor. And for this reason it follows that it is hidden from all knowledge. And thus if anyone who sees God conceives something in his mind, he conceives not of God but rather one of God’s effects.
Reply Obj. 5: The splendor of God, though it surpasses every form by which our intellect is now informed, does not surpass the divine essence itself, which will be like a form for our intellect in heaven. And thus, though it is invisible to us now, it will then be visible.
Reply Obj. 6: Even though there cannot be a proportion of the finite to the infinite, since the remainder of the infinite beyond the finite is indeterminate, there can be a proportionality that is a likeness of proportions between them. For as finite is equated to finite, infinite is equated to infinite. Now for something to be known completely, there must sometimes be a proportion between the knower and the known, since the power of the knower must be adjusted to the knowability of the thing known, equality being a kind of proportion. But sometimes the knowability of the thing exceeds the power of the knower, as when we know God; sometimes the converse is true, as when God knows created things. And in such a case there need not be a proportion between the knower and the known, but instead only a proportionality, namely, such that as the knower is related to the knowing, so also the thing knowable is related to the fact of its being known. And such a proportionality suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite as well as vice versa.
Or we may say that the original meaning of ‘proportion’ signifies the relation of quantity to quantity with reference to a determinate excess or equalization, but that its meaning was later transferred to signify every relation of any given thing to another. And it is in this latter manner that we say that matter should be proportionate to form. And in this way nothing prevents our intellect, though finite, from being called proportionate to seeing an infinite essence, though not to comprehending it due to its immensity.
Reply Obj. 7: ‘Likeness’ and ‘distance’ can be taken in two ways. In one way, they are understood with reference to agreement in nature, and in this way God is more distant from the created intellect than a created intelligible object is from the senses. In the other way, they are understood with reference to proportionality, and in this way the reverse is true. For the senses are not proportionate to knowing anything immaterial, whereas the intellect is proportionate to knowing any immaterial thing. And it is this likeness, not the first kind, that is required for knowledge. For it is obvious that when the intellect understands a stone, it is not like it in natural being, as, too, sight apprehends reddish honey and reddish bile, though it does not apprehend that honey is sweet. For the honey’s being reddish in color shares more with bile inasmuch as it is visible than the sweetness of honey does with bile.
Reply Obj. 8: In the vision by which God will be seen in his essence, the divine essence itself will be like the intellect’s form by which it understands. And it is not necessary for them to become one single thing with respect to being simply, but only to become one so far as this pertains to the act of understanding, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 9: In this respect we do not maintain what Avicenna said, for in this he is also contradicted by other philosophers, that Avicenna is speaking the knowledge of separated substances as they are known through the habits of the speculative sciences and the likeness to things. For he cites this to show that science is not a substance in us but an accident. Even so, although the divine essence, according to the properties of its nature, is more distant from our intellect than the substance of an angel, it has a greater character of intelligibility, since it is pure act with no admixture of potency, which is not the case in other separated substances. Nor will the knowledge by which we will see God in his essence be in the genus of accident on the part of what will be seen, but rather only as regards the act of the one understanding, which will be neither the substance of the one who understands nor of the one who is understood.
Reply Obj. 10: A substance separated from matter understands itself and understands other things, and the authority cited can be held as true in either way. For since the essence itself of a separated substance is actually intelligible through itself by the fact that it is separated from matter, it is obvious that when a separated substance understands itself, what understands and what is understood are completely identical. For it does not understand itself through any intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material things. And this seems to be the Philosopher’s understanding in On the Soul 3, as is clear from what the Commentator says on the same passage. But to the extent that it understands other things, what is understood in act becomes one with the intellect in act, inasmuch as the form of what is understood becomes the form of the intellect inasmuch as the power of understanding is in act, not that it is the intellect’s very essence, as Avicenna proves in On Natural Things 6. For the intellect’s essence remains one under two forms when it understands two forms successively, after the manner in which prime matter remains one under different forms. Hence, too, the Commentator, commenting on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, On the Soul, Bk. 3, comment 5.) compares the potential intellect to prime matter in this regard. And in this way it does not at all follow that our intellect becomes the divine essence itself when it sees God, but that the essence is compared to it as a perfection and form.
Reply Obj. 11: These authorities and all those like them should be understood of the knowledge by which we know God in the wayfaring state, on the basis of the argument given before.
Reply Obj. 12: The ‘infinite’ taken in a privative sense is unknown as such. For it is named from the removal of a completeness, from which comes the knowledge of a thing. And this is how the infinite is reduced to matter subject to privation, as is clear in the Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 3, ch. 7, 207b35–208a4; cf. ch. 6.) But ‘infinite’ taken in a negative sense is named from the removal of limiting matter, since form is also limited in a certain way through matter. And so the infinite in this sense is maximally knowable, and this is the sense in which God is infinite.
Reply Obj. 13: Augustine (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina, par. 9 (CSEL 44:296).) is speaking of corporeal vision, by which God will never be seen, as is clear from what he says just before: for no one has ever or ever can see God as these visible things that are named are seen, and he is by nature invisible, just as he is incorruptible. Now just as by his nature he is most of all a being, so also he is in himself most of all intelligible. But the fact that he is sometimes not understood by us is due to our own deficiency. For this reason the fact that he will be seen by us after not having been seen is due not to a change on his part but rather on ours.
Reply Obj. 14: In heaven the saints will see God as he is, if this refers to the mode of what is seen, for God will be seen by the saints to have that mode which he has. But if it refers to the mode of the knower, then he will not be seen as he is, since the efficacy of the created intellect is not as great in seeing as the efficacy of the divine essence in being known.
Reply Obj. 15: There are three kinds of medium found in corporeal and intellectual vision. The first is the medium under which something is seen. And this is what perfects sight for seeing in general, though not determining sight to any specific object, as corporeal light is related to corporeal sight and the light of the agent intellect to the potential intellect. The second is the medium by which something is seen. And this is the visible form by which both kinds of sight are determined to a specific object, as for example, through the form of a stone knowledge the intellect is determined to the understanding of a stone. The third is the medium in which it is seen. And this is that which, when looked into, leads the sight to another thing, as for example, by looking into a mirror sight is led to the things represented in the mirror and by seeing an image it is led to what it is an image of. And in this way, too, the intellect is led to a cause through its knowledge of an effect and vice versa. Therefore, in the vision of heaven there will not be the third medium, namely God’s being seen through the species of other things, as he is now known, and for this reason we are now said to see in a mirror. Nor will there be there the second medium, since the divine essence itself will be what our intellect will see God by, as is clear from what has been said. Instead there will only exist there the first medium, which will elevate our intellect to the ability to be joined to the uncreated essence in the way described. But this knowledge is not said to be mediated by this medium, since it does not fall between the knower and the thing known but is, rather, what gives to the knower the power of knowing.
Reply Obj. 16: Physical created things are not said to be seen directly, except when whatever can be joined to sight in them is joined to it. But they are not able to be so joined in their essence by reason of their materiality. And so they are then seen directly when their likeness is joined to the intellect. But God is able to be joined to the intellect in his essence. Thus he would not be seen directly if his essence were not joined to the intellect. And this unmediated vision is called ‘seeing his face.’ Furthermore, a physical thing’s likeness is received in the sight according to the same account by which it exists in the thing, though not according to the same mode of being. And so the likeness leads to the thing directly. But no likeness can lead our intellect to God in this way, as is clear from what has been said. And for this reason the case is not similar.
Article 2
Whether they can see God with the eyes of the body
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 12, a. 3; In IV Sent. d. 48, q. 2, a. 1; Super Matt. 5; Super Iob 19, lec.) It seems that after the resurrection the saints will see God with bodily eyes. For the glorified eye will possess greater power than a non-glorified eye. But blessed Job saw God with his eye: I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees thee (Job 42:5). Therefore, all the more will the glorified eye be able to see God in his essence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, from my flesh I shall see God, my savior (Job 19:26). Therefore, it seems that in heaven God will be seen with physical eyes.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 29, n. 3.) speaking of the sight possessed by glorified eyes, says the following: those eyes will have a far greater power, not to see more sharply in the way that serpents or eagles are regarded as seeing (for no matter how clear these animals’ power of perception, they can see nothing other than bodies) but to see also incorporeal things. But any power that can know incorporeal things can be elevated to see God. Therefore, glorified eyes will be able to see God.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the same difference exists between corporeal things and incorporeal things as vice versa. But an incorporeal eye can see corporeally. Therefore, a corporeal eye can see incorporeal things. And so the same follows as before.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, commenting on the passage: it stood still, but I could not discern its appearance (Job 4:16), Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 5, par. 34.) in his Moralia 5, says the following: man who, if he had willed to keep the precept, would have been destined to become spiritual even in his flesh, by sinning became fleshly even in his mind. But from the fact that he became fleshly in his mind, as it says in the same passage, he only thinks on things that lead to the spirit through corporeal images. Therefore, too, when he becomes spiritual in his flesh, as promised to the saints after the resurrection, he will also be able to see spiritual things in the flesh. And so the same follows as before.
Obj. 6: Man can only be made blessed by God. But he will be made blessed not only as regards his soul but also his body. Therefore, he will be able to see God not only in his intellect but also in his flesh.
Obj. 7: Just as God is present in the intellect through his essence, so also he will be present in the senses, since he will be all in all, as it says in 1 Cor 15:28. But he will be seen by the intellect by virtue of the fact that his essence is joined to it, as was said above. Therefore, he will also be able to be seen by the senses.
On the contrary (1), Ambrose (Ambrose, On the Gospel of Luke, ch. 1, n. 27 (PL 15:544).) says on Luke: and God is not sought by corporeal eyes, nor circumscribed by sight, nor grasped by touch. Therefore, God will not in any way be seen by the physical senses.
Furthermore (2), Jerome (Jerome, On Isaiah, ch. 6 (PL 24:93).) says: the eyes of the flesh are unable to gaze upon the deity, not only of the Father, but neither of the Son nor of the Holy Spirit; but the eyes of the mind can, of which it is said, 'blessed are the clean of heart.'
Furthermore (3), Jerome (Ibid.) again says: incorporeal things are not seen by corporeal eyes. But God is maximally incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (4), Augustine (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 11, n. 28.) says: no one has ever seen God as he is, either in this life, or in the life of the angels, in the way that these visible things are discerned by corporeal vision. But the blessed life is called the life of the angels, in which the resurrected will live. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (5), man is said to have been made in the image of God because he can perceive God, as Augustine says. (See Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28), Bk. 3, ch. 20.) But man is in the image of God not according to the flesh but according to the mind. Therefore, he will see God in his mind, not his flesh.
I answer that, something can be sensed by the physical senses in two ways. In one way, in itself. In the other, incidentally. What is sensed in itself is whatever can introduce a passion to the physical senses by itself. Now, something can introduce a passion by itself either to a sense as sense or to this particular sense precisely as this particular sense. When it introduces a passion to the sense by itself in this second way, it is called a proper sensible object, as for example color is with respect to sight and sound with respect to hearing. But because sense as sense uses a bodily organ, something can be received in it only in a corporeal manner, since everything received in something is in it after the mode of the receiver. And thus all sensible objects introduce a passion to the sense as sense insofar as they have magnitude. And thus magnitude and everything consequent upon it, such as motion, rest, number, and such things, are called common sensibles in themselves alone. Something is sensed incidentally, however, that does not introduce a passion to the senses, either as sense or as this particular sense, but instead is joined to things which introduce a passion to the sense as such; for example, Socrates, the son of Diarius, a friend, and other such things. These are known per se in the universal by the intellect, but in the particular they are known in man in the cogitative power, and in other animals in the estimative power. The external senses are said to sense things of this sort, though incidentally, when from what is sensed per se the apprehensive power, to which it belongs to know what it is known as such, apprehends at once and without doubting or discursion, as when we see that someone is alive from the fact that he is speaking. But when the situation is otherwise, the senses are not said to see such an object, even incidentally.
I say, therefore, that God can in no way be seen by corporeal sight or sensed with any other sense as visible as such, either here or in heaven. For if what befits a sense precisely as a sense is taken away from the sense, it will not be a sense at all. Likewise, if what belongs to sight precisely as sight is taken away from sight, there will be no sight. Since, then, the sense considered as a sense perceives magnitude, and sight, precisely as this kind of sense, perceives color, it is impossible for sight to perceive something that is neither color nor magnitude, unless sense is spoken of equivocally. Since, therefore, sight and sense are going to be the same specifically in the glorified body, it will not be possible for them to see the divine essence as visible as such. But it will see it as visible incidentally, when on the one hand corporeal sight will see God’s great glory in bodies, especially glorified bodies, and most of all the body of Christ, and on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly that God will be perceived in things seen corporeally, as life is perceived in the fact of speaking. For even though our intellect will not then see God from creation, it will see him in created things seen corporeally. And this is the manner in which God can be seen corporeally that Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 29, n. 6.) posits at the end of the City of God, as is clear from his words to one who reads them closely. He says: it is quite believable that in that state we will see the worldly bodies of the new heavens and the new earth in such a way that we will see with the clearest acuity God present everywhere, governing all bodies, not as we now perceive intellectually the invisible things of God through the things that have been made, but rather in the way that when we look at men we do not have to believe that they are alive but instead see it at once.
Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Job is understood as about the spiritual eye, about which the Apostle says: the eyes of your heart enlightened (Eph 1:18).
Reply Obj. 2: This text is not understood to mean that we are going to see God through the eyes of flesh but rather that, being ourselves in the flesh, we will see God.
Reply Obj. 3: In those words Augustine is speaking by way of inquiry and conditionally, as is clear from what comes before: and so these eyes will have a different power by far if that incorporeal nature will be seen through them. And later he adds: and consequently, the power, and afterwards makes a determination, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 4: All knowledge comes through an abstraction from matter. And thus the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more it is the principle of knowledge. And so it is that a form existing in matter is in no way the principle of knowledge, but a form existing in the senses is in a way the principle of knowledge, as being separated from matter, and a form in our intellect is better still. And thus the spiritual eye, from which the impediment to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal thing. It does not follow, however, that the corporeal eye, in which the cognoscitive power falls short to the extent that it participates in matter, can know perfectly the incorporeal things that can be known.
Reply Obj. 5: Even though a mind that has been rendered carnal can only think about things received from the senses, it still thinks about them in an immaterial way. Likewise, what sight apprehends it must always apprehend in a corporeal manner. Hence it cannot know things that cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply Obj. 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man precisely as man. And because man possesses the fact of being man not from the body but rather from the soul, though the body pertains to man’s essence inasmuch as it is perfected by the soul, man’s beatitude consists principally only in an act of the soul. And from the soul beatitude is channeled into the body through a kind of overflowing, as is clear from what was said. (Distinction 44, Question 2, Article 4.) But there will be a kind of beatitude of our body inasmuch as it will see God in sensible creation, especially in Christ’s body.
Reply Obj. 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things, but physical sight cannot. And thus the intellect will be able to know the divine essence joined to it, but the physical sight will not.
Article 3
Whether by seeing God they will comprehend him
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 12, a. 7.) It seems that in heaven the saints, by seeing God, comprehend him: so run that you may comprehend (1 Cor 9:24). Therefore, the comprehension of God is the prize for virtue that is awarded to the saints.
Obj. 2: In On Seeing God, Augustine (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 9.) says: something is wholly comprehended by seeing it when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden to the one seeing. But if God is seen by someone, nothing of him is hidden to the one seeing. For since he is simple, it cannot be the case that something of him is seen and something else is hidden. Therefore, God is comprehended by anyone who sees him.
Obj. 3: Everything that is seen completely and wholly is comprehended. But the whole of God is seen wholly by those who see his essence, since the whole of God is nothing but his essence. Moreover, any mode of his is his essence. Nor can his essence be seen in any way except as a whole and wholly. Therefore, all who see his essence comprehend him.
Obj. 4: As it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 430a2–6.) the intellect understands itself and other things in the same way. But, as Augustine (Augustine, The Book of Eighty-Three Questions (CCSL 44a), q. 15.) says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: everything that understands itself comprehends itself. Therefore, everything that understands another comprehends it. But anyone who sees the divine essence understands it. Therefore, he comprehends it.
Obj. 5: Whenever what something is is known, it is comprehended, since then it is known, as it were, in its definition. Now something is comprehended when its boundaries can be seen all around, as Augustine says in On Seeing God. (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina, par. 9 (CSEL 44:296).) But when something’s essence is seen, what it is is known. Therefore, anyone who sees the essence of God comprehends him.
Obj. 6: The quantity of an action follows on the quantity of the form, which is the principle of the action. For the quantity of heating follows on the quantity of the heat. But the form that is the principle of knowledge is what a knower knows by. Therefore, the mode of knowledge follows on the mode of what the thing is known by. But what God is known by is nothing other than his essence, as was said above, and this is infinite. Therefore, the vision is also infinite and thus the divine essence can be comprehended, even though it is infinite.
Obj. 7: If the divine essence cannot be comprehended, this is only because of its excessive brightness. But a knowable excess impedes knowledge inasmuch as it corrupts the cognoscitive potency, which occurs only in the senses but not in the intellect. This is clear from what is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a29–429b5.) that one who understands the greatest things is not less able to understand the least things but is, rather, more able to understand them, whereas the contrary occurs in the senses. Since, then, the divine essence is only seen by the intellect, as has been said, it seems that the excess of divine brightness does not impede comprehension of the divine essence.
Obj. 8: The divine essence can be comprehended by an intellect, since God comprehends himself. If, then, it cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, this will be due to a defect of that intellect. But the light of glory takes away every intellectual defect, since through glory every bodily defect is also taken away. Therefore, those who will see God in the light of glory will comprehend him.
On the contrary (1), in On Seeing God Augustine (Augustine, Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 8.) says: no one ever comprehends the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body but even with the mind itself.
Furthermore (2), as Augustine (Augustine, The Book of Eighty-Three Questions (CCSL 44a), q. 15.) says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: what comprehends itself is finite to itself. Therefore, what is comprehended by something else is also finite to it. But God cannot be finite to any created intellect. Therefore, no created intellect can comprehend God.
Furthermore (3), Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 1, ch. 5 (PG 94:799).) says in Book 1: for those who believe divine Scripture there is no doubt that the substance of God is incomprehensible.
Furthermore (4), everything that comprehends something is either greater than or equal to it. But the created intellect cannot be greater than God or even equal to him. Therefore, it cannot comprehend him.
I answer that, to ‘comprehend’ is said as if ‘taking together,’ i.e., taking hold of. And thus something is properly comprehended when it is taken hold of together, i.e., with everything that belongs to it. For this reason everything that is comprehended must be enclosed in the comprehensor. But what is contained is properly enclosed in what contains it. And thus what is comprehended must be contained in the comprehensor. Now just as something is said to be contained in something else physically when it does not exceed the container by its dimensive quantity on any side, like wine in a jar, so also something is said to be contained by something else spiritually when it lies under its power and exceeds it in no respect. And thus something is said to be comprehended by knowledge when what is known lies under the act of the cognoscitive power and does not exceed it.
Now every excess refers to a quantity. And the knowable is said to exceed the cognoscitive power according to the amount that the knowable is knowable by it. The sensible, however, is known both according to dimensive quantity, because the senses use a bodily organ in knowing by reason of which they know all sensible things that are reduced to dimensive quantity, and also according to quantity of power, as is seen in the proper objects of sense, which are qualities. And thus, too, the senses’ comprehension is impeded both because of an excess of dimensive quantity, as one is impeded from comprehending the whole earth, and also due to an excess of quantity of power, as one is impeded from comprehending the brightness of the sun. For the eye is not as powerful in its ability to know as is the sun’s brightness, which is knowable. Now, what is intelligible is not known by the intellect under the aspect of dimensive quantity except incidentally, namely inasmuch as it is received from the senses. From this it follows that it understands with the continuous and time. And in this regard the intellect is impeded from comprehending the intelligible due to the excess of quantity, as it is impeded from comprehending a line or an infinite number. But speaking per se, the intelligible is compared to the intellect under the aspect of quantity of power from the fact that the proper object of the intellect is the what. And thus in things separated from the senses the intellect’s comprehension is only impeded through excess of quantity of power. And this occurs when the intelligible object is more knowable than the intellect knows or can know. Just as one who knows the conclusion that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles (Euclid’s Elements, Bk. 1, prop. 32.) on the basis of a probable argument, namely because people commonly say this, does not comprehend this fact. And this is not because he sees part of it and does not see another part but rather because the way in which he knows it falls short of the way in which it can be known, for it can be known by demonstration.
Now the divine essence is knowable through its own truth, and the intellect can know through the intellectual light that is in it. But the truth of the divine essence exceeds any light of a created intellect. Thus it is impossible for it to see God as perfectly as he is seeable. And from this it follows that no created intellect can comprehend God.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the comprehension of glory, i.e., that by which the soul becomes able to hold in itself all that pertains to the perfection of glory. And to this extent it is said to comprehend glory, though it never comprehends the essence intellectually. Or else in this passage arriving at the possession of God is called comprehension, inasmuch as comprehension is said to succeed to the place of hope.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine includes two elements in the definition of comprehension. One of these excludes the excess of the knowable above the power of the knower with respect to dimensive quantity. In this regard he says: when it is seen such that nothing of it is hidden to the one seeing. The other excludes excess with respect to quantity of power. With regard to this he says: or whose boundaries can be seen on every side. For a thing’s boundaries are seen on every side when the one seeing it reaches the end of vision by seeing perfectly.
Reply Obj. 3: The saints will see the whole divine essence in heaven, but they will not see it completely; not because there will be any mode in God that they do not see or any mode in their intellect that is not turned toward God, but rather because the mode by which they are turned toward knowing God is not equal to the mode by which God can be known. And it is this inequality that is shown when it is said that the divine essence will not be seen wholly. For the adverb ‘wholly’ indicates neither absolutely the mode of the one seeing nor absolutely the mode of the thing seen but instead the mode of the one seeing by way of comparison to the thing seen. For this adverb modifies the seeing itself in accord with which the one seeing is compared to what is seen.
Reply Obj. 4: When something understands itself, the knower and the known have the same mode. And thus if it understands itself it comprehends itself. But the knower and the known do not have the same mode when the intellect understands something else. Thus the case is not similar.
Reply Obj. 5: Someone knows what a thing is in the same way that he knows the thing’s essence, since the essence is the thing’s quiddity. And thus only one who comprehends a thing’s essence comprehends what it is. Hence just as the saints will see the divine essence but not comprehend it, so also they will see what God is but not comprehend this. And thus God will not be seen by them in the way that a thing is seen through its definition and whose essence is thus comprehended.
Reply Obj. 6: Action is attributed not to form alone, which is the principle of action, but to the composite, just as heating is attributed to what is hot, not to heat alone. And thus we must measure an action not only with reference to the form, which is the principle of the action, but also with reference to the form’s subject. But a form that is not subsistent by itself has no other mode from the mode of the subject, since it only has being inasmuch as it is the act of such a subject. And thus the measure of the form is the measure of the composite. But a form that is subsistent by itself has a mode inasmuch as it is a given subsistent thing and another mode to the extent that it is the act of such a subject. And this mode is taken after the measure by which the perfectible attains to being perfected by such a form, and it is on the basis of this mode that the action is measured. Now the divine essence is subsistent by itself. And thus the vision that comes to the created intellect through it is measured not according to the infinite mode that belongs to the essence itself in its own right but rather according to the mode by which the intellect attains to being perfected through it. But it attains to this inasmuch as it is joined to it through the light of glory, which is finite. And thus the vision is finite on the part of the one seeing.
Reply Obj. 7: The truth of God’s essence, through which he is knowable, is called his brightness, just as the sun is knowable through its brightness. And even though it does not impede comprehension by corruption of the intellect, it does impede it from its very excess, since it cannot be the case that a created intellect attains to knowing the divine essence as perfectly as it can be known.
Reply Obj. 8: Glory perfects nature and does not destroy it. And thus the light of glory does not take away an imperfection that pertains to the very character of the nature, such as the fact that it is created from nothing. Yet from this very fact the created intellect falls short of the possibility of comprehension. And thus it is unable to arrive at comprehension even through the light of glory.
Article 4
Whether some of those who see God in his essence will see him more perfectly than others
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 12, a. 6.) It seems some of those who see God in his essence do not see him more perfectly than others. For, as Augustine (Augustine, The Book of Eighty-Three Questions (CCSL 44a), q. 32.) says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, one cannot understand the same thing more than another. But the divine essence will be seen only intellectually. Therefore, one will not see it more fully than another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the more perfectly something is seen, the more express is the likeness of the thing seen in the one who sees it. But there will not be a more express likeness by which God is seen in one person than in another of those who see God in his essence, since the essence is the same in all of them. Therefore, one person will not see better than another.
Obj. 3: Someone from whom impediments to vision are more removed sees better. But no impediment to vision will remain in anyone. Therefore, all will see equally.
Obj. 4: All the saints shall see God as he is (1 Jn 3:2). But he cannot be seen better than he is. Therefore, one will not see better than another.
Obj. 5: The best mode of knowing God is that by which he is seen in his essence. But there cannot be anything better than the best. Therefore, of those who see God in his essence, one does not see better than another.
On the contrary (1), humans are taken up into the lot of the angels. But the higher angels see God more clearly than the lower angels, as is clear from Dionysius in the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, chs. 5, 8, and 10 (PG 3:195ff.).) Therefore, in glory some will see more clearly than others in the case of human beings, too.
Furthermore (2), man’s beatitude consists essentially in the vision of God. But some will be more blessed than others, as was said above. Therefore, some will see more clearly than others.
Furthermore (3), the saints will see God in the light of glory, as it is said: in thy light do we see light (Ps 35:10). But some will be filled with greater light than others. For star differs from star in brightness. So is it with the resurrection of the dead, as it is said in 1 Corinthians 15:41–42. But the body’s brightness will indicate the mind’s brightness. Therefore some will see God more clearly than others.
I answer that, since the principle of action is the form by which the action is carried out, it is on the part of the form that we must take the measure of the action. But the case is different in subsistent forms than in other forms, as was said before. For in other forms there is quantity of strength in the action on the basis of the quantity of what is received of the form in the subject, such as what is received of heat in what is hot. In subsistent forms, however, there is quantity of strength to the extent that the subject is more or less subject to the form. (Thomas speaks here of a quantitas fortitudinis rather than his more usual expression quantitas virtualis.) Now a cognoscitive potency is subject to the form by which it knows with reference to its possessing the power of knowing. For what makes sight able to see is what makes it receptive to the likeness of color. Now just as the potential intellect is rendered able to know natural objects of knowledge through the light of the agent intellect, so also through the superadded light of glory it is rendered able to see the divine essence. For this reason the mode by which our intellect lies under the divine essence as an intelligible form is taken according to the quantity of the received light. Consequently, so is the mode of perfection in operation, of which such a form is the principle, namely in the vision of God in his essence. And thus, since some saints are filled with a greater light of glory than others, some will see more clearly than others.
Reply Obj. 1: One person cannot understand the same thing more than another if the word ‘more’ implies the mode on the part of the thing understood. For a person can only understand a thing by understanding that the thing has the mode that it has. For if someone attributes another mode to the thing, he errs and does not understand it. And this is how Augustine understands it. But if the word ‘more’ indicates the mode on the part of the one understanding, then in this case one can understand better than another inasmuch as his knowledge of one and the same knowable object is keener.
Reply Obj. 2: Even though one saint does not have in his intellect a more express likeness of God by which he knows him than another saint does, since they all see God in his essence, the intellect of one does lie more perfectly under the form by which it understands than does the intellect of another. And thus one understands more perfectly than another.
Reply Obj. 3: The intensity according to which something is called greater or less is caused not only by withdrawal from the contrary but also by approach to the terminus, as is evident in the case of intensity of corporeal light. And so also spiritual light is intensified in one of the blessed more than in another through a greater assimilation to God, even though nothing contrary to the light is found in any of them.
Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that all the saints will see God as he is, the word ‘as’ implies the mode on the part of what is seen, not on the part of the one seeing. For everyone will see that God is in that mode in which he is. Even so, the mode of the one seeing will not be equal to the mode of the thing seen but rather at an infinite distance. And thus the mode of one who sees can be less distant than the mode of another.
Reply Obj. 5: Seeing God in his essence is, according to genus, the most perfect mode of knowing God there is. But within this genus greater and less can still be found, just as fire is the most subtle of corporeal things in its species, though one fire is found to be more subtle than another.
Article 5
Whether it is necessary for those who see the divine essence to see everything that God sees
Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 12, a. 8; q. 106, a. 1, ad 1; In II Sent. d. 11, q. 2, a. 2; In III Sent. d. 14, a. 2, qa. 2; In IV Sent. d. 45, q. 3, a. 1; De veritate, q. 8, a. 4; q. 20, aa. 4 & 5; SCG III, chs. 56 & 59.) It seems that the saints who see God in his essence see everything that God sees in himself. For, as Isidore says in On the Highest Good, (Isidore, On the Highest Good, Bk. 1, ch. 10, n. 17 (PL 83:556).) the angels know all things in the Word of God before they happen. But the saints will be equal to the angels, as is clear from Matthew 22:30. Therefore, the saints will also see everything by seeing God.
Obj. 2: Gregory says: for there all behold God with a common clarity, and what is there that they do not know in that place where they know the one who knows all? (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 33.) But he is speaking of the blessed who see God in his essence. Therefore, one who sees God in his essence knows all things.
Obj. 3: As it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a29–429b5.) by being able to understand the greatest things, the intellect is also more able to understand the least. But God is the greatest intelligible object. Therefore, he increases the intellect’s power for understanding most of all. Therefore, the intellect that sees God understands everything.
Obj. 4: The intellect is only impeded from understanding something if it is overcome by it. But no created thing overcomes the intellect that sees God. For, as Gregory says in the Dialogues 2, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 260), Bk. 2, ch. 35.) all creation becomes small to the soul that sees the creator. Therefore, those who see God in his essence know everything.
Obj. 5: Every passive potency that is not reduced to act is imperfect. But in the potential intellect of the human soul there is, as it were, a passive potency to know all things. For the potential intellect is how it can become all things, as it says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, chs. 4, 5, and 8.) If, then, in beatitude it did not understand all things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Obj. 6: Whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the mirror. But in the Word of God all things are reflected as in a mirror. For the Word itself is the pattern and likeness of all things. Therefore, the saints who see the Word in his essence see all created things.
Obj. 7: As it is said: the desire of the righteous will be granted (Prov 10:24). But the saints desire to know all things. For all men by nature desire to know, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1.) and nature is not taken away by glory. Therefore, God will give them knowledge of all things.
Obj. 8: Ignorance is a kind of penalty belonging to the present life. But every penalty will be taken away from the saints by glory. Therefore, so will all ignorance. And thus they will know all things.
Obj. 9: The saints’ beatitude is more primarily in the soul than in the body. But the saints’ bodies will be reformed in glory after the likeness to Christ’s body, as is clear from Philippians 3:21. Therefore, their souls will also be perfected after a likeness to Christ’s soul. But Christ’s soul sees all things in the Word, as has been said in Book III, Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 2, quaestiuncula 2. Therefore, all the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Obj. 10: Like the senses, the intellect also knows every thing with whose likeness it is informed. But the divine essence indicates any thing in a more express manner than any other likeness to that thing. Therefore, since in that blessed vision the divine essence becomes like a form of our intellect, it seems that the saints who see God see all things.
Obj. 11: The Commentator says about On the Soul 3 (Averroes, On the Soul, Bk. 3, comment 36.) that if the agent intellect were the form of the potential intellect then we would understand all things. But the divine essence more clearly represents all things than the agent intellect. Therefore, the intellect that sees God in his essence knows all things.
Obj. 12: Due to the fact that the lower angels do not at this time know all things, they are illuminated about what they do not know by the higher angels. But after the day of judgment an angel will not illuminate another angel. For at that time all preeminence will cease, as a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:547.) says on 1 Corinthians 15. Therefore, the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same reason all other saints who see God in his essence.
On the contrary (1), as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8 (PG 3:238).) the higher angels purify the lower angels of unknowing. But the lower angels see the divine essence. Therefore, an angel who sees the divine essence is able to not know certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly than an angel. Therefore, the souls that see God need not see all things.
Furthermore (2), only Christ has the Spirit without measure, as it is said (Jn 3:34). But it belongs to Christ, inasmuch as he has the Spirit without measure, to know all things in the Word. This is why it says in the same passage that the Father has given all things into his hand. Therefore, it belongs to no one but Christ to know all things in the Word.
Furthermore (3), the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its effects are known through it. But some of those who see God,who is the principle of all things, in his essence, will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore, some will know more things than others. And thus not all will know all things.
I answer that, God, by seeing his own essence, knows all the things that are or will be or have been. And this is called knowing by the knowledge of vision, since he knows these things as if present after a likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover, by seeing his own essence, he knows all things that he can do, even though he has never done them nor is going to do them. Otherwise, he would not perfectly know his own power. For a power cannot be known unless the objects of the power are known. And this is called knowing by the knowledge of simple intelligence. Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the divine essence, to know all the things that God can do. For the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are known in it, as in a single principle of a demonstration someone who has a more perspicacious intelligence sees more conclusions than someone else who has a slower intelligence. Since, then, we take account of the quantity of the divine power on the basis of the things of which it is capable, if an intellect sees in the divine essence all the things that God can do, it would have the same quantity of perfection in its understanding as the quantity of the divine power for producing effects. And thus it would comprehend the divine essence, which is impossible for every created intellect. All those things that God knows with the knowledge of vision, however, can be known by a created intellect; namely, they are known in the Word by the soul of Christ, as was said in Book III, Distinction 14.
But as regards others who see the divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see God in his essence see all the things that God sees with the knowledge of vision. But this is repugnant to the statements of the saints, who hold that there are some things the angels do not know, though it is obvious according to the faith that they all see God in his essence.
And thus others say that, apart from Christ, although they see God in his essence, they do not see everything that God sees, due to the fact that they do not comprehend the divine essence. For it is not necessary for one who knows the cause to know all its effects, unless he comprehends the cause, which does not belong to a created intellect. And thus each of those who see God in his essence perceives more things in God’s essence the more clearly he beholds his essence. And so it is that one can instruct another about these things. And so the knowledge of the angels and the holy souls can be increased up till the day of judgment, as can other things pertaining to their accidental reward. But afterward it will not progress further. For then it will be the final state of things and in that state it will be possible for all to know all the things that God knows by knowledge of vision.
Reply Obj. 1: What Isidore says here, that in the Word, the angels know all things before they come to be, cannot refer to everything that God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence alone, since these things will never come to be. Rather, it must refer only to the things that God knows by the knowledge of vision. About these he also says that not all the angels know all these things but, perhaps, only some of them do, and even those who know them all do not know them all perfectly. For we can consider many intelligible aspects in a single thing, such as its different properties and relationships to other things. And it is possible for one to perceive more aspects than another by means of the same thing known in common to the two. This is also why Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, n. 3 (PG 3:218).) that the lower angels are taught the knowable aspects of things by the higher. And thus, too, the angels who know all creation need not participate in all the things that can be known in it.
Reply Obj. 2: These words of Gregory show that in the beatific vision there is a sufficiency for the perception of all things on the part of the divine essence, which is the medium by which there is vision, through which God sees all things. But the fact that not all things are seen is due to a deficiency on the side of the created intellect, which does not comprehend the divine essence.
Reply Obj. 3: The created intellect does not see the divine essence according to the essence’s proper mode but rather according to its own mode, which is finite. This is why it is not necessary that this vision broaden its efficacy in knowing infinitely to the knowledge of all things.
Reply Obj. 4: Deficiency of knowledge proceeds not only from the knowable exceeding the intellect but also from the fact that a notion that can be united with the intellect is not so united with it, as vision sometimes does not see a stone from the fact that the appearance of the stone is not united with our vision. But even though the divine essence itself, which is the pattern of all things, is united with the intellect of the one who sees God, it is not united with it as being the pattern of all things but rather to the extent that it is the pattern of some. And one who beholds the divine essence more fully perceives more of these.
Reply Obj. 5: When a passive potency can be perfected by more than one ordered perfection, if it is perfected by its ultimate perfection it is not called imperfect, even if it lacks some of the preceding dispositions. But all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is ordered to the knowledge of God as to an end. This is why someone who sees God in his essence, even if he knew nothing else, would have a perfected intellect. Nor is it rendered more perfect by knowing anything else together with God, except as leading to fuller vision of him. Thus Augustine says (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 5, ch. 4.) in his Confessions 5: unhappy is that man who knows everything, i.e., all creatures, without knowing you, but blessed is he who knows you even if he knows them not. Indeed one is not more blessed for knowing both you and them but rather is blessed on your account alone.
Reply Obj. 6: That ‘mirror’ is possessed of a will and so just as it shows itself to whom it wills, so also it shows in itself what it wills. And this is not similar to a material mirror, which does not have the power to be seen or not to be seen. Hence we must say that in a material mirror both things and the mirror itself are seen under their proper form, even though the mirror is seen through the received form while a stone is seen through its own form being reflected in another thing. And thus the first is known through the same aspect as the other. But in the uncreated Mirror a thing is seen through the form of the Mirror itself, as an effect is seen by way of likeness to the cause and vice versa. And thus it is not necessary for anyone who sees the eternal Mirror to see everything that is reflected in the Mirror. For it is not necessary for one who sees the cause to see every one of its effects, unless he comprehends the cause.
Reply Obj. 7: The desire of the saints by which they desire to know all things will be fulfilled by seeing God alone, just as their desire by which they wish to have all good things will be fulfilled by possessing God. For just as God is sufficient for the affections in the fact that he possesses perfect goodness and all good things are in a certain way possessed by possessing him, so also seeing him suffices for the intellect: Lord, show us the Father, and we shall be satisfied (Jn 14:8).
Reply Obj. 8: ‘Ignorance’ taken in the proper sense means privation. And in this way it is a punishment. For in this way ignorance is not knowing things that ought to be known or that it is necessary to know. But the saints will lack knowledge of none of these things in heaven. Sometimes, however, ‘ignorance’ is taken in a common sense for all unknowing. Thus Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) says that the angels are purged of unknowing. But ignorance in this way is not a penalty but rather a kind of lack. In this way, too, it is not necessary for every such deficiency to be taken away by glory. For by the same reasoning it could also be said that it is a lack in Linus that he has not reached the glory of Peter.
Reply Obj. 9: Our body will be conformed to Christ’s body in glory by way of likeness, not equality. For it will be brilliant like Christ’s body, though not equally. Likewise, too, our soul will possess glory after likeness to Christ’s soul, but not in equal measure. And thus our soul will also have knowledge like Christ’s soul, but not as much, i.e., it will not know all things as does Christ’s soul.
Reply Obj. 10: Even though the divine essence is the pattern of all things that can be known, it will not be joined to any created intellect as being the pattern of all things. And thus the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 11: The agent intellect is the form proportionate to the potential intellect, as also the potency of matter is proportionate to the potency of the natural agent, in such a way that everything that is in the passive potency of matter or the potential intellect is in the active potency of the agent intellect or the natural agent. And thus if the agent intellect were the form of the potential intellect, then the potential intellect would have to know all the things to which the power of the agent intellect extends. But the divine essence is not proportionate to our intellect in this way. And thus the case is not similar.
Reply Obj. 12: Nothing prevents our saying that after the day of judgment, when the glory of men and angels will be thoroughly consummated, all the blessed will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision, though in such a way that not everyone sees everything in the divine essence. Rather, the soul of Christ will see everything there fully, as it now sees it, whereas others will see there more or fewer things according to the degree to which they know God. And so the soul of Christ will illuminate all other souls concerning the things that it sees more than others in the Word. Hence it says in Rev 21:23 that the brightness of God illuminates the city of the blessed and the Lamb is its lamp. Likewise, too, the higher angels will illuminate the lower, not by a new illumination as if the knowledge of the lower would be increased by this, but rather by a kind of continuation of the illumination, just as if we understood the sun to illuminate the air while being at rest. And thus it is said: those who turn many to righteousness shall shine like the stars for ever and ever (Dan 12:3). But it is said that preeminence of order will cease as regards the things now carried out concerning us through their ordained ministries, as is clear from a Gloss on the same passage.
Article 6
Whether any created being can arrive at seeing God in his essence from purely natural endowments
Obj. 1: To the sixth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 12, a. 4.) It seems that a created intellect can see God in his essence from its own proper natural endowments. For, according to the opinion of many, the angels were created in a state of natural endowments alone. But the angels at the beginning of their creation saw things in the Word, as Augustine says in the Literal Meaning of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28), Bk. 2, ch. 8.) And this is called their morning knowledge. Therefore, a created intellect can see God in his essence from its own proper natural endowments.
Obj. 2: The good and wicked angels have nothing in common except natural endowments. But the wicked angels see God in his essence, as is seen from what we have in Job 1:6: the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan also came among them. But it is the angels that enjoy the most intimate contemplation who are called those who stand before the throne, according to Gregory. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Bk. 2, par. 3.) Therefore, the angels are able to see God in his essence from their own proper natural endowments.
Obj. 3: One who can see what is less intelligible can see also what is more intelligible, as the Commentator says about On the Soul 3. (Averroes, On the Soul, Bk. 3, comment 7.) But the divine essence is more intelligible than these material objects that are only intelligible if we render them so, whereas God, since he is altogether free from matter, is intelligible by himself. Since, then, we see material creation from our own proper natural endowments, it seems that all the more can we see God in his essence from our proper natural endowments. And this seems especially true of the angels.
Obj. 4: As it says in On the Soul 3: the intellect is to the intelligible as sight is to the visible. (See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a18: “Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.”) Now sight is only impeded from vision in one of four ways. In one way, it is impeded due to the corruption of the sight, as when there is a mark on the pupil. This cannot be said of the angelic intellect even in the state of natural endowments, since they are clean and clearest mirrors, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 22 (PG 3:723).) In another way, it is impeded due to the absence of the visible object. This, too, cannot be said of the case in question, since God is present to every intellect because he fills all things. In a third way, from the fact that the visible object is not actually visible, as when colors are in darkness. For they only become actually visible through light. This, too, cannot be said in the case in question, since God is visible by himself because he is intelligible light, as is clear (1 Jn 1:5). In the fourth way, sight is impeded through the excellence of the object, which corrupts the senses. This, too, has no place in the case in question. For the excellences of intelligible things do not corrupt the intellect in the way that the excellences of sensible objects corrupt the senses, as it says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a29–429b5.) Therefore, there is nothing to impede a created intellect from being able to see God in his essence from its own proper natural endowments.
Obj. 5: Each thing is known through its likeness. But an angel by its own nature is the express likeness of God himself, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 22 (PG 3:723).) asserting that an angel is the image of God, the manifestation of that hidden light, i.e., the divine light. Therefore, an angel can see God in his essence through its own proper nature.
Obj. 6: It says in the Book of Causes (Book of Causes, prop. 8.) that every intelligence understands what is above it inasmuch as it is caused by it. But every created intellect is in its own nature caused by God. Therefore, it can see God in his essence by its own natural endowments.
Obj. 7: It pertains to the immensity of the divine liberality to communicate to a created being everything of which it is capable. But a created being is capable of receiving the gift of seeing God in his essence by its own natural endowments. For it can attain to seeing God in his essence through the light of glory, and this light is like something superadded to nature in such a way that it could be implanted in nature by God. Therefore, it has been conferred on a created being that from its own proper natural endowments it attains to seeing God in his essence.
Obj. 8: The Commentator says at the beginning of the Metaphysics (Averroes, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, last comment.) that if there were an intelligible object that no intellect understood then it would be intelligible in vain. But it is absurd to say that the divine essence is intelligible in vain. Therefore, there is an intellect that can see it by its own nature.
On the contrary (1), it is said: the grace of God is life eternal (Rom 6:23). But eternal life is seeing God in his essence, as is clear: this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent (Jn 17:3). Therefore, it is only by grace that anyone can arrive at seeing God in his essence.
Furthermore (2), what is given to charity as a reward cannot be arrived at by natural endowments, since even charity itself is above nature. But the vision of God in his essence is given to charity as a reward, as is clear from Scripture: he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him (Jn 14:21). Therefore, the created intellect cannot arrive at the vision of God in his essence from its own proper natural endowments.
Furthermore (3), nature together with grace is stronger than nature alone. But the saints when they were in limbo, even though they had grace, did not see God in his essence. Hence it is said in their person: what manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness and see not the light of heaven? (Tob 5:12) Therefore, much less can anyone attain to this from purely natural endowments.
Furthermore (4), the order of causes follows the order of effects. For a more noble effect has a more noble cause. But among all the things that can be bestowed on a mere creation, seeing God in his essence is the greatest. Therefore, the cause of this cannot be nature but rather God alone, who is the highest cause of all things.
I answer that, for the intellect to see God in his essence, the divine essence must be united to our intellect in a certain way as an intelligible form. But a form is only joined to what is perfectible when the perfectible has the dispositions by which it is rendered capable of receiving such a form, as the body is only united to the soul when in the body there are fitting dispositions for the reception of the soul. Hence for the intellect to be united to the divine essence in the aforementioned mode there must be in it something after the manner of a disposition preparing it for the aforementioned union. And this is the light by which the intellect is perfected for the vision of God in the divine essence.
But this disposition cannot be natural to a created intellect. For the final disposition for a form, for the same reason, is received both in what is perfectible and the form itself in such a way that if one is natural, the other must also be natural. For what can be perfected attains to the form through this final disposition to the form. But the form that is the divine essence exceeds every natural capability and capacity. For a potency and its proper act are always reckoned in the same genus. Hence potency and act divide each genus of being, as is clear in the Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 3, ch. 1, 200b25–31.) And thus the capability or potency of a created thing only extends to a form belonging to its own genus. And so the divine essence, which is outside every genus, exceeds the natural capability of any given created intellect. And thus the final disposition for the union of the intellect with such an essence exceeds every capability of nature. Hence it cannot be natural but is, rather, above nature. And this disposition is the light of glory, of which it is said: in thy light do we see light (Ps 35:10). The created intellect can, however, arrive at the knowledge of God in accord with its natural capability through the created forms implanted in it or acquired by it. But this knowledge is not the vision of him in his essence, as is clear from what was said, nor through this knowledge is it known what he is, but only that he is and what he is not.
Reply Obj. 1: The angels in their first condition did not see the Word in his essence, though they did see him through a created likeness, which is their very nature, since it is a likeness to God. And this is the case whether we posit that they were created in grace or not, as long as we do not posit that they were created in glory. Hence, too, evening knowledge, by which they knew themselves in their proper nature, in them preceded morning knowledge, by which they know things in the Word, as is clear from the fact that the first day has evening without morning.
Reply Obj. 2: The devil is not said to have stood before the Lord as if seeing him in his essence. Rather, this is said because the devil was seen by God and God’s providence extended to him just as to the good angels, after the manner in which we say that those things are at hand to us that lie subject to our providence. Hence ‘standing before’ is taken in an equivocal sense.
Reply Obj. 3: It is possible for something to be more intelligible in itself while being less intelligible to some intellect, as is manifestly true in the case of our own intellect. For the capability of our intellect is determined to sensible forms that are rendered actually understood through the agent intellect, by virtue of the fact that the phantasms are related to our intellect as sensible things are to the senses, as it says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 7.) And thus our intellect must naturally be gently led through sensible forms to whatever it understands, as Dionysius also says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1 (PG 3:119).) And because separated substances, which are most intelligible in themselves, surpass the genus of sensible forms, our intellect is found to be too weak to know them. It is for this reason that it says in the Metaphysics 2 (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 993b9–11.) that our intellect is to what is by nature most manifest as the eye of the night owl is to the sun. As for the natural capability of the angelic intellect, even though it is not determined to sensible forms, it is still determined to created forms of its own genus. And thus just as our intellect falls short of the knowledge of separated substances, so also and much more does the angelic intellect fall short of the vision of God in his essence with reference to its natural capability. The Commentator’s statement, however, is understood as referring to created intelligible objects.
Reply Obj. 4: The created intellect is not impeded from the natural ability to see God in his essence out of a deficiency in the divine essence, as if it were not actually intelligible in its own right, but instead on the part of the created intellect itself. First, on account of the deficiency of the created power of understanding itself, whose natural capability is determined to created being. This deficiency, though, differs in angels and in man, if we consider them with respect to their natural endowments. For in the intellect of an angel a deficiency is not found with reference to its own generic character but rather by comparison to an intellect outside its genus, i.e., the divine intellect. For it possesses every perfection due to the genus of intellect, in which only the created intellect is included, since the uncreated intellect is outside any genus. But the human intellect suffers deficiency even with reference to its generic character, since in it there is intelligible light that is obscured by shadow. Hence Isaac says that reason arises in the shadow of intelligence. (J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli Liber de definicionibus," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 (1937‒38): 313.) Second, due to the absence of the intelligible object. For even though the divine essence is present to each and every thing, it is not present to every intellect as an intelligible form, for this only happens when there is in the intellect a sufficient disposition for union to the divine essence as to an intelligible form. Third, due to the excess of the brightness of the divine essence beyond the form by which a created intellect naturally understands. And so the created intellect consequently falls short of seeing God in his essence, even though the immensity of the divine essence does not corrupt but rather strengthens the intellect.
Reply Obj. 5: A created intellect can arrive at knowledge of God through a created likeness from its natural endowments. But this knowledge is not the vision of God in his essence, as was proved above.
Reply Obj. 6: The effect retains a likeness to its cause. And from this it follows that an intelligence naturally knows its cause from the likeness to it that it possesses. But this is not seeing God in his essence, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 7: Not everything that is superadded to a created being can pertain to the constitution of its very nature. For what pertains as proper to a higher nature cannot be communicated to a lower nature in such a way that it would naturally possess it, unless the lower nature is transferred to the higher nature, just as it cannot be communicated to what is transparent that it should shine brightly in the absence of a bright body, unless it itself is made into a bright body, even though light is indeed communicated to it by a bright body. But to be determined to an uncreated intelligible form is a property of the uncreated intellect. And thus the light through which the intellect is united to the uncreated intelligible form can be communicated to a created intellect, but that the created intellect should naturally possess this very light cannot be communicated to it, unless it is transferred to the nature of the uncreated intellect, which is impossible.
Reply Obj. 8: Even if no intellect understood the divine essence, either by nature or by grace, the divine essence would not be intelligible in vain, both because it understands itself and because it does not exist for the sake of anything else. But for something to be in vain occurs only in the case of things that exist for the sake of something else to which they do not attain.
Article 7
Whether anyone can see God in his essence in the wayfaring state
Obj. 1: To the seventh question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I, q. 12, a. 11.) It seems that God can be seen in his essence in the wayfaring state. For it is said: I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated: and all the earth was filled with his majesty; and the Seraphim cried out (Is 6:1). But one whose majesty fills all the earth is one who is essentially God. Therefore, Isaiah saw God in his essence while in the wayfaring state.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, to see God face to face is to see God in his essence, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:12, for this is the name the Apostle gives to the blessed vision. But Jacob saw God face to face while he was in the wayfaring state. This is why he says: I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is preserved (Gen 32:30). Therefore, someone in the wayfaring state can see God in his essence.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees thee (Job 42:5). But sight concerns things that are present, whereas hearing concerns those that are absent. Therefore, after Job had known God as if absent through hearing, while still in this life he saw God as if present in his essence.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is said of Moses: plainly and not by riddles does he see the Lord (Num 12:8). But every vision of God is either by a riddle or in his essence, as is clear (1 Cor 13:12). Therefore, Moses saw God in his essence while he was in the wayfaring state.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, on the passage: a man . . . was caught up to the third heaven (2 Cor 12:2), a Gloss (From Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, par. 28.) says that God showed the Apostle the life in which God will be seen forever. And thus the Apostle was caught up to the vision of God in himself, not in any figure. And below it is said that in the third order of angels are thrones, cherubim, and seraphim, who contemplate God more closely. It is after a likeness to them that the Apostle is said to have seen God. From all this it is plainly shown that he saw God in his essence. And so the same follows as before.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Augustine (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, par. 31.) in the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, things that are in the soul by their essence are seen with intellectual vision. But intellectual vision pertains to the intelligible objects themselves, not by way of any likenesses but in their essences, as he says. Therefore, since God is in the soul of a wayfarer by his essence, it seems that the wayfarer sees him in his essence.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, the affections are more corrupted by sin than the intellect. For sin is in the will, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Retractations, bk. 1, ch. 15.) But the affections can love God immediately in the wayfaring state. Therefore, the intellect can also see God immediately.
Obj. 8: Everything that the intellect turns itself to without being turned to anything else is seen directly by the intellect. But the intellect of a wayfarer can be turned to God without being turned to something else. Therefore, a wayfarer’s intellect can see God immediately.
Obj. 9: Furthermore, the means by which we judge of other things must be more known to us than those other things are. But, according to Augustine in On the True Religion, (Augustine, On the True Religion, ch. 30.) we judge of all things on the basis of uncreated truth, taking counsel from it in all matters even in the wayfaring state. Therefore, we see this truth. But the uncreated truth is the divine essence. Therefore, in the wayfaring state we can see God in his essence.
Obj. 10: Furthermore, that on account of which something is what it is, is even more so. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2, ch. 15, 72a29.) But everything that we know we know through the divine light, which is the divine essence itself. For, as it says in On Spirit and Soul, (Pseudo-Augustine, On Spirit and Soul, ch. 12 (PL 40:787).) our mind cannot proceed to the act of knowledge unless it has the divine light poured into it. Therefore, we see God himself in his essence more than we see anything else.
Obj. 11: According to Augustine, (This may be gathered from a number of works of Augustine, but the statement as Thomas cites it is expressly found in the aforementioned On Spirit and Soul, ch. 11 (PL 40:786).) our mind is informed by God without the interposition of any created thing. But in every mediated vision something else is interposed. Therefore, in this life our mind sees God directly.
Obj. 12: Furthermore, by any speculative science we know about the subject what it is. But God is the subject in a speculative science, or at least in part of a science, as in theology and metaphysics, which also concerns God, as is clear in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 2.) Therefore, through a speculative science we know of God what he is. And this is to see him in his essence. Therefore, since we can have all the speculative sciences in the wayfaring state, we are able to see God in his essence in the wayfaring state.
Obj. 13: Furthermore, nothing is impeded except by its contrary. But the corruption of the body is not contrary to the disposition of the intellect, since they do not occur in the same thing. Therefore, the disposition of the intellect is not impeded by the corruption of the body. But the soul in an incorruptible body will see God in his essence. Therefore, when it is joined to a corruptible body it is also able to see God in his essence.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me and live, upon which a Gloss (From Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 54.) says: for as long as one is wholly in this life, God can be seen through certain images, but through the very species of his nature he cannot be seen.
Furthermore (2), the Gloss upon John 1:18, no one has ever seen God, says: no mere man living in this body sees God as he is.
Furthermore (3), commenting on 2 Corinthians 5:6–7: while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight, a Gloss says: it cannot happen that a man still leading this mortal life come to drink of that most serene light of unchangeable truth with every cloud of corporeal phantasies struck down and borne away.
Furthermore (4), it belongs to Christ alone to be both wayfarer and comprehensor. But whoever sees God in his essence is a comprehensor. Therefore, no one other than Christ, while still a wayfarer, can see God in his essence.
Furthermore (5), if the cause is present, so is the effect. But the reason why the soul is blessed is the divine vision, as is clear from what has been said. If, then, someone sees God in his essence in the wayfaring state, he will experience beatitude in the wayfaring state, which is absurd.
I answer that, since beatitude is the ultimate end of the rational creature, the wayfaring state in any rational creature is said to be that state in which it falls short of beatitude. Now, the beatitude of every rational creature consists in the vision of God in his essence, as is clear from what has been said. But that most delightful activity which beatitude consists in must belong to a potency disposed and perfected with regard to the most worthy object, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7.) And thus for the rational creature to be blessed through the vision of God in his essence it must be capable of this vision through a disposition inherent in it, which we say is the light of glory. Now in this way no mere creature in the wayfaring state can see God in his essence. For by all the dispositions he has in the wayfaring state, man is capable of nothing more than understanding whatever he understands through species abstracted from the senses. For the phantasms are to our intellect as sensible things are to our senses, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 3, ch. 4, 429a13–17; ch. 7, 431a15–18.) Even the angelic intellect in the wayfaring state by all natural dispositions, or even those of grace, is not capable of anything more than understanding everything it understands through the created forms to which the natural capability of its intellect is determined, as is clear from what has been said. But God in his essence cannot be seen either through a form abstracted from the senses or through any created form, as is clear from what has been said. Hence it is clear that no intellect of a mere creature in the wayfaring state is capable of the vision of God in his essence through any disposition inherent in it.
But it sometimes happens by divine power that a thing is miraculously led to something of which it is nowise capable through any dispositions inherent in it, as that a virgin should give birth or that fire should burn in water. Likewise, too, it can happen miraculously that by divine power a created intellect having only a disposition of the wayfaring state be elevated to the vision of God in his essence. Even so, one cannot be called blessed simply from such a vision but instead only in a qualified sense, namely inasmuch as he shares in the act of the blessed. For a body in the state of gravity can also participate miraculously in the act of agility or impassibility, as we read of Habakuk (Dan 14:35) and of the three young men preserved in the fiery furnace (Dan 3:93), though their bodies were not glorified. But things that come about miraculously are said to be possible not with reference to the nature in which they come about but only with reference to the power of the one who brings them about. For we do not say, properly speaking, that a blind man can regain sight but that God can grant him sight.
And thus it should be said that no mere created being in the wayfaring state can see God in his essence, but that God can bring it about that a created thing sees him in his essence while still remaining in the wayfaring state. From what has been said it is also clear that no man can know the essence of God in the wayfaring state, nor even the angels, since it exceeds all sensible forms, through which our intellect knows in the wayfaring state and exceeds, too, our mind itself, from whose likeness we do know something of intellectual substances.
Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, n. 3 (PG 3:179).) when Scripture says that a given saint, such as Isaiah or any other, has seen God, this should not be understood as meaning that he saw the essence of God, which is hidden to all wayfarers, but rather that certain forms, either corporeal or imaginary, were shown to them through which they were gently led to the knowledge of God. And this occurred by the ministry of angels, by whose illumination a prophet’s intellect was strengthened to reach some knowledge of divine things from forms that appear. And because an angel principally intended not to lead him to knowledge of itself but to knowledge of God, the angel was not said to appear in visions of this sort but rather God, on behalf of whose person the angel appeared and by whose power it had the efficacy to illuminate the mind. And this is called theophany, i.e., the apparition of God, in Scripture. Sometimes, however, the angel is also said to be the one who appears, on account of the ministry that it carried out. Hence Gregory says: the angel who is described as having appeared to Moses is recounted now as an angel, now as the Lord. It is mentioned as an angel because it served in an outward way by speaking, as the Lord because he who presides within granted the efficacy to the one speaking. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143), Preface, par. 3.) And this is also Augustine’s conclusion in On the Trinity 2. (Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 2, ch. 13 et seq.)
Reply Obj. 2: That vision of Jacob’s was imaginary or corporeal. Even so, he is said to have seen face to face because the figure in which God appeared to him was seen by him face to face. For this reason a Gloss on the same passage says: not because God can be seen but because he saw the form in which God spoke to him. Yet in the fact that it says face to face a certain eminence of vision is noted. For, as Rabbi Moses says, distinguishing levels of prophecy, the level of prophecy is more eminent when something appears to the prophet in a waking vision than if it appears to him while sleeping. And if there is a revelation in either case the more eminent level is when the one who speaks appears in a figure that is seen rather than when his speaking is only heard without anything being seen. Furthermore, the level is more eminent if the one who speaks appears in the figure of an angel than in the figure of a man. And the apparition to Jacob had this eminence. For it was not when he was sleeping but when he was awake. Nor did he only hear the voice of the one speaking with him but also saw the figure, though it was that of a man. For this reason it is said that a man appeared to him whom he understood to be an angel. And it is to designate this eminence that it says that he saw the Lord face to face, referring to the angel as the Lord for the reason already mentioned.
According to Gregory’s Gloss on the same passage, it cannot be said that this should be understood of a spiritual vision, by which the minds of the saints, purged of vices, contemplate God even in the wayfaring state by the aid of the divine light poured into them. Now, even though the divine nature is not seen as it is in such a vision, since the light received is not a likeness that sufficiently represents the divine essence, as said above, a more perfect knowledge of God is had, since the light is a more express likeness to him than the light of nature or of a sensible creature, from which man is led to knowledge of God by natural knowing. For if he had not seen it, namely the uncreated truth, in any way, he would not perceive that he was unable to see it, as it says in the same Gloss. And because we know someone by his face, we call knowledge of God his face.
Reply Obj. 3: Job’s statement can be understood as describing an imaginary or an intellectual vision. If it is understood as an imaginary vision, then it indicates Job’s advancement in the level of prophecy, since first a revelation was only made to him by hearing the one speaking, whereas later it was by seeing the speaker. If, on the other hand, it is understood as an intellectual vision, then the advancement of his knowledge of faith in the understanding of divine things is shown, of the sort that the saints possess through the contemplation we mentioned before, which is called vision. For just as by seeing things we know them by receiving from the things themselves, so also in contemplation the saints receive light from God himself, through which they contemplate divine matters in a higher manner than others. But we know things that are heard by assenting to those who received the species from the things themselves when they relate to us what they have seen. And likewise through faith we adhere to the statements of the apostles and prophets, who were enlightened by divine light. And in this way we need not posit that he saw God in his essence.
Reply Obj. 4: Scripture attributes two kinds of eminence in vision to Moses. One where it is said that the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend (Ex 33:11). It cannot, however, be assumed from these words that he saw God face to face, as is clear from the fact that he asked, show me thy glory (Ex 33:18), because it was not at that time granted to him. That is why it was said to him: you cannot see my face (Ex 33:20). And thus a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:289.) on the same passage says: Scripture is speaking according to people’s opinion, for they thought that Moses spoke with God face to face, since he would appear and speak to him through a subject creature, i.e., an angel and the cloud. But this speaking can be understood to have been imaginary or corporeal. This is why Augustine says in On the Trinity 2: the speech that occurred vocally had the tenor of a friend speaking to a friend. (Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 2, ch. 16.) It can also be understood as an intellectual vision, to the extent that he gazed upon the intelligible objects of divine things, after the manner of which it is said: let me hear what God the Lord will speak (Ps 84 [85]:8). And the privileged status of his revelation is shown in both ways, inasmuch as God revealed his secrets to him in a way more familiar than the rest, as to a friend, according to what is said: I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you (Jn 15:15). And thus it says: there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel like Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face (Deut 34:10).
The other eminence of Moses’ vision is shown when the Lord says to Aaron and Miriam about him: with him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in dark speech; and he beholds the form of the Lord, or the Lord’s glory, according to the Septuagint (Num 12:8). This passage shows that his petition was fulfilled when he had asked: show me thy face (Ex 33:18). Thus he saw God in his essence before his death, as Augustine says (On Genesis 12 and On Seeing God). (See Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, ch. 27; Epistle 147 to Paulina (CSEL 44), par. 13.) And so Scripture says significantly: I shall speak to him face to face, which had not been said to him in Exodus. For the vision of God in his essence does not occur by the mediation of any higher spirit, but rather God himself shows himself immediately. And this is what it means to speak mouth to mouth. For we should understand not the mouth of the body but the mouth of the mind, as Augustine says. (Ibid.) But the vision of contemplation belonging to the wayfaring state occurs by the mediation of the angels’ illumination, as is clear from Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, n. 3 (PG 3:179).) And thus it cannot be said in this regard that he speaks mouth to mouth but instead that he speaks as if through intermediaries. Still, the vision by which he saw God in his essence prior to death did not render him blessed simply. Thus that vision did not remain in him permanently but only for a time, though that span of time is not specified in Scripture. For it was not from a disposition in the intellect but only from the divine power as if miraculously, as has been said.
Now when a created nature is miraculously elevated to something above nature, it cannot at the same time be in the contrary act, as when Peter’s body miraculously possessed the act of the gift of agility by walking on the water, the act of gravity, which is to be borne downward, was not in it at the same time. Likewise, too, when the intellect of a wayfarer is miraculously elevated to the vision of God in his essence, it cannot at the same time be in act of the vision of the wayfaring state, by which the soul naturally perceives sensible objects. And thus in that state the soul of the one seeing must be altogether drawn out of the act of the senses. Thus Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis (CSEL 28.1), Bk. 12, par. 27.) that no one can see God in his essence, unless in a certain way he dies to this life, whether altogether departing from the body or turned away from and removed from sensible, carnal things. And he says the same in On Seeing God. In this way it is not contrary to what is said: man shall not see me and live (Ex 33:20). Hence Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 89.) says in a Gloss on the same passage: the brightness of the eternal God can be seen by some living in the flesh though growing with inestimable virtue, though man shall not see him and live, for one who sees that wisdom, which is God, utterly dies to this world.
Reply Obj. 5: When he was taken up at that time Paul saw God in his essence in the same way as was said of Moses, as Augustine says in On Seeing God and Literal Meaning of Genesis 12, (In the same chapters cited just above.) so that in this manner the teacher of the gentiles and the master of the Jews would obtain the same privilege. Though some say that this sort of vision was a middle between the vision of the wayfaring state and the vision of heaven, meaning that he did not see God in his essence but instead by a most eminent contemplation in the wayfaring state, though the words of the saints give the contrary impression. Even so, in this regard it can be said that it was a middle between these two types of knowledge, since in the fact that he saw God in his essence it was above the knowledge of the wayfaring state, while in the fact that Paul did not simply experience beatitude from that vision, it was below the knowledge of heaven.
Reply Obj. 6: Intellectual vision does not pertain to things that are in the soul in their essence in every way, but things that are in it as intelligible forms are in the intellect. Now God is not in the soul of a wayfarer in this way in his essence but instead by a likeness. And what Augustine says, that intellectual vision is of those things whose likenesses are nothing other than themselves, should be referred to the object of vision, not to the medium by which the vision is had. For it is obvious that the medium by which a stone is seen is the species of it in the soul, which is not the stone’s very essence. Rather, by the stone’s likeness one arrives at knowing the stone’s very essence. For the object of the intellect is the ‘what,’ that is, the essence or quiddity of the thing. But this does not occur in imaginary or corporeal vision because the object of the imagination or the senses is not the thing’s very essence but rather the accidents that are on the outside, such as color, shape, and such things. Hence, too, in the intellectual vision of a wayfarer it is not necessary for the divine essence to be itself the medium by which the vision is had, but for a sort of knowledge of the divine essence to be arrived at through a likeness to it, not one by which it is known what God is, but one by which it is known what he is not.
Or else we may say that Augustine, in the Literal Meaning of Genesis 12 (from which the words are taken in the Gloss on 2 Cor 12), cites this to show the difference between intellectual vision and other kinds of vision. For intellectual vision has the advantage over the others of being able to know the things belonging to the intellect in their essence, whereas the senses or imagination cannot do this. But it does not follow that because of this the intellect only understands through its essence and not through any likenesses.
Reply Obj. 7: In all potencies ordered to one another it is necessary that where the act of a prior potency ends, the act of a secondary potency must begin. For this reason, since the will presupposes the intellect, the will is borne toward what the intellect ends in. Now even though the intellect knows God in the wayfaring state only through his effects, its activity does terminate in God himself according to however little knowledge it receives concerning him. And thus to be borne up to God the affections do not need to return to these means. Rather, they can be borne immediately to God, to whom the intellect has come.
Reply Obj. 8: Even when something is seen through the likeness of another thing, it can be the case that someone seeing the thing through a medium thinks about the thing directly without his knowledge being turned to any other thing. For it is not turned to the medium as a given thing but as the image of the thing known through it. But the motion of the intellect to an image precisely as image and to what is imaged is the same, though the intellect’s motion to an image as a given thing and to what it is an image of are different. And thus when, through the likeness of a created thing that the intellect has within itself it is turned to the created thing not as a certain thing but only as the likeness of a thing, then it thinks about God directly, even though it does not see God directly.
Reply Obj. 9: As a Gloss says on the passage truths are decayed, (Ps 11:2), from the one uncreated truth many truths are reflected in our souls, just as from a single face many likenesses are reflected in a broken mirror or in many mirrors. And this truth reflected in our intellect first and principally consists in the first self-evident principles. And thus when we judge all things by them, our judgment is in accord with the first truth, which the truth of these principles is a likeness of.
Reply Obj. 10: Something can be known from another in two ways. In one way, as when from the knowledge of it one arrives at the knowledge of the other. And in this way what something is known by is more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. In the other way, as perfecting the knower for knowing, either like a form, as the species of a stone in the eye perfects the eye for seeing, or as an effective principle of this form, as it is said that the eye sees by the sun. And in this way what something is known by need not be more known, or rather it is even possible for it not to be known. For it is known by a certain bending of the intellect away from the knowable object to what was the principle of the knowledge. It is in this way that we know all things in God. And thus the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 11: Augustine’s statement should be understood with regard to the fact that no created being is interposed between our mind and God by whose mediation our mind proceeds into being from God or by whose mediation it is informed by grace or by glory as by an efficient means. Even so, nothing prevents our mind from being informed by God by the mediation of a created form, such as the habit of grace or charity. And it is in this way that the mind of a wayfarer is informed by a created species for the vision of God.
Reply Obj. 12: Avempace posited that man could reach an understanding of the essences of separated substances through the speculative sciences that we come to learn in this life. But the Commentator, commenting on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, On the Soul, Bk. 3, comment 36.) disproves this position from the fact that no principles have yet been discovered by which we could reach this understanding, which does not seem probable if such an understanding could be reached through the principles of the speculative sciences, especially since all of human knowledge is ordered to this. For it would not be probable for the human species to fall short of its natural perfection completely. And thus it should be said that his position is impossible. The reason for this is that the speculative sciences proceed from self-evident principles received from the senses, as it says in the Posterior Analytics 2. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2, ch. 19.) And thus we cannot arrive by them at the essences of things that exceed all sensible forms. For this reason there is no speculative science that we now acquire by which we know what God is or what an angel is, except under certain likenesses, knowing of them rather what they are not than what they are. And for this reason the Philosopher says at the beginning of the Metaphysics (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 982b29.) that man does not possess science about God, namely because we are unable to have it completely.
Reply Obj. 13: The body can only be corruptible when the soul does not have full dominion over the body. For if it did have full dominion it would confer its incorruption on it. And thus in the state of corruption the soul must know in accord with the requirements of the body, namely by receiving from the senses. But God cannot be seen in his essence by such a mode of knowledge, as is clear from what has been said, and to this extent the state of corruption is incompatible with the vision of God in his essence.
Question 3
The delight of the blessed
Next, we inquire about delight; and here five questions arise:
first, what is delight;
- second, what is the cause of delight;
- third, on the comparison of delight to sadness;
- fourth, on the goodness or evil of delight and sadness;
- fifth, on the comparison of spiritual delight to corporeal delight.
- Article 1
What is delight
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 1; q. 35, a. 1.) It seems that delight (The word delectatio could easily be translated as “pleasure” when referring to physical and sensible pleasures. We have translated it “delight” throughout the ensuing question in order to preserve the relationship between physical pleasures, which humans share with animals, and spiritual delights, which humans experience in common with angels.) is not a passion. For every passion consists in motion, as it says in the Book of Six Principles (Gilbertus Porretanus, Liber sex principiorum.) and the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 2.) But delight is neither a motion nor any kind of generation, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12.) Therefore, delight is not a passion.
Obj. 2: An activity is not a passion but rather an action, since it belongs to one in act precisely as being in act. But delight is a kind of perfection of an activity, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4.) Therefore, delight is not a passion.
Obj. 3: In every passion what experiences it is drawn into the limits of what is acting, for the agent assimilates the patient to itself. But the cause of delight is fittingness, and thus whatever is delighted remains within its own limits. Therefore, delight is not a passion.
On the contrary (1), joy and delight belong to the same genus. But joy is a passion. For it is included as one of the four principal passions, as is clear from the City of God 9. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 9, 3.) Therefore, delight is a passion.
Furthermore (2), the object of delight is the good. But the good is the proper object of the appetite. Therefore, delight pertains to the appetite. But other things that pertain to the appetite are passions, such as love, anger, and so forth. Therefore, delight, too, is a passion.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that delight cannot be in the intellective part of the soul or in other spiritual substances. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 4; q. 35, a. 1; In I Sent. d. 45, a. 1.) For, as it says in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 3, 247a1–20.) every passion is in the sensitive part of the soul. But delight is a passion, as has been proved. Therefore, it cannot be in the intellective part or in any spiritual substance.
Obj. 2: Avicenna says in On Natural Things 6 (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 2, ch. 3.) that the subject of delight belongs to a corporeal species. But the intellective part does not use any corporeal organ. Therefore, there cannot be any delight in it.
Obj. 3: What belongs to the intellective part is not common to both us and brute animals. But delight also exists in brute animals. Therefore, delight does not belong to the intellective part.
On the contrary (1), it is said: there is joy before the angels of God over one sinner who repents (Lk 15:10).
Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154b26.) that God rejoices always by a single, simple activity. Therefore, there can be delight in other spiritual substances for the same reason.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that delight is in time. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 2; De veritate, q. 8, a. 14, ad 12; Super Eth. 10, lec. 5.) For delight follows on our activity, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b23.) But our activity is in time. Therefore, delight, too, is in time.
Obj. 2: Everything in which we can understand a before and an after is in time. But we can understand a before and an after in delight, since someone can delight continuously for a long period of time. Therefore, it seems that delight is in time.
Obj. 3: Delight is categorized alongside other passions. But the other passions of the soul are in time, such as anger and the like. Therefore, so is delight.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174a17.) says in the Ethics 10: no one would understand delight with reference to a time.
Furthermore (2), delight follows apprehension of what is fitting. But vision and other apprehensions are not in time but in an instant. Therefore, neither is delight measured by time.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that delight and joy are absolutely identical, as well as exultation, rejoicing, and joyfulness. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 3; q. 35, a. 2; In III Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 3; d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 4; De veritate, q. 26, a. 4, ad 5; SCG I, ch. 90.) For passions and habits are distinguished on the basis of objects. But joy and delight and the others mentioned have the same object, namely, the fitting good. Therefore, they are the same.
Obj. 2: From the same cause proceeds the same effect. For the same is always such as to do the same. But we can posit nothing but one and the same cause for delight and joy, namely, being joined to what is fitting. Therefore, they are the same.
Obj. 3: One thing has one opposite. But delight and joy have a single opposite, which is sadness. Therefore, delight and joy are altogether a single thing.
On the contrary (1), in On Natural Things 6, Avicenna (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 4, ch. 5.) says that joy is a species of delight. Therefore, they are not altogether identical.
Furthermore (2), if joy and delight were altogether identical, then wherever there is delight there would be joy. But this is false. For, properly speaking, we say that there is delight in the senses, but not joy. Therefore, delight and joy are not completely the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, when anything attains to its proper perfection it obtains stability and vigor, as do bodies when they arrive at the limits of their natural motion, since they are kept in their natural place. But since motions are distinguished on the basis of limits, we must make a different judgment about arriving at a limit of completion according to different kinds of motion.
Now something is moved to its perfection in two ways. In one way, through a natural inclination, as a stone is moved downward. And this motion does not first require knowledge in what is moved but in another who is the principle causing this inclination. This is natural motion. In the other way, through an inclination whose principle is the knowledge of whatever is moved. And this inclination is called appetite, either animal or intellectual. Therefore, just as in the termination of natural motion there is a kind of natural invigoration of what is moved, so also in the pursuit of the perfection that the animal appetite tends toward, there is a sort of rest or invigoration of it, presupposing knowledge of the perfection now possessed, just as the appetite presupposed knowledge of the perfection not yet possessed. And such vigor or rest of the appetite is called delight. Hence, too, the Commentator says on the Ethics 10 that delight is a kind of grand blossoming of nature.
But there are two kinds of appetite, just as there are two kinds of knowledge: that of the sensitive part and that of the intellective part. The appetite of the sensitive part is a power in a corporeal organ and is the immediate principle of physical motion. This is why everything that occurs in the sensitive appetite is connected to some sort of physical transmutation, which does not occur in things in the intellective appetite, unless ‘passion’ is taken in a broad and improper sense, as was said in Book III, Distinction 15, Question 11, Article 1, Quaestiuncula 2. For this reason, delight in the sensitive appetite is a passion, whereas delight in the intellective appetite is not, unless ‘passion’ is taken in a broad sense.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not a problem for a motion to terminate in another motion incidentally, although this is impossible per se, as is proved in the Physics 5. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 5, ch. 2, 225b17–33.) Therefore delight, precisely as such, always consists in a termination of motion. But even so, because in the termination of the motion of the appetite a motion arises, in which animal passion consists, it happens that passion is accidentally in delight, but it is in sensitive delight per se.
Reply Obj. 2: Even though an activity precisely as an activity is not a passion, it can still have a passion connected to it, either as preceding it or as following it. It may precede, as sensing has the reception of sensible species connected to it, and understanding has the reception of intelligible species connected to it, to the extent that all sensing is a kind of undergoing. It may follow, however, as some sort of physical change follows on the activity of the sensitive appetite, in the dilation or constriction of the heart and other such things. And in this way, even though delight is about activity, it still consists in a kind of passion to the extent that the delight is sensitive.
Reply Obj. 3: Someone who is delighted is within the bounds of his perfection, which is what his delight springs from. Now these limits are foreign in the way that perfection and the perfectible differ, but they are proper to the extent that perfection is connatural to the perfectible.
We concede the other two objections with regard to sensitive delight.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that delight is found in God, angels, men, and brute animals in different ways, according to the different ways they relate to their own perfections, from attainment of which their delight arises.
Brute animals cannot attain to a higher perfection than material perfection. This is why they obtain it by a material motion, i.e., one carried out through a bodily organ. And so in them the delight that arises is a material passion.
In the case of angels, since they are altogether separated from matter, there can be no material perfection but only immaterial perfection. This is why they also obtain it in an immaterial manner and the delight that follows in them is immaterial. Hence Dionysius says at the end of the Celestial Hierarchy: the heavenly governances, i.e., angels, in no way whatsoever receive what belongs to the delight of passion for us. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15, n. 9 (PG 3:339).)
But men are composed of a spiritual and material nature. And thus as regards the lower part, namely the sensible appetite, in which men and brute animals agree, there is material delight, whereas in the higher appetite, in which men and angels agree, they have immaterial delight, such as when they rejoice about spiritual matters, like acts of contemplation and other divine gifts. Hence Dionysius says in the same place that: holy men have often also been made to participate in the angelic delight through the deifying superadditions of divine illuminations. (Ibid.)
Now in all the cases mentioned, perfection is something different from what is perfected. For this reason it is possible for there to be more than one perfection in a single thing. And thus both in brute animals as well as in men and angels there are multiple delights that come to them. But God has no perfection that is not identical to himself, since he is pure act. And thus he has only the one, unique delight, not one that comes from without but one that is essential. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154b26.) that God always rejoices with one, simple delight.
Reply Obj. 1: There is no passion in the intellective appetite, only in the sensitive appetite. For what undergoes something is moved and led by another. But the intellective appetite, since it has free mastery of itself, is not said to be led, whereas the sensitive appetite is led. This is why passion is found in it alone, while the delight that is in the intellective appetite is not a passion but a kind of perfection of activity, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Avicenna is speaking of sensitive delight, which is completed through a physical organ, as in the case of other things pertaining to the sensitive part.
Reply Obj. 3: Things that are common to us and to brute animals under the same account do not pertain to the intellective part. But something is common to us and to brute animals under different accounts when in us it pertains to the intellect, such as knowledge, and other such things. Some things extend from God down to brute animals by a certain commonality of analogy, such as knowledge. Others, such as life, extend from God down to plants. Finally, others, such as being, extend even down to stones, as is clear from Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) in On the Divine Names. And in this respect spiritual delight has something in common with delight in brute animals.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there are two ways in which something can be said to exist in time: per se and incidentally. Now because ‘before’ and ‘after’ pertain to the very notion of time, and whatever applies to something according to its specific character is in it per se, those things in which something required for their specific completion is awaited in the future are essentially in time. And this is the way that motion is in time. For a species of motion is not completed in the middle but only if it reaches the term. Likewise, too, rest is in time by virtue of the fact that to be at rest is to be in the same manner now as before. And so it pertains to the notion of rest that something be awaited in the future. On the other hand, something is said to be in time incidentally when nothing required for the completion of its species is awaited in the future, such as being a man, which is completed in a single instant. But it is connected with motion, which is in time essentially, inasmuch as the being of man is changeable.
Delight, however, awaits nothing in the future for the completion of its species and character of it. For, even in an instant, it is true to say that a man delights. Hence it is only in time incidentally, namely, to the extent that the perfection that delight arises from is itself connected to motion. And thus if there is a perfection that has no contact with motion, such delight will be in time neither per se nor incidentally. And this is the spiritual delight in the angels. In brute animals, however, delight exists in time incidentally inasmuch as motion is directly joined to their perfections. But in us delight is not in time as regards the intellective part even incidentally, unless very indirectly, namely, inasmuch as the activity of our intellect is joined to phantasms. Still, it is true that no delight is in time, speaking per se.
Reply Obj. 1: Delight follows directly on the soul’s activities, which are to apprehend and to will. But these activities are only in time incidentally. For to see, to understand, and to will all occur in a moment.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that someone is said to delight for a longer time than another is only inasmuch as delight is in time incidentally, just as a man is said to see or to live for a longer time.
Reply Obj. 3: Even other passions of the soul, as regards what is on the part of the soul, are only in time accidentally, namely, inasmuch as motion on the part of the body is joined to them. Delight, however, has more the character of not being in time than other passions. For other passions consist in an appetite to the extent that it tends to something, such as anger to vengeance and hate to another’s harm. But delight consists in an appetite to the extent that its motion is terminated in its appropriate appetible object. But every term of motion is not in time but in an instant.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that delight, joy, rejoicing, and all such things have in common that they are caused by an appetite’s being united to its perfection. Now a perfection can be joined to something in two ways: in one way, really; in the other way, according to the understanding of it. Now from the fact that a perfection is really joined to something, delight arises, whereas from its being joined in apprehension, joy and all the rest arise. For this reason, we have joy over the hope of future things and the memory of past ones. But we only delight in present things. Thus it is also the case that because the external senses only apprehend present things, we are not said to rejoice in them but to delight. The internal senses, however, apprehend both present and absent things. This is why we are said both to delight and to rejoice in the interior senses. The internal senses are said to delight over the fact that they are joined to their perfection, as over its very activity, over which the internal senses also rejoice inasmuch as the perfection is apprehended. But in the activity of the external senses, which is only joined to it by apprehension, one can rejoice but not delight, just as an internal sense or the intellect does not delight in eating sweets but can rejoice in the fact inasmuch as it apprehends it as fitting to the external senses.
Now rejoicing, exultation, and joyfulness express certain effects of joy. Rejoicing expresses the interior effect, to the extent that the affections themselves are expanded as if taking on strength and being perfected from being united to the object of appetite. Hence, too, the passion of joy is perfected with a swelling of the heart. For we say ‘rejoicing’ as if saying ‘widening.’ (There is a play on words in Latin, laetitia and latitia, which is impossible to convey in English.) But exultation expresses a further effect of joy breaking out into external expression as a sign of internal joy. This is why it is called ‘ex-ultation,’ from the fact that interior joy bursts out externally, which happens from the greatness of that interior joy. This is why Cassiodorus says on Psalm 9 that we speak of exultation in great joys. (Cassiodorus says something like this in various places. Here is the closest in Psalm 9: “Exsultare est enim animi et corporis maiore motu iucundissima libertate gaudere” (Exposition of the Psalms [CCSL 97], Ps 9, l. 57).) Finally, joyfulness implies a further effect of joy breaking out into external expression, which not only points to interior joy but also stirs others to rejoice.
Reply Obj. 1: Joy and delight, though they have a single reality as their object, do not have that reality as their object under the same notion. For the good really acquired produces delight, but it produces joy as grasped in apprehension. Rejoicing, exultation, and joyfulness, however, are the same as joy, except that they express certain effects of joy, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: The cause is the same for delight and joy, though not in the same order. It is first and per se the cause of delight, but it is secondarily the cause of joy. For something that is apprehended never produces joy except inasmuch as it is judged as possessed or able to be possessed in reality to produce delight. And thus being united with a perfection first and per se produces delight, but inasmuch as it is apprehended as producing delight it produces joy even when it does not actually cause delight. This is how delight is prior to joy in nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Sadness is directly opposed to joy, whereas the opposite of delight is pain, according as delight is in the external senses, especially touch. But according as it is internal, it has no other opposite than sadness, though it could have another opposite if a name were proposed for it.
Article 2
What is the cause of delight
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 1, ad 1; q. 32, a. 1.) It seems that the cause of delight is not only the unimpeded connatural activity of a habit. For Avicenna says in On Natural Things that delight arises from the perception of the fitting acquired. But not only activity is fitting, but also many other things. Therefore, not only activity is the cause of delight.
Obj. 2: Contraries do not have the same cause. But activity is sometimes the cause of sadness, even proper and connatural activity. Hence acedia, which is a kind of sadness, also arises from spiritual works. Therefore, activity is not the proper cause of delight.
Obj. 3: If something is the cause of something else, the continuation of the former is the cause of the continuation of the latter. But the continuation of activity is not the cause of the continuation of delight. In fact, continuation of activity frequently leads to tedium and activities are more delightful when they are novel. Therefore, activity is not the cause of delight.
Obj. 4: Rest is opposed to activity. But rest causes delight. Therefore, activity is not the proper cause of delight.
Obj. 5: Those who are old give greater attention to activity than the young. But there is less delight in the old than in the young, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 3, 1156a21–31.) Therefore, activity is not the cause of delight.
Obj. 6: If activity were the cause of delight, then people in a given relation to activity would be related in a similar way to delight. But some who have similar activity do not similarly delight. For the melancholy delight less than the sanguine. Therefore, it seems that activity is not as such the cause of delight.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12, 1153a15.) that delight is the connatural activity of a habit. And this can only be understood causally. Therefore, activity is the cause of delight.
Furthermore (2), a given thing is distinguished from others according as its cause is distinguished from others. But delights are distinguished from each other based on the distinctions between activities, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175a22–27.) Therefore, activity is the cause of delight.
Furthermore (3), a habit is known only through an activity or through something caused by an activity. But there is a habit known from delight, as it says in the Ethics 2: we must take as a sign of habit the pleasure that arises in acts. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b4–6.) Since, then, delight is not itself an activity, it seems that it is caused by an activity.
I answer that, just as the soul is the form of the body, so also in things that are common to soul and body, what is on the part of the soul is formal whereas what is on the part of the body is material, as in anger the desire for vengeance is formal while the heating of blood in the heart is material.
Since, then, delight insofar as it is a passion is among the things common to soul and body, we can seek two causes for it: a formal cause on the part of the soul and a material cause on the part of the body. But delight, to the extent that it is on the part of the soul, has a character that is sort of common to all in whom delight is found, namely, God, angels, men, and brute animals; while to the extent that it is on the part of the body, it abides only in the sensitive part of the soul. Consequently, the formal cause of delight is the cause of all delight, but not its material cause. It is also clear that with reference to form it is something actual, with respect to matter it is something potential, and with respect to the dispositions of matter it is something that has an aptitude or adeptness to act. And thus on the basis of the material cause we know how someone is disposed to delight, while on the basis of its formal cause it is apparent how someone actually delights. The formal cause, then, of every passion or activity is its object. Now the formal object of delight is the fitting good that one is united with. For from the fact that delight is in the appetitive part, its object must be the good, while from the fact that the appetite is already terminated in its object, it must be fitting and attained.
Now the good that is the proper object of delight is activity, especially for the following three reasons.
First, since delight consists in the resting of the appetite and the motion of the appetite is to the good, the delight of the rest itself must be in the ultimate of goods. Now the ultimate and most perfect in each thing is its activity. Hence every inherent form is compared to activity in a certain way as potency to act, and for this reason the form is called first act, such as science, and activity is called second act, such as considering, as is clear in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412a6–11.)
Second, since delight is in an appetite and every passion or activity of an appetite requires apprehension as a prerequisite, the attained good that causes delight must be apprehended. But a disposition already inhering is not apprehended by us like that while it is in the process of becoming, as Avicenna says in On Natural Things 6. (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 3, ch. 3.) For example, those suffering from a continuous fever feel less of the fever’s heat than others suffering from fever, even though the fever is more intense in their case. For the heat is already diffused to the members as if part of their constitution. And this occurs because our sensing and understanding come from the intellect and senses being changed by their objects, whereas nothing is changed by what is already at rest in it. And so since our being and our living and all our proper acts are in us as resting in us, while activity alone is in us as in the process of becoming, it is in activity itself that we perceive both our being and our living. This is why we take delight in our activity as well as in living and sensing and other such things, in which we receive a certain indication of our being and our living, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle says this in a variety of ways in Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, chs. 4–5.)
Third, because activity proceeds from the goods that are in us and in a certain way contains them in itself as an effect contains its cause. By activity we are also united to external goods. Hence every good in which we can take delight gives rest to our appetite by the mediation of activity; and so activity is the essential cause of delight. Not every activity, however, is the cause of delight, but rather one that proceeds from a habit and is not impeded. For the attained good only gives delight inasmuch as it is fitting.
Now an activity is rendered fitting to us and connatural, as it were, through a habit. For a habit inclines to an act after the manner of nature, as Tully says of virtue. (See Cicero, De inventione (Teubner, ed. E. Stroebel), Bk. 2, ch. 53, par. 159: “virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus.”) And thus it says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 9.) that when a work brings about delight this is a sign of an inherent habit. But even though an activity becomes connatural to us on the basis of a habit, it can still be unfitting to us for some accidental reason, that is, inasmuch as we have certain impediments in our progress toward such an activity. Hence the activity that causes delight must be unimpeded. And this is what the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12, 1153a15.) says in the Ethics 7: that delight consists in the unimpeded activity of a connatural habit. In this way, then, the proper formal cause of delight is the unimpeded activity of a connatural habit, while the material cause of delight should be taken on the part of its subject. Now the subject of delight and of all the soul’s passions is the animal spirit, which is the proximate instrument of the soul in activities that are carried out through the body.
Now for the spirit to be ready for delight two things are required: due quantity and due quality.
Due quantity is that there be an abundance of spirits, for two reasons. First, because a spirit that abounds in quantity abounds also in power. Second, since expansion of the heart and of spirits is required for the passion of delight, such expansion cannot be completed when there are few spirits. For nature constricts them and holds them back at their source. But when there are many spirits, nature can hold part back at their source and release the excess for the expansion. And thus the convalescent, in whom there are few spirits, are more prone to sadness than to delight.
But due quality is found in three things. First, that the spirit have a temperate constitution. And thus the sick do not tend to delight. Second, that the spirit be clear, not cloudy. And thus the melancholic, in whom there are dark and earthy spirits, are prone to sadness. Third, that its substance be at a midpoint between denseness and thinness. For if it is too thick, as in the case of the elderly, or too thin, as in the case of the lean, it is not apt for delight because then it is not capable of easy expansion. These are the reasons why wine gives joy, since it generates many spirits that are clear, temperate, and midway between thickness and thinness. Therefore, the greater the disposition on the part of material causes to joy or sadness, the less is required on the part of the formal cause, and vice versa. And thus there are some who rejoice or are saddened at a slight occurrence while others only experience joy or sorrow from a great one.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though there are many things besides activity that are fitting, delight only arises from all of them by the mediation of activity. For we are united to external fitting things by an activity, while internal ones are apprehended in activities.
Reply Obj. 2: Not every activity is a cause of delight, but rather the unimpeded activity of a connatural habit. And thus when we are constrained to activities contrary to the habits that are in us or in which we suffer impediments, by reason of which we experience fatigue and exertion, we do not delight in such activities but instead are saddened.
Reply Obj. 3: There are three reasons why we do not delight in an activity as it proceeds as we do at its beginning.
The Philosopher assigns the first reason in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175a29–1175b2.) namely, that since activity is the cause of delight, the more attentively one works, the greater the delight that arises from the activity. But man is more attentive to an activity at its beginning than as it progresses. For everything that is new draws more of our focus to itself. And thus as an activity progresses, when a person turns to an activity more negligently, he does not feel as much delight in the work.
He gives the second reason in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14.) which reason was also mentioned above. For delight in us must follow the mode of our nature. Therefore, since our nature is changeable there will not always be the same object of delight for us, since we will have already been changed from our original disposition. And so after a little while there what was previously fitting for us will no longer be fitting. And thus what was previously an object of delight becomes for us less delightful or even sorrowful. And this is also the reason why the continuity of a single thing in us leads to fatigue, while changing back and forth delights. In God, however, who is always in the same state, there is always the same delightful activity, and he is not delighted by any alternation. And the argument is similar regarding the angels and blessed men.
The third reason can be gleaned from the words of Avicenna in On Natural Things 5. (Avicenna, On Natural Things, Bk. 6, pt. 3, ch. 3.) For since perception of the fitting is required for delight, the less something is felt, the less it is an object of delight. Now things are felt more when they are new, since their disposition afterwards becomes like a quality inherent in those who feel it. For example, craftsmen who are used to hearing the sound of hammers are not affected by these sounds in the same way as others are. And thus at the beginning of an activity a person takes more delight than later as it progresses continuously, even though the activity is, perhaps, more intense as it progresses.
Reply Obj. 4: Even if an activity is delightful in itself, nevertheless, inasmuch as a motion is attached to it that leads to fatigue, it is in a certain way painful and saddening. This is why rest is also incidentally delightful, inasmuch as it takes away the cause of saddening, namely motion.
Reply Obj. 5: With regard to the material cause of delight the elderly are less apt to delight than the young. And thus they are also not as affected by a greater formal cause of delight as the young are by a lesser cause, speaking of delight as a passion, i.e., something overflowing into the sensible appetite and more sensible to us. So too, sulfur can be lit by a meager fire, since it is apt for this, while wood that is less apt for this is not lit by a larger fire. Even so, spiritual delight, which is not a passion, is not less in the elderly than in the young, but perhaps greater.
Reply Obj. 6: Those who carry out a similar activity sometimes do not take delight in it in the same way. This can happen both on the part of the material cause, because they do not have spirits similarly disposed to the activity, and on the part of the formal cause, since the same activity is fitting to one through a habit inherent in him while it is unfitting to another who lacks the habit. In fact, it may even be contrary to him, if he possesses the contrary habit. And for this reason, giving, which is delightful to one who is liberal, is a cause for sadness to one who is avaricious.
Article 3
On the relationship of delight to sadness
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 35, a. 3; q. 31, a. 8, ad 2; ST III, q. 84, a. 9, ad 2.) It seems that sadness is not contrary to delight. For passions are distinguished according to their causes. But the cause of sadness is motion and exertion, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle does not say exactly this, but something like it, at Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154a22ff.) This is why the young, who are in motion, desire delights as a sort of medicine against sadness. Now the cause of delight is activity. But motion and activity are not contraries, since they are sometimes joined together. Therefore, neither is delight contrary to sadness.
Obj. 2: When two things are contrary, one is not the matter of the other. But delight can be the matter of sadness. For, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 9, ch. 4, 1166b5–24.) one who is depraved is after a little while saddened by what had delighted him. Likewise, too, sadness is the matter of delight, as a penitent is enjoined that he should always sorrow and rejoice at this sorrow. Therefore, delight and sadness are not contraries.
Obj. 3: Delight and joy are not altogether identical, as is clear from what has been said. But sadness is opposed to joy. Therefore, it is not opposed to delight.
On the contrary (1), medicines come about by way of contraries, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b15–16.) But delights are medicines against sadnesses, as it says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154a27–28.) Therefore, delight and sadness are contraries.
Furthermore (2), good and evil are contraries. But delight is opposed to sadness as good is to evil, as it says in the Ethics 7. (Ibid.) Therefore, they are contraries.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there is some sadness contrary to the delight that comes from contemplation. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 35, a. 5; ST III, q. 46, a. 7, ad 4; In III Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 3; d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5; De veritate, q. 26, a. 3, ad 6, and a. 9, ad 8; Comp. theo. 165.) For fatigue is a cause of sadness. But fatigue occurs in contemplation. Therefore, sadness occurs in contemplation. Therefore, there is a sadness that is contrary to the delight that comes from contemplation.
Obj. 2: Just as it happens that we may contemplate something as fitting, so also it happens that we may contemplate something as harmful. But the contemplation of what is fitting causes delight. Therefore, the contemplation of what is harmful causes sadness. And thus the same follows as before.
Obj. 3: Every action that is contrary to an inherent habit is a cause of sadness, just as to one who has a habit of injustice the activity of what is just is saddening. But it does happen that someone who has the habit of a science proceeds to act against the character of the inherent habit, as when a grammarian speaks ungrammatically and a logician syllogizes improperly. Therefore, in contemplation there can be sadness. And thus the same follows as before.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in the Topics 1 (Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 1, ch. 15: “the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none” (106a37–38).) that there is not sadness contrary to the delight that arises from contemplation.
Furthermore (2), contemplation proceeds from notions in the soul. But the notions of things, even of contraries, in the soul are not contraries, as it says in the Metaphysics 7. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 7, ch. 7, 1032b1–5.) Therefore, neither can anything be contrary to the delight that is caused by contemplation.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that sadness has a greater effect than delight. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 35, a. 6; ST II-II, q. 138, a. 1; In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.) For, as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: there is no one who does not rather flee pain than desire pleasure. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Questions (CCSL 44A), qu. 36.) Therefore, man is more affected by sadness than by delight.
Obj. 2: Just as sadness by its intensity moves a person to flight, so also delight moves someone to desire. But not everyone desires delights. In fact some, such as the temperate, avoid them. But everyone flees sorrows, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 13.) Therefore, delight has less effect than sadness.
Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5.) all sadness impedes man in his activity. But not every delight helps, but only proper delight. Therefore, sadness has a more intense effect than delight.
On the contrary (1), good is more efficacious in acting than evil. For evil only acts by the power of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:731).) But the good is the cause of delight and evil the cause of sadness. Therefore, delight has a greater effect than sadness.
Furthermore (2), as it says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14.) delight drives out not only sadness that is contrary to it but also any other sadness as well. Therefore, delight is stronger than sadness.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, the formal character of every passion is drawn from its object. Therefore both actions and passions are distinguished on the basis of their objects. Now the object of delight is the good, while the object of sadness is evil. Hence sadness must be formally contrary to delight.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though motion is not in itself contrary to activity, we do find in motion some basis for its causing sadness, which is contrary to activity insofar as it is the cause of delight. For activity is the cause of delight to the extent that it is fitting to the one acting. But in motion, in which there is progress from one thing to another, there must be something unfitting to what is moved, since the things between which the motion exists are contraries. And thus by reason of the contrariety that it has toward what is movable, motion induces weariness and sadness. For this reason unnatural and violent motions especially cause weariness. This is how, then, motion causes sadness by reason of contrariety, whereas activity causes delight by reason of fittingness. And therefore delight and sadness must be opposed on the basis of the opposition between fittingness and contrariety.
Reply Obj. 2: Sadness is not the matter for delight, nor is delight the matter for sadness, speaking per se. Rather, this occurs only incidentally, inasmuch as a delight happens to be evil, which is the proper matter of sadness, or a sadness happens to be good, which is the proper matter of delight. And it can occur in these contraries that one is incidentally the matter of the other because of the commonality of their objects, which are good and evil, one of which can be connected to the other under different aspects. For what is good in one aspect can be evil in another aspect. It happens, too, that contraries of this sort may consist in an act of the soul, which reflects on its act inasmuch as it knows that it knows and wills itself to will. In this way, too, sadness can be the matter for joy and even joy itself, though it cannot occur in natural things that something be the matter of itself or even that contraries would be the matter for one another.
Reply Obj. 3: If this force were given to the words, so that delight was distinguished from joy as suffering from sadness, then sadness would correspond to joy as its opposite and suffering would correspond to delight. But because suffering is properly understood as referring to the senses, especially the sense of touch, while delight, properly speaking, also extends to the internal powers, we say that delight is opposed not only by suffering but also by sadness.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that apprehension can be called the cause of delight in two ways. In one way, on the part of the very thing apprehended, as when we apprehend a good that befits us and so we are delighted. And in this way apprehension is the cause of all delight. Hence nothing prevents something being contrary to the delight that is caused like this from apprehension, whether sensible or intelligible; otherwise, sadness would not be contrary to any delight. In the other way, on the part of the apprehension itself, as when someone delights not in what is apprehended but in the very apprehension by which he apprehends it. And in this case, speaking per se, there cannot be a sadness contrary to the delight that is caused from any apprehension. For this type of sadness would also have to be caused by an apprehension, since contraries concern the same thing. But apprehension, speaking per se, can in no way produce sadness. For only what is contrary can produce sadness, but no apprehension as such is contrary or repugnant to the person who apprehends. In fact, it is that person’s perfection. For the species by which apprehension occurs are perfections of the one apprehending. For this reason, no apprehension, either sensible or intelligible, speaking per se, causes sadness but only delight, sometimes more and sometimes less, according as the apprehension is more perfect and more fitting to the one who takes delight. This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b14ff.) that the most perfect—and thereby the most delightful—vision belongs to the faculty of sight that is best disposed to the most beautiful of the objects of vision.
Now, it does happen accidentally that sadness is caused by apprehension in two ways. In one way, on the part of the one apprehending, namely, a person who apprehends through a physical organ, which can undergo weariness and corruption due to a change in the organ. And this is how an apprehension of the sensitive part accidentally causes sorrow, whereas intellective apprehension only does by an extremely remote accident, namely, inasmuch as the intellect’s consideration is joined to the activity of the sensitive powers, from which weariness can occur in our intellect’s consideration, which would not be the case if we were able to understand without phantasms. In the other way, on the part of the effect of apprehension, inasmuch as by having devoted time to apprehension we incur a kind of loss, for example, if we are thereby impeded from something more useful or drawn into sin by the occasion. But then, properly speaking, sadness is not caused by apprehension but by consideration of the effect of apprehension. And thus, properly speaking, there is no sadness contrary to the delight that comes from intellectual contemplation.
The reply to the first and second objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: An activity contrary to a habit of knowledge sometimes proceeds from one knowingly. And then such an activity is fitting to the habit, since by a habit of knowledge we know not only what is right but also what is erroneous. Thus even knowing that something is erroneous pertains to the perfection of knowledge. If, however, a consideration contrary to knowledge proceeded from someone unknowingly, as for example when someone has a false view that he thinks is true, such contemplation will still be delightful because it is apprehended as fitting, even though it is not fitting, just as to a just man an unjust activity would be delightful if he thought that it were just.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that both delight and sadness result from some apprehended cause. Therefore, they can also be considered in two ways: on the part of the cause that delights or saddens, or on the part of the apprehension that delight or sadness follows. Now, the cause of delight is the fitting good attained, while the cause of sadness is the repugnant evil endured. But a good can be found that is completely fitting, having nothing disagreeable from any vantage point, whereas there cannot be found any evil that is so disagreeable as to be fitting in no regard whatsoever. For there is no thing that is purely evil so that it is not good in any respect. And thus the cause of delight is more perfectly related to giving delight than the cause of sadness is to saddening, generally speaking. But one cannot lay down one rule for all specific cases on account of the different causal orders in evilness and goodness. Consequently, some cause that brings delight can surpass one that causes sadness and vice versa. But on the part of apprehension, generally speaking, sadness surpasses delight in its genus by the fact that like things are less felt than contrary things. Therefore since fittingness causes delight while repugnance causes sadness, sadness prevails over delight as regards apprehension, though in particular cases a given delight can take precedence over a given sadness as regards apprehension. It should be said, then, that if we speak properly delight has a stronger effect than sadness, but sadness is felt more keenly than delight, as also we feel the love of a thing absent more keenly than the love of a thing present, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 10. (See Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 10, ch. 12.)
Reply Obj. 1: We flee sadness more than we desire delight because we feel it more keenly.
Reply Obj. 2: All sadness, speaking per se, is evil, as will be said below, (In the following article, sub-question 2.) though accidentally it can be good. But not every delight is good, speaking per se. Thus both the good and the wicked flee every sadness, but they do not all desire all delights.
Reply Obj. 3: There are more ways in which an activity can be impeded than in which it can be perfected. For it is only perfected when all the causes come together, whereas an activity is impeded if any of the things necessary for the activity is impeded. And thus all sadness impedes an activity, inasmuch as it is contrary to the one carrying out the activity, but not all delight assists the work. In fact, extraneous delight impedes it inasmuch as it draws the intention away to something other than the attention necessary for perfect action. But proper delight even helps the one working, lending him a certain strength, inasmuch as it is fitting and leads his attention to focus on the delightful activity.
Article 4
On the goodness or evil of delight and sadness
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 34, a. 2; Super Eth. 7, lec. 11; Super Eth. 10, lec. 4 & 8.) It seems that every delight is good. For anything that makes other things more worthy of choice when it is united with them is good per se. But delight united with any goods whatsoever renders them more worthy of choice. Therefore, delight as such is good. And so every delight will be good.
Obj. 2: Only the good is desired. But anything is desirable from the fact that it is delightful. Therefore, delight, speaking per se, is good. And so the same follows as before.
Obj. 3: All being precisely as being is good. Therefore, that, too, which is the ultimate perfection of being is universally good. But delight is the ultimate perfection of being. For it perfects activity, which is second act, as is clear from the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b23.) Therefore, all delight is good.
On the contrary (4), what the virtuous man flees is evil. But a person who is temperate flees delight. Therefore, delight is evil.
Furthermore (5), what impedes the judgment of reason is evil. But delight corrupts the estimation of prudence, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, ch. 5, 1140b12–20.) Therefore, delight is evil.
Furthermore (6), anything whose desire makes someone evil is evil per se. But the desire for delight renders some people evil, as in the case of the intemperate, who pursue delight as an end, and flatterers, who only ever say sweet things to delight others. Therefore, delight is evil.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that not all sadness is evil. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 39, a. 1; In III Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 3.) For nothing salvific is evil. But there is a sadness that is salvific: godly grief produces a repentance that leads to salvation (2 Cor 7:10). Therefore, there is a good sadness.
Obj. 2: Nothing praiseworthy is evil. But some sadnesses are praiseworthy, such as mercy, which is sadness at another’s evil, and penitence, which is sadness over past sins. Therefore, not all sadness is evil.
Obj. 3: As delight is to good, sadness is to evil. But not all delight is good. Therefore, not every sadness is an evil.
On the contrary (1), everything that impedes right activity is evil. But all sadness impedes activity, as is clear in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175b16–23.) Therefore, all sadness is evil.
Furthermore (2), anything that, when added to something, makes it less good, is evil in itself. But sadness joined to any good makes it less worthy of choice. This is why it is said: not with sadness or of necessity: for God loves a cheerful giver (2 Cor 9:7). And the same argument can be made when sadness is joined to the act of any virtue. Therefore, sadness is evil in itself.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that some delight is the greatest good. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 34, a. 3; Super Eth. 7, lec. 11–14; Super Eth. 10, lec. 2.) For what is the last end is the best. But delight is the last end. For, as it says in the Ethics 7: it is the architectonic end. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12, 1152b25.) But the architectonic ends are more noble and desirable, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 1094a15. Note that here “architect” means, for Aristotle, either the contemplative philosopher or the political philosopher.) Therefore, delight is the greatest good.
Obj. 2: It is said in On the Heavens 2: every thing is for the sake of its activity. (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 286a7–8.) But activity is for the sake of delight, since delight is the perfection of activity, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b23.) Therefore, delight is the last end.
Obj. 3: What is desired only for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is the last end. But that is what delight is. For it is foolish to ask why someone wishes to have delight. Therefore, delight is the last end.
Obj. 4: What all people desire and with whose contrary there is nothing that can be chosen seems to be the greatest good and the last end. But all desire delight: children and beasts, wise men and fools. And no good would be capable of being chosen if it were sad. Nor would it be possible to persevere continuously in a good if it were sad. Therefore, delight is the greatest good.
On the contrary (5), man’s last end and his greatest good is his beatitude. But beatitude is not delight but rather an activity, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, delight is not the greatest good.
Furthermore (6), according to Plato, delight is a sensible generation into some nature. But no generation is the greatest good, since generation is a movement toward perfection. Therefore, no delight can be the greatest good.
Furthermore (7), everything that is chosen is chosen in its order to the greatest good. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 3, 1174a4–9.) we would give our attention to many things even if they brought no delight, for example, seeing, remembering, knowing, and the possession of virtues. Therefore, delight is not the greatest good.
Furthermore (8), everything that is ordered by nature to something else is not the last end. But nature directs delight to activity. Hence nature has attached delight to the activities of the nutritive and generative part, which are ordered to the preservation of the individual and the species, so that animals will be more inclined to these works. Therefore, delight is not the greatest good or the last end.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, delight can be considered in two ways: as delight or as this particular delight. Delight precisely as delight names a good. But inasmuch as it is a particular given delight, it can have the aspect of evil on the part of what specifies it, just as every action as regards the nature of action is good, but as regards a connected defect a given action can be evil. Likewise, too, inasmuch as something of defect is joined to a given delight, to this extent something of evil is joined to it. But defect is joined to delight in the manner in which it is also joined to activity, since delight is caused from activity. And in this way a deficient delight comes from a deficient activity. And thus, as it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5.) as activities differ from one another in goodness and evilness, so do delights, such that in this regard a delight is called good when it proceeds from a good activity and evil when it proceeds from an evil activity.
Reply Obj. 1: The delight that makes goods more worthy of choice is a thing’s proper delight, as when a just man takes delight in a just activity. But if the delights of what is intemperate were joined to just activities, they would not render them more delightful. Hence it does not follow that all delights are good.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not only good that is desired but also apparent good. Now every delight from the fact that it is delight is good; no matter how evil it becomes from some circumstance, it has that whereby it can appear good and consequently why it can be desired. And this is how it is desirable to someone who does not possess right judgment. But to someone who has right judgment certain delights are not desirable, as one who is prudent and temperate does not desire the delights of what is intemperate.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument does not prove that delight is good, except precisely as delight.
But because by the arguments to the contrary some people wished to show that every delight is evil, we must also respond to them.
Reply Obj. 4: A virtuous person does not flee every delight and, in fact, embraces proper delight, which is taking delight in the works of the virtues. He does, however, flee inordinate delights. And we concede that the latter are evil.
Reply Obj. 5: Not every delight impedes the judgment of reason, but rather immoderate and extraneous delight, as physical delight disturbs reason’s judgment if it is intense. But spiritual delight strengthens the judgment of reason, since a person works more attentively on the things in which he takes delight, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1175a29ff.) And so it also does not follow that every delight is evil.
Reply Obj. 6: The delights that make a man wicked should not be called delights truly and simply, since they are not fitting to a man as man but rather as the good of man is corrupt in him in a certain way, just as what seems sweet to someone with a corrupt sense of taste should not be called sweet simply. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1176a4ff.) Yet even granting the supposition that they are true delights, they differ specifically from delights that are good.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that something can be called good in two ways: either as worthy of choice in itself, or as ordered to what is worthy of choice, as bitter potions are not good or desirable by themselves but only inasmuch as they are beneficial to health. Therefore no sadness, speaking per se, is good as being desirable in itself. For this reason, too, Augustine in the Confessions (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 10, ch. 28.) judges them (tribulations and sorrows) to be tolerated, not loved. The reason for this is that every sadness proceeds from something unfitting, but the possession of something unfitting cannot be desirable per se. But there are some sorrows that are good or desirable inasmuch as they are useful for something, whether to drive out perverse delights or some other such thing.
And in this way the reply to the first objection is clear. For that sadness is said to be godly and salvific which is ordered to salvation. Thus it does not follow that it is good except as a kind of medicine.
Reply Obj. 2: Sadness can only be praiseworthy on the supposition of an existing evil. For supposing that there is misery, mercy is praiseworthy. Likewise, in the case of pre-existing sin, penitence is worthy of choice. However, where there is the perfection of goods, there is no place either for mercy or penitence. Hence it does not follow that sadness is good simply, but only in a qualified sense.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though all sadness should be fled from in itself, it does not follow that all delight is in itself good and to be desired. For in order that something be good, many factors must come together and if any of them is lacking this brings in the character of evil. And thus, everything that possesses something of evil is to be fled from, though not everything that has something of the good is to be desired simply. And so all sadness, inasmuch as it possesses something of defect, is to be fled from. But not every delight is to be desired, even though it has something of the good in it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there have been three opinions on delight. One was that of the Epicureans, who posited that delight as such is the greatest good, thereby also being of the opinion that all delight is good. Another was the opinion of the Stoics and Platonists, who held that all delight is evil. The third was the opinion of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who posited that some delights are good and others evil and that nothing prevents a delight from being the greatest good in the genus of human goods. For delight follows on activity. Therefore, since there is an activity that is the greatest good in the genus of human goods, which is happiness, the delight following on it will also be the greatest good. And these two should not be considered as two goods but rather as a single good. For just as from a perfection and the perfectible a single perfect thing results, so also from delight and activity comes about a single perfect activity, which is happiness, since delight is the perfection of activity, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 4, 1174b23.)
Now which of these should be chosen for the sake of the other, i.e., whether delight should be chosen for the sake of activity or vice versa, the Philosopher left unresolved in that place. But even so, it seems that we should say according to the truth of the matter, that delight is ordered to activity as to an end, as all secondary perfections exist for nothing else but the perfecting of their perfectible objects. But delight is a perfection superadded to activity, as comeliness is to youth. Hence delight is ordered to activity. In this way, then, properly speaking, no delight is the greatest good, but it is something belonging to the greatest good, namely happiness. For happiness includes delight, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1177a23–26.) And this is how both arguments should be answered.
Reply Obj. 1: Delight is said to be the architect’s end, not because it it is the architectonic (i.e., civil) last end, except perhaps as something belonging to the last end, as has been said. Rather, it is called the architect’s end as a kind of rule by which the architect—i.e., the civil architect—judges everything. Hence the Philosopher adds in this passage: by regarding which we call this good and this evil. (Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 7, ch. 11.) For from the fact that one delights in good things he is known to be good, and one who delights in evils is known to be evil.
Reply Obj. 2: Delight is not the perfection of an activity by which the activity has its species but rather one that is superadded to it after the manner of a secondary perfection, as health is related to man, and not as the soul is related to man. Now there is this difference between primary and secondary perfections: the perfectible is ordered to primary perfection as to an end, as matter is to form, but conversely secondary perfection is ordered to the perfectible, namely, so that the perfectible may have perfect being through it. And this is the way that delight is ordered to activity.
Reply Obj. 3: Concerning things ordered to an end we usually ask on what account those that are not united to the end are done, whereas no such question arises in the case of those that are united to the end, since it is at once apparent that they are desirable. And because delight is united with perfect activity, which is the end, it is not usual to ask for what reason someone wishes to have delight. And besides, delight indicates the resting of the appetite in something. Therefore, to ask why someone wishes to have delight is the same as asking why he wishes his appetite to be at rest, which is the same as if we asked why someone wishes to obtain his will’s end. Now even though the end is an activity, ‘activity’ does not by its name imply the notion of end or of resting in the end. And this is why we ask, “what are you working for?” rather than “what are you taking delight for?”
Reply Obj. 4: The end of any thing is its most perfect activity. Thus all desire delight, by which activity is perfected, just as they desire the perfection of their proper activity. And just as error can occur in the desire for an activity, since some focus on extraneous activities while neglecting proper activities, as do all the wicked who pursue the activities proper to beasts while omitting those belonging to man, so also some pursue extraneous delights in place of proper ones.
To the arguments on the other side of the question:
Reply Obj. 5: Happiness is not just any activity, but a perfect activity, which must be delightful. And this is how delight is something belonging to the greatest good.
Reply Obj. 6: This definition that Plato gives is problematic, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 7 and 10. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 12; Bk. 10, chs. 3–4.) For delight consists not in generation but rather in having been generated, since a thing can have its proper activity, which is the cause of delight, when it is already perfect, but not when it is imperfect and in the process of becoming.
The other two arguments conclude that activity is better than delight, which is true. But perfect activity is better than either, and delight is part of perfect activity.
Article 5
On the comparison of spiritual delight to physical delight
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 5; Super Eth. I, lec. 13; Super Eth. X, lec. 10; Super Metaphys. 12, lec. 8; Super Ps. 18.) It seems that physical delights are more powerful than spiritual ones. For the delightful precisely as delightful is desirable. Therefore, what the appetite is more inclined to is more delightful. But it is inclined to physical delights in more cases and more frequently than to spiritual ones. Therefore, physical delights are more powerful than spiritual ones.
Obj. 2: The thing itself has greater efficacy than the likeness of a thing. But physical delights, such as touch and taste, come from contact with things themselves, whereas spiritual delights, such as there are in contemplation, come from the likenesses of things, by which we understand things. Therefore, physical delights are more powerful than spiritual ones.
Obj. 3: As Avicenna says in On Natural Things 5, the activity of present useful causes is more efficacious than the activity of future useful causes. Likewise, the activity of useful causes is more efficacious for delight than the activity of useful causes is for uprightness. Likewise, the activity of what is by opinion is more efficacious than what is by reason. But physical activities proceed from present goods that are useful for delight according to an opinion of the good, whereas spiritual ones proceed especially from future upright goods that are in accord with reason. Therefore, physical delight is more powerful than spiritual delight.
Obj. 4: Physical delights sometimes distract reason by their efficacy and cause a change in the body. And thus they need to be held in check, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7: the strong desires for venereal pleasures manifestly effect a change in the body and even produce insanity in some. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 3, 1147a14–17.) Spiritual delights, however, do not seem to do this. Hence there is no need to hold them in check. Therefore, physical delights are more powerful than spiritual ones.
On the contrary (1), the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1177a23–25.) says in the Ethics 10 that: the most delightful activity is the one that corresponds to wisdom. For philosophy seems to have wondrous delights in purity and steadfastness. And this is also what is said from the mouth of wisdom: the remembrance of me is sweeter than honey, and my inheritance sweeter than the honeycomb (Sir 24:20).
Furthermore (2), the good is the cause of delight. But spiritual good has preeminence over physical good. Therefore so too does spiritual delight have preeminence over corporeal delight.
Furthermore (3), what is whiter has less mixture of black. But physical delight has sadness mixed with it, which is contrary to it, whereas spiritual delight has no contrary sadness that can mix with it. Therefore, spiritual delight is more powerful than physical delight.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that among physical delights what has to do with touch is not the most powerful. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 31, a. 6; ST II-II, q. 141, a. 4; De malo, q. 14, a. 4, ad 1.) For spiritual delight is more powerful than physical delight. Therefore, the closer a physical delight is to spiritual delight, the more powerful it is. But the delight of sight and hearing is nearer to spiritual delight than the delight of touch. Therefore, it is more powerful.
Obj. 2: The cause of delight is the perception of the fitting. But among the other senses sight is more perceptive and capable of knowledge, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 980a23–27.) Therefore, the delight of sight is also the most powerful among physical delights.
Obj. 3: The delights of touch are especially in the acts of the nutritive and generative parts. But these acts are also common to plants, in which no delight is found. Therefore, touch has a minimum of delight.
On the contrary (1), temperance concerns the greatest physical delights and sadnesses. But it concerns the delights of touch, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 1118a17–1118b8.) Therefore, the delights of touch are more powerful than other physical delights.
Furthermore (2), pain is opposed to physical delight. But pain pertains especially to the sense of touch, since it comes from the division of what is continuous. Therefore, among physical delights, too, the delight of touch is more powerful.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that among spiritual delights, delight in works of the active life is more powerful than delight in the works of the contemplative life. For delight pertains to the affections. But the active life depends on rectitude of the will, whereas the contemplative life consists more in perfection of the intellect. Therefore, delight in works of the active life is more powerful than delight in works of the contemplative life.
Obj. 2: The cause of delight is the activity of a connatural habit. But the habit of the moral virtues, which give perfection in the active life, moves more after the manner of nature than the habit of the intellectual virtues. For one who has knowledge can consider something false without difficulty, but a just man cannot without difficult do unjust works, as it says in the Ethics 5. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 9, 1137a5–25.) Therefore, the delight of the moral virtues, which pertain to the active life, is more powerful than the delight of the intellectual virtues, which pertain to the contemplative life.
Obj. 3: Fittingness is an aspect of delight. But delight shares more with moral virtue than with intellectual virtue: we posit both moral virtue and malice in relation to delight and sadness, as it says in the Ethics 2 and 7. (The references here are to the entire books, which make this point repeatedly.) Therefore, the delight of the active life is more powerful than the delight of the contemplative life.
On the contrary (1), the activities of the contemplative life have no admixture of bitterness or tedium. Hence: companionship with her, namely wisdom, has no bitterness, and life with her has no pain (Wis 8:16). But the activities of the active life are sprinkled with many bitternesses. Therefore, the delights of the contemplative life are more powerful.
Furthermore (2), the more delightful an activity is, the more it can be continued. But the activity of contemplation can be continued most of all, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1177a21–23.) Therefore, the activity of contemplation is most delightful.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there is equal delight in all the blessed. For, as a Gloss (Cf. Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:548–49.) says on the passage star differs from star in glory (1 Cor 15:41), there will be equal joy in unequal brightness.
Obj. 2: There will be perfect charity in the blessed. And so each will perfectly fulfill the precept: you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Matt 22:39). Therefore, each will only rejoice at the good of another as at his own good. And so it seems that all will possess equal joy.
Obj. 3: Joy is only lessened by some impediment. But there will be no impediment in any of the blessed. Since, then, there is one reason for everyone’s act of rejoicing, namely the vision of God, it seems that all will rejoice equally.
On the contrary (1), men are taken up on the basis of difference of merits to the different orders of angels, as Gregory says. (See Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels (CCSL 141), Bk. 2, homily 34.) But there is not equal joy in all the angels. Hence Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) says that the supreme hierarchy alone has been made worthy to share the divine refreshment in household unity, ‘refection’ being understood as delight. Therefore, not all the blessed will rejoice equally.
Furthermore (2), the vision of God in the blessed will be the cause of delight. But some saints will see God more clearly, as said above. Therefore, they will not all take delight equally.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, just as something is said to be more known in two ways, either simply or in relation to us, so also one delight can be judged as more powerful than another either simply or in relation to us.
Speaking simply, then, spiritual delight has an incomparable preeminence over physical delight for six reasons. First, because spiritual perfection, which causes spiritual delight, incomparably surpasses physical perfection, which causes physical delight.
Second, because, being better, it is more fitting to the one who takes delight. For each person is most of all what is most perfect in him, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 7, 1178a5–8.) But in us spiritual nature is the most perfect, in respect of which spiritual things are fitting to us, as in each the form is more powerful than the matter. And what befits us according to spiritual nature is more fitting to us. And for this reason, as far as it itself is concerned, it is such as to give greater delight.
Third, because spiritual perfection is naturally more delighted in than physical perfection. And this is clear from experience. For men sustain many physical harms in order to avoid infamy or to possess victory or eminence, which are intelligible perfections, not physical ones. But the more something is loved, the more it is delighted in when possessed. For this reason the Philosopher says in the Parts of Animals 1 (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Bk. 1, ch. 5.) that when the lover loves something, he is drawn to what he comprehends of it, even though sometimes what he comprehends is little in comparison to the many things he comprehends of other things. And in this way the little knowledge that we have of heavenly spiritual substances is most delightful to us.
Fourth, since union is the cause of delight, the more intensely something is united with us, the more delight it gives. But spiritual, intellective things are united with us more intimately than physical things apprehended through the senses. For the senses are joined through apprehension to physical things as it were only on the surface. But the intellect penetrates to the depth of a thing’s quiddity. This is why intelligible delight is more powerful than sensible delight.
Fifth, since activity is the cause of delight by the fact that it proceeds from someone doing it perfectly, as when someone is perfected by a habit, the more perfection is found in the doer regarding the activity, the more delightful his activity is. But motion is the act of the imperfect. For this reason activities mixed with motion fall short of the perfection of delight to the extent that they are connected with motion. For from motion they give rise to weariness. And thus since motion is joined to physical activities, whereas spiritual activities are removed from motion, spiritual delights will be more pure than physical delights and, consequently, have greater intensity.
Sixth, because spiritual delights are longer-lasting and more stable than physical delights, as proceeding from incorruptible and immovable causes.
On the other hand, speaking of delight in relation to us, physical delight is more perceptible to us for four reasons. First, because we perceive sensible, physical things more than spiritual things by the fact that we must arrive at intelligible things from sensible ones. Now before there can be delight, perception of what is fitting is required. And so it is that more are inclined to physical delights than to spiritual ones, since more know sensible things than intelligible ones.
Second, because of the disposition of our affections, which are used to physical delights. For this reason, just as a diseased sense of taste does not perceive pure sweetness, so also our affections, being polluted by physical delights, are not able to perceive those delights which are most pure, namely spiritual ones. And thus virtuous men, who have purified their affections from physical delights, enjoy spiritual delights more. This is also why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5, 1176a15–19.) that the delight which seems more powerful to one who is virtuous is the most powerful of all.
Third, because physical delights are closer to physical motive powers. And so from physical delights and pains an immediate change happens in the body. But this is not the case with spiritual delights and sadnesses, unless they are so strong that they overflow into the sensible appetite. Now bodily changes are most keenly perceived. This is also why physical delight is more perceived than spiritual delight.
Fourth, because, as Augustine says in the Confessions 8, (Augustine, Confessions (CCSL 27), Bk. 8, ch. 3.) joy or delight follows more where greater trouble preceded. Now in physical matters we are continuously troubled by continuous motions, all of which come with a certain exertion. But in spiritual matters we find no such troubling. For this reason physical delights appear greater, as more closely affording a remedy against physical troubles. Therefore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 14, 1154a26–28.) physical delights are desired as a kind of medicine against physical troubles. And for this reason the young, in whom nature continuously labors from the growth of the body and other motions, are more drawn to physical delights. Likewise, too, the melancholic, whose bodies always feel the bite of their agitated constitution, have an intense appetite for pleasure, as if always in need of medicine, as the Philosopher says in the same place. (Ibid., 1154b11–14.)
Reply Obj. 1: This argument proceeds from a consideration of delights in relation to us.
Reply Obj. 2: Through the spiritual we abstract we reach the inner depths more than through the real union offered to the senses, since touch and taste only know the accidents, whereas the intellect knows the quiddity itself of the thing.
Reply Obj. 3: Avicenna is speaking in this passage about the comparison of delights in relation to us. This is why he says the opposite in his Metaphysics, when speaking about the comparison of delights in themselves. There he says that physical delights do not even deserve the name ‘delight’ by comparison to spiritual ones. Or else it may be said that Avicenna is speaking in this passage about the delights that consist in passion, which come about through the motion of the bodily spirit of an animal. For he is of the opinion that sensible delights of this sort come less from spiritual things than physical ones.
Reply Obj. 4: Because physical delights cause a change in the body more than spiritual ones, they naturally impede reason, as do other bodily changes. But spiritual delights, though they seize the mind for themselves, in no respect impede the use of reason. For this reason they are given the name ‘sober.’ Thus we can find over-abundance in corporeal delights, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 14, 1154a10–17.) since they are not worthy of choice to man in themselves but only accidentally, namely, as being medicines staving off corporeal sadnesses. And thus they should be desired with the preservation of a certain measure, which reason affixes to them. And if they go beyond this measure, they are deemed harmful. But spiritual delights are desired in themselves, as connatural to man, not as medicines, since they have no contrary sadnesses. And thus reason affixes no measure to spiritual delights. Rather, the greater they are the more worthy they are of being chosen.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the delights of the sense of touch are compared to the delights of the other senses in two ways.
In one way, as regards intensity. And in this way, the delights of touch are more intense than others for four reasons. First, because the object of touch is really joined to us, whereas the objects of sight, hearing, and smell are joined to us through something of theirs, although none of the senses can enter into the interiority of a thing. But a physical thing is more efficacious in giving delight physically than the species of the thing or something caused by the thing.
Second, because the objects of touch are more connatural to us due to the fact that an animal is constituted by hot, cold, moist, and dry. And thus objects of touch bring greater delight to us than other sensible objects, just as they also bring greater harm. For when they are excessive, they corrupt not only one sense but the whole animal.
Third, since the sense of touch is like the foundation of the senses, by reason of which, when its organ is immobilized all the senses are immobilized, as it says in On Sleeping and Waking. (Aristotle, On Sleep, ch. 1, 454b9–455a2.) What occurs in touch, both in the case of delight and in the case of harm, overflows into the other senses. And for this reason the delight of touch is the more intense among physical delights.
Fourth, because the delights of touch concern what is necessary for the preservation of the individual and the species, as in food, drink, and reproduction. And for this reason the greatest delight is attached to them, in order that animals not neglect them. And so it is that temperance concerns these delights most of all, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 10, 1118a17–1118b8.)
In the second way, the delights of touch are compared to other delights as regards nobility. And in this way they are more material and more bestial and, consequently, less noble. For the other senses receive their objects in a more spiritual manner than touch. This is also why other animals only delight in the other senses as ordered to touch, as it says in the Ethics 3, (Ibid., 1118a17–22. In various places Aristotle notes how human sense-knowledge is connected with delight in knowledge as such. See, e.g., Sense and Sensibilia, ch. 1, 437a4–16; Metaphysics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 980a20-b25.) but man delights in the others even as ordered to knowledge alone.
Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that the delights of the other senses are closer to spiritual delights than the delights of touch, we can gather that they are more noble, but not that they are more intense, since they do not transcend the mode of physical delights.
Reply Obj. 2: Even though sight is more perceptive than the other senses, its perception is according to a lesser joining to the thing than in the sense of touch. And thus the delight that pertains to the sensible object of delight is more through touch than through vision. Nonetheless, delight that pertains to the knowledge of sight is greater than the delight that pertains to the knowledge of touch. But other animals do not delight in sensing in this way, but only men in order to the knowledge that they acquire from the senses. Hence such delight falls in a certain way in the genus of spiritual delights.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though those things that the delights of touch especially pertain to are found in plants, the plants do not perceive them. And so plants’ lack of delight does not stem from a lack of delightful objects, but from the lack of perception.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the delights in the works of the speculative life have preeminence over the delights in the works of the active life, for four reasons.
First, because they are more noble, as coming from more noble things. For the acts of the active life follow on the turning of the soul’s lower part to the things below it, like the passions, which the moral virtues correspond to, and the uses of external goods, in which some virtues, such as justice and liberality, consist. But the acts of the contemplative life exist insofar as the soul through the higher reason is turned to eternal things, which are above it.
Second, because they are more fitting. For just as reason in us is more excellent than the senses, so also what is more fitting to reason is more fitting to us than what befits the senses. Likewise, the speculative intellect takes precedence over the practical. For this reason the perfections of the speculative intellect are more fitting to man.
Third, because they are more pure. For the works of the active life concern the passions of the sensitive part and physical motions. And so they have an admixture of weariness and materiality, which is not the case in spiritual delights.
Fourth, because spiritual delights are more perfect. For man requires many others for the works of the active life. But in the works of the contemplative life each person is more sufficient to himself. And so the delight of the contemplative life does not suffer from deficiency in the way that the delight of the active life does due to there being something lacking of the things required for the activity’s perfection.
Reply Obj. 1: The affections are related equally to both the active and the contemplative life. For just as someone may be willing to carry out works of the active life, someone may also be willing to carry out works of the contemplative life. And so in the affections there is delight in common in both cases. But the cause of the delight of the contemplative life is in the intellect as regards the higher part, while the cause of the delight of the active life is in the lower part of the soul. Now the affections are not less affected by what belongs to the higher part of reason than what belongs to the lower part, but rather more affected.
Reply Obj. 2: A habit inclines to act in two ways. In one way, to the act’s being carried out. And in this way to incline to act only belongs to a habit in the appetitive part. For the appetite that has the good and end as its object moves itself and the cognitive power to act. For the fact that one carries out some action, if it is not from a necessity of nature, arises from the desire for the act or end. In the other way, as regards the mode of acting, namely, that what is done be done rightly. And every habit inclines to act in this way. Therefore, a contemplative habit such as wisdom or understanding does not incline a person to use the act of contemplation, but rather to use it rightly when he uses it. But for one to use it comes from the inclination of a habit not in the lower appetite but of one in the higher, such as charity. For this reason charity also pertains to the contemplative life, as inclining contemplative habits to their acts. But the habits of the active life, such as the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part, as fortitude and temperance are in the irascible and concupiscible. And so these habits incline both to the doing of an act and to its being done rightly. And as far as this goes they are compared to nature, which is the principle of motion. Nevertheless, what a speculative habit inclines to is more connatural to us than what an active habit inclines to.
Reply Obj. 3: The cause of delight is fittingness, not the fittingness of the delight but rather of the cause of the delight. But delights that correspond to moral virtue are physical delights or are mixed in with physical affairs, which are the matter of the moral virtues. But other more noble delights, namely spiritual ones, apply to the contemplative life, not that delight is the matter of contemplation but rather that it is a consequence of contemplation.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that the intensity of delight can come from two factors: from a cause of delight that is stronger and from a disposition in the one who takes delight that has greater capacity for delight. Now the proximate cause of delight is activity, whereas the remote cause is the object of the activity, as in the delight of the blessed which we are now discussing, the proximate cause is the vision of God, but the primary cause is God. This primary cause, then, is one and common to all the blessed. Therefore in this regard their delight is equal. The vision and disposition for delight, however, are not equal, since one person sees more clearly than another, as is clear from what was said above. Also, one person is more capable of delight than another on account of a more perfect habit, which is the light of glory. And thus some delight more than others, though in a qualified sense all delight equally, materially speaking, i.e., inasmuch as they rejoice over an equal thing, namely God. And this is how the Gloss that was cited should be understood, that there will be equal joy in unequal clarity. (’Clarity’ here could also be translated ‘glory.’)
And so the reply to the first objection is clear. Or else we may say to it that all the blessed are said to have equal joy inasmuch as each arrives at the height of joy according to his own mode. But the mode of one will be more ample than that of another. And in this regard the joy of one will be greater than another’s joy, such that the parity implies an equality not of quantity but of proportion. (They are all equal inasmuch as the fullness or actualization of one’s capacity stands to that capacity as the fullness of another’s stands to that other’s.)
Reply Obj. 2: Even though in the kingdom of heaven the lesser rejoices not only at his own good but also at the good of one higher than him, he does not rejoice in it as much as his superior does. For God will be the reason for joy in all. And thus the more a person rejoices in God, the more he will rejoice in anything else. Hence the higher will rejoice more at the good of the lower than even the lower himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though there is no impediment to delight in any of the blessed, there are in them other causes of intensity. For something is intensified not only by moving away from the contrary but also by approaching the terminus.
Question 4
The dowries of the blessed
Next, the dowries must be inquired about; and here five questions arise:
first, whether any dowries should be assigned to the blessed;
- second, whether a dowry differs from beatitude;
- third, whether there are dowries in Christ;
- fourth, whether they are in the angels;
- fifth, on the number of the dowries.
- Article 1
Whether any dowries should be assigned to the blessed
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that we should not posit any dowries in blessed men. For a dowry is given by law to the bridegroom for undertaking the burdens of marriage. But the saints bear not the figure of the bridegroom but rather the figure of the bride, inasmuch as they are members of the Church. Therefore, dowries are not given to them.
Obj. 2: Dowries are given by law not by the father of the bridegroom but by the father of the bride. But all the gifts of beatitude are given to the blessed by the Father of the Bridegroom, namely Christ: every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights (Jas 1:17). Therefore, the sort of gifts given to the blessed should not be called dowries.
Obj. 3: Dowries are given in marriage for the easier bearing of the burdens of marriage. But there are no burdens in spiritual marriage, especially in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore, we should assign no dowries there.
Obj. 4: Dowries are only given for the sake of marriage. But spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ through faith during the state of the Church militant. Therefore, for the same reason if any dowries apply to the blessed, they will also apply to the holy ones in the wayfaring state. But they do not apply to the latter. Therefore, neither do they apply to the blessed.
Obj. 5: Dowries have to do with external goods, which are called goods of fortune. But the rewards of the blessed will pertain to internal goods. Therefore, dowries should not be counted among them.
On the contrary (1), it is said: this is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church (Eph 5:32). From this we hold that spiritual marriage is signified by fleshly marriage. But in fleshly marriage the bride endowed with a dowry is led into the bridegroom’s home. Therefore, since the saints are led into the home of Christ when they are beatified, it seems that they are endowed with certain dowries.
Furthermore (2), in physical marriage the dowries are assigned for the solace of the marriage. But spiritual marriage is more delightful than corporeal marriage. Therefore, it should be assigned dowries most of all.
Furthermore (3), the bride’s adornments pertain to the dowry. But the saints are led adorned into glory, as it is said: he has clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a bride adorns herself with her jewels (Is 61:10). Therefore, the saints in heaven are in possession of dowries.
I answer that, without a doubt, when the blessed are transferred to glory they are divinely granted certain gifts for their adornment. And these adornments are given the name of ‘dowries’ by the masters. Hence a kind of definition of ‘dowry’ is given, in the sense in which we are now speaking: a dowry is a perpetual adornment of the soul and body, sufficient for life, continually perduring in eternal beatitude. And this description is taken after the likeness of a corporeal dowry, by which a bride is adorned and provision is made to the bridegroom whereby he can sufficiently nurture his bride and children. Even so, the dowry is preserved for the bride in a way that cannot be lost such that it reverts to her if the marriage is dissolved. But on the meaning of the name different people are of different opinions.
For some say that ‘dowry’ is not taken from any likeness to corporeal marriage, but rather according to the manner of speaking by which we call every perfection or adornment of any man a dowry, as someone is said to be ‘endowed’ with knowledge who abounds in knowledge. And this is the way in which Ovid used the term ‘endowment’ when he said: and be pleasing by whatever endowment you are able. (Ovid, Ars amatoria I.596.) But this does not seem altogether fitting. For whenever a term is applied to signify something principally, it is not usually transferred to other things except according to a likeness. Hence since the first established meaning of the term ‘dowry’ pertains to fleshly marriage, it seems that in any other instance we will find some likeness to the principal signified object.
And thus others say that we find a likeness in this regard: that a ‘dowry’ properly refers to a gift that is given in corporeal marriage on the part of the bridegroom to the bride when the bride is led into the bridegroom’s home, pertaining to the bride’s adornment. This is clear from what Shechem said to Jacob and his sons: ask of me ever so much as marriage present and gift (Gen 34:12), and from Exodus 22:16: if a man seduces a virgin . . . and lies with her, he shall give the marriage present for her, and make her his wife. This is why the adornment furnished to the saints by Christ when they are led into the house of glory is called a dowry as well.
But this is manifestly contrary to what the jurists say, to whom it pertains to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry is properly a kind of giving on the woman’s side to those who are on the man’s side, given because of the burden of marriage that the man sustains. But what the bridegroom gives the bride is called a brideprice. And the dowry in 1 Kings 9:16 is understood in this way, where it is said that Pharaoh, the king of Egypt, captured Gezer and gave it as dowry to his daughter, the wife of Solomon.
Nor do the authorities cited contradict this. For even though dowries are usually assigned by the parent of the girl, it is sometimes the case that the bridegroom or the bridegroom’s father assigns dowries in place of the girl’s father. This happens in two ways. Either it is from great affection for the bride, as was the case with Shechem, whose father wished to bestow the dowry he should have received because of his son’s strong love for the girl. Or it occurs as a punishment to the bridegroom so that he bestows a dowry from his own wealth on a virgin he has corrupted, which the girl’s father would have had to assign. And this is the case of which Moses is speaking in the authority cited.
And thus, according to others, it should be said that in fleshly marriage a dowry is properly said to be what is given by those on the woman’s side to those on the man’s side for sustaining the burdens of marriage, as has been said. But then the difficulty remains of how this signification can be applied to the case in question, since the adornments in beatitude are given to the spiritual bride by the Father of the Bridegroom. This will be made clear by replying to the arguments.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though in fleshly marriage dowries are allotted to the bridegroom for his use, their ownership and dominion pertain to the bride, as is clear from the fact that if the marriage is dissolved the dowry remains legally the bride’s. And so also in spiritual marriage the adornments themselves that are given to the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her members, belong to the Bridegroom himself inasmuch as they yield glory and honor to him, but to the bride inasmuch as she is adorned by them.
Reply Obj. 2: The Father of the Bridegroom, namely of Christ, is the person of the Father alone, but the Father of the bride is the entire Trinity. Now effects in creation pertain to the entire Trinity. Hence dowries of this sort in spiritual marriage, properly speaking, are given rather by the Father of the bride than by the Father of the Bridegroom. But even though this conferral is done by all the persons of the Trinity, it can be appropriated to each person in some way: to the person of the Father as giving, since in him is authority and paternity with respect to creation is appropriated to him as well, as was said in Book I, Distinction 18, Question 1, Article 5, so that in this way the Father of the Bridegroom and of the bride may be the same; to the Son inasmuch as they are given for him and through him; and finally to the Holy Spirit inasmuch as they are given in him and according to him. For love is the reason for all giving.
Reply Obj. 3: What is brought about by a dowry, namely, support for marriage, applies to a dowry per se. But what is removed by a dowry, namely the burden of marriage, which is relieved by way of a dowry, applies to it incidentally, just as it applies to grace per se to make a person just, but it is incidental that it makes a just person out of a wicked one. Therefore, even though in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, there is in it the utmost joyfulness and dowries are conferred on the bride to bring this joyfulness to perfection, i.e., so that through them she may be united with the Bridegroom with the utmost delight.
Reply Obj. 4: Dowries were not customarily bestowed on the bride when espoused but when she was led into the bridegroom’s home, such that she held the bridegroom face to face. But as long as we are in this life we are away from the Lord (2 Cor 5:6). And thus it is not the gifts that are conferred on the saints in this life that are called dowries but instead those that are conferred on them when they are transferred into glory, in which they enjoy the Bridegroom face to face.
Reply Obj. 5: In spiritual marriage interior beauty is required, as it says in Psalm 45 (44): 13: all glorious is the princess within. But in corporeal marriage external ornament is required. And for this reason the kind of dowries that are bestowed in corporeal marriage do not need to be bestowed in spiritual marriage.
Article 2
Whether a dowry differs from beatitude
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: below, a. 5, qa. 1, ad 5.) It seems that a dowry is the same as beatitude. For as is clear from the definition above, it is an adornment of soul and body, continually perduring in eternal beatitude. But beatitude of the soul is a kind of adornment of it. Therefore, beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 2: Whatever imbues the bride’s union with the bridegroom with delight is called a dowry. But beatitude does this in spiritual marriage. Therefore, beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 3: Vision, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Explanation of the Psalms, Ps. 90, serm. 2, par. 13: “tota merces nostra uisio est.”) is the whole substance of beatitude. But vision is included as one of the dowries. Therefore, beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 4: Enjoyment makes a person blessed. But enjoyment is a dowry. Therefore, a dowry makes a person blessed, and thus it is beatitude.
Obj. 5: According to Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy 3, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94), Bk. 3, prose 2.) beatitude is the state perfected by the gathering together of all goods. But the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries. Therefore, dowries are parts of beatitude.
On the contrary (1), a dowry is given without merits. But beatitude is not given but rendered. Therefore, beatitude is not a dowry.
