Article 1 — Whether the separated soul undergoes anything from the body

The question is on the passions of the soul. First, it is asked whether the separated soul undergoes anything from the body. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 3; SCG IV.90; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 6, ad 7; a. 21; Quodlibet, bk. 2, q. 7, a. 1; bk. 3, q. 10, a. 1; bk. 7, q. 5, a. 3; Compendium Theologiae, ch. 180; ST I.64.4, ad. 1; Supplementum III.70.3; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 20.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not suffer from bodily fire: for Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 16 (PL 34:467).) that the agent is more excellent than the patient; but the soul is more excellent than any body; therefore, the soul cannot suffer from bodily fire.

Obj. 2: But one might respond that fire acts on the soul as being the instrument of divine avenging justice.

On the contrary, an instrument does not complete an instrumental action except by exercising a natural action; as the water of baptism sanctifies the soul by washing the body, and a saw makes a bench by cutting wood; but fire cannot have any natural action with regard to the soul; therefore it cannot act on the soul as an instrument of divine justice.

Obj. 3: Yet one might respond that fire’s natural action is to burn, and so it naturally acts upon the soul insofar as it removes from it what is burnable.

On the contrary, the burnable things that the soul is said to carry about with itself are sins, to which bodily fire is not opposed; therefore, since every action is natural by reason of contrariety, it seems that the soul is not able to suffer from bodily fire, inasmuch as it carries about with itself what is burnable.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (PL 34:480).) that it is not by bodily things but by what are similar to bodily things that souls divested of bodies are affected, either well or badly; therefore, the fire by which the separated soul is punished is not bodily.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Damascene says at the end of book 4: the devil, his demons, and his man, namely the Antichrist*, as well as the impious, and sinners shall be handed over to eternal fire, yet not material as it is with us, but such as God surely knows*; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 27 (PG 94:1228A).) however, all bodily fire is material; therefore, the fire by which the separated soul suffers is not bodily.

Obj. 6: But one might respond that that bodily fire afflicts the soul inasmuch as it is seen by it, as Gregory says in the Dialogues, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:368A).) the soul suffers from fire in the very way that it sees; and so what immediately afflicts the soul is not a body, but rather an apprehended likeness of a body.

On the contrary, the thing seen, inasmuch as it is seen, is a perfection of the one seeing; therefore, from its being seen, it does not cause affliction to the one seeing but rather delight; thus, if something seen causes pain, this will be insofar as it is hurtful in some other way: but fire cannot afflict the soul in another way than by acting upon it, as has been proved; therefore, neither does the soul suffer from fire by seeing it.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, there is a certain proportion of the agent to the one that undergoes; but there is no proportion of the incorporeal to the corporeal; therefore the soul cannot sufer from bodily fire, since it is incorporeal.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, if bodily fire does not naturally act on the soul, it is necessary that this happen by some additional power; thus, that power will be either bodily or spiritual; it cannot be spiritual, for a bodily thing is not susceptible of a spiritual power; but if it is bodily, then since the soul is more excellent than every bodily power, fire will not be able to act upon it by this power; therefore, the soul is not able to suffer, neither naturally nor supernaturally.

Obj. 9: But one might respond that the soul is made less noble than a bodily creature by sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the book On the True Religion 29, (Augustine, On True Religion, 29 (PL 34:145).) that a living substance is more noble than any non-living substance; but the rational soul still remains living by a natural life after sin; therefore, it is not made less noble by bodily fire, which is a non-living substance.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, if that bodily fire afflicts the soul, this only happens inasmuch as it is apprehended or sensed as being harmful; but something causes harm from the fact that it deprives of something: thus Augustine says that evil causes harm because it deprives of the good: (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 12 (PL 40:237; CCSL 46).) but bodily fire is unable to deprive the soul of anything; therefore it is unable to afflict it.

Obj. 11: Yet one might respond that it deprives of the glory of the vision of God.

On the contrary, children who are only damned for original sin lack the vision of God; therefore, if bodily fire deprives the damned of nothing else, the punishment of those who are punished in hell for actual sins will not be greater than of children who are punished in limbo, which is contrary to Augustine. (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 93 (PL 40:275; CCSL 46); Contra Julianum, bk. 5, ch. 11 (PL 44:809).)

Obj. 12: Furthermore, all that acts on another imprints upon it a likeness of the form by which it acts; but fire acts by heat; therefore, since the soul cannot be heated, it seems that it cannot suffer from fire. (Argument is taken from Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 44, part 11, a. 3, q. 2, ad oppositum 2.)

Obj. 13: Furthermore, God is more prone to have mercy than to punish; (Glossa ordinaria, at Jeremiah, prologue from Origen, 4.579; Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah, hom. 1, para. 1 (PG 13:255A); see also William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 30, ch. 1.) but some resisting voluntarily are not helped by the instruments of divine mercy, namely the sacraments, particulalry if it is an adult; therefore, by the instrument of divine justice, which is bodily fire, the unwilling soul does not undergo punishment; however, it is the case that it undergoes it willingly; therefore, in no way is the soul punished by bodily fire.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, all that suffers by another is in some way moved by it; but according to no species of motion is the soul able to be moved by bodily fire, as is clear by induction; therefore the soul cannot suffer from bodily fire.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, all that suffers from another holds its matter in common, as it seems from Boethius in the book On the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ; (Boethius, Cont. Eut. et Nest., ch. 6 (PL 64:1349D).) but the soul and bodily fire do not hold matter in common; therefore, it cannot suffer from bodily fire.

On the contrary (1) is what it says in Luke 16:24, that the rich man who was placed in hell with respect to his soul alone says, I am tormented in this flame.

Furthermore (2), Gregory, in book 15 of the Morals on the Book of Job 20:26, a fire shall devour him that is not kindled, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, ch. 29 (PL 75:1098D).) says that since the fire of Gehenna is bodily and it corporeally burns the reprobate within itself, it is not kindled by human work, nor is it nourished by wood, but being created once, it persists inextinguishable, it does not need kindling, and does not lack heat.

Furthermore (3), Cassiodorus says in On the Soul (Cap. 2 (PL 70, 1286 C).) that the soul separated from the body hears and sees more effectively by its own senses than when it is in the body; but while it is in the body, it is afflicted by another body when sensing; therefore, much more when it is separated from the body.

Furthermore (4), demons are incorporeal just like the soul; but demons suffer from bodily fire, as is clear from Matthew 25:41, go accursed into the eternal fire; therefore, so also does the separated soul.

Furthermore (5), it is greater that the soul be justified than that that the soul be punished; but some bodily things act on the soul for its justification, inasmuch as they are the instruments of divine mercy, as is clear in the Church’s sacraments; therefore, some bodily things are able to act upon the soul for its punishment, insofar as they are instruments of divine justice.

Furthermore (6), the less noble is able to suffer from the more noble; but bodily fire is more noble than the soul of the damned; therefore the souls of the damned are able to suffer from bodily fire.

Proof of the minor: any being whatsoever is more noble than non-being; but not to exist is more noble than the existence of a damned soul, as is clear from Matthew 26:24 it would have been better for him if that man had not been born; (« Bonum erat...: sec. recens. Paris. (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 15467) et recens. Veteris Latinae.) therefore, any being whatsoever is more noble than a damned soul, and thus also bodily fire.

I answer that it must be said that in evidