D. 46 - Divine justice and mercy
After the Master has considered the places for souls in which they are punished or rewarded before the common resurrection and the general judgment, and the suffrages by which we help the dead or are helped by them, here he considers divine justice and mercy, by which all these matters are arranged.
Now it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers divine justice and mercy according to their action in the punishment of the damned; in the second, he considers them in general, at: but how is it that Cassiodorus, above, said that God’s justice and pity, that is, his mercy, are “two things”? (Sententiae IV, 46.3 (267). 1.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows that God’s mercy has no place in the punishment of the damned; second, he shows the contrary, at: but this is contradicted by what Cassiodorus says. (Sent. IV, 46.1 (265). 1.) Third, he determines the truth, at: hence it may not unsuitably be said. (Sent. IV, 46.1 (265). 5.)
Concerning this he does three things: first, he proposes what the truth is about this question; second, he resolves the authority that is to the contrary, at: and so that statement; (Sent. IV, 46.1 (265). 6.) third, he explains what he said, namely, that God’s judgment is secret, at: by his “hidden judgment is understood the pain, by which each one now is either disciplined unto purification or warned to conversion.” (Sent. IV, 46.2 (266). 1 citing Augustine, Enarrationas in Psalmos, on Ps. 9, n. 1.)
But how is it that Cassiodorus, above, said that God’s justice and pity, that is, his mercy, are “two things”? Here he determines many things about God’s justice and mercy in general; and it is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires about the difference between God’s justice and mercy; in the second, he inquires how justice and mercy coincide in God’s work, at: after these matters, it is suitable to consider in what sense “all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.” (Sent. IV, 46.5 (269). 1 citing Gen. 1, 31; Wis. 1, 14.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he raises questions; second, he considers them, at: to these words it may be answered as follows. (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 3.)
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he inquires whether justice and mercy are the same in God; second, whether the same works should be attributed to justice and mercy, at: why, then, does Scripture say of God’s works that some pertain to mercy, some to justice? (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 2.)
To these words it may be answered as follows. Here he resolves the questions raised; and concerning this he does two things: first, he resolves the first question; second, he resolves the second, at: so it is that some works. (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 3.)
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he resolves the first question; second, he raises a doubt about the resolution offered, at: but in accordance with this distinction, a question arises; (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 4.) third, he resolves the doubt, at: but I said above. (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 5.)
After these matters, it is suitable to consider in what sense “all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.” Here he inquires how God’s mercy and justice occur in his work. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that there is no work of God’s in which his mercy and justice do not agree. Second, he inquires whether both coincide in every work of his, at: but since Cassiodorus said above that all God’s works are included in these two, it can justly be asked, etc. (Sent. IV, 46.5 (269). 3.)
And concerning this he does two things: first, he proposes the question; second, he resolves it, at: it seemed to some. (Sent. IV, 46.5 (269). 4.) And it is divided into two parts, according as he gives two opinions about this question; the second part begins at: but to others it seems that. (Sent. IV, 46.5 (269). 5.)
Question 1
Divine justice
Here two questions arise. First, about divine justice. Second, about his mercy.
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
first, whether justice should be attributed to God.
- second, concerning the effect of his justice.
- third, about his justice against the damned.
- Article 1
Whether justice should be attributed to God
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 21, a. 1; ST I-II, q. 61, a. 5; SCG I, ch. 93; SCG II, ch. 29; De div. nom. 8, lec. 4.) It seems that justice should not be attributed to God. For according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 8, 1178b8–22.) in the Ethics 10, it is ridiculous to praise the gods for any moral virtue, or to attribute to them acts of moral virtue. But justice is a moral virtue. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, justice is divided against temperance. But we do not attribute temperance to God. Therefore, neither should we attribute justice to him.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, justice consists in an equality, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, chs. 3–4.) But nothing can be equal to God. Therefore, there cannot be any justice of God toward another.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, that there is no justice of a lord toward his servant. (More accurately, Aristotle says that there is not strict justice between a master and a servant or between a husband and a wife: see Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 6, 1134b7–17, and ch. 11, 1138b7–12; cf. Politics, Bk. 1, ch. 6, 1255b5–15.) But God is master of all people. Therefore, justice does not apply to him.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Psalm 11 (10):7: the Lord is just; he loves just deeds.
Furthermore (2), everything that is most powerful is to be attributed to God. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b27–31.) justice is the most preeminent of the virtues. Therefore, it should be attributed to God above all.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the terms ‘goodness’ and ‘justice’ are applied to God with the same meaning. For justice is universally every virtue, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1130a10.) But the virtue of each thing is its goodness, for virtue is what makes something good, and makes its work good, as is evident in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 6, 1106a15–17.) Therefore, according to the same account someone is called good and just.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 8, n. 7, PG 3:894.) says that justice is praised in God, inasmuch as he distributes to all things according to their dignity. But to distribute to all things pertains to the notion of goodness, for divine goodness is the cause of all sharing. Therefore, justice and goodness are said of God according to the same account.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, goodness and justice coincide in God more than in his creatures. But in creatures the accounts of goodness and justice seem to be the same, for if it were not the case that by the fact that God created things good, they were also just, it would unfittingly seem to be the case that everything from the good God would be good, but not everything from the just God would be just. Therefore, in God goodness and justice are said according to the same account.
On the contrary (1), Boethius (Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint (‘De hebdomadibus’) (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart), p. 50, l. 165.) says in his book On the Hebdomads: to be good regards the essence, but to be just regards the act. But being and action are not said according to the same account in God. Therefore, neither are justice and goodness.
Furthermore (2), genus and species do not have the same account. But goodness and justice are related as genus and species. This is why Boethius (Ibid.) says in his book On the Hebdomads: the good is indeed general, but the just is specific. Therefore, goodness and justice do not have entirely the same account.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justice and truth do not have the same account in God. (Parallel: ST I, q. 21, a. 2.) For those things that are different according to species in us differ according to account in God. But in us truth is considered a different virtue from justice, differing specifically, as is evident in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7, discusses the virtue of truthfulness; his discussion of justice is in Bk. 5.) Therefore in God too, justice and truth are said according to different accounts.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, genus and species do not have completely the same account. But truth, according to Cicero, (Cicero, De inuentione (Teubner ed., ed. Stroebel), Bk. 2, ch. 53, par. 161.) is a species of justice. Therefore, truth and justice do not have the same account.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as seen in the text quoted from Boethius, (Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint (‘De hebdomadibus’) (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart), p. 50, l. 165.) since justice is like a species of goodness, it pertains to the affections; while truth pertains to the intellect. Therefore, truth and justice are not attributed to God according to the same account.
On the contrary (1), in relation to Psalm 25 (24):10, which is cited here: all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, truth is explained as justice. Therefore, they are the same according to account.
Furthermore (2), justice consists in the rendering of a debt. But God is not debtor to us except by his promise, as Anselm says. (Anselm of Canterbury, Orations or Meditations, Meditation 3, on human redemption (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, vol. 3).) Therefore, it is the same thing for God to render a debt as to keep a promise. Therefore, since God is called truthful by the fact that he keeps his promise, he will be called just and truthful according to the same account.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, justice properly speaking establishes an equality in giving and receiving, as is evident from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 3.)
Now this can happen in two ways. In one way, according as an equality is established between the giver and receiver, so that namely the one receiving accepts as much from the giver as he should accept. And this is what commutative justice consists in, namely, that which sets a mean in buying and selling, and in all transactions. In another way, according as an equality is established between two recipients, which happens by the fact that both receive equally for their merits; and this is what distributive justice consists in.
In the first, therefore, namely in commutative justice, an equality of quantity is required, so that a person receives as much as he has given according to value. And therefore between those in whom there cannot be an equality of quantity, there cannot properly be commutative justice. This is the case between people when one of them cannot compensate anything equivalent to the benefits he has received from the other; as a son cannot pay anything back equivalent to the benefits of his father, from whom he has received being and nurturing and teaching. And therefore no matter how much he might restore to his father in services, there would not be perfect equality. Therefore, neither is the account of commutative justice properly preserved; but nevertheless some measure of justice can be preserved, inasmuch as a son renders to his father according to his own measure as the father gave according to his measure, so that in place of equal quantity an equality of proportion is taken. But distributive justice does not require equality of quantity, but only of proportion. For it is not necessary that the one who distributes distribute equally to all, but proportionally to each according to his own measure.
Therefore, this is the way that the account of distributive justice can properly be applied to God, namely, inasmuch as he preserves the equality of proportion in sharing his goods, giving to each proportionally according to the measure of each. This is why Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 8, n. 7, PG 3:894.) says in Chapter 8 of the Divine Names that justice is praised in God inasmuch as he distributes to all according to their dignity. But commutative justice, by which equality is established between God as giver and a creation as receiver, cannot belong to God in its proper meaning, for the benefits of God always exceed the merits of a creation. But nevertheless some equality of proportion is preserved between God as giver and the created thing as receiver, namely, inasmuch as he relates to his own superabundance as the created thing relates to that which befits it according to its own smallness. And in this way a certain mode of commutative justice is also found in God with respect to nature, as it is found between father and son.
And accordingly two modes of divine justice are assigned. One, inasmuch as God renders according to merits: for this pertains to distributive justice, to which it belongs to distribute all things proportionally according to their own dignity. The other mode, according as he does what is becoming to his own goodness; as he is also said to be just in that he spares sinners, because it is becoming to him. However, this pertains to the mode of commutative justice, not indeed preserved according to an equality of quantity, as is required in commutative justice properly so called, but preserved according to an equality of proportion, for namely, God is related to what he does superabundantly, as the created being is to that in which he is lacking. And according to this, to superabound in benefits is called just in him, inasmuch as it is proportionate and becoming to him. Commenting on 2 Corinthians 3:18, we are all . . . being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another, for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit, the old Gloss of Ambrosiaster says, so that he might display such glory to be given which befits the sublimity of the giver. (This last sentence, from Glossa vetus onwards, is given only in the Parma edition, and with an incorrect Scriptural citation.)
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher excludes moral virtues from God inasmuch as they deal specifically with a civil matter, as justice is about buying and selling and management and such. However, this does not make it impossible for justice to exist in God, according as he is the distributor of natural goods to all creation.
Reply Obj. 2: Temperance concerns innate passions, while justice concerns exchanges of activities. From this it is clear that the matter of temperance can in no way apply to God like the matter of justice. And furthermore, temperance directs with regard to those things that are within the temperate man, but justice regards what is outside; and so they are not the same.
Reply Obj. 3: Justice does not always require an equality between giver and receiver, nor always an equality of quantity, but sometimes an equality of proportion suffices. And so it is not unfitting if justice is held to exist in God in a certain way.
Reply Obj. 4: Between a master and servant there cannot be commutative justice properly speaking, for no equality according to quantity can be established between them, since all that is the servant’s is his master’s. Nevertheless, a certain mode of commutative justice is preserved to the extent that between them is found an equality of proportion. This is why in the Ethics 5 the Philosopher also distinguishes the justice between master and servant from political justice, which is properly so called; and in this manner there can also be justice of God toward a creature.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that justice presupposes the notion of goodness in God. For goodness in God implies the notion of the end, in which lies the fullest perfection. Now, the end moves the agent to act; therefore, the goodness of God also moves him in a certain way to his activity, not indeed such that he acquires goodness, but such that he communicates his goodness to others. For as was said in Book II, Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 1, God does not act because of an appetite for an end, but because of the love of the end, willing to communicate his own goodness as much as is possible and befitting according to his providence. And therefore just as the end is the first principle in every undertaking, so divine goodness is the first principle of all communication by which God bestows perfections on creation. But justice determines a certain way of communicating those things, namely, inasmuch as it preserves a certain equality of sharing. And so it is clear that goodness and justice differ in account in two ways. First, because goodness pertains to the very perfection of the divine nature, according to which it has the character of an end; but justice pertains to the act itself of communication. Second, because although goodness is related to communication as its principle, it nevertheless relates to communication in general, not determining any specific manner of communication; but justice determines in it a specific manner, namely, equality. And Boethius (Boethius, Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint (‘De hebdomadibus’) (Loeb ed., ed. Stewart), p. 50, l. 165.) refers to these two differences in his book On the Hebdomads, saying that good regards essence, but justice regards action; and again that good is general, and justice specific.
Reply Obj. 1: Although virtue makes the person who has it good and renders his work good, nevertheless, the accounts of goodness and virtue are not the same. For virtue is said according as it is the principle of action, and stands in the role of an efficient cause; but good rather regards the account of the end. But since the effect must be proportionate to the end, and from this the one acting acquires goodness, as does his act, this is why virtue, which bears this proportion, since it is the disposition of the perfect to the best, as it says in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 7, ch. 3, 246a10–246b3, and throughout the chapter.) is said to make the agent and the act good. And likewise too, justice, whether it is taken as a particular virtue, or as the same as every virtue, stands in the role of an efficient cause. However, according as justice is every virtue, although justice and virtue are the same in subject, they nevertheless do not have the same account, as it says in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 1, 1129b26–1130a13, as well as ch. 2.) Therefore, it does not follow in any way that justice and goodness have the same account.
Reply Obj. 2: Both goodness and justice are principles of distribution, but in different ways. For goodness is like a final principle, not determining a specific mode of distribution; but justice is like an efficient principle, determining the specific mode of distribution. And therefore Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 8, n. 7, PG 3:894.) also attributes to justice the distribution according to worthiness; but he attributes communication taken absolutely to goodness.
Reply Obj. 3: God bestows some perfection on each creation that he produces in being: otherwise, it could not exist; and so all things are called ‘good’ insofar as they are from the good. Nevertheless, he does not give to each of the things that he produces in being to be actually according to that special mode of action that justice preserves. And therefore it is not necessary that all things that are from the just God be called just; and so too it does not follow that the accounts of the good and the just are the same.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that every equality established by a certain act requires some rule according to which the equalization happens. Therefore, since justice consists in acting to establish equality in giving and receiving, it is necessary that every justice have a some rule according to which this equalization happens. Now the rules of justice are reasons established in the mind, according to which a just man establishes equality. And thus when his actions agree with these reasons, he is said to preserve justice; however, when they disagree, he is said to act unjustly. And since the account of truth consists in the conformity of things to the intellect, therefore the name of truth is transferred to signifying the conformity of the works of justice to the ideas of justice; and it is this truth that we call the truth of justice. And according to this, justice itself is the same as truth; but nevertheless justice is said according to an equality established outwardly, while truth is said according to a conformity of an outward equality to the thoughts that are in the mind; and according to this, truth and justice in God are taken as the same in understanding.
Reply Obj. 1: There are two ways outward actions are related to an interior disposition of the mind: one way as a sign to a thing signified; the other as the thing regulated to the rule. And according to either relationship, the conformity of outward actions to the interior disposition of the mind constitutes the account of truth. Therefore, the truthfulness that the Philosopher is speaking about in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, ch. 7.) consists in the conformity of actions to the mind as they are the sign of it, namely, when someone shows himself to be in words and deeds as he is interiorly. This is why this virtue, according to him, is opposed to boasting and pretense. But the truth of justice, which we are speaking about, brings about the conformity according to the other relation of outward actions to the mind, namely, that they be related to it as to the rule governing the equality established in things through acts of justice. But since not only the equality that is established in things by our acts, but also our acts themselves must be brought into uniformity with the account that is in the mind, in this commensuration another truth is also found, according to which the activities themselves are brought into conformity with the mind. And this is the truth of life, which consists in each person acting according to what reason teaches.
Reply Obj. 2: That truthfulness of which Cicero speaks has to do with the conformity of speech to the thing, namely, according as someone confesses in court how the matter stands, and acts as he promised; and this truthfulness is a part of justice.
Reply Obj. 3: The truth that is in the intellect is an equality of the intellect to the thing indifferently, whether it be established by our act or not; and this is not what we are speaking about at present. And since words are signs of understanding, alongside this truth we consider the truth of doctrine, which is distinguished against the truth of justice. For the truth of doctrine consists in truth of enunciation. Therefore, it can be gathered from what has been said, that truth is taken in one way according to the conformity of the intellect to the being of the thing; and from this point of view we have the truth of doctrine. In another way, truth is taken according to the conformity of our actions to right understanding; and then, as they are the sign of it, but not taking into account anyone’s loss or gain is considered, we have the truthfulness of which the Philosopher speaks, which is divided against pretense or boasting; but when loss or gain is considered, then we have the truth that is a part of justice, which Cicero sets down, by which someone is kept uninjured in trials and in confessions. Both of these kinds of truth may be reduced to the truth of doctrine, inasmuch as both consist in making something known. But insofar as our actions are related to the intellect as what is regulated is related to its rule, then according as right understanding is the rule governing actions, it is the truth of life; but according as it is the rule governing the equality established among things, it is the truth of justice.
Article 2
Concerning the effect of his justice
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that God’s work is called just solely by the fact that it is pleasing to him. For in the Proslogion, (Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, ch. 11 (Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, 1:109).) Anselm says, speaking of God: the only thing that is just is what you will, and what is not just is what you do not will. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Romans 9:21 says: has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use? And he is speaking of God under the likeness of the potter. But whatever the potter wishes to be made out of mud, it is just for it to be made out of mud. Therefore, whatever God wills to be done in creation is the just thing to be done. And thus something is said to be just by the sole fact that it is willed by God.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever the will is something other than justice, justice restrains the will, and so in a certain way it resists it. But there is nothing that restrains the will of God. This is why Matthew 20:15 says: am I not allowed to do what I will? Nor again can anything resist it; for it says in Psalm 115 (113):3: he does whatever he pleases, and in Romans 9:19: who can resist his will? Therefore, his will itself is his justice. Therefore, by this fact what is just is whatever is willed by God.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, in us for our work to be just is not the same as for it to be willed by us, by the fact that we are debtors to someone to whom if we wished to pay the debt, our work would not be just. But God is a debtor to no one. Therefore, his work is only called just because it pleases him. (This cryptic objection deserves some explanation. For us, the fact that we will something and the fact that it is just are not the same thing. For example, we might have borrowed a gun from someone, and we owe him his gun back. And yet the fact that we will to pay our debt to this man does not make giving him the gun just in every situation. For God, the situation is different: nothing is “due” to anyone by God in the first place, so the only meaning of “just” as applied to his works is that they are pleasing to him. For him, the fact that he wills something is the same as the fact that it is just.)
On the contrary (1), God is said to act justly inasmuch as he renders to each one for his merits: thou dost requite a man according to his work (Ps 62 [61]:12). But God’s will does not examine merits. Therefore, God’s work is not said to be just by the sole fact that it pleases him.
Furthermore (2), God’s work is not called a work of justice and a work of mercy from the same thing. But a work of mercy is a work of the divine will. Therefore, a work of God is not said to be just by the sole fact that it is pleasing to him.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that God cannot omit anything of those things that are necessary to the justice of his work. For it says in 2 Tim 2:13: he remains faithful, for he cannot deny himself. The Gloss comments on this: but he would deny himself if his words were not fulfilled. Therefore, since God’s work is called just by the fact that it fulfills God’s words, it seems that he cannot leave justice out of his work.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, commenting on the text of Romans 11:24: if you have been . . . grafted contrary to nature, the Gloss says: God, the creator and author of all things does nothing against nature, just as neither does he act against himself. But he is the author of natures, just as he himself is the author and cause of all justice. Therefore, he can do nothing against the order of justice established in things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if he were able to change the order of justice established in things, then he would be able to damn the good and reward the wicked. But this seems unfitting. Therefore, God cannot change the order of justice that is in things.
On the contrary (1), the order of justice requires that someone be punished for sin. But God can forgive the punishment due to sin: otherwise, it would be in vain to ask that he forgive us our sins. Therefore, he can change the order of justice established in things.
Furthermore (2), the order of justice in human affairs is like the order of natural things, which is why human justice is drawn from the justice of natural things, according to the philosophers. But God sometimes changes the order of natural things established by him, as is clear in miraculous works. Therefore, he can also change the order of justice established in human affairs.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that God punishes no one except for sinning. For as Jerome (Jerome, Epistle to Heliodorus, PL 22:601.) says, whatever we suffer, our sins have merited. But he appoints punishment by means of suffering. Therefore, all punishment is a repayment for sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, reward is related to merit as punishment is related to sin. But reward is only rendered for merit. Therefore, neither is punishment meted out for anything but sin.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, punishment is like a kind of medicine, namely, when either a person who is punished is corrected by his penalty, or there are others who are frightened away by it. But this would not be the case if punishment were also imposed without sin. Therefore, punishment is only imposed for sin.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, human justice is patterned after divine justice. But, according to human justice, it would be considered unjust to punish someone without fault. Therefore, much more is this unfitting to divine justice.
On the contrary (1), Job was heavily punished. But the punishment was not inflicted on him for his fault, as Gregory often says. (In the Moralia.) Therefore, God does not always impose punishment for fault.
Furthermore (2), misfortunes that happen in this world are common to both the good and the wicked, as Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 20, ch. 3.) says in his book the City of God. But fault is not common to both. Therefore, sometimes punishment is imposed without fault.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the Lord acts more justly with one person than with another. For punishment is a work of justice. But he punishes one person more than another. Therefore, he acts more justly with one person than another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, mercy tempers the severity of justice. But God acts more mercifully with one person than with another. Therefore, also more justly.
On the contrary, justice is a certain equality. But equal does not admit of more and less. Therefore, God does not act more justly with one person than with another.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, justice and will in God are the same in reality, but in notion, justice adds something beyond the will: namely, an order befitting divine effects, according to which one is made to conform proportionally to another. For there is a twofold order in created things: one, according to which a creature is ordered toward God, and another according to which one creature depends on another. Thus, by the word ‘will,’ only the order of created things to God is expressed, but ‘justice’ includes together with this the order of one creature to another. For just as it is due to fire, having been constituted in such a nature, that it be up, when the order of things to each other is considered, so it is also due to fault that it be punished in keeping with the same order. This is why it is evident that something is said to be just not only because it is willed by God, but because it is due to a certain created thing according to the order of creature to creature. For nothing can be due to any thing except by reason of its own nature or condition. However, the cause of a thing’s nature and properties is the divine will; and therefore the whole order of justice can be traced back to the divine will as to its origin.
Reply Obj. 1: Although everything that God wills is just, nevertheless, it is not said to be just merely because God wills it, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not owed to mud that noble vessels be formed from it rather than base ones, but when a noble vessel is formed out of mud, it is owed to the nobility of that vessel that it be put to a fitting use. Likewise, that God produces the sort of creature he wishes is a fact indifferent to the account of justice; but once a certain nature has been produced, attributing to it what befits its nature does pertain to his justice, and the contrary is opposed to his justice. And similarly it is indifferent to his justice that he give grace or not give it, since the gift of grace is not due to nature; but after he has conferred grace, which is the principle of merit, it pertains to his judgment that he grant rewards for merits. And this is how justice is caused by the supposition of his will.
Reply Obj. 3: What is included in the will does not restrain the will. However, by the very fact that God wills to make a certain nature, he wills to attribute to it those things that befit that nature; just as if a man wishes an end, by this very fact he wishes all those things that are for the sake of the end. And so the will of God is neither restrained by his justice, nor can it resist his justice.
Reply Obj. 4: Although God is not a debtor to any creature, nevertheless there can be something due to a creature, namely, when something is needed if that creature is to imitate the exemplar of divine wisdom. And justice does concern this debt, when God is said to do something justly; which indeed does pertain more to the order of thing to thing than to the order of a creature to God.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that a work of justice can be omitted in two ways. In one way, such that it is done against justice; in the other way, so that it is done above and beyond justice. For since justice is said by the relation to another, it happens against the order when what is due to someone or a condition that he requires is taken away from him. However, if something more is bestowed on him, it is not against justice, but above and beyond justice; for even if something is not owed to a certain thing, nevertheless its privation is not owed to it. This is why if something is presented to it that is not owed to it, nothing is done against the order of justice, as is evident in someone who shares his goods generously with another. But, as the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 3, 1131b20–24.) says in the Ethics 5, the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil. This is why just as without prejudice to justice someone can bestow his own goods on someone else more than he is due, so too without prejudice to justice he can impose less of a penalty for sins committed against him than was due. But just as someone cannot without injury bestow more of another’s goods on someone than he was due, so he cannot impose less penalty for a sin committed against someone else. And thus a judge cannot without prejudice to justice diminish due penalties for sins committed against God or the state, except perhaps to the extent that he sees it would be to the state’s benefit.
Now God is the giver of all goods, and every sinner sins against him. This is why he can bestow more goods than are due to someone, and impose fewer evils, or even completely relax a punishment. And in this he would not act against justice, but above and beyond justice. But if he bestowed on someone less of his goods than the person was due, or if he punished someone more than he had sinned, this would be against the order of justice. Nor could God do this, speaking of his ordinary power, just as he could not make it so that his work, according as it participates in being, did not imitate him. For something is due to a thing according to the exigencies of its condition, by the very fact that without this it cannot imitate the divine exemplar according to its own proper character.
Reply Obj. 1: God would deny himself if he did not bestow on a creation what is due to it according to its own disposition. For then he would not preserve the truth in the condition and governance of his works. But he does not deny himself if he presents something more to a creation than is due to it, as was said.
Reply Obj. 2: Although God does nothing against nature, nevertheless he does something above and beyond nature, namely, inasmuch as he does something in nature for which the powers of nature do not suffice. Likewise too even if he does nothing against justice, he can nevertheless do something above and beyond justice.
Reply Obj. 3: To damn Peter, to whom salvation is due by the favor of the grace conferred on him, would be contrary to justice; and so God cannot do this, speaking of his ordinary power. But to save Judas would not be contrary to justice, but above and beyond it, as is clear from what has been said. But nevertheless it would be contrary to his foreknowledge and disposition, by which he prepared for him an eternal punishment. Therefore, the order of justice does not prevent him from saving Judas, but the order of foreknowledge and eternal disposition prevents it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that punishment by its very nature always includes something harmful. But something is harmful from the fact that it takes some good away. Now among a person’s goods there are some that are good for him per se, which are the goods of a person as a human being, but some are goods according to his order to those goods, like temporal goods. Therefore, these are goods to the extent that they assist a person to those spiritual goods. But if they impede him, then they are not goods for him but evils. This is also why the Philosopher (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 13, 1153b14–24.) says in the Ethics 7 that good fortune should be judged according to its relation to virtue, as it assists or impedes it.
Therefore, to suffer loss in spiritual goods is always bad; but to suffer loss in temporal goods is indeed sometimes good, but sometimes bad. It is bad according as it impedes one from the exercise of virtue and the obtainment of spiritual goods; but it is good according as it helps virtue or the obtainment of spiritual good, just as physical exercise is useful to acquiring physical strength. And because, as was said, punishment means harming, therefore loss in spiritual goods is always a punishment, whereas loss in temporal goods is sometimes not a punishment but a medicine working toward salvation; just as the bitterness of a drink is not a punishment, but a remedy for physical health. But nevertheless, because our nature is such that it must arrive at the perfection of spiritual good by the loss of temporal ones, from the fault of sin it comes that all nature has been damaged: nor will such medicine be any longer useful when the wound of sin is perfectly cured, since man will have attained the final end of his spiritual perfection.
This is why it should be said that punishment, properly speaking, is never given except for a fault; but nevertheless what happens to be penal, namely, the loss of temporal goods while in the wayfaring state, sometimes is imposed on a man without previous fault in his person, although not without the previous fault in the nature. But after this life when spiritual progress has ended, a person will sustain no loss, even in physical things, without fault. For then he will wipe away every tear from their eyes (Rev 21:4). But in spiritual goods a person will endure no loss, whether in this life or in the future life, without personal fault.
Reply Obj. 1: Jerome speaks generally about what previous actual and original sin have merited, whether in the person or in the nature.
Reply Obj. 2: A good may be presented to a person without any previous merit, like the first grace; but then it does not have the account of a reward. Therefore, it is not unfitting if some evil is imposed on someone without previous fault, which does not have the account of punishment, but rather of a medicine moving him toward the good.
Reply Obj. 3: Punishment is not called a medicine only because it deters people from evil by frightening them, as the objection assumes, but also inasmuch as it moves people toward the good by training them and withdrawing them from the love of temporal things. And so the argument does not follow.
Reply Obj. 4: Even with no previous fault, without prejudice to human justice something penal may be imposed on someone, like the training of youths or medicine for the infirm. Therefore, it is not unfitting if the same thing happens according to divine justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that since action is the middle between an agent and an effect, it can be modified from either side. Therefore, when it is asked whether God acts more justly with one person than with another, if this referred to the action as issuing from the agent, since his own justice, by which he acts justly with everyone, is one and invariable, he does not act more justly with one person than with another. However, if it referred to the action as terminating in the effect, then it also cannot be said that he acts more justly with one person than with another, because any work is called just by the fact that it is brought into proportional equality. However, equality, whether of quantity or of proportion, has the same account in the least things as in great things; for there is the same proportion between two and one as between twenty and ten, and the same equality that exists between one and one exists between hundred and hundred. And therefore one work cannot be more just than another, as long as both are just; for the same justice is preserved when bad things are rendered for evil, and good things for good, whether they are small or large. But nevertheless, because in us it is not required for virtue that we always attain the mean, but it suffices sometimes to be near the mean because of the difficulty of finding the mean, as it says in the Ethics 2, (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 9, esp. 1109a34 and 1109b17–20.) this is why among us one person is said to act more justly than another, according as he approaches the mean more or less, while neither person actually attains it. But God himself, to whom is known the measure of every thing, always reaches the mean indivisibly in his operation, and thus in no way does he act more justly with one person than with another.
Reply Obj. 1: Punishment is not an effect of justice insofar as it is justice, but insofar as it is proportioned to a fault. Therefore, it is permitted by God that a greater or lesser punishment be imposed; however, it will always be imposed by his justice according to the same proportion.
Reply Obj. 2: Mercy has to do with the divine effect absolutely, not concerning any proportion or equality in it. This is why he is said to act more mercifully with one person than with another according to the greater or lesser effect of mercy, if this is referred to the action according as it is determined to the effect, but not if it is referred to it according as it issues from an agent: for he acts mercifully toward all men with a single invariable mercy. Nor, however, does it follow because of this that he might act in any way more justly with one person than with another: for the effect of his mercy is not against justice, but above and beyond justice, as is clear from what has been said.