Furthermore (2), beatitude is only one, whereas the dowries are more than one. Therefore, beatitude is not a dowry.
Furthermore (3), beatitude is in a person according to what is most powerful in him, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 1095a14–20.) But a dowry is also applied to the body. Therefore, dowry and beatitude are not the same.
I answer that, concerning this there are two opinions. For some say that beatitude and dowry are really the same though they differ logically. For a dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas beatitude does not. But, as it seems, this cannot be the case, since beatitude consists in activity, while a dowry is not an activity but rather a quality or a kind of disposition. And thus we should say, according to others, that beatitude and dowry really differ such that beatitude refers to the perfect activity itself by which the blessed soul is joined to God but dowries refer to habits, dispositions, or whatever other qualities that are ordered to this perfect activity. In this way the dowries are ordered to beatitude rather than being in beatitude as parts of it.
Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the soul but is something that comes from the adornment of the soul, since beatitude is a kind of activity. Adornment, on the other hand, refers to a loveliness of the blessed person himself.
Reply Obj. 2: Beatitude is not ordered to the union but rather is itself the union of the soul with Christ, which is by an activity. But dowries are gifts disposing to this sort of union.
Reply Obj. 3: Vision can be taken in two ways. In one way, actually, i.e., for the act of vision itself. And in this way it is not a dowry but beatitude itself. In the other way, it can be taken as habitual, i.e., for the habit by which such an activity is elicited, i.e., for that very brightness of glory by which the soul is divinely enlightened to see God. And in this way it is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, though not beatitude itself.
And the same thing should be said to the fourth objection concerning enjoyment.
Reply Obj. 5: Beatitude gathers together all goods, not as parts of the essence of beatitude but as in a way ordered to beatitude, as said above.
Article 3
Whether Christ has dowries
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that it belongs to Christ to have dowries. For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory. Thus it is said: who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body (Phil 3:21). Therefore Christ, too, has dowries.
Obj. 2: Dowries are assigned in spiritual marriage after a likeness to corporeal marriage. But in Christ there is found a kind of spiritual marriage that is unique to him, namely that of two natures in one person, to the extent that the human nature in him is said to be espoused by the Word, as is clear from a Gloss on the passage: he hath set his tabernacle in the sun, as a bridegroom leaving his chamber (Ps 19:4), as well as: behold the tabernacle of God with men (Rev 21:3). Therefore, it belongs to Christ to have dowries. (The word “tabernacle” is read here in the sense of a bridal chamber.)
Obj. 3: As Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 3, ch. 31.) in accord with the rule of Ticonius, Christ refers to himself not only as Bridegroom but also as bride on account of the unity of the mystical body between head and members, as is clear: as a bridegroom decks himself with a garland, and as a bride adorns herself with her jewels (Is 61:10). Since, then, brides are due dowries, we must, it seems, hold that there are dowries in Christ.
Obj. 4: A dowry is due to all the members of the Church, since the Church is the bride. But Christ is a member of the Church, as is clear: now you are the body of Christ and members of a member (1 Cor 12:27), where a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:542.) explains of Christ. Therefore, dowries are due to Christ.
Obj. 5: Christ has perfect vision, enjoyment, and delight. But these are included as dowries. Therefore, Christ had dowries.
On the contrary (1), there is a distinction of persons between bridegroom and bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God, who is the Bridegroom, as is clear: he who has the bride is the bridegroom (Jn 3:29). Therefore, since the dowries are assigned to the bride or for the bride, it seems that it does not belong to Christ to have dowries.
Furthermore (2), the same person does not give dowries and receive them. But Christ is the one who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore, it does not belong to Christ to have dowries.
I answer that, concerning this difficulty there are two opinions.
For some say that in Christ there is a threefold union: one that is called consensual, by which he is united to God through a connection of love; another conferring dignity, by which the human nature is united to the divine; third, that by which Christ is united to the Church. They say, then, that it belongs to Christ to have dowries under the account of dowry according to the first two unions, though with regard to the third a dowry most excellently befits him, though not under the account of dowry, since in such a union Christ is like the Bridegroom and the Church the bride. And a dowry is given to a bride as regards property and dominion, though it is given to the bridegroom as regards use. But this does not seem fitting. For in that union by which Christ is joined to the Father through the consent of love, even as God, there is not said to be a marriage, since there is not any subjection there, which there must be in the bride with respect to the bridegroom. Neither can the notion of dowry be found properly in the union of the human nature to the divine in the unity of the person or even through a conformity of will, for three reasons. First, because a conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride is required in a marriage in which dowries are given, and this is lacking in the joining of the human nature to the divine. Second, because there is required in this case a distinction of persons, but the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word. Third, because a dowry is given when the bride is newly led into the bridegroom’s home, and this seems to pertain to the bride, who goes from not being joined to being joined. But the human nature, which is assumed by the Word into unity of person, was never something not perfectly joined.
Hence we must say, with others, that either the aspect of dowry does not at all befit Christ or that it does not befit him properly as in the other saints, though what the dowries indicate befit him in a most excellent manner.
Reply Obj. 1: This conforming should be understood in accord with what a dowry is, not in accord with the account of a dowry that is in Christ. For it is not necessary for what we are conformed to Christ in to exist in us and in Christ in the same way.
Reply Obj. 2: The human nature is not properly said to be a bride in the union by which it is joined to the Word, since there is no distinction of persons preserved in that case, which is required between bridegroom and bride. But that the human nature is sometimes said to be espoused to the extent that it is joined to the Word is inasmuch as it possesses the act of the bride, i.e., because it is inseparably joined, and because in this joining the human nature is lower than the Word and is ruled by the Word as a bride is ruled by her bridegroom.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that Christ is sometimes called a bride is not because he is truly a bride but inasmuch as he assumes the person of his bride, namely the Church, who is spiritually joined to him. Hence nothing prevents that after this manner of speaking he could be said to have dowries, not that he himself has them, but because the Church has them.
Reply Obj. 4: The name ‘Church’ is taken in two ways. Sometimes it names only the body which is joined to Christ as to its head. And in this way the Church alone has the character of the bride and Christ is not a member of the Church but is the head of the Church influencing all the Church’s members. In the other way, ‘Church’ is taken as naming the head and the members joined to it. And in this way Christ is called a member of the Church, inasmuch as he has an office distinct from all others, namely to give an influx of life to the others, although he is not very properly called a member, since ‘member’ implies a kind of partiality. In Christ, however, the spiritual good is not parted out but is whole and integral. Hence he himself is the Church’s whole good, nor is he together with others any greater than he by himself. But speaking in this way of the Church, the Church names not only the bride but also the bridegroom and bride, as through the spiritual union the two become one. Hence, granted that Christ is in a way called a member of the Church, he can in no way be called a member of the bride. And so the notion of dowry does not apply to him.
Reply Obj. 5: This argument commits the fallacy of accident. For they do not befit Christ under the notion of dowry.
Article 4
Whether the angels have dowries
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the angels have dowries. For on the passage: my dove, my perfect one, is only one (Song 6:8), a Gloss says: there is one Church in men and angels. But the Church is the bride, and so it befits the Church’s members to have dowries. Therefore, the angels have dowries.
Obj. 2: On the passage: be like men who are waiting for their master to come home from the marriage feast (Lk 12:36), a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:298.) says: the Lord has gone to a wedding when after the Resurrection the new man has joined the multitude of angels to himself. Therefore, the multitude of angels is the bride of Christ. And so dowries are due to the angels.
Obj. 3: Spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union. But the spiritual union between the angels and God is not less than the spiritual union between blessed humans and God. Therefore, since the dowries we are now discussing are assigned by reason of spiritual marriage, it seems that dowries apply to the angels.
Obj. 4: Spiritual marriage requires a spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. But in nature the angels are more like Christ, inasmuch as he is the supreme spirit, than men are. Therefore, a spiritual marriage of the angels to Christ is even more possible than that of men to Christ.
Obj. 5: Greater agreement is required between head and members than between bridegroom and bride. But the conformity between Christ and the angels is sufficient for Christ to be called the head of the angels. Therefore, for the same reason this comformity is sufficient for him to be called the Bridegroom with respect to them.
On the contrary (1), in his commentary On the Song of Songs, (Origen, On the Song of Songs, hom. 1, PG 13:38.) Origen distinguishes four persons: the bridegroom and bride, the young women, and the companions of the bridegroom. And he says that the angels are the companions of the bridegroom. Since, then, dowries are only due to the bride, it seems that dowries do not befit the angels.
Furthermore (2), Christ espoused the Church to himself by his Incarnation and Passion. Hence this is prefigured when it is said: you are a bridegroom of blood to me (Ex 4:25). But by his Passion and Incarnation Christ was not joined to the angels in a way other than he had been previously. Therefore, the angels do not belong to the Church insofar as the Church is called bride. Therefore, dowries do not befit the angels.
I answer that, there is no doubt that the things belonging to the soul’s dowries befit angels as well as men. But they do not befit them as well as men under the notion of dowry, due to the fact that the notion of bride does not apply as properly to angels as it does to human beings. For a conformity of nature is required between bridegroom and bride such that they be of the same species. Now human beings have this commonality with Christ, inasmuch as he assumed a human nature, through which he became like all men in the nature of the human species. However, he is not like angels according to unity of species, either in his divine nature or in his human nature. And thus the notion of dowry does not befit angels as properly as it does men. Nevertheless, with things that are said metaphorically, since a likeness in every respect is not required, one cannot conclude from some dissimilarity that one thing is not predicated of another thing metaphorically. And the argument given cannot prove that dowries do not befit the angels simply speaking, but only that dowries do not befit them as properly as they do men, due to the dissimilarity mentioned.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though angels belong to the unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church insofar as the Church is called bride by conformity of nature. And so it does not befit them properly to have dowries.
Reply Obj. 2: This espousal is taken in a broad sense for union, which does not possess a conformity of nature in species. And in this way nothing prevents us from positing dowries in the angels, if we take ‘dowries’ in a broad sense.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though in spiritual marriage there is only a spiritual union, those who are joined together in the full account of marriage must have a common natural species. And for this reason espousal does not properly pertain to the angels.
Reply Obj. 4: The conformity by which the angels are like Christ as God is not such as suffices for the full account of marriage, since it is not a conformity through sharing in species, but rather an infinite distance still remains.
Reply Obj. 5: Nor is Christ properly called the head of the angels according to that account of ‘head’ requiring conformity of nature. Yet one should know that, even granted that the head and the other members are parts of an individual of a single species, still if each part is considered by itself, it does not belong to the same species as another part. For a hand is a different species of part than a head. Hence, speaking of the members in themselves, no other agreement than one of proportion is required among them, such that one receives from another and one is subservient to another. And then the agreement between God and the angels is more sufficient for the account of head than for the account of bridegroom.
Article 5
On the number of the dowries
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 12, a. 7, ad 1; In III Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; Super Heb. 1, lec. 6.) It seems unfitting to hold that there are three dowries of the soul: vision, love, and enjoyment. For the soul is joined to God according to the mind, in which the image of the Trinity exists on the basis of memory, intelligence, and will. But love pertains to the will and vision to the intelligence. Therefore, something should be posited that corresponds to the memory, since enjoyment pertains not to the memory but rather to the will.
Obj. 2: The dowries of beatitude are said to correspond to the virtues of the wayfaring state by which we are joined to God, which are faith, hope, and charity, whose object is God himself. But love corresponds to charity and vision to faith. Therefore, something would have to be posited that would pertain to hope, since enjoyment pertains instead to charity.
Obj. 3: We are only said to enjoy God through love and vision. For we are said to enjoy the things we love for their own sake, as is clear from Augustine in On Christian Doctrine 1. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Bk. 1, ch. 4.) Therefore, enjoyment should not be posited as a different dowry from love.
Obj. 4: Comprehension is required for the perfection of beatitude: run that you may comprehend (1 Cor 9:24). Therefore, a fourth dowry would still have to be posited.
Obj. 5: Anselm (Not Anselm, but Eadmer, in his book De similitudinibus, ch. 48, PL 159:627.) says that the following pertain to the soul’s beatitude: wisdom, friendship, harmony, power, honor, security, and joy. And so it seems that the aforementioned dowries are unfittingly assigned.
Obj. 6: Augustine says at the end of the City of God that: in that beatitude God will be seen without end, will be loved without tedium, will be praised without weariness. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 30.) Therefore, praise should be counted with the previously assigned dowries.
Obj. 7: Boethius includes five things pertaining to beatitude in the Consolation of Philosophy 3: sufficiency, which riches promise; joyfulness, which desire promises; celebrity, which fame promises; security, which power promises; veneration, which dignity promises. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94), Bk. 3, prose 2.) And so it seems that these should be set down as dowries rather than the ones named.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that we should not consider there to be dowries in the body in addition to the dowries of the soul. For the dowries are ordered to spiritual union, in which beatitude consists, as has been said. But the things in the body do not incline to this kind of union. For the activities of the mind, through which the soul is joined to God, are not carried out by physical organs. Therefore, we should not posit any dowries of the body.
Obj. 2: Dowry and beatitude are due to man insofar as he is in the image of God. But man is not in the image of God according to his body but according to his soul, as is clear from Augustine in On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 12, chs. 6–7.) Therefore, dowries are not due to the body.
Obj. 3: The lower powers of the sensitive and vegetative soul are more perfect than the body itself. But no dowries are assigned that correspond to the lower powers of the soul. Therefore, no dowries should be assigned that correspond to the body.
On the contrary (1), dowries are due to the blessed insofar as they are conformed to Christ. But men are conformed to Christ not only according to the soul but also according to the body. Therefore, dowries are due also to the body.
Furthermore (2), this is also clear from the definition of ‘dowry’ given above, which runs: a dowry is an adornment of soul and body.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the dowries of the body are unfittingly counted as four: subtlety, agility, clarity, and impassibility. For Anselm (Eadmer, De similitudinibus, ch. 48, PL 159:627.) seems to count seven, saying that there will be seven beatitudes of the body: beauty, swiftness, fortitude, freedom, health, pleasure, and longevity.
Obj. 2: The perfection of a living body involves not only motion but also the senses. But one dowry is included that pertains to motion, namely agility. Therefore, there should be another that would pertain to the senses.
Obj. 3: The bodies of the saints will be delightful according to all the senses. Therefore, just as clarity, which pertains to sight, is considered a dowry, so also other dowries pertaining to the other senses would have to be included.
Obj. 4: Just as impassibility befits the glorified body, so also it befits the glorified soul. Therefore, there is no need to include it as a dowry of the body since it is not included as a dowry of the soul.
Obj. 5: Just as subtlety is a dowry of the body, so also is transparency, as is clear from Gregory in the Moralia (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 18, par. 48.) on the passage: gold or glass cannot equal it (Job 28:17). Therefore, transparency should be included among the dowries of the body.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, everyone holds in common that there are three dowries of the soul, but the position is held in different ways. For some say that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and enjoyment. Others say that they are vision, comprehension, and enjoyment. Still others say that they are vision, love, and comprehension. Nevertheless, all these ways of assigning them are reduced to the same thing and their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said that a dowry is something inhering in the soul by which it is ordered to the activity that beatitude consists in. In this activity two things are required: the substance of the activity itself, which is vision, and the perfection of the activity, which is delight. For beatitude must be a perfect activity.
Now a vision is delightful in two ways. In one way, on the part of the object, inasmuch as what is seen is delightful. In the other way, on the part of the vision, inasmuch as seeing is itself delightful, as we delight in knowing evils, though evils do not delight us. And because this activity in which ultimate beatitude consists should be most perfect, it is required that this vision be delightful in both ways.
Now for the vision itself to be delightful, it must be made connatural to the one seeing through some habit. But for it to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are required: that the visible object be fitting and that it be united with the one seeing. In this way, then, for the delightfulness of vision on the side of the vision itself a habit is required that elicits the vision, and this is one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things are required: fittingness through affect, and in this regard some include love as a dowry and some enjoyment to the extent that enjoyment pertains to the affections, for what we take utmost delight in we consider most fitting. A union with the visible object is also required, and so some people set this down as comprehension, which is nothing other than to possess God as present and hold him in himself. But, according to others, this is enjoyment, not the enjoyment of hope as in the wayfaring state, but the enjoyment of the very thing at last as it is in heaven. (The expressions fruitio spei and fruitio rei constitute a pun.) And so the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues: vision to faith, hope to comprehension (or enjoyment in one way of taking it), and love to charity—or, according to another way of taking it, enjoyment, for perfect enjoyment of the sort that will be had in heaven includes love and comprehension in itself, and thus some take it for one and others for the other.
Some, however, attribute these three dowries to the three powers of the soul: vision to the rational, love to the concupiscible, and enjoyment to the irascible, inasmuch as such enjoyment is acquired through a kind of victory. But this is not said properly, since the irascible and concupiscible powers are not in the intellective part but the sensitive part, as was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 2, while the dowries of the soul are held to be in the mind itself.
Reply Obj. 1: Memory and intelligence have only a single activity. For either intelligence itself is an activity of memory, or if intelligence is said to be a kind of potency, then memory does not result in activity except by the mediation of intelligence, since it belongs to memory to retain knowledge. For this reason, only one single habit corresponds to memory and intelligence, namely knowledge. And thus a single dowry alone, namely vision, corresponds to both.
Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment corresponds to hope inasmuch as it includes comprehension, which takes the place of hope. For what is hoped for is not yet had. And thus in a certain way hope afflicts a person because of the distance from what is loved. And for this reason it does not remain in heaven but rather comprehension takes its place.
Reply Obj. 3: The enjoyment that includes comprehension is distinguished from vision and love, though in a different way than love is distinguished from vision. For love and vision designate different habits, one of which pertains to the intellect and the other to the affections. But comprehension or the enjoyment that is taken for comprehension, does not imply a different habit from these two but rather implies the removal of the impediments to the mind being able to be united to God face to face. And this occurs through the fact that the very possession of glory frees the soul from every defect, just as it makes it sufficient for knowing without phantasms and for mastering the body, and other such things, that exclude the impediments by which it happens that we now are on pilgrimage far from the Lord.
The reply to the fourth objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 5: Dowries are properly the immediate principles of the activity that perfect beatitude consists in, through which the soul is united with Christ. However, what Anselm (Eadmer.) enumerates are not of this sort but are, rather, things that accompany or result from beatitude in many different ways, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to whom, of the things enumerated, wisdom alone pertains. But these things are also in relation to others, whether they be peers, to whom friendship pertains as to the union of affections, and harmony as to consent in things to be done; or whether they be inferiors, to whom power pertains to the extent that the lower are disposed by the higher, and honor in accord with what is shown to the higher by the lower. And they also may be in relation to oneself, to whom security pertains as regards removal of evil and joy as regards attainment of the good.
Reply Obj. 6: The praise that Augustine counts as the third of the things there will be in heaven is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a consequence of beatitude. For from the fact that the soul is united to God, which beatitude consists in, it follows that it breaks forth into praise, which is why praise does not have the character of a dowry.
Reply Obj. 7: The five things Boethius enumerates are certain conditions of beatitude, not dispositions to the act of beatitude, because beatitude by reason of its perfection possesses alone and uniquely by itself whatever men seek after in various things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 1 and 10. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, esp. chs. 5, 7; Bk. 10, chs. 7–8.) And accordingly Boethius shows that these five things exist in true beatitude, since they are what all men seek after in temporal happiness. They pertain either to being free from evil, such as security, or ot to the attainment of the good or of the fitting, as joyfulness, or of the perfect, such as sufficiency; or they are for the manifestation of the good, such as celebrity, inasmuch as the good of one lies within the knowledge of many, and veneration, inasmuch as a sign of this knowledge or good is shown. For veneration consists in showing honor as a testimony of virtue. Hence it is clear that these five elements should not be called dowries but rather certain conditions of beatitude.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that man is a partaker in beatitude to the extent that he exists in the image of God. Now, the image of God consists first and principally in the mind, but through a kind of derivation a representation of the image is found also in man’s body, insofar as the body must be proportioned to the soul, as is also clear from what the Master says in Sentences II, Distinction 16. For this reason, beatitude or glory is first and principally in the mind, but through a kind of overflowing it also spills over into the body so that man’s beatitude can be spoken of with reference to the body, which perfectly follows the command of the soul joined to God. Hence just as the blessed soul’s dispositions to the perfect activity by which it is joined to God are called the soul’s dowries, so also the glorified body’s dispositions by which it is made perfectly subject to the soul are called dowries of the body.
Reply Obj. 1: The glorified body’s perfection also in a certain way helps the soul more freely and perfectly cling to God, inasmuch as it is not drawn away from clinging to God by any physical impediments, and also inasmuch as the soul possesses being more perfectly when joined to the body than it does when separate from the body. And so its activity is also more perfect, as said above.
The reply to the second objection is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), Bk. 12, ch. 1.) to the external man pertains not only the body but also the body’s senses. For this reason all the lower powers that are connected with organs are reckoned together with the body and receive dowries also together with it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that the soul is the form of the body and its mover. Hence since the body’s dowries are ordered to the body’s being perfectly subject to the soul, this will be so that it is subject to it perfectly both as form and as mover. Now three things are caused in matter by form: substantial being, powers and secondary (accidental) forms, and the preservation of both.
Therefore, inasmuch as the glorified body is perfectly subject to the soul in the substantial being it has from it, there is the dowry of subtlety. For the glorious body is called subtle, as was said above (Distinction 44), from the fact that it is informed perfectly by the soul.
And inasmuch as it is perfectly subject to it as its form according to the accidental forms that are in the body from the soul, there is the dowry of clarity.
In turn, inasmuch as the glorious body is perfectly preserved by the soul, there is the dowry of impassibility. For it is called impassible from the fact that by the soul’s power it is preserved immune from all harm.
But inasmuch as the body is perfectly subject to the soul as its mover, there is the dowry of agility. For the body is called agile insofar as it is responsive and ready for all the acts of the soul.
Now some correlate the four dowries of the body with the four cardinal virtues, because corporeal goods are the matter of the cardinal virtues. Thus they say that clarity corresponds to prudence on account of knowledge. Next, justice, which is perpetual and immortal, corresponds to impassibility. Next, agility, from which it comes about that nothing can resist the body, corresponds to fortitude, for which reason agility is indicated where it is said: it is raised in power (1 Cor 15:43). Finally, subtlety, which attenuates the body, corresponds to temperance. And in this way the four dowries of the body correspond to the four cardinal virtues just as the three dowries of the soul correspond to the three theological virtues, as has been said.
Reply Obj. 1: The seven things listed by Anselm are contained under these four. For beauty is contained under clarity; swiftness, freedom, and fortitude, under agility; health and longevity under impassibility; and pleasure can be reduced to subtlety, since from the fact that the body is perfectly informed by the soul it is disposed for delight.
Reply Obj. 2: Agility pertains not only to motion but also to the senses and all other activities of the soul, such that the glorious body is thus called agile insofar as it is perfectly suited to all the activities carried out by the body.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in On Generation and Corruption 2, (Cf. On Generation and Corruption, Bk. 2, ch. 2, 329b7–15.) visible qualities are more noble than other sensible qualities in the fact that lower bodies agree with higher bodies in visibility, and not in other sensible qualities. Hence light or clarity, which is a quality proper to heavenly bodies, is the more noble among other corporeal qualities and a better likness for expressing intelligible clarity. And thus from the overflowing of glory from the soul to the body, clarity is included as a dowry in the glorious body rather than any other sensible quality.
Reply Obj. 4: The soul is not naturally passible, except incidentally, inasmuch as the body suffers. Or by divine justice it is passible due to fault, which is far from the souls of the blessed on account of the love of God. And so the fact that impassibility is included as a dowry of the body does not necessitate that it be included as a dowry of the soul.
Reply Obj. 5: The clear and the transparent are reduced to the same genus by the fact that light is the act of the transparent. And thus transparency is not listed as a dowry distinct from clarity. Now of the dowries listed, both of soul and of body, special mention has been made: of enjoyment in Book I, Distinction 1; of love in Book III, in the treatise on charity; of vision above, in this same Distinction; and of the four dowries of the body above in Distinction 44.
Question 5
The crown of distinction
Next, the “aureole” or crown of special distinction must be inquired about; and here five questions arise:
first, what an aureole is;
- second, how it differs from a fruit;
- third, on what basis a crown of special distinction is due;
- fourth, to whom it is due;
- fifth, on the number of the special distinctions.
- Article 1 What an aureole is (The term aurea, which refers to the essential reward of heaven, will be translated “golden crown.” The term aureola, which is a diminutive of aurea, has been translated in previous sections as “special crown of distinction,” but will here be rendered simply as “aureole,” for the sake of brevity.)
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that an aureole is not different reward from the essential reward, which is called a golden crown. For the essential reward is beatitude itself. But beatitude, according to Boethius, is the state perfected by the gathering together of all goods. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (CCSL 94), Bk. 3, prose 2.) Therefore, the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven. And so the aureole is included in the golden crown.
Obj. 2: More and less do not make for different species. But those who keep the counsels and precepts are rewarded more than those who keep only the precepts. But their reward seems to differ in nothing except that one is greater than another. Since, then, ‘aureole’ refers to a reward that is due to works of perfection, it seems that an aureole does not indicate something distinct from the golden crown.
Obj. 3: Reward corresponds to merit. But the root of all merit is charity. Since, then, the golden crown corresponds to charity, it seems that in heaven there will not be a reward distinct from the golden crown.
Obj. 4: Blessed men are taken up into the orders of the angels, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels (CCSL 141), Bk. 2, homily 34.) But among the angels, although some gifts are given to some of them in a surpassing way, nevertheless with them nothing is possessed individually. For all gifts are in all of them, though not equally, since some possess more sublimely than others what they all have, as Gregory also says. (Ibid.) Therefore in the blessed, too, there will not be any reward that is not common to all. Therefore, an aureole is not a reward distinct from the golden crown.
Obj. 5: A more excellent reward is owed to more excellent merit. If, then, a golden crown is due to works of precept, but an aureole is due to works of counsel, then an aureole will be more perfect than the golden crown. And then it should not be designated by a diminutive. (Aureola, the reward for special distinction, is literally a “little crown” as compared with the aurea, “golden crown” that represents the reward of attaining heaven.) And so it seems that an aureole is not a reward distinct from a golden crown.
On the contrary (1), on the passage: he shall make another little golden crown (Ex 25:25), a Gloss says: to this crown pertains the new song, which the virgins alone sing together before the Lamb. From this it seems that an aureole is a kind of crown rendered not to all but to some in particular. A golden crown, however, is rendered to all the blessed. Therefore, an aureole is something other than the golden crown.
Furthermore (2), a crown is due to a struggle followed by victory: he is not crowned, unless he competes according to the rules (2 Tim 2:5). Therefore where the contest has a special character, there should be a special crown. But in some works the contest does have a special character. Therefore, they should have a crown before the others, and this we call an aureole.
Furthermore (3), the Church Militant descends from the Triumphant, as is clear: I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God (Rev 21:2). But in the Church Militant special rewards are rendered to those who perform special works, as a crown to the victors and a prize to the runners. Therefore, it should be likewise in the Church Triumphant.
I answer that, man’s essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God inasmuch as a person perfectly enjoys him as perfectly seen and loved. This reward is metaphorically called a crown or a golden crown, both from the perspective of merit, which occurs with a kind of struggle, for the life of man upon earth is a warfare (Job 7:1), and also from the perspective of the reward, through which man is made in a certain way a partaker in divinity and, consequently, in royal power: thou hast made them a kingdom and priests to our God (Rev 5:10). Now a crown is the proper sign of royal dignity and for the same reason the reward that is added to the essential reward has the character of a crown. A crown also signifies a certain perfection by reason of its circular shape and on this basis, too, belongs to the perfection of the blessed.
But because nothing can be superadded that is not less than that to which it is added, the superadded reward is given the name of aureole. (This word, aureola, is the diminutive of aurea.) Now there are two ways that something may be added to the essential reward, which is called the golden crown. In one way, from the condition of the nature that is rewarded, as beyond beatitude, the body’s glory is joined to the soul. Thus even the glory of the body itself is sometimes given the name of aureole. This is why commenting on Exodus 25:25: thou shalt make another little golden crown (Ex 25:25), a Gloss (From Bede, On the Tabernacle (CCSL 119A), Bk. 1, ch. 6.) says that at the end an aureole is placed on top of it, since in Scripture it is said that a more sublime glory is kept in store for them in the reception of their bodies. But this is not the aureole that we are now discussing.
In the other way, from the character of a meritorious work, which has the character of merit from two sources, from which it also has the character of goodness. One is from the root of charity, which is referred to the last end. And so the essential reward, namely attaining the end, is due to it, and this is the golden crown. The other is that by its genus the act has a certain praiseworthiness from due circumstances, from the eliciting habit, and from the proximate end. And in this way an accidental reward is due to it, which is called an aureole. And this is the way in which we mean aureole in the present discussion.
And so it should be said that ‘aureole’ indicates something that is superadded to a golden crown, i.e., a certain joy in one’s own works having the character of a surpassing victory, which is a different joy from rejoicing at being united with God, which is the joy called the golden crown. Yet some say that the common reward itself, the golden crown, takes the name ‘aureole’ insofar as it is rendered to virgins, martyrs, or teachers of the faith, just as a denarius takes the name ‘debt’ from the fact that it is owed to someone, though in this case the debt and the denarius are altogether the same thing. This is not in such a way that the essential reward must be greater when it is called an aureole but rather that it corresponds to a more excellent act, not according to intensity of merit but according to the manner of meriting, such that although in two people there may be an equal clearness of the vision of God, in one it is called an aureole and not in the other, inasmuch as it corresponds to more excellent merit according to the manner of acting. But this seems to be contrary to the understanding of the Gloss (Ibid.) on Exodus 25. (Exodus 25 has to do with the furnishings of the tabernacle.) For if the golden crown and an aureole were the same, the aureole would not be said to be placed on top of the golden crown. And besides, since reward corresponds to merit, an excellence in reward must correspond to the excellence of merit that stems from the manner of acting. And we call this excellence an aureole. Hence an aureole must differ from the golden crown.
Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude includes in itself all the goods necessary for man’s perfect life, which consists in man’s perfect activity. But some goods can be superadded, not as necessary for perfect activity in such a way that without them it cannot exist, but because with their addition beatitude has greater brilliance. Hence it pertains to the well-being of beatitude and to something of its comeliness, just as political happiness is adorned by nobility, physical beauty, and other such things, though it can exist without them, as is clear in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 8, 1099b1–5.) And this is how an aureole is related to the beatitude of heaven.
Reply Obj. 2: A person who keeps the counsels and the precepts always merits more than someone who only keeps the precepts, insofar as the character of merit is considered in works on the basis of the genus of the works, though not always as the character of merit is weighed on the basis of the root of charity. For it sometimes happens that one person keeps only the precepts with a greater charity than another keeps both the precepts and the counsels. But the converse is more often the case, since the proof of love is doing the work, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels (CCSL 141), Bk. 2, homily 30, par. 1.) It is not, therefore, the essential reward itself as more intense that is called an aureole, but rather what is superadded to the essential reward indifferently, whether the one possessing the aureole has a greater essential reward or a lesser or equal one to the essential reward of someone without an aureole.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity is the principle of meriting, but our act is like the instrument by which we merit. Now to obtain the effect there is required not only due disposition in the one moving first but also right disposition in the instrument. And thus in the effect something follows on the part of the first principle, which is the principal effect, and something on the part of the instrument, which is secondary. This is why in the reward too there is something on the part of charity, namely the golden crown, and something from the genus of the activity, such as an aureole.
Reply Obj. 4: All the angels merited their beatitude from the same genus of act, namely in the fact that they were turned toward God. And thus none of them has an individual reward that is not found in the others in some way. Men, on the other hand, merit beatitude by different kinds of acts. And thus the case is not similar. Still, what one person seems to have in a special way among men is possessed by all in a certain way as common, namely inasmuch as through perfect charity each considers the good of another as his own. This joy, however, by which one rejoices with another cannot be called an aureole, since it is not given as his reward for victory but rather has to do with someone else’s victory, whereas a crown is given to the victors themselves, not to those who rejoice with them in their victory.
Reply Obj. 5: The excellence of merit arising from charity is greater than the excellence that arises from the genus of the act, just as the end that charity orders toward is more important than what is directed toward the end, which is what our acts are concerned with. Hence, too, the reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it be, is greater than any reward corresponding to the act by reason of its genus. And thus the aureole is spoken of in the diminutive in relation to the golden crown.
Article 2
How it differs from a fruit
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that an aureole does not differ from a fruit. For different rewards are not owed for the same merit. But an aureole and hundredfold fruit (See Matthew 13:23 and 19:29.) correspond to the same merit, namely virginity, as is clear in a Gloss on Matthew 13:8. Therefore, an aureole is the same as the fruit.
Obj. 2: Augustine says in On Virginity (Augustine, On Holy Virginity (CSEL 41), ch. 45.) that the hundredfold fruit is due to a martyr and the same to a virgin. Therefore, fruit is a kind of reward common to both virgins and martyrs. But an aureole is also due to the same people. Therefore, an aureole is the same as a fruit.
Obj. 3: In beatitude we only find two rewards: essential and accidental, which is added above the essential. But the reward superadded to the essential is said to be the aureole, as is clear from the fact that Exodus 25 says that the aureole is placed on top of the golden crown. But a fruit is not the essential reward, since then it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore, it is the same as an aureole.
On the contrary (1), things that are not subdivided in the same way do not have the same nature. But a fruit and an aureole are not subdivided in the same way, since an aureole is subdivided into the aureole of virgins, martyrs, and teachers, whereas fruit is subdivided into the fruit of spouses, widows, and virgins. Therefore, a fruit and an aureole are not the same.
Furthermore (2), if fruit and aureole were the same, then to whomever is due a fruit, an aureole would be due. But this is clearly false. For fruit is due to widowhood, but an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a fruit is not due only for the virtue of continence. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 33, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3; d. 49, q. 5, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 2.) For on the passage: there is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory (1 Cor 15:41), a Gloss says that the dignity of those who have hundredfold fruit is compared to the glory of the sun, those who have sixtyfold fruit to the glory of the moon, and those who have thirtyfold fruit to the glory of a star. But this differentiation of glories, according to the Apostle’s intention, pertains to every difference in beatitude. Therefore, the different fruits should not correspond to continence alone.
Obj. 2: ‘Fruits’ are so named from ‘fruition.’ But fruition pertains to the essential reward, which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 3: Fruit is due to labor: the fruit of good labors is renowned (Wis 3:15). But there is greater labor in fortitude than in temperance or in continence. Therefore, the fruit does not correspond to continence alone.
Obj. 4: It is more difficult not to exceed moderation in food, which is necessary for life, than in venereal pleasures, without which life can be preserved. And so the effort for parsimony is greater than that of continence. Therefore, the fruit corresponds more to parsimony than to continence.
Obj. 5: Fruit implies refreshment. But refreshment is especially in the end. Since, then, the theological virtues have the end, namely God himself, as their object, it seems that the fruit should correspond to them most of all.
On the contrary, a Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:131.) on Matthew 15 assigns fruits to virginity, widowhood, and spousal continence, which are the subdivisions of continence.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three subdivisions of continence. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 70, a. 3, ad 2.) For there are twelve fruits of the Spirit: charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, long-suffering, gentleness, faithfulness, modesty, continency, chastity (Gal 5:22–23). And thus it seems that we should not posit only three.
Obj. 2: ‘Fruit’ refers to a specific reward. But a reward that is assigned to virgins, widows, and spouses is not specific, since all those who will be saved fall into one of these three categories because no one lacking continence will be saved and continence is exhaustively divided into these three classes. Therefore, fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three mentioned.
Obj. 3: Just as widowhood surpasses spousal continence, so also virginity surpasses widowhood. But sixtyfold does not surpass thirtyfold in the same way that one hundredfold surpasses sixtyfold, either by arithmetical proportion, since sixtyfold is thirty greater than thirtyfold while one hundredfold is forty greater than sixtyfold, or by geometrical proportion, since sixtyfold is related to thirtyfold by a double proportion while one hundredfold is related to sixtyfold by a sesquitertian proportion because it contains the whole plus two thirds. Therefore, the fruits are not fittingly suited to the three degrees of continence.
Obj. 4: The things said in Sacred Scripture have perpetuity: heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away (Lk 21:33). But the things made by human institution can be changed daily. Therefore, we should not take the account of what is said in Scripture from things of human institution. And so it seems that the reason Bede assigns concerning these fruits is unfitting, for he says that thirtyfold fruit is due to spouses, since when representing it on an abacus thirty is signified by touching together the thumb and index finger at their highest point so that in a certain way they kiss each other, and so the number thirty signifies the kisses of spouses. The number sixty, however, is signified by touching the index finger to the middle joint of the thumb, and in this way the oppression that widows suffer in the world is signified through the fact of the index finger’s lying on the thumb and pressing it down. When, finally, we reach one hundred by counting, we move from the left side to the right. Hence virginity is designated by the number one hundred, since it has a portion of the dignity of the angels, who are on the right, i.e., in glory, whereas we are on the left due to the imperfection of the present life.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, things that are said metaphorically can be taken in various ways according to the adaptation of different qualities of the thing from which the word is taken.
Now since among physical things fruit is properly spoken of with reference to things born of the earth according to the different conditions that can be found in physical fruits, ‘fruit’ can be taken in a spiritual sense in different ways. For corporeal fruit is something sweet that gives refreshment as it comes into a man’s use. It is also the last thing at which nature’s activity arrives and what agriculture looks forward to in the scattering of seed or in whatever other ways. Thus sometimes fruit is taken in a spiritual sense as meaning what refreshes like the last end. And in this signification we are said to have the fruition of God perfectly in heaven but imperfectly on the way. And it is from this meaning that the ‘fruition’ that is a dowry is taken. But we are not speaking this way of the fruits at present. Sometimes, however, fruit is taken in a spiritual sense only as meaning what refreshes, even though it is not the last end. And in this way the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as they refresh the mind with sincere sweetness, as Ambrose (Ambrose, On Paradise, ch. 13 (PL 14:325); On the Holy Spirit, Bk. 1, ch. 12, PL 16:764.) says. And this is how fruit is taken in Galatians 5:22–23: the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace. But this is not the meaning we are now after, for this was dealt with in Book III, Distinctions 23–27.
Spiritual fruit can be understood in another way after a likeness to corporeal fruit, inasmuch as corporeal fruit is a kind of benefit that is looked forward to from the work of agriculture in such a way that fruit is said to be the reward that a man obtains from the work of laboring in this life. And in this way every reward possessed in the future from our labors is called a fruit. This is the sense in which fruit is taken in Romans 6:22: you have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting. This is also not the sense in which we are now treating of fruit. Rather, we are now treating of fruit inasmuch as it arises from a seed, because this is how the Lord speaks of fruit in Matthew 13:23, where he divides fruit into thirty, sixty, and a hundredfold.
Now fruit can come out of seed insofar as the seminal power is efficacious for the conversion of the earth’s moisture into its own nature. And the more efficacious this power is and the more prepared the earth is, the richer the fruit that follows. Now the spiritual seed sown in us is the word of God. Hence the more a person is converted to spirituality, withdrawing from the flesh, the greater is the fruit of the word of God in him or her. In this regard, therefore, fruit differs from a golden crown and from an aureole. For the golden crown consists in the joy one has over God, the aureole in the joy one has over the perfection of works, but the fruit consists in the joy one has over the very disposition of the worker according to the degree of spirituality to which one has progressed from the seed of the word of God.
Some distinguish between aureole and fruit, saying that an aureole is due to one who competes, according to 2 Timothy 2:5: he is not crowned, unless he competes according to the rules; whereas a fruit is due to one who labors, according to what is said in Wisdom 3:15: the fruit of good labors is renowned. Others, however, say that a golden crown regards conversion to God but that an aureole and fruit consist in what is directed toward the end, in such a way that fruit more principally regards the will and an aureole more regards the body. But since labor and competition are in the same thing in the same regard, and the reward of the body depends on the reward of the soul, according to this position there would only be a logical difference between fruit, golden crown, and aureole. And this cannot be the case, since there are some to whom fruit is assigned to whom an aureole is not assigned.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting for different rewards to correspond to the same merit according to the different things in it. And so a golden crown corresponds to virginity to the extent that it is preserved for the sake of God by the command of charity, and an aureole corresponds to it to the extent that it is a kind of work of perfection having the character of a surpassing victory, and finally fruit corresponds to it insofar as through virginity man passes into a certain spirituality, withdrawing from carnality.
Reply Obj. 2: Fruit in the proper sense, as we are now speaking of it, indicates not a reward common to martyrdom and virginity but rather one common to the three degrees of continence. Now the Gloss that states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, insofar as any remuneration is called a fruit, so that in this way by hundredfold fruit is designated that remuneration which is due to any of the works of perfection.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though an aureole is an accidental reward superadded to the essential reward, not every accidental reward is an aureole but only the reward pertaining to the works of perfection by which a man is most greatly conformed to Christ in his perfect victory. For this reason it is not unfitting that there should be another accidental reward for withdrawal from carnal life, and this is called a fruit.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that as has been said, a fruit is a kind of reward that is due to a person from the fact that he passes from a carnal to a spiritual life. And thus it corresponds especially to that virtue which especially frees someone from subjection to the flesh. Now continence does this, since through sensual pleasures the soul is made especially subject to the flesh to the point that in the carnal act, according to Jerome, (In fact, Origen, On Numbers, hom. 6, PG 12:610; cf. Jerome, Epistle 22, To Eustochius, PL 22:409.) the spirit of prophecy neither touches the hearts of prophets nor is it possible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 11, 1152b17–18.) And thus this fruit corresponds more to continence than to another virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: This Gloss takes fruit in a broad sense, in the way that any remuneration is given the name ‘fruit.’
Reply Obj. 2: ‘Fruition’ is not derived from ‘fruit’ according to that likeness by which we are now speaking of fruit, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: Fruit, as we are now speaking of it, does not correspond to labor because of fatigue but rather insofar as seeds become fruitful through labor. And so even the crops themselves are called ‘labors’ inasmuch as one labors for their sake or they are acquired by labor. But the comparison to fruit, insofar as it arises from seed, fits better with continence than fortitude because a man is not subject to the flesh through the passions of fortitude as he is through the passions that continence concerns.
Reply Obj. 4: Even though pleasures in food are more necessary than those in sexual matters, they are not as forceful. And thus the soul is not made so subject to the flesh by them.
Reply Obj. 5: Fruit is not taken here as when one is said to enjoy by being refreshed in the end but in another way. And thus the argument does not follow.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that through continence, which the fruit corresponds to, as has been said, a person is led into a kind of spirituality, having left carnality behind. And thus in accord with the different modes of spirituality that continence produces, different fruits are distinguished. For there is a necessary spirituality and one that is superabundant. Necessary spirituality consists in the fact that uprightness of spirit is not perverted by the pleasures of the flesh. This happens when someone makes use of things delightful to the flesh according to the right order of reason. And this is the spirituality of spouses. Superabundant spirituality, however, is when a person altogether withdraws himself from such pleasures of the flesh, which suffocate the spirit.
But this occurs in two ways: either with respect to each and every time, past, present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or with reference to a given time, and this is the spirituality of widows. And so to those preserving conjugal chastity thirtyfold fruit is given, to those preserving the chastity of widowhood, sixtyfold fruit, and to those preserving virginal chastity, hundredfold fruit, for the reason that Bede assigns, although another reason from the nature of numbers can also be assigned. For the number thirty arises from taking three times ten. Three is the “number of every thing,” as it says in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 268a5–15.) and possesses in itself a kind of perfection common to all things, namely, that of the beginning, the middle, and the end. For this reason the number thirty is fittingly assigned to spouses, since in them, besides observing the Decalogue, which is signified by the number ten, there is only the common perfection without which there can be no salvation. The number six, however, from which the number sixty arises by taking it ten times, possesses a perfection from its parts, since it consists of all its parts added together. (E.g., 6 is a perfect number in the sense that the sum of its factors other than itself (1, 2, and 3) equals 6.) And so it fittingly corresponds to widowhood, in which is found perfect withdrawal from pleasures of the flesh as regards all circumstances, which are like the parts of a virtuous act. For widowhood enjoys the pleasures of the flesh with no person and in no place, and so on for all other circumstances, which was not the case in conjugal continence. But the number one hundred fittingly corresponds to virginity because ten, from which one hundred arises by multiplying it by itself, is the limit of numbers, and virginity likewise holds the limit of spirituality, since nothing of spirituality can be further added to it. For one hundred, being a square number, has the perfection of shape. A square shape is perfect according as it possesses equality in each part, having all equal sides. This is why it belongs to virginity, in which equal incorruption is found for all time.
Reply Obj. 1: In that passage fruits are not taken in the way in which we are here speaking of fruits, as is clear from what was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing compels us to conclude that fruit is a reward that does not apply to all those who will be saved. For not only is the essential reward common to them all but also some accidental rewards, such as joy at those works without which there is no salvation. However, it may be said that these fruits do not apply to all who will be saved, as is clear in the case of those who lived incontinently and repent at the end. For to them no fruit is due, but only the essential reward.
Reply Obj. 3: The difference between the fruits is taken more on the basis of the species or shapes of the numbers than their quantities, though a reason can also be assigned as to excess of quantity. For a married man abstains only from one who is not his own wife, whereas a widow abstains both from her own husband and anyone who is not her husband. And in this way we find there a kind of pattern of doubling, as sixty is double thirty. One hundred, however, adds forty on top of sixty, and forty arises from multiplying four by ten. Now the number four is the first solid and cubic number. And so an addition like this is appropriate for virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption above the perfection of widowhood.
Reply Obj. 4: Even though the representation of numbers is of human institution, it is founded in a way on the very nature of things, inasmuch as according to the ordering of the fingers, joints, and points of contact, numbers are designated step by step.
Article 3
The reasons why an aureole is due
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that an aureole is not due by reason of virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in a work, a greater reward is due. But widows suffer greater difficulty in abstaining from pleasures of the flesh than do virgins. For Jerome (Jerome, Epistle 123, To Ageruchia, PL 22:1047.) says that the more difficult it is for someone to abstain from the lures of sensual pleasure the greater is the reward. And he is speaking for the encouragement of widows. The Philosopher, too, in On Animals, (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 7, ch. 1, 581b20.) says that young women who have undergone corruption (”Corruption” describes the loss of physical virginal integrity, but without the morally negative connotations it has in English.) desire sexual intercourse more on account of recalling its pleasure. Therefore, an aureole, which is the greatest reward, is more due to widows than to virgins.
Obj. 2: If an aureole is due to virginity, then where the most perfect virginity is, we would most of all find an aureole. But the most perfect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin. Hence, she is given the title ‘Virgin of Virgins.’ And yet she is not due an aureole since she underwent no struggle in remaining continent, since she was not infected by the corruption of the fomes. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 3: A surpassing reward is not due to what is not praiseworthy at every time. But it would not have been praiseworthy to preserve virginity in the state of innocence, since at that time there was the precept for man: be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). Nor would it have been praiseworthy in the time of the law, when barren women were accursed. Therefore, an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 4: The same reward is not due to virginity preserved and virginity lost. But an aureole is sometimes due to virginity lost, as in the case of a woman who is unwillingly forced into prostitution by a tyrant because she professes Christ. (Such cases are frequent in the lives of the saints, as narrated, e.g., in the ancient Acts, the Martyrology, and the Golden Legend.) Therefore, an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 5: A surpassing reward is not due to what is in us by nature. But virginity is innate to every man, both good and wicked. Therefore, an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 6: Just as widowhood is related to sixtyfold fruit, so also virginity is related to hundredfold fruit and an aureole. But it is not every widow who is due sixtyfold fruit, but rather only one who vows widowhood, as some say. Therefore, it seems that an aureole is not due to every state of virginity but only to virginity that is preserved out of a vow.
Obj. 7: A reward does not correspond to necessity, since all merit consists in the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally impotent, or eunuchs. Therefore, virginity is not always due an aureole.
On the contrary (1), Scripture says: thou shalt make another little golden crown (Ex 25:25). A Gloss adds: to the crown pertains the new song that the virgins sing together before the Lamb, namely, those who follow the Lamb wheresoever he goes. Therefore, the reward that is due to virginity is called an aureole.
Furthermore (2), Isaiah 56:4 says: thus says the Lord to the eunuchs, and it goes on: I will give . . . a name better than sons and daughters. A Gloss adds: it is a sign of their proper surpassing glory. But by ‘eunuchs’ who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven (Matt 19:11), virgins are designated. Therefore, virginity is due a surpassing reward, and this is called an aureole.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an aureole is not due to martyrs. (Parallels: below, a. 5, qa. 1; De veritate, q. 26, a. 6, ad 3.) For an aureole is a reward that is rendered to works of supererogation. Hence commenting on Exodus 25:25: another little golden crown, Bede (Bede, On the Tabernacle (CCSL 119A), Bk. 1, ch. 6.) says: this can rightly be understood of the reward of those who transcend the general commandments by free choice of a more perfect life. But to die for the confession of the faith is sometimes a matter of necessity, not of supererogation, as is clear from what is said: man believes with his heart and so is justified, and he confesses with his lips and so is saved (Rom 10:10). Therefore, martyrdom is not always due an aureole.
Obj. 2: According to Gregory, (In fact, Gratian’s Decretals, Part 2, cause 23, qu. 6, appen. to can. 4, Iam vero (RF 1:949), after a canon attributed to Gregory the Great.) services become all the more pleasing the more free they are. But martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment inflicted violently by another. Therefore, an aureole, which corresponds to surpassing merit, is not due to martyrdom.
Obj. 3: Martyrdom consists not only in externally suffering death but also in the interior will. Hence Bernard (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Feast of Stephen, John, and the Holy Innocents (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclercq, 4:270).) distinguishes three kinds of martyrdom: that of will, not death, as in the case of John; that of will and death, as in the case of Stephen; and that of death but not will, as in the case of the Holy Innocents. If, then, an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be more due to martyrdom of the will than to external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from the will. But this is not what is held. Therefore, an aureole is not due to martyrdom.
Obj. 4: Affliction of the body is less than affliction of the mind, which occurs through internal pains and internal sufferings of the soul. But internal affliction is also a kind of martyrdom. Hence Jerome says in a Sermon on the Assumption: I am right in saying that the Mother of God was a virgin and martyr, even though she finished out her life in peace. Hence ‘a sword will pierce your own soul,’ (Jerome, Epistle 9, to Paula and Eustochium, PL 30:142.) namely, a sword of pain at the death of her Son. Since, then, an aureole does not correspond to internal pain, neither should it correspond to external pain.
Obj. 5: Penitence itself is a kind of martyrdom. Hence Gregory says: though the occasion offered by persecution may be lacking, our peacetime has a martyrdom of its own, for even if we do not subject fleshly necks to the iron, we do indeed slay fleshly desires in our mind by the sword of the spirit. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels (CCSL 141), Bk. 1, homily 3.) But an aureole is not owed to a punishment that consists in external works. Therefore, neither is it due to every external martyrdom.
Obj. 6: An illicit work should not be given an aureole. But it is illicit to hand oneself over for execution, (Manus inicere and the corresponding manus iniectio is a technical term in Roman law, meaning “to lay hands” on someone so as to arrest him, especially for future execution. Throughout, Aquinas’s reflexive constructions involving manus inicere have been translated “to hand oneself over for execution.”) as is clear from Augustine in the City of God. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 1, chs. 17, 20, and 26.) Yet the martyrdoms of some who laid hands on themselves when fleeing the madness of tyrants are celebrated in the Church, as is clear in church history in the case of certain women in Alexandria. (See Eusebius, History of the Church, Bk. 8, ch. 12, PG 20:769; John Chrysostom, Homily on the Holy Martyrs Bernice and Prosdoke, PG 50:639; Ambrose, On Virginity, Bk. 3, ch. 7, PL 16:241.) Therefore, martyrdom is not always due an aureole.
Obj. 7: It has happened at times that someone is wounded for the faith and even survives for a time. It is obvious that such a person is a martyr and yet, so it seems, an aureole is not due to him because his struggle did not last to the point of death. Therefore, martyrdom is not always due an aureole.
Obj. 8: Some are more afflicted in the loss of temporal things than even in the affliction of their own body, as is clear from the fact that they bear many afflictions in order to make a profit. If, then, they are stripped of their temporal goods for the sake of Christ, it seems that they are martyrs, and yet it does not seem that an aureole is due to them. Therefore, the same follows as before.
Obj. 9: A martyr seems to be one who is killed for the faith. Hence Isidore says: they are called ‘martyrs’ in Greek and ‘witnesses’ in Latin because they bear or bore sufferings for the sake of witness to Christ and fought for the truth even unto death. (Isidore, Etymologies (ed. Lindsay), Bk. 7, ch. 11.) But there are some other virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so forth, which cannot exist without grace. Yet to these an aureole is not due. Therefore, it seems that neither is an aureole due to martyrdom.
Obj. 10: Just as the truth of the faith is from God, so also is any truth, as Ambrose says, (In fact, Ambrosiaster, On I Corinthians, on 12:3, PL 17:258.) since all that is true, no matter who says it, is from the Holy Spirit. If, then, an aureole is due to one who undergoes death for the truth of the faith, for the same reason it should be due to those who undergo death for any other truth, which does not seem to be the case.
Obj. 11: The common good is more important than a particular good. But if someone dies for the preservation of the republic in a just war he is not due an aureole. So, too, if he is killed for the preservation of his own faith, he is not due an aureole. And so an aureole is not due to martyrdom.
Obj. 12: All merit proceeds from free will. But the Church celebrates the martyrdoms of some who did not possess the use of free will. Therefore, they did not merit an aureole. And so an aureole is not due to all martyrs.
On the contrary (1), Augustine says in On Holy Virginity: no one, as far as I am aware, has dared to put virginity before martyrdom. (Augustine, On Holy Virginity (CSEL 41), ch. 46.) But an aureole is due to virginity. Therefore, one is also due to martyrdom.
Furthermore (2), a crown is due to one who competes. But in martyrdom the struggle has special difficulty. Therefore, it is due a special aureole.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an aureole is not due to teachers. (Parallel: below, a. 5, qa. 1.) For every reward that will be had in the future corresponds to an act of virtue. But to preach or to teach is not an act of any virtue. Therefore, an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.
Obj. 2: Teaching and preaching come from learning and study. But things that are rewarded in the future are not acquired by human study, since we do not merit by what we have naturally acquired. Therefore, for teaching and preaching no one merits an aureole in the future.
Obj. 3: Exaltation in the future corresponds to humiliation in the present because he who humbles himself will be exalted (Lk 14:11). But there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching; in fact there is rather an occasion for pride. Hence a Gloss on Matthew 4 says that the devil has deceived many who are puffed up with the honor of teaching authority. Therefore, it seems that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.
On the contrary (1), commenting on Ephesians 1:19: that you may know . . . the immeasurable greatness of his power, a Gloss says: the holy teachers will have a sort of increase beyond what others will commonly have. (Glossa ordinaria, PL 114:590.) Therefore, etc.
Furthermore (2), commenting on Song of Songs 8:12: my vineyard, my very own, is for myself, a Gloss says: he shows something of the unique reward that he prepares for his teachers. (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:1166.) Therefore, teachers will have a unique reward. And this we call an aureole.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, where there is a preeminent kind of victory a special crown is due. Hence since by virginity one gains a kind of unique victory in relation to the flesh, against which we continuously wage war, as is clear: the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh (Gal 5:17), a special crown is due to virginity, which is given the name ‘aureole.’ Everyone commonly holds this, but not everyone agrees on which virginity should have an aureole.
For some say that an aureole is due to an act. Thus the woman who actually preserves virginity will possess an aureole, if she belongs to the number of those who will be saved. But this does not seem to be fitting, since according to this position women who have the intention of marrying and yet die before they marry will have an aureole.
And so others say that an aureole is due to the state, not the act, so that only those virgins merit an aureole who have placed themselves in a state of preserving perpetual virginity by a vow. But this, too, does not seem fitting, since by an equal will one person can preserve virginity without vowing it as another does by vowing it.
And thus we may say rather that all merit is due to an act of virtue under the command of charity. Now virginity pertains to the genus of virtue insofar as perpetual incorruption of mind and body falls under choice, as is clear from what has been said (Distinction 33). And thus an aureole is properly due only to those virgins who had the resolution of preserving virginity perpetually, whether they confirmed this resolution with a vow or not. And I say this to the extent that an aureole is taken in its proper sense as a reward rendered for a certain kind of merit, even if this resolution should at one time be broken, without losing the integrity of the flesh, as long as it is found at the end of life. For virginity of the mind can be recovered, although virginity of the flesh cannot be, as said above in Distinction 33. But if we take ‘aureole’ in a broad sense as meaning whatever joy they will have in heaven above the essential joy, then an aureole will also correspond to those incorrupt in the flesh, even if they did not have the resolution of preserving virginity perpetually. For there is no doubt that they will rejoice at the incorruption of the body just as the innocent rejoice at the fact that they were immune from sin, even if they did not have the opportunity to sin, as is clear in the case of baptized children. This is not, however, the proper sense of ‘aureole,’ but is taking it in a much broader sense.