Article 3
About his justice against the damned
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST I-II, q. 87, a. 3; ST III, q. 86, a. 4; In II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 5; In IV Sent. d. 21, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3; Super Matt. 25; SCG III, ch. 144; De malo, q. 7, a. 10; Super Rom. 2, lec. 2; Comp. theo. 183.) It seems that eternal punishment is not imposed on sinners by divine justice. For a punishment should not exceed the guilt: according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be (Deut 25:2). But guilt is temporal. Therefore, the punishment should not be eternal.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, one mortal sin is greater than another. Therefore, one should be punished with a greater punishment than another. But no punishment can be greater than eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore, eternal punishment is not due to every mortal sin, and if it is not due to one, it should be due to none, since the sins do not have an infinite distance from one another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a just judge only imposes punishment for the sake of correction; which is why Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 3, 1104b15–17.) says that punishments are a kind of medicine. But the fact that the wicked are punished for eternity is not for their own correction or that of other bad people, since at that time there will not be others who could be corrected by this in the future. Therefore, according to divine justice eternal punishment would not be imposed for sins.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, anything not willed for its own sake is only willed for the sake of some benefit. But punishments are not willed by God for their own sake, for he does not delight in punishments. Therefore, since no benefit can arise from the perpetuation of a punishment, it seems that perpetual punishment is not imposed for sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing that exists per accidens is perpetual, as it says in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 1, ch. 2, 269b6–10.) But punishment is inflicted for things that are per accidens, since they are against nature. Therefore, it cannot be perpetual.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, God’s justice seems to require that sinners be reduced to nothing; for it is said that by ingratitude a person loses the benefits he has received. Now, among other benefits of God is also being itself; and so it seems just that a sinner, who makes himself ungrateful to God, loses his very being. But if they were reduced to nothing, their punishment could not be perpetual. Therefore, it does not consonant with divine justice that sinners be punished perpetually.
On the contrary (1), Matthew 25:46 says: they will go, namely sinners, away into eternal punishment.
Furthermore (2), punishment is related to fault as reward is to merit. But according to divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: everyone who sees the Son and believes in him should have eternal life (John 6:40). Therefore, eternal punishment is also due to temporal guilt according to divine justice.
Furthermore (3), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5, 1132b22–30.) punishment is reckoned according to the dignity of the one who was sinned against, which is why someone who strikes the prince is punished with a greater punishment than if he struck anyone else. But anyone who sins mortally sins against God, whose precepts he transgressed, and whose honor he bestowed on others, when he established his end in something else. However, God’s majesty is infinite. Therefore, anyone who sins mortally is deserving of infinite punishment and so it seems that a person is justly punished eternally for mortal sin.
I answer that, since punishment has two kinds of quantity, namely, according to the intensity of its severity, and according to the length of time, the quantity of a punishment corresponds to the quantity of guilt according to the intensity of severity, so that the more gravely someone sinned, the heavier the punishment inflicted on him. This is why Revelation says: as she glorified herself and played the wanton, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning (Rev 18:7). But the duration of the punishment does not correspond to the duration of the fault, as Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 11.) says in the City of God 21; for adultery, which is committed in a moment of time, is not punished by momentary punishment even according to human laws, but the duration of the punishment has to do with the disposition of the sinner. For sometimes the one who sins in a certain polity deserves by this sin to be completely removed from the society of the state, whether by perpetual exile or even by death. But sometimes he does not deserve to be completely excluded from the citizens’ society, and then so that he can be a suitable member of the state, punishment is prolonged or shortened as is expedient to the correction, so that he might live peacefully and appropriately in the state.
So, too, according to divine justice, by sin someone makes himself deserving of being entirely separated from the fellowship of the city of God. This happens by every sin in which a person sins against charity, which is the bond uniting that city. And therefore for mortal sin, which is the contrary of charity, a person is eternally excluded from the society of the saints and eternal punishment is imposed, for, as Augustine says in the book mentioned above, just as the punishment of the first death removes men from this mortal city, so does the punishment of the second death remove men from the immortal city. (Ibid.) However, the fact that the punishment that the earthly city inflicts is not considered perpetual, is incidental, inasmuch as man does not remain perpetually, or inasmuch as even that city perishes eventually. Therefore, if a person lived eternally, the punishments of exile and slavery, which are imposed by human law, would endure in him perpetually. But those who sin in such a way that they do not deserve to be completely separated from the fellowship of the holy city, such as who sin venially, will have a shorter or longer punishment the more or less they are purifiable, according as the sins inhered more or less in them; which is enacted in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to divine justice.
Other reasons are also found given by the saints why people may be justly punished with an eternal punishment for a temporal sin. One is that they sinned against an eternal good when they held eternal life in contempt. And this is what Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 12.) says in the book mentioned: he who destroyed in himself a good which might have been eternal himself became worthy of an eternal evil. Another reason is that man sinned in his own eternity, (The meaning of this phrase is explained below.) which is why Gregory (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 46.) says in the Dialogues 4 that it pertains to the great justice of the one judging that they are never without suffering who never wished to be without sin.
And if it be objected that some people who sin mortally propose to change their lives for the better sometime, and so in keeping with this they do not deserve eternal punishment, as it seems; then it should be said, according to some people, that Gregory is speaking about the will that is manifest by their work. For anyone who falls into mortal sin by his own will places himself in a state from which he cannot be snatched unless divinely assisted. This is why by the very fact that he wishes to sin, he consequently wishes to remain in sin perpetually. For man is a spirit that goes, that is, into sin, and does not return by himself (cf. Ps 78:39). For example, if someone threw himself into the mud, which he could not get out of unless he were helped, it could be said that he wished to remain there eternally no matter how much he thought something else. (This is a most astute point. Thomas is arguing that even if someone who threw himself into a deep pit was thinking “I’d like to get out of this pit someday,” and even if he kept thinking that, it is in the nature of the pit that he cannot get out of it at will, and so his will is a “velleity,” with no effectiveness at changing his condition.)
Or it can be said, and this is better, that by the very fact that someone sinned mortally, he established his final end in creation; and because all life is ordered toward the end of life, therefore by the fact that he orders his whole life to that sin, he would also wish to remain perpetually in sin, if he were able to do so unpunished. And this is what Gregory says, commenting on Job 41:32: one would think the deep to be hoary; he says in the Morals 34: this is why the wicked fell short of the end: they have clearly willed to live without the end, so that without the end they would be able to remain in wickedness; for they seek rather to sin than to live. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 34, par. 19.) And another reason can be assigned why there is an eternal punishment for mortal sin, namely because by it is a sin against God, who is infinite; and so, since there cannot be a punishment infinite in intensity, since a created thing is not capable of any infinite quality, it is necessary that it be at least of infinite duration. There is also a fourth reason for the same things: that guilt remains eternally, since guilt cannot be forgiven without grace, which a man cannot acquire after death; and punishment should not cease as long as guilt remains.
Reply Obj. 1: As was already said, punishment should not be fitted to guilt according to the quantity of its duration, as is seen to be the case even according to human laws. Or it could be said that as Gregory resolves it, although the fault is from a temporal act, nevertheless in the will it is eternal, as has already been explained.
Reply Obj. 2: The quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of sin according to intensity, and thus for unequal mortal sins the penalties will be unequal in intensity, but equal in duration.
Reply Obj. 3: Punishments that are inflicted on those who are not completely ejected from the society of the city are ordered to their correction. But those punishments by which some people are totally expelled from the society of the city are not for their correction, though they can be for the correction and tranquility of the others who remain in the city. And this is how the eternal damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are in the Church now, for punishments do not only serve for correction when they are inflicted, but also when they are determined.
Reply Obj. 4: The penalties of the wicked lasting perpetually will not be entirely useless, for they are useful for two things. First, for the fact that in them divine justice is preserved, which is acceptable to God for his own sake. This is why Gregory (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 44.) says in the Dialogues 4: almighty God, because he is merciful and full of pity, takes no pleasure in the torments of wretched men: but because he is also just, therefore he is not restrained from punishing the wicked in perpetuity. Second, they are useful in that the elect rejoice in them when they contemplate in them the justice of God, and when they recognize that they have escaped this punishment: the righteous will rejoice when he sees the vengeance (Ps 58 [57]:10); and they will be, that is, the wicked, to the satiety of vision, that is, to the saints, (Isa 66:24), as the Gloss says. (All modern translations of Scripture, including the Douay-Rheims, render Isaiah’s meaning to be something quite different: “And they shall go forth and look on the dead bodies of the men that have rebelled against me; for their worm shall not die, their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh [et erunt usque ad satietatem visionis omni carni]” (Isa 66:24).) And this is what Gregory says in the Dialogues 4: (In the same place as immediately above.) all the wicked consigned to eternal punishment are punished by their own iniquity; nevertheless they will burn to some purpose, namely that all the just may see in God both the joys that they are receiving and they may perceive in them the punishments that they have escaped; the more they see evils punished eternally, which they have vanquished by his help, the more they will recognize that they are debtors to divine grace eternally.
Reply Obj. 5: Although punishment corresponds to the soul per accidens, nevertheless it corresponds to the soul infected by guilt per se. And because the guilt will remain there in perpetuity, this is why the punishment will also be perpetual.
Reply Obj. 6: Punishment corresponds to guilt, properly speaking, according to the disordering that is found in it, and not according to the dignity of the one who is sinned against, for then a punishment infinite in intensity would be returned for any sin. Therefore, although when someone sins against God, who is the author of being, he deserves to lose being itself, nevertheless, when the disordering in the act itself is considered, the loss of existence is not owed to him, for it is presupposed to merit or demerit; nor by the disordering of sin is being taken away or corrupted. And so the privation of being cannot be the due punishment for any fault.
Question 2
The mercy of God
Next, we inquire about the mercy of God; and here three questions arise:
first, whether mercy should be posited in God;
- second, its effect;
- third, whether God’s mercy can suffer the punishments of the damned to be perpetual.
- Article 1
Whether mercy should be posited in God
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 21, a. 3; ST II-II, q. 30, a. 4; SCG I, ch. 91; Super Ps. 24.) It seems that in God there is no mercy. For as Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 14, PG 94:931.) says, mercy is compassion for another’s evils. But compassion (Compassio, meaning “suffering with.” Because God cannot suffer, the objection holds, he cannot “suffer with.”) does not happen in God. Therefore, neither does mercy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, mercy has to do with misery. But the greater a sinner someone is, the more miserable he is; for which reason Scripture says: sin makes the nations miserable (Prov 14:34). Therefore, if God is merciful, the more someone is a sinner, the more he will provide for him; which seems absurd.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, mercy inclines the merciful to drive away another’s misery. Therefore, the merciful one neither imposes misery on another, nor permits it to be imposed, if he can. But God casts some into the misery of punishment, and permits them to fall into the misery of guilt. Therefore, since he is omnipotent, he is not be merciful.
On the contrary (1), it says in Ps 144:8: the Lord is gracious and merciful.
Furthermore (2), just as God punishes some, so he spares others, for he repents of evil (Joel 2:13). (”Rend your hearts and not your garments. Return to the Lord, your God, for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love, and repents of evil” (Joel 2:13).) But because he punishes, we consider there to be anger in God, although anger is a passion. Therefore, by the fact that he spares, he should be called merciful, even though in us mercy is a passion.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in God goodness and mercy are said according to the same account. For it is evident that God freed the gentiles by his mercy alone: that the gentiles might glorify God for his mercy (Rom 15:9). But the Apostle attributed the conversion of the nations to the divine goodness: note then the goodness and the severity of God: severity toward those who have fallen, but God’s goodness to you (Rom 11:22). Therefore, goodness and mercy are of the same account in God.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, principles are known by their effects. But the same thing is an effect of both mercy and goodness, namely, providing for those who have less. Therefore, both have the same account.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, mercy is a certain virtue. But virtue is the goodness of the virtuous. Therefore, mercy, as such, is a certain goodness; and so it seems that both have the same account.
On the contrary (1), things that have one account also have one extent of application. But goodness and mercy do not have the same extent, for divine goodness is communicated to all created things, inasmuch as all goods are from the first good, whereas mercy is not found in all created things, such that all would be said to be merciful. Therefore, goodness and mercy do not have the same account.
Furthermore (2), mercy would not exist unless misery existed. But goodness can exist even when no misery exists; for the good does not depend on evil, as neither does possession depend on privation. Therefore, mercy and goodness in God do not have the same account.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the work of divine mercy can be traced back to the attribute of power. For a work of God is traced back to that attribute that is most manifest by it. But the work of mercy most manifests God’s power; this is why it says in the Collect: O God, who manifest your omnipotence most by sparing and having mercy. (The Collect for the Tenth Sunday after Pentecost in the traditional Roman Rite.) Therefore, the work of mercy can be traced back to omnipotence.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, divine mercy is most manifest in the justification of the wicked. But it is a greater thing to justify the wicked than to create heaven and earth, as Augustine says. (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus (CCSL 36), Tract. 72, par. 3.) Therefore, since creation is reducible to power, it seems that also the work of mercy should be traced back to God’s power.
On the contrary (3), it seems that it is traced back to the attribute of wisdom. For he does not have mercy by passion, but by judgment. Now judgment pertains to wisdom. Therefore, the work of mercy also is to be attributed to wisdom.
Furthermore (4), mercy in a certain way causes another’s misery to exist in the one who has mercy. But our misery cannot exist in God except by knowledge. Therefore, mercy pertains to God’s knowledge or wisdom.
On the contrary (5), it seems that it pertains to goodness. For divine love is given as the reason for mercy in Wisdom 11:26: for it says: thou sparest all things, for they are thine, O Lord who lovest souls. But love pertains to goodness. Therefore, mercy should be attributed to goodness.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, a man is called merciful from the fact that he makes another’s misery his own; which indeed can happen in two ways. First, in that he is somehow affected by another’s misery, inasmuch as he suffers with the one suffering. Second, according to a certain consideration, for he considers the misery of his neighbor as though it were his own, and is moved by it to drive off his misery by kindness as though he were driving off his own misery. Now God can in no way partake in misery; and so according to the first mode, mercy does not occur in him. But he relates to driving off others’ misery as a man relates to driving off their misery. For just as a man in driving off another’s misery considers the benefit of the man whose misery he drives off, so too, God driving off our misery by his kindness does not order this to his own benefit but to ours. This is why, inasmuch as our misery is like his own according to a certain consideration of the one who drives it away, in this way he is called merciful and said to have mercy. And consequently it is commonly said that there is no mercy in God according to passion, but according to effect; which effect, nevertheless proceeds from the affection of his will, which is not a passion but the simple act of his will.
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene defines mercy as a passion found in us, and by it does not belong to God in this way.
Reply Obj. 2: Mercy in us is a kind of passion; but no passion is praiseworthy, except according as it is regulated by reason. This is why mercy is not praiseworthy in us, except according as it follows the order of reason. For nothing that is in us is applicable to God unless in the way that it is praiseworthy in us. And therefore mercy in God is according to the account of his wisdom; and so it is not necessary that because someone is a greater sinner, he obtains a greater effect of mercy, unless according as it is ordained in divine wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3: And by this the solution to the third objection is clear. For a merciful man does not drive away another’s misery as much as he can, but as much as right reason permits. In the same way too, God drives away our misery according to the order of his wisdom; and thus he imposes the misery of punishment on some, and permits others to fall into the misery of guilt.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that the accounts of mercy and goodness differ in three things. First, in the fact that mercy has to do with the starting terminus, but goodness more with the end terminus. For the person on whom God bestows his benefits goes from being deficient to being perfect. Therefore, goodness has to do with the communication of perfection, for the good is diffusive of its own being; but mercy has to do with the removal of a defect. Second, in the fact that mercy, properly speaking, pertains to the divine providence by which he communicates good things only to rational creatures; for it regards misery, which, since it is contrary to happiness, can only belong to rational creatures, to whom it pertains to be happy. But goodness regards divine providence with respect to anything. Third, in the fact that mercy conveys a certain likening of the one providing to the one he provides for, inasmuch as the provider considers the other’s misery as though it were his own. And therefore mercy can only exist in an intellectual nature, which has a grasp of another’s misery. But goodness has an order to communicating simply, and so goodness can belong to any created being that has communicable perfection. A fourth difference can also be assigned: mercy precludes being owed from the one provided for, for what is owed to someone is not said to be given out of mercy. But goodness does not exclude the notion of being owed from the one to whom something is given; and that is why goodness is common to the bestowal of justice and to mercy.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting to attribute the conversion of the nations both to divine goodness and to mercy as well, although for different reasons, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 2: Mercy is related to goodness by an addition in a certain way, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore every work that belongs to mercy belongs also to goodness, but not vice versa.
Reply Obj. 3: Although mercy is a kind of goodness, nevertheless it adds something beyond the account of goodness; and according to this the accounts of goodness and mercy are not entirely the same, just as man and animal do not have entirely the same account.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that every divine work proceeds from power, wisdom, and goodness; but nevertheless some works are appropriated to power, or to wisdom, or to goodness, according as what pertains to one of those attributes appears in them more marvelously. Now power simply conveys account of the principle producing something, while it belongs to wisdom to order (which is why to wisdom pertains the manner of producing a thing by which something is brought into being in an ordered way), and lastly, goodness, which has the account of the end, has to do with the motive for producing. Thus, in the work of creation, in which what chiefly appears admirable is the fact that a thing is produced in being, divine power is most manifest; while in the work of governance, in which things are disposed in order, the very order of things itself appears admirable, and so it is attributed to wisdom. But the work of re-creation seems admirable from its very motivation, for he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in righteousness, but in virtue of his own goodness (Tit 3:5). (In fact, the text of Tit 3:5 has suam misericordiam rather than suam bonitatem, as Thomas recalls it here. Below, he quotes the text with misericordiam.) This is why it is especially attributed to his goodness. And because something is said to be done mercifully from the fact that something is given not owing to a debt but out of the goodness of the giver, thus the work of mercy, precisely as such, is appropriated to goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: God is said to manifest his omnipotence most of all by sparing and having mercy, not so much as to the substance of the deed, but as to having a right to do it. For the one who is subject to any higher authority cannot licitly forgive punishments established by a higher authority. Therefore, by the fact that God forgives punishments, and bestows beyond what is due, he shows that he does all things on the basis of his own power and authority, and that he is not subject to any higher power. But as to the substance of the deed, his goodness is especially manifest when he spares; and consequently the work of mercy should be attributed to his goodness.
Reply Obj. 2: Justifying the wicked is said to be greater than creating heaven and earth inasmuch as someone is raised to a more noble being by justification than by creation, or inasmuch as in creation there is nothing opposed to the creator, since it is from nothing, while in justification the disordered will is opposed to the justifier. Therefore, although the work of justification manifests his power, nevertheless it especially commends his goodness inasmuch as his goodness alone is what moves him to justify, since more is found on the side of the one to be justified that resists justification.
Reply Obj. 3: Although mercy is directed by judgment, nevertheless mercy’s being does not consist in judgment, but rather in willing. And so it is more appropriated to goodness than to wisdom.
And the fourth objection about knowledge should be answered similarly; for knowledge is prerequisite for the will to drive off misery, which completes the account of mercy.
Article 2
The effect of God’s mercy
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that God does not always show mercy by punishing less than is deserved and rewarding above merit. For Revelation 18:7 says, as she glorified herself and played the wanton, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning; and Matthew 7:2 says: the measure you give will be the measure you get. Therefore, it seems that the measure of punishment or reward will be according to the measure of merit or transgression; and thus he does not punish less than is deserved, nor reward beyond merit.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Revelation 18:6 says: repay her double for her deeds, and Isaiah 40:2 says: she has received from the Lord’s hand double for all her sins; and commenting on Psalm 72 (71):14: from oppression and violence he redeems their life, the Gloss (See Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms (CCSL 39), Ps. 71, par. 16.) says: he demands more in penalties than was committed in sins. Therefore, it seems that he does not punish less than is deserved, but rather more than is deserved.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptized children are freed from every sin. Therefore, they do not owe any punishment. But nevertheless many punishments are often divinely inflicted on them in this life, like fevers and the like. Nor can it be said that these work to their benefit, since sometimes they die before attaining adulthood. Therefore, it seems that he does not always punish less than is deserved.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, no other punishment is owed to original sin than the loss of the divine vision. But unbaptized children who died in original sin are punished with this punishment. Therefore, it seems that he does not always punish less than is deserved.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, what can be otherwise should not be asserted to be always thus. But God can preserve the measure of justice sometimes, so that he punishes according to what is deserved; for this is neither against his absolute power nor against his ordered power. Therefore, it is not to be asserted that he always punishes less than is deserved.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, it says: the lowliest man may be pardoned in mercy, but mighty men will be mightily tormented (Wis 6:6); and judgment is without mercy to one who has shown no mercy (Jas 2:13). Therefore, it seems that the mighty and the unmerciful will not be punished less than they deserve.