Reply Obj. 1: Other things being equal, in one respect virgins have a greater struggle in remaining continent, and in another respect widows do. For in virgins the desire for experience also inflames concupiscence, a desire that proceeds from a sort of curiosity by which it happens that a person is more eager to see what he or she has never seen before. And their concupiscence is sometimes increased, too, by thinking that there is greater pleasure than there truly is and by not considering the disadvantages that are connected with this kind of pleasure. And in this regard widows have less struggle, though they have a greater struggle on account of the memory of past pleasure. And in different people, one of these will predominate over the other, according to the different dispositions that people have. For some are moved more in the former respect and others in the latter. But whatever be the amount of the struggle, this much is certain, that the victory of virgins is more perfect than that of widows. For the most perfect kind of victory, and the most beautiful, is never to have surrendered to the enemy. And a crown is due not to the struggle but to victory in the struggle.
Reply Obj. 2: Concerning this there are two opinions. Some say that the Blessed Virgin does not have an aureole as a reward for virginity, if an aureole is properly taken as regarding the struggle, though she does have something greater than an aureole on account of her most perfect resolution to preserve virginity. Others, however, say that she does have an aureole, even an aureole under its proper notion, and a most excellent one at that. For even though she did not feel the struggle, she did indeed have a struggle with the flesh, but from the strength of virtue held the flesh in check to the point that this sort of struggle could not be felt by her. But this does not seem fittingly said. For since the Blessed Virgin is believed to have been altogether immune from the inclination of the fomes on account of her perfect sanctification, it is not pious to hold that there was any struggle from the flesh in her, because such struggle is only from the inclination of the fomes. Nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as is clear from a Gloss on the passage: a thorn was given me in the flesh (2 Cor 12:7). So we should say that she does properly have an aureole, so that she in this regard she may be like the other members of the Church in whom virginity is found. And even though she had no struggle through temptation from the flesh, she did have a struggle through temptation from the enemy, who had no reverence even for Christ himself, as is clear in Matthew 4.
Reply Obj. 3: Virginity is only due an aureole inasmuch as it adds a certain excellence above other grades of continence. But if Adam had not sinned, virginity would have added no perfection above spousal continence. For in that case there would have been honorable marriages and an immaculate marriage bed with none of the filth of concupiscence. Hence virginity would not have then been preserved and no aureole would be due to it. But after the change in the condition of human nature, virginity possesses a special comeliness and thus a special reward is rendered it. In the time of the law of Moses, too, when the worship of God was to be propagated also through the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from the commingling of the flesh. Hence a special reward would not be rendered to such a resolution unless it proceeded from a divine inspiration, as is believed of Jeremiah and Elijah, of whom we read nothing about being married.
Reply Obj. 4: If a woman has been overcome by violence, she does not for this reason lose the aureole, as long as she keeps the resolution of perpetually preserving virginity and in no way consents to the act. Nor does she lose her virginity through such an act, as was said above in Distinction 33. And this I say, whether she is violently corrupted because of her faith, or any other cause. But if she undergoes this for the faith, it will be meritorious for her and will pertain to a kind of martyrdom. This is why St. Lucy said: (See Breviarium S. O. P., 13 December, At Matins, 6th reading (I:947); cf. Mombritius, Sanctuarium, Passio S. Luciae (II:108.41).) if you cause me to be violated unwillingly, my chastity will receive a double crown, not that she has two aureoles of virginity but rather because there will be a double reward, one for the virginity she kept and the other for the injury she suffered. I say, too, that if such a woman who is overcome by violence conceives, she does not lose the merit of virginity by this fact; however, she will not be made equal to the mother of Christ, in whom there was integrity of the flesh with the integrity of mind.
Reply Obj. 5: Virginity is innate in us by nature as regards what is material in virginity. But the resolution of preserving perpetual incorruption, from which virginity has merit, is not innate but rather comes from the gift of grace.
Reply Obj. 6: Sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow but only to one who keeps the resolution of preserving widowhood, even if she does not make a vow, as was also said of virginity.
Reply Obj. 7: If the impotent and eunuchs have the intention of preserving perpetual incorruption, even if the capability of coition were present, they should be called virgins and merit an aureole. For they make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the intention of marrying if they could, they do not merit an aureole. Hence Augustine says in On Holy Virginity: for those for whom the male member itself is weakened so that they are not capable of generation, such as eunuchs, when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God though with the resolution that they would have spouses if they could, it is enough for them to be counted equal to the members of the faithful who are married. (Augustine, On Holy Virginity (CSEL 41), ch. 24.)
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that just as there is a kind of struggle in the spirit against the lower desires, so also there is in a human being a kind of struggle against sufferings inflicted externally. This is why just as there is a special crown, which is called an aureole, due to the most perfect victory in which we triumph over the desires of the flesh, namely to virginity, so also an aureole is due to the most perfect victory one can have over an external assault. But the most perfect victory in the case of external sufferings can be considered in two ways. First, from the magnitude of the suffering. Now among all sufferings inflicted externally, death holds the chief place, just as in internal passions the desires for sensual pleasures hold the chief place. And thus when someone gains victory in death and the things ordered to death, he conquers most perfectly. Second, the perfection of victory can be considered from the cause of the struggle, namely, when one is attacked for the most noble cause, which is, of course, Christ himself. And these are the two things which we find in martyrdom, which is death undergone for the sake of Christ. For it is not the punishment but the cause that makes a martyr. And thus martyrdom is due an aureole just as virginity is.
Reply Obj. 1: To endure death for the sake of Christ, in itself, is a work of supererogation. For not everyone is bound to profess his faith before a persecutor. But it is necessary for salvation in a particular case, namely, when someone is apprehended by a persecutor and questioned about his faith, which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For the aureole is not due to the work of supererogation as supererogatatory but rather inasmuch as it has a kind of perfection. For this reason, when a perfection like this remains, even if it is not supererogatory, the person merits an aureole.
Reply Obj. 2: Martyrdom is not due a reward insofar as it is inflicted from without but rather insofar as it is borne voluntarily. For we only merit through what is in us. And the more difficult what someone bears voluntarily is and the more naturally repugnant to the will, the more firmly fixed in Christ the will is shown to be that bears it for Christ’s sake. And thus a more excellent reward is due to it.
Reply Obj. 3: There are some acts that contain a certain extreme pleasure or difficulty in the act itself. And in such cases the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit to the extent that in the act the will must be changed by the vehemence of the act from the state in which it previously was. And thus, other things being equal, one who actually carries out an act of lust sins more than one who only consents to the act because the will is increased in the act itself. Likewise, since the act of martyrdom contains the greatest difficulty, the will for martyrdom does not attain to that merit which is due to the act of the martyrs by reason of difficulty, though it can also arrive at a further reward, considering the root of merit. For one can will to undergo martyrdom out of a greater charity than another who actually undergoes it. For this reason a martyr in will can merit by his will an essential reward equal to or greater than what is due a martyr. But an aureole is due to the difficulty that is the struggle of martyrdom itself. Hence an aureole is not due to martyrs in will alone.
Reply Obj. 4: Just as the pleasures of touch, which temperance concerns, hold a special place among all internal and external delights, so also pains of touch take precedence over all other pains. And thus an aureole is due to the difficulty that occurs in enduring pains of touch, for example, those consisting in blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of bearing internal pains. For these latter, however, one is not properly called a martyr, except by a kind of likeness. And this is the manner in which Jerome is speaking.
Reply Obj. 5: The affliction of penitence is not, properly speaking, martyrdom because it does not consist in things ordered to the infliction of death, since it is ordered only to taming the flesh, and if it exceeds this measure it will be a blameworthy affliction. It is called martyrdom, then, because of a similarity in the affliction. This affliction exceeds the affliction of martyrdom in how long it lasts while martyrdom exceeds it in intensity.
Reply Obj. 6: According to Augustine in the City of God 1, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 1, chs. 17, 20, 26.) it is not licit for anyone to lay hands on himself for any cause whatsoever, unless, perhaps, this occurs by divine inspiration in order to give an example of fortitude so that death may not be feared. Now those whose cases the objection brings forward are believed to have brought death on themselves by divine inspiration, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdoms.
Reply Obj. 7: If someone receives a fatal wound for the faith and lives on for awhile, there is no doubt that he merits an aureole, as is clear in the case of the blessed Cecilia (See Breviarium S. O. P., November 22, At Matins, 6th reading (II:1315); cf. Mombritius, Sanctuarium, Passio S. Caecilia (I:341.12).) who lived on for three days, and in the case of the many martyrs who have died in prison. But even if he receives a wound that is not fatal and yet incurs death from it, he is believed fully to merit an aureole, even though some say that he does not merit an aureole if he incurs death from his own lack of care or negligence. For this negligence would not have led to his death if the wound he received for the faith had not been presupposed. And thus the wound received for the sake of Christ is for him the full occasion of his death. Hence he does not for this reason seem to lose the aureole, unless there is such negligence as would mean he is guilty of mortal sin, which in that case takes away both his aureole and his golden crown. If, however, from the fatal wound received he does not die because of some chance contingency, or even if he has received wounds that are not fatal and then dies while still imprisoned, he still merits an aureole. Hence the martyrdoms of some saints who died in prison from blows received long before are celebrated in the Church, as in the case of Pope Marcellus. (See Acta Sanctorum, Acta altera S. Marcelli, January 16, Bk. 1, ch. 4 (BL 2:376a).) Therefore no matter how affliction inflicted for Christ’s sake is drawn out unto death (whether death follows from it or not), a person does become a martyr by it and merits an aureole. If, however, it is not drawn out unto death, then one should not for this reason be called a martyr, as is clear in the case of Sylvester, whom the Church does not celebrate with solemnity as she does a martyr, because he finished out his life in peace, even though he bore certain sufferings before then.
Reply Obj. 8: Just as temperance does not concern delights in money or honors or other such things, but is only in the pleasures of touch as though particular to it, so also fortitude concerns dangers of death as especially in its purview, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 6, 1115a24.) And thus it is only to an injury inflicted on one’s own body from which death naturally follows that an aureole is due. Thus, whether one loses temporal goods or fame or anything of this sort for the sake of Christ, he does not for this reason properly become a martyr and does not merit an aureole. Nor can someone love external things more than his own body ordinately. But inordinate love does not assist in meriting an aureole. Nor, too, can the pain of losing things be equated with the pain of the slaying of the body and other such things.
Reply Obj. 9: The sufficient cause for martyrdom is not only the confession of faith but also any other virtue, not political but infused, which has Christ as its end. For one becomes a witness to Christ by any act of virtue inasmuch as the works that Christ perfects in us are a testimony to his goodness. This is why certain virgins were killed for the virginity they wished to preserve, as blessed Agnes and some others, and their martyrdoms are celebrated in the Church. (There are very many such saints. Among those with which Aquinas would have been familiar from their liturgical cult, we may cite St. Agnes, St. Agatha, and St. Dymphna. Aquinas in fact wore a first-class relic of St. Agnes around his neck, as we learn from his biographers.)
Reply Obj. 10: The truth of the faith has Christ as its end or object. And thus the confession of the faith merits an aureole if a punishment is added, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. The confession of any other truth, however, is not a sufficient cause for martyrdom by reason of the matter but only by reason of the end, as, for example, if one wished to be killed rather than sin against Christ by telling a lie of any sort.
Reply Obj. 11: The uncreated good also exceeds every created good. Thus no created end, whether the common good or a private good, can bestow on an act goodness as great as the uncreated end, that is, when an act is performed for the sake of God. And thus when someone undergoes death for the common good not referred to Christ, he does not merit an aureole. But if this is referred to Christ, he will merit an aureole and will be a martyr, as, for example, if someone defends the republic from the assault of enemies who are bent on corrupting faith in Christ and undergoes death in such defense.
Reply Obj. 12: Some say that in the Holy Innocents slain for Christ the use of reason was quickened by divine power, as also in John the Baptist when he was still in his mother’s womb. And in this regard they were truly martyrs both in will and in act, and they possess an aureole. But others say that they were martyrs in act alone, not in will. Bernard seems to be of this opinion, distinguishing the three kinds of martyrdom, as has been said. And in this regard, just as the Holy Innocents do not attain to the perfect notion of martyrdom but do possess something of martyrdom from the fact that they suffered for Christ, so also they possess an aureole, not according to the perfect notion but according to a certain participation, namely, inasmuch as they rejoice that they were killed in service to Christ, as it was said of baptized children that they will have a certain joy at their innocence and integrity of flesh.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that just as through martyrdom and virginity one gains a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so also a most perfect victory against the devil is gained when someone not only does not yield to the devil’s assault but even drives him out, and this not only from himself but also from others. Now this happens through preaching and teaching. And thus an aureole is due to preaching and teaching as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor should we say, as some say, that it is due to prelates alone, to whom it belongs to preach and teach ex officio, but rather we should say that it belongs to whoever licitly carries out this act. To prelates, however, even though they have the office of preaching, it is only due if they actually preach. For a crown is not due to a habitual condition but to an actual struggle, according to 2 Timothy 2:5: he is not crowned, unless he competes according to the rules.
Reply Obj. 1: Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue, namely mercy. Hence they are counted among the spiritual alms, (That is, spiritual works of mercy.) as is clear above from Distinction 25, Question 2, Article 3.
Reply Obj. 2: Even though the capability of preaching and teaching sometimes comes from study, the practice of teaching and preaching proceeds from the will, which is informed by charity infused by God. And so its act can be meritorious.
Reply Obj. 3: Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the next life, except for one who seeks his own glory in such exaltation. But one who turns this exaltation to the benefit of others acquires a recompense for himself from it. For when it is said that an aureole is due to teaching, this must be understood as to that teaching that concerns what pertains to salvation, through which the devil is driven from the hearts of men as by spiritual arms, of which it is said: the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual (2 Cor 10:4).
Article 4
Who deserves an aureole
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that Christ is due an aureole. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. But in Christ these three were preeminently present. Therefore, an aureole especially belongs to Christ.
Obj. 2: Everything that is most perfect in human matters should be especially attributed to Christ. But the reward of an aureole is due to the most surpassing merits. Therefore, it is due to Christ.
Obj. 3: Cyprian (Cyprian, On the Dress of Virgins, PL 4:477.) says that virginity bears the image of God. Therefore, the exemplar of virginity is in God. And so it seems that an aureole also belongs to Christ as God.
On the contrary (1), an aureole is joy in conformity to Christ, as is said. But no one is conformed or likened to himself, as is clear from the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 9, ch. 3, 1054b6.) Therefore, Christ is not due an aureole.
Furthermore (2), Christ’s reward never increased. But Christ did not have an aureole from the moment of his conception, since at that time he had never struggled. Therefore, he never had an aureole afterward.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the angels are due an aureole. For, as Jerome says (Jerome, Epistle 9, to Paula and Eustochium, PL 30:131.) when speaking of virginity: to live apart from the flesh in the flesh is more the life of angels than of man. And a Gloss (Glossa Lombardi, PL 191:1596; cf. Augustine, On Holy Virginity (CSEL 41), ch. 13.) on 1 Corinthians 7 says that virginity is the share of the angels. Since, then, an aureole corresponds to virginity, it seems that it is due to angels.
Obj. 2: Incorruption of spirit is more noble than incorruption of flesh. But in the angels incorruption of spirit is found, since they never sinned. Therefore, they are more due an aureole than are men who are incorrupt in the flesh, since these latter have otherwise sinned.
Obj. 3: An aureole is due to teaching. But the angels teach us by purifying, illuminating, and perfecting, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 10, n. 3, PG 3:273.) Therefore, they are due an aureole, or at least those who teach.
On the contrary (1), he is not crowned, unless he competes according to the rules (2 Tim 2:5). But there is no struggle in the angels. Therefore, neither are they due an aureole.
Furthermore (2), an aureole is not due to an act that is not carried out through the body. Hence an aureole is not due to those who love virginity, martyrdom, and teaching, if these are not externally present in them. But the angels are incorporeal. Therefore, they do not possess an aureole.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that an aureole is also due to the body. For the essential reward is of greater account than the accidental. But a dowry, which pertains to the essential reward, is not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore, so is an aureole, which pertains to the accidental reward.
Obj. 2: A punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin carried out through the body. Therefore, to a merit carried out through the body, a reward in soul and body is also due. But the meriting of an aureole is carried out through the body. Therefore, an aureole is also due to the body.
Obj. 3: A certain beauty of virtue will be apparent in the martyrs’ bodies in their bodies’ very scars. Hence Augustine says: I do not know how we shall be so overcome with love for the blessed martyrs that we will wish in that kingdom to see the scars of their wounds in their bodies, those which they bore for the name of Christ. And perhaps we will see them. For in them there will be not deformity but dignity, and though in the body a certain beauty not of the body but of virtue will shine forth. (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 22, ch. 19.) Therefore, it seems that the aureole of the martyrs is in the body. And the same reason pertains in the other cases.
On the contrary (1), the souls now in paradise possess aureoles, but they do not have bodies. Therefore, the proper subject of an aureole is not the body but the soul.
Furthermore (2), all merit is from the soul. Therefore, the whole reward should be in the soul.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, there are two opinions about this. For some say that in Christ there is an aureole according to the proper notion of aureole, since we find in him struggle and victory and, consequently, a crown according to its proper notion. But, even though the notion of golden crown or crown applies to Christ, the notion of aureole does not apply to him, if we consider the matter carefully. For the very fact that when we say ‘aureole’ we use the diminutive implies something possessed by way of participation and not according to its fullness. Therefore, having an aureole belongs to those in whom there is a participation in more perfect victory by imitation of that in which the full character of perfect victory consists. And thus since in Christ the principal and full character of such victory is found, through whose victory all other victors are so constituted, as is clear: be of good cheer, I have overcome the world (Jn 16:33), and the Lion of the tribe of Judah . . . has conquered (Rev 5:5), it does not belong to Christ to have an aureole but something from which all aureoles originate. As Revelation 3:21 says: he who conquers, I will grant him to sit with me on my throne, as I myself conquered and sat down with my Father on his throne. Hence we should say, according to others, that even though what is in Christ does not have the character of an aureole, it is more excellent than every aureole.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ was most truly a virgin, martyr, and teacher, but even so the accidental reward corresponding to these qualities in Christ does not have any noteworthy quantity in comparison to the magnitude of the essential reward. Hence he does not have an aureole under the notion of aureole.
Reply Obj. 2: Although an aureole is given for what from our perspective is a most perfect work, nevertheless we say ‘aureole’ in the diminutive, as this signifies a kind of participation of a perfection deriving from another in whom the work is found in its fullness. And in this respect it pertains to a kind of diminution and so is not found in Christ, in whom every perfection is found most fully.
Reply Obj. 3: Even though virginity has, in a way, an exemplar in God, it does not have an exemplar according to a single notion. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates, is not in God and in a virgin according to the same notion.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the angels are not due an aureole. The reason for this is that an aureole properly corresponds to a kind of perfection in surpassing merit. But the things that pertain to the perfection of merit in human beings are connatural to angels or even regard their common state or their reward itself. And thus angels do not have aureoles on account of the things by which an aureole is due to men.
Reply Obj. 1: Virginity is called the angelic life inasmuch as through grace virgins imitate what the angels have by nature. For it is not a matter of virtue in the angels that they abstain altogether from the pleasures of the flesh, since pleasures of this sort cannot exist in them.
Reply Obj. 2: Perpetual incorruption of spirit in angels merits the essential reward. For it is necessary for salvation, since in them there can be no subsequent reparation after a fall to ruin.
Reply Obj. 3: The acts in accord with which the angels teach us pertain to their glory and to their common state. Hence they do not merit an aureole through such acts.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that an aureole is properly in the mind, for it is joy over the works to which an aureole is due. But just as from the joy of the essential reward, which is a golden crown, a certain comeliness overflows into the body, which is the body’s glory, so also from the joy of an aureole a comeliness is reflected in the body in such a way that an aureole is principally in the mind but is reflected also in the flesh through a kind of overflowing.
And in this way the reply to the objections is clear. It should be known, however, that the comeliness of the scars that will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole. For some martyrs in whom there will not be such scars will have an aureole, as, for example, those who were drowned or killed off by starvation or the squalor of imprisonment.
Article 5
On the number of the aureoles
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: Super II Tim. 4, lec. 2.) It seems that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and preachers are not fittingly enumerated. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to the virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of teachers to the virtue of prudence. Therefore, it seems that there should be a fourth aureole due to justice.
Obj. 2: A Gloss (Bede, On the Tabernacle (CCSL 119A), Bk. 1, ch. 6.) on Exodus 25 says that the golden crown is added since through the Gospel eternal life is promised to those who keep the commandments: if you would enter life, keep the commandments (Mt 19:17). An aureole is added on top of this when it is said: if you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor (Mt 19:21). Therefore, an aureole is due to poverty.
Obj. 3: By a vow of obedience one subjects himself wholly to God. Therefore, the utmost perfection consists in the vow of obedience. And thus it seems that an aureole is due to it.
Obj. 4: There are also many other works of supererogation over which man will have special joy in the future. Therefore, there are many other aureoles besides these three.
Obj. 5: Just as a person spreads the faith by preaching and teaching, so does someone who compiles written records. Therefore, a fourth aureole is due to such as these.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the aureole of virgins is the most important of all. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 152, a. 3.) For it is said (Rev 14:3–4) of virgins that it is these who follow the Lamb wherever he goes and that no one else could learn that song that the virgins chanted. Therefore, virgins have the most excellent aureole.
Obj. 2: Cyprian (Cyprian, On the Dress of Virgins, PL 4:455.) says of virgins that they are the most illustrious portion of Christ’s flock. Therefore, they are more due an aureole.
Obj. 3: It seems that the aureole of martyrs is of greatest account. For Haymo (Haymo, On the Apocalypse, Bk. 4, on 14:3, PL 117:1106.) says that not all the virgins have precedence over spouses but rather those who are reckoned equal to the married martyrs for guarding virginity in the torment of suffering. Therefore, it is martyrdom that gives to virginity preeminence over other states. Therefore, martyrdom is due an aureole of greater account.
Obj. 4: It seems that a teacher of the faith is due the aureole of greatest account. For the Church Militant has the Church Triumphant as exemplar. But in the Church Militant teachers are due the greatest honor: let the elders who rule well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching (1 Tim 5:17). Therefore, in the Church Triumphant they are due an aureole of greater account.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one person does not have an aureole (whether of virginity, martyrdom, or teaching) in a more excellent way than another. For those things that are at the limit of perfection are not intensified or diminished. But an aureole is due to works that are at the limit of perfection. Therefore, no aureole is intensified or diminished.
Obj. 2: Virginity does not admit of more or less, since it implies a certain privation and negations are not more or less intense. Therefore, neither is the reward of virginity, namely the aureole of virgins, made more or less intense.
On the contrary, an aureole is added on top of the golden crown. But the golden crown is more intense in one than another. Therefore, so too is an aureole.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, an aureole is a kind of privileged reward corresponding to a privileged victory, as is clear from what has been said. And thus the three aureoles are taken on the basis of privileged victories in the three struggles that assail every man.
For in the struggle against the flesh, a person gains the greatest victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures, which are the greatest of this kind. And thus an aureole is due to virginity. Next, in the struggle by which we fight against the world, the chief victory is when we undergo persecution by the world to the point of death. Hence also martyrs, who gain victory in this struggle are due the second aureole. Finally, in the struggle by which we fight against the devil, the chief victory is when someone casts out the enemy not only from himself but also from the hearts of others, which occurs through preaching and teaching. And thus to teachers and preachers the third aureole is due.
Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles on the basis of the three powers of the soul such that the three aureoles are said to correspond to the greatest acts of the soul’s three powers. For the greatest act of reason is to spread the truth of the faith also to others, and to this act is due the aureole of teachers. The greatest act of the irascible power is to overcome even death for the sake of Christ, and to this act is due the aureole of martyrs. Finally, the greatest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain thoroughly from the greatest pleasure, and to this is due the aureole of virgins. But others distinguish the three aureoles on the basis of the things by which we are conformed most nobly to Christ. For he was mediator between the world and the Father. He was, therefore, a teacher insofar as he manifested to the world the truth he had received from the Father. He was, in turn, a martyr to the extent that he bore persecution from the world. Finally, he was a virgin inasmuch as he preserved purity in himself. And thus teachers, martyrs, and virgins are conformed to him most perfectly. Hence an aureole is due to such people.
Reply Obj. 1: We do not find a struggle in the act of justice as in the acts of other virtues. Nor is it true that teaching is an act of prudence, for it is rather an act of charity or mercy to the extent that such a habit inclines us to carry out the act of teaching, or even an act of wisdom as directing it. Or we may say, according to others, that justice encompasses all the virtues and thus a special aureole is not due to it. Now, how this can be true was said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 4.
Reply Obj. 2: Poverty, although it is a work of perfection, does not hold the first place in any spiritual struggle. For the love of corporeal things assaults us less than the concupiscence of the flesh or persecution inflicted on one’s own body. Hence poverty is not due an aureole. Rather it is due judiciary power by reason of the humiliation consequent on poverty, as said above. (Book IV, D. 47, Q. 1, Art. 2, qc 2.) The Gloss cited, however, takes aureole in a broad sense for any kind of reward rendered for merit.
A similar reply can be given to the third and fourth objections.
Reply Obj. 5: An aureole is also due to those who write down sacred teaching, but this is not distinguished from the aureole of teachers. For to compose things in writing is a certain way of teaching.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the preeminence of one aureole over another aureole can be considered in two ways. First, on the side of the struggle, such that an aureole is said to be greater when it is due to a tougher struggle. And in this way the aureole of martyrs has preeminence over the other aureoles in one way and the aureole of virgins in another. For the struggle in martyrdom is tougher in itself and afflicts with greater strength, whereas the struggle of the flesh is more dangerous inasmuch as it lasts longer and looms much closer to us. Second, on the part of those things that the struggle pertains to. And in this way the aureole of teachers is greatest among the others. For this sort of struggle focuses on intelligible goods while the others have to do with sensible passions. But the eminence that is found on the part of the struggle is more essential to the aureole. For the aureole, in its proper notion, regards victory and struggle. The difficulty of the struggle, too, that is found on the part of the struggle itself is of greater account than what is found on our side according as it is closer to us. And thus, simply speaking, the aureole of martyrs is greatest among them all. And thus a Gloss on Matthew 5:10, blessed are those who are persecuted, says that in the eighth beatitude, which pertains to martyrs, all the others are brought to perfection. For this reason, too, when the Church lists out the saints, she orders martyrs before teachers and virgins. (In, for example, the traditional Litany of the Saints chanted in the liturgy.) But nothing prevents the other aureoles from being more excellent in some respect.
And in this way the solution of the objections is clear.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that since merit is in a certain way the cause of reward, rewards must be differentiated as merits are differentiated. For something is made more or less intense through its cause being made more or less intense. But the merit of an aureole can be greater or less. Thus an aureole, too, can be greater or less. It should be known, however, that the merit of an aureole can be made more intense in two ways: in one way on the part of the root and in another way on the part of the work. For it can be the case that there are two people, one of whom undergoes a greater torment of martyrdom out of less charity, or gives greater attention to preaching, or even removes himself more from the pleasures of the flesh. Therefore, the intensity of the aureole does not correspond to the intensity of merit that is found as coming from the root but rather this supplies the intensity of the golden crown. Instead, the intensity of the aureole corresponds to the intensity of merit from the genus of the act. This is how it can be the case that one who merits less in martyrdom as regards the essential reward will have a greater aureole for the martyrdom.
Reply Obj. 1: The merits that should be awarded aureoles do not attain to the limit of perfection simply but rather in species, just as fire is the most subtle of bodies in its species. Hence nothing prevents one aureole from being more excellent than another, just as one fire is more subtle than another.
Reply Obj. 2: One person’s virginity can be greater than another’s due to greater withdrawal from what is contrary to virginity in such a way that there is said to be a greater virginity in her who avoids more the occasions of corruption, just as privations can be made more intense, as when it is said that a person is more blind because he is further removed from sight.
Exposition of the Text
“Distinct boundaries shall mark the two cities.” (Sententiae IV, 49.1 (280). 1 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 111.) This is said because the number of the elect and the damned is being increased until the day of judgment and also because glory and punishment can be increased, at least as regards incidental reward and punishment. But after the judgment they will not be able to be further increased.
The coin is one. (Sent. IV, 49.1 (280). 2.) This is said because the object of all the blessed is the same.
“He lives blessedly indeed who lives as he wills, and wills nothing improperly.” (Sent. IV, 49.1 (280). 8 citing Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 13 ch. 8 n. 11.) This opinion of Augustine harmonizes with the Philosopher’s opinion, (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4, 415b9–12.) such that by living the activity of life is understood, by as he wills it is shown that activity is not impeded, and by and wills nothing improperly, it is shown to be connatural because evils are contrary to nature.
And it is held back by this desire from tending with all its might to that highest heaven, until that desire comes to rest. (Sent. IV, 49.4 (283). 3.) This being held back is understood as regards the fact that the soul separated from the body does not have perfect being and thus neither does it have the perfect activity by which it can be joined to God perfectly.
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