On the contrary (1), it is said in Psalm 103 (102):10: he does not deal with us according to our sins, nor requite us according to our iniquities.
Furthermore (2), what is proper does not abandon that to which it is proper. But it is proper to God to have mercy, as it says in the Collect: God, whose nature is always to have mercy and to spare. (Collect for the Tenth Sunday after Pentecost.) Therefore, he always has mercy. But this would not be the case unless he conferred rewards beyond merit and ills less than deserved. Therefore, it seems that it always happens thus.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that God’s mercy and truth are not united at all times. (Parallel: ST I, q. 21, a. 4; De veritate, q. 28, a. 1, ad 8; SCG II, ch. 28; Super Rom. 15, lec. 1; Super Ps. 24.) For the work of creation does not presuppose anything. But a work that is according to justice presupposes debt; while a work that is according to mercy presupposes misery. Therefore, in the work of creation justice and mercy do not coexist.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, converting the gentiles and converting the Jews are different works. But in the conversion of the gentiles there seems to have been only mercy, while in the salvation of the Jews there was justice, from what is said in Romans 15:8–9: I tell you that Christ became a servant to the circumcised to show God’s truthfulness, in order to confirm the promises given to the patriarchs, and in order that the gentiles might glorify God for his mercy. Therefore, mercy and truth are not in every one of the Lord’s works.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there does not seem to be any justice where one person is punished for the sin of another. But sometimes God punishes one person for another’s sin, as Canaan was cursed for the sin of Ham (Gen 9:25), and for David’s sin his people were struck down (2 Sam 24:15). Therefore, it seems that he does not always preserve justice and mercy in his works.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it does not seem that justice has been enacted where there was no prior merit, since justice has to do with what is due. But there was no prior merit in a wicked person who is justified. Therefore, there does not seem to be any justice in the justification of the wicked.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, justice only ever renders equal things to equals. But sometimes God grants unequal things to equals, for before Jacob and Esau were born or had done anything of good or evil, they were completely equal, and yet he prepared glory for one and punishment for the other, as is evident from Romans 9. Likewise, when Aaron and the children of Israel sinned equally in adoring the idol, Aaron was not punished when the people were punished, as is evident from Exodus 21. Therefore, it seems that he does not keep justice in everything.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems to be unjust that a better person should be given less of good things and more of bad things. But temporal goods are sometimes given by God more abundantly to bad people than to the good, and punishments are sometimes imposed more on the good than the bad. Therefore, it seems that he does not preserve justice with his mercy in every one of his works.
On the contrary (1), Augustine (Augustine, De consensu euangelistarum, Bk. 1, ch. 14, par. 21 (CSEL 43:20).) says in his Harmony of the Gospels: God, who cares for human things, cares justly and mercifully, so that neither does his mercy preclude his justice, nor his justice exclude his mercy. Therefore, it seems that justice and mercy come together in every work of the Lord.
Furthermore (2), justice and mercy do not differ in God more than power, goodness, and wisdom. But every work of God’s power is a work of his wisdom and goodness. Therefore, it seems that similarly every work of justice is a work of mercy, and vice versa.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the work of God justice is more principal than mercy. (Parallels: see the foregoing quaestiuncula.) For as it says in Hebrews 10:31: it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. But this would not be the case if mercy were foremost in his work. Therefore, justice rules in his work more than mercy.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is first in any genus is more principal. But justice seems to be prior to mercy, for mercy is born from justice, as Anselm says in his Proslogion. (Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, ch. 9 (ed. Schmitt, 1:108).) Therefore, justice is more important in God’s work than mercy.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is in something according to itself belongs to it more principally than what belongs to it according to another. But as Anselm says in his Proslogion: you are just, sparing the wicked according to yourself and not according to us, just as you have mercy according to us and not according to yourself. (Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, ch. 10 (ed. Schmitt, 1:109).) And so mercy applies to God according to us; but justice according to himself. Therefore, justice is more principal in the work of God than mercy.
On the contrary (1), it is said: yet mercy triumphs over judgment (Jas 2:13); that is, mercy is given the highest place in judgment, as the Gloss says. Likewise Psalm 145 (144):9*: his mercies are above all his works*. Therefore, mercy is more principal in God’s work than justice.
Furthermore (2), what is proper to someone belongs to him more principally than what is alien to him. But it is proper to the work of God to have mercy and to spare; and the work of punishing is alien to him, as is evident from Exodus 22. (Apart from a reference to God being compassionate in Ex 22:27, the remainder of the chapter suggests rather the opposite.) Therefore, mercy is more principal in the work of God than justice.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, an agent and what it works upon must always correspond to each other proportionally, so that the agent is related to the action in the same way as the patient to what happens to it. But those things that are unequal do not have a like proportion except to unequal things: for just as six is greater than four, so three, whose double is six, is greater than two, whose double is four. And this is why however much the agent exceeds the patient, it is necessary that the action exceeds the passion, as we see in every equivocal agent, because the patient does not receive the whole effect of the action. Now the giver stands in the role of agent, and the receiver in the role of patient; and thus when the giver exceeds the receiver, it is fitting that the giving exceeds that receiving which is proportioned to the receiver. And thus, since God is the most excellent giver because of the abundance of his goodness, it is necessary that his giving of good things always exceed the reception that is proportioned to the recipient. Now less evil is counted the same as more good, as is said in the Ethics 5; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 3, 1131b20–24.) and therefore God always gives good things beyond what is deserved, and always imposes the evils of punishment less than is deserved.
Reply Obj. 1: ‘As much’ and ‘so much’ do not mean an equality of quantity but of proportion in the authority quoted. Now the proportion of punishment to fault can be understood in two ways: either in general or specifically. In general, such that anyone who sinned is punished; and anyone who sinned much, is much punished. However, specifically, there are two ways: either by taking the proportion of punishment to fault according to what is due to the fault absolutely, or having presupposed its mitigation by divine mercy, which forgives something of the punishment. Therefore, in the first and third modes God never punishes less than is deserved, for he always punishes sinners much, nor is any of the punishment that remains after the mitigation of divine mercy forgiven. But as to the second mode, a person is always punished less than he deserves, for no one is punished as much as he has merited by his fault.
Or it could be said, and better, that this is an equality of proportionality and not of equality; and it is to be looked for not according to the relation of punishment to fault, but according to the proportion of two sinners to two punishments, namely, such that whoever sinned more is punished more, and according as one surpasses in sin, so in punishment; and this is also how are to be understood all the authorities that seem to show an equality between fault and penalty.
Reply Obj. 2: The doubling of that punishment is not to be understood as though the punishment were two times the fault, but because a man is punished in two ways, namely, in soul and body. Now, when it is said that more will be exacted in punishment than was committed in faults, that should be understood as referring to the duration of time, for an eternal punishment is inflicted for a momentary pleasure. But the duration of the punishment is not proportioned to the duration of the fault, but rather the intensity of the punishment corresponds to the enormity of the fault, as is seen from what was said above.
Reply Obj. 3: Two punishments follow upon original sin. One, according as it infects the person, and then its punishment is the loss of the vision of God. The other, according as it corrupts nature, and then those punishments follow it that are caused by a principle of nature, like death, which is caused by the contrariety of the principles of nature, and other things like it that are ordered toward death, or that result from the disordering of the principles of nature, like fever and such. I say, therefore, that baptism cleanses the person but does not cure the nature, which is evident from the fact that by an act of nature a baptized person transmits original sin to his children. And so a child is absolved by baptism from the liability to eternal death, which is the loss of the divine vision, yet the liability to temporal death still remains, and other things like it that result from the sin of nature; which, although they do not work to the benefit of that person if he dies before a mature age (for he does not merit by his sufferings), are nevertheless granted for the benefit of others who are like him in nature, for punishments such as this result from the sin of nature. (Thomas seems to be arguing that something like the suffering of a baptized child is permitted as a kind of punishment to other fallen human beings, such as the parents who will suffer from the child’s sickness or death.)
Reply Obj. 4: As a punishment for original sin according to the rigor of justice, the loss of the divine vision is not the only thing due to our nature, but also its very annihilation. And so by the fact that natural goods are preserved for unbaptized children, they are punished less than is deserved. This is why it says in Lamentations 3:22: it belongs to the Lord’s mercy that we are not consumed.
Reply Obj. 5: Just as God’s power has an order to his justice, so too it has an order to his mercy; and so, although it is not inconsistent with his power as it is ordered to his justice to forgive nothing of the punishment, nevertheless, it is inconsistent with his power according as it is ordered to mercy. And thus, from the vantage of his ordered power (ordered, namely, to mercy), God cannot do this.
Reply Obj. 6: The unmerciful do not receive mercy completely freeing them from punishment; however, they do obtain mercy relaxing some of the punishment. Likewise too, if the powerful are wicked, they cannot be excused by weakness, which sometimes excuses entirely, as the lowly, that is, the completely weak, are excused by it.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that God’s operation is like a middle between God, the one operating, and the work itself that he has performed. Now every middle partakes in some way of both extremes, and so in God’s operation it is necessary for something to be found on the part of God himself working and on the part of the work performed, in which the operation is terminated. On the part of the one operating, it is required that there be a superabundance in the conferral of goods and the diminishment of evils, since God himself is the most excellent worker, as was said, and in this divine mercy consists. But on the part of what is done, what is required is a reception proportional to the receiver; and in this the account of justice consists. Therefore, it is necessary that in every divine operation something of mercy and something of justice is found; nor is justice opposed to mercy, for mercy is not praiseworthy unless it is according to right reason, which is the rule of justice, or according to the order of wisdom in divine things. Nor is mercy opposed to justice, since the bestowal of something above what is due of goods, or less than what is due of evils, is not against justice, but above and beyond it, as is clear from what has been said. And so neither does the immensity of mercy exclude justice from divine work, nor does the immensity of justice exclude mercy.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice, as is clear from what has been said, sometimes consists in recompense for merits, and in this way no justice is considered to exist in the work of creation. But sometimes justice consists in that which is befitting to divine goodness; and in this way it does not presuppose anything on the side of the receiver, but only on the side of God. Taken that way, there can be justice in the work of creation. For it is just that each thing should have being in the manner preordained by divine wisdom. Likewise, too, mercy is said in two ways. In one way, as it drives off a preexisting misery in a way that is not owed; and there can be no mercy in the work of creation in this manner. (In other words, creation means bringing something into being ex nihilo. Therefore, there is no preceding condition of misery from which that created thing can be delivered.) In the other way, generally, according as without it being owed, any defect whatsoever is removed; and in this way there is mercy in the work of creation, for by creating, God removes the greatest defect, namely, non-existence. And he did this by a gratuitous will, not constricted by any debt.
Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle uses this kind of distinction because there was a certain mode of justice in the salvation of the Jews which was not present in the conversion of the gentiles; namely, the fulfillment of promises, which were promised by God through the prophets to the Jews, and not to the gentiles. But nevertheless, in both cases salvation included both justice and mercy: the justice, however, that is according to what is becoming to divine goodness, for it was fitting that God not totally discard the rational creature which he had made for beatitude; but mercy, because in neither case did merits precede which were sufficient for this, according to which it says: he saved us, not because of works of righteousness we did, but in keeping with his own mercy (Tit 3:5).
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine (Augustine, Questionum in heptateuchum (CCSL 33), Bk. 6, qu. 8.) says commenting on Joshua 7:1, but the people of Israel broke faith in regard to the devoted things, one person is never punished for another in eternal suffering, but in temporal punishment sometimes one person is punished for another. And there can be three reasons for this. One is that eternal punishment is not inflicted on anyone for the perfection of the one suffering it, but for the vengeance on the fault. But temporal punishment is sometimes imposed for the improvement of the one suffering it. Thus, just as sometimes someone without fault is punished with temporal punishment, so too sometimes someone is punished for the sin of another for his own perfection and that of others, so that it will be seen how much one person should be concerned for another, that he not fall into sin, and for this reason the whole congregation is punished temporally for the sin of one; and also to shown that one must flee from sin, which is so gravely punished that many are punished for one transgressor.
The second reason can be that in temporal matters one man belongs to another, as a son is in a certain way his father’s thing; and so sometimes a son is temporally punished for the sin of his father, and a slave for the sin of his master. But as to the good of the soul, each one bears his own person: behold, all souls are mine; the soul of the father as well as the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:4). Third, there is the reason that Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 25, par. 14.) assigns, that sometimes a person is a participant in the guilt of another, as when by the guilt of the subjects, those responsible for them are sometimes allowed to fall into sin; and so it is no surprise if those who are subject are punished for the sins of those who have charge of them, as at the end of 2 Samuel, (Chapter 24.) the people are punished for David’s sins. So it is not contrary to divine justice that sometimes one person be punished for the sins of another. Nevertheless, human judgements should not be patterned on this example, such that one person is punished for another, as Augustine says. For a man cannot know what benefit may arise from temporal punishment, which God knows infallibly.
Reply Obj. 4: In the justification of the wicked a certain mode of justice is preserved, which is according to what befits divine goodness, or according as a promise is kept, as we have in the Gloss on Psalm 51 (50):4: so that thou art justified in thy sentence and blameless in thy judgment. For God promised that forgiveness would be granted to sinners seeking forgiveness.
Reply Obj. 5: It is not injustice if what is owed to neither is given unequally to equal parties, as is clear from Matthew 20, in the parable of the workers in the vineyard, who, although they had worked unequally, were given an equal reward. For by the fact that someone gives liberally what he is free to give or not to give, it makes no difference to justice how much is given. Therefore, I say that eternal punishment ought to be given to all people by the merit of their own sin, but the fact that some are freed is due to divine generosity alone. For he could justly damn all people, and therefore it is no injustice if he elects some and reprobates others, between whom there was no difference in prior merits. Now, Aaron was punished, although not with a manifest punishment, as the people were, as a sign that those in responsibility should not be manifestly punished, but privately, in order to avoid scandal. However, Aaron’s punishment is said to have been inflicted on him and his sons, that they became unclean in the sacrifice of bloody calves, as we have in Numbers 19. However Augustine (Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum (CCSL 33), Bk. 2, q. 148.) in the gloss on Exodus 32 ascribes this to the secret judgment of God, who spares certain people for a time so that they might grow better, when others are punished.
Reply Obj. 6: The fact that less temporal good and sometimes more evil is given to better people results in their progress in spiritual good, which is the good of man simply. For temporal goods are not the goods of man simply, except according as they instrumentally serve a spiritual good. Now the way that they contribute to advancement in spiritual good was shown above.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that what is formal in each thing is most excellent in it, for matter is completed by form. However, in any action what exists on the side of the agent is formal, as it were; but what is on the part of the patient or receiver is like the matter. Now it was said above that mercy in every divine work results from the side of God himself, who is superabundant in good, but justice, from the side of the receiver, who receives according to his own proportion; and therefore, in any divine work mercy stands above justice as the formal above the material; and this is what is said in Psalm 145 (144):9: his mercies are above all his works.
Reply Obj. 1: It is said to be a frightening thing to fall into the hands of the living God, not because of the withdrawal of his mercy which softens some of the punishment, but because of the interminability of the punishment, or also because of the removal of the possibility of resistance: for no one can resist his anger, since he is omnipotent; nor can anyone escape him, since he is present everywhere; nor can anyone falsely excuse himself before him, since he knows all.
Reply Obj. 2: Anselm is not speaking about the justice that regards the proportion to a creature, or about human merit, but about the justice that has to do only with what befits divine goodness, for mercy is born from this fittingness. But at present we are speaking about justice according as it regards what is due on the side of the created being.
And the third objection should be answered in the same way.
Article 3
Whether God’s mercy can suffer the punishments of the damned to be perpetual
Quaestiuncula 1
Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I, q. 64, a. 2; In III Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; Super Matt. 25; SCG III, ch. 144.) It seems that by divine mercy every punishment will be ended, both for men and also for demons. For thou art merciful to all, for thou canst do all things (Wis 11:23). But even the demons are included in “all,” for they God’s creatures. Therefore, the demons’ punishment will also end.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all (Rom 11:32). But God consigned the demons to sin; that is, he permitted them to be consigned to sin. Therefore, it seems that he also will someday have mercy on the demons.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Anselm (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (Schmitt ed., 2:99).) says in his book Why God Became Man: it is not just that God should allow the rational creature to perish completely, which he made for beatitude. Therefore, it seems that since every rational creature was created for beatitude, it is not just that one be permitted to perish entirely.
On the contrary (1), it is said: depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41). Therefore, they will be punished eternally.
Furthermore (2), as the good angels have been made blessed by their turning toward God, in the same way the bad angels have become miserable by their turning away from him. Therefore, if the misery of the bad angels were ever to end, then the beatitude of the good ones would have an end, which is unfitting.
Quaestiuncula 2
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that divine mercy would not permit men at least to be punished eternally. For it says: my spirit shall not abide in man forever, for he is flesh (Gen 6:3); and here ‘spirit’ is taken for indignation, as is clear from the Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:104.) on the same place. Therefore, since the indignation of God is nothing other than his punishment, they will not be eternally punished.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the charity of the saints at the present time causes them to pray for their enemies. But at that time they will have even more perfect charity. Therefore, at that time they will pray for their enemies who are damned. But their prayers could not be in vain, since they are most especially acceptable to God. Therefore, by the prayers of the saints divine mercy will some day free the damned from punishment.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the fact that God foretold the eternal punishment of the damned pertains to prophecy of threat. But threatening prophecies are not always fulfilled, as is clear from what was said about the destruction of Nineveh, which was not destroyed in the way predicted by the prophet, who was even saddened by this fact. (Jonah 3:4, 3:10, 4:1.) Therefore, it seems that much more by divine mercy the threat of eternal punishment will be commuted into a lesser sentence, when this could not result in anyone’s sorrow but in everyone’s joy.
Obj. 4: What is said in Psalm 77 (76):7 leads to the same conclusion: will God be angry forever, and never again be favorable? But God’s anger is his punishment. Therefore, God will not punish people forever.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, commenting on Isaiah 14:19, but you are cast out, the Gloss says: and if all souls will at some time have rest, you will not, speaking of the devil. Therefore, it seems that all human souls will some day have rest from their punishments.
On the contrary (1), of the elect and the reprobate together it is said: they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life (Matt 25:46). But it is unfitting to hold that the life of the just will end at some time. Therefore, it is unfitting that the suffering of the reprobate will ever be terminated.
Furthermore (2), as Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4, PG 94:878.) says, what the fall was to the angels, death is to men. But the angels were irreparable after their fall. Therefore, men are the same after death; and thus the punishment of the damned will never be ended.
Quaestiuncula 3
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that at least the punishment of Christians will be ended by divine mercy. For the Lord says, he who believes and is baptized will be saved (Mark 16:16). But this is the case with all Christians. Therefore, all Christians will be saved in the end.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Lord says, he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life (John 6:54). But this is the shared food and drink of Christians. Therefore, all Christians will be saved in the end.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if any man’s work is burned up, he will suffer loss, though he himself will be saved, but only as through fire (1 Cor 3:15); and he is speaking about those in whom the foundation of Christian faith existed. Therefore, all such as these will be saved in the end.
On the contrary (1), it is said in 1 Corinthians 6:9: the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God. But some Christians are unrighteous. Therefore, not all Christians will attain the kingdom of God.
Furthermore (2), Scripture says: it would have been better for them never to have known the way of righteousness than after knowing it to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them (2 Pet 2:21). But those who do not know the way of truth are punished eternally. Therefore, so are those Christians who, after knowing it, turn back.
Quaestiuncula 4
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that all those who do works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect the works of mercy: for judgment is without mercy to one who has shown no mercy (Jas 2:13); and blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy (Matt 5:7).
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Matthew 25, the Lord’s sentence is set down with the elect and the reprobate. But this sentence has to do only with works of mercy. Therefore, only for having omitted works of mercy are some people punished eternally; and so the same conclusion as before.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says: forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors (Matt 6:12); and there follows: for if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will forgive you (Matt 6:14). Therefore, it seems that the merciful, who forgive the sins of others, will themselves obtain forgiveness; and so they will not be punished eternally.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, commenting on the text, godliness is of value in every way (1 Tim 4:8), Ambrosiaster’s gloss (This is not found word for word in Ambrosiaster.) says that the height of all Christian practice is in mercy and godliness, which, when someone follows it, if he suffers from the frailty of the flesh, he will undoubtedly be beaten, but still he will not perish; but if someone has had only the discipline of the body, he will suffer perennial punishment. Therefore, those who persevere in works of mercy, but who are detained by sins of the flesh, will not be punished eternally; and so, the same as above.
On the contrary (1), Scripture says: neither fornicators nor adulterers . . . will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9–10). But many such people exert themselves in works of mercy. Therefore, not all the merciful shall attain the eternal kingdom; and so some of them will be eternally punished.
Furthermore (2), Scripture says: whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all of it (Jas 2:10). Therefore, anyone who keeps the law as regards the works of mercy, and neglects other works, incurs the guilt of transgressing the law; and thus he will be punished eternally.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, it was Origen’s error, as Augustine says (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 17.) in Book 21 of the City of God, that the demons would one day be freed from their sufferings by God’s mercy. But this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First, because it manifestly conflicts with the authority of Scripture, which says, the devil who had deceived them was thrown into the lake of fire and brimstone where the beast and the false prophet were, and they will be tormented day and night for ever and ever (Rev 20:10), which is how eternity is customarily expressed in Scripture. Second, because on the one hand, it stretches the mercy of God too far, while on the other hand, it narrows it excessively; for there seems to be the same reason for the good angels to remain in beatitude eternally, and for the bad angels to be punished eternally. Therefore, just as he held that demons and the souls of the damned would someday be freed from their sufferings, so too he held that the angels and souls of the blessed would someday fall back into the miseries of this life.
Reply Obj. 1: God, as he exists in himself, is merciful to all; but because his mercy is regulated by the order of wisdom, it does not extend to certain ones who made themselves unworthy of mercy, like the demons and the damned, who are obstinate in wickedness. Nevertheless, it can be said that mercy has a place in them, inasmuch as they are punished less than they deserve, though they are not absolved completely from punishment.
Reply Obj. 2: There the distribution is to be understood as concerning the nations of individuals, and not the individual members of a nation, so that this text is understood as applying to men according to their state of being wayfarers, for he has been merciful to both Jews and gentiles, but not all gentiles, nor all Jews.
Reply Obj. 3: Anselm understands that as to what befits divine goodness it would not be just, and he speaks of the created thing according to its genus; for it is not befitting to divine goodness that one whole genus of creation should fail to attain the end for which it was made, and so it is not fitting for all men to be damned, nor all angels. But nothing prevents some men or angels from perishing eternally; for the intention of the divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
To the second question, it should be said that, as Augustine says in the City of God 21, (Ibid.) some people avoided Origen’s error because they held that the demons were punished perpetually, but all men would be freed from punishment at some time, even unbelievers. But this position is entirely irrational. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness, and thus are to be punished perpetually, so are the souls of men who die without charity; since what the fall was to the angels, death is to men, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4, PG 94:878.)
Reply Obj. 1: That saying is to be understood as being about man according to his genus, for indignation is removed from the human race at some point by the coming of Christ. But those who chose not to be or to remain in this reconciliation that was brought about by Christ have caused the divine anger to last perpetually in themselves, since there is no other mode of reconciliation granted to us except by Christ.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the City of God 21, (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 18.) and Gregory says in the Morals 34 (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 34, par. 19.) and the Dialogues 4, (Gregory, Dialogues (SC 265), Bk. 4, ch. 44.) the saints pray for their enemies in this life so that they may be converted to God, since they still can be converted. For if it were known to us that they were predestined to death, we would not pray for them any more than for the demons. And since after this life those who die without grace will not have any time of conversion, no prayer will be made for them by the Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For this is what we should pray for them, as the Apostle says, that God give them repentance, and recover them from the snares of the devil (2 Tim 2:25).
Reply Obj. 3: A prophecy threatening future punishment is only changed when the person to whom the warning is given changes in merit: I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it. If that nation repents of its evil, I too will repent of the evil that I have in mind for them (Jer 18:7). This is why, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the warning of punishment will always be fulfilled in them. But nevertheless a prophecy of condemnation is always fulfilled according to a certain understanding, for as Augustine says (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 24.) in the book mentioned above: the wicked Nineveh was overthrown, and a good Nineveh was built where there was none before; the walls and houses remained standing, but the abandoned morals of the city were overthrown.
Reply Obj. 4: The words of that psalm pertain to vessels of mercy which did not make themselves unworthy of mercy. For in this life, which is in a sense God’s anger on account of life’s miseries, he changes vessels of mercy into something better. This is why it follows in Psalm 77 (76):10: the right hand of the Most High has changed. Or it could be said that this is understood as about a mercy that relaxes the punishment somewhat, not as about a mercy that frees entirely, if its meaning be also extended to the damned. This is why it does not say, he will contain his mercies from anger, but in anger, for the punishment is not completely taken away, but while the punishment itself continues, mercy is working to diminish it.
Reply Obj. 5: That Gloss is not speaking simply, but under an impossible hypothesis, to exaggerate the magnitude of the devil’s sins or of Nebuchadnezzar’s.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To the third question, it should be said that there were some people, as Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 19.) says in the book mentioned, who did not promise all men absolution from eternal punishment, but only Christians; and in this they also differed from each other.
For some said that whoever had received the sacraments of the faith would be immune to eternal punishment. But this is contrary to truth, for some people receive the sacraments of the faith and do not have faith, without which it is impossible to please him (Heb 11:6).
And so others said that only those would be immune from eternal punishment who had received the sacraments of faith and who held to the Catholic faith. But a difficulty with this view is that sometimes certain people hold to the Catholic faith and afterward they fall away from it, so they are not less deserving of punishment, but more so; for it would have been better for them never to have known the way of righteousness than after knowing it to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them (2 Pet 2:21). It is also plain that the founders of heresies, who contrive new heresies departing from the Catholic faith, sin more than those who have followed some heresy from the beginning.
And so others said that only those are immune to eternal punishment who persevered in the Catholic faith at the end, no matter how much they are involved in other offenses. But this is manifestly contrary to Scripture: for it says, faith without works is dead (Jas 2:20), and not every one who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven (Matt 7:21); and in many other places Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishments. Therefore, not all those who remain in the faith at the end will be immune to eternal punishment, unless they are found to be forgiven of their crimes at the end.
Reply Obj. 1: There the Lord is speaking of formed faith, which works through love, and anyone who has died in this faith will be saved. But this is not only opposed to the error of unbelief, but to any mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The Lord’s words are to be understood not as concerning those who eat only sacramentally, who sometimes receive unworthily, eating and drinking to their own judgment, as it says in 1 Corinthians 11:27–29; but of those who eat spiritually, who are incorporated into him by charity. For sacramental eating causes this incorporation, if one approaches the sacrament worthily. Therefore, to the degree that the sacrament’s power is engaged, it leads to eternal life, although someone can deprive himself of this fruit through sin, even after having received the sacrament worthily.
Reply Obj. 3: The foundation in the Apostle’s words is understood to be formed faith; and someone who builds venial sins upon it will suffer some loss, for he will be punished by God. However, he will be saved in the end as by fire, whether of temporal tribulation, or the punishment of purgatory that takes place after death.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To the fourth question, it should be said that as Augustine (Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 48), Bk. 21, ch. 27.) says in the book mentioned, some people affirmed that not all who hold to the Catholic faith would be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persisted in works of mercy, although they were also subject to other offenses. But this cannot stand, for without charity there cannot be anything acceptable to God, nor anything leading to eternal life. Now, it does happen that people persist in works of mercy who do not have charity; and then it will not benefit them at all toward meriting eternal life or toward immunity from eternal punishment, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 13:3. And this appears particularly absurd among thieves, who steal many things but still donate some of them mercifully. And therefore it should be said that for anyone who dies with mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, no matter how much time passes.
Reply Obj. 1: Those obtain mercy who apply mercy ordinately; but they do not apply mercy ordinately who neglect themselves in showing mercy, but rather afflict themselves by behaving badly. And therefore such people do not obtain the mercy that absolves completely, even if they obtain a mercy that relaxes something of the punishment they owe.
Reply Obj. 2: The discussion is described as only about works of mercy not because some people are punished eternally solely because of neglecting them, but because those who have been freed from eternal punishment after having sinned are the ones who have obtained pardon for themselves by works of mercy, making friends for themselves with the mammon of iniquity.
Reply Obj. 3: That is said by the Lord to those who seek to have their own debt relaxed, not to those who remain in sin. And so through works of mercy only the penitent obtain the mercy that frees entirely.
Reply Obj. 4: Ambrose’s (Actually, Ambrosiaster.) Gloss is speaking about the frailty of venial sin, from which, after the suffering of purgatory, which he calls threshing, a person will be absolved through his works of mercy. Or if he is speaking about the frailty of mortal sin, it should be understood in this way, that while still in this life, those who fall into sins of the flesh out of fragility are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Therefore, a person like this will not perish; that is, he will be disposed by such works not to perish.
Exposition of the Text
“There can be no other torments that we know of to compare the punishment of the damned to.” (Sententiae IV, 46.4 (265). 4 citing Augustine, Enchiridion, chs. 112–113.) Augustine (Augustine, On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins and the Baptism of Infants, Bk. 1, ch. 16, par. 21 (CSEL 60:20).) says that the punishment of children is extremely slight, although they are kept out of the kingdom. And it should be said that this statement should be understood as concerning those who lack the divine vision, and have the remorse of conscience, because they are deprived of these things by their own fault.
How incomprehensible are his judgments! (Sent. IV, 46.2 (266). 1 citing Rom. 11, 33.) But to the contrary, in Psalm 119 (118):13 it says: with my lips I declare all the judgments of your mouth. And it should be said that God’s commands are called judgments in the psalms; but the Apostle calls God’s plan of action his judgments.
But the variety of senses and effects in creatures is designated, (Sent. IV, 46.3 (267). 3.) inasmuch as from the different conceptions we receive from created things, we attribute different notions to God, so that diversity is not in God according to his being, but there is a diversity according to reason alone; and this is called the variety of the senses; or, according to what are connoted, the variety of effects. And this was already said in Book I, Distinction 2, Question 1, Article 2, reply to the fifth objection.
Chapter 182 of 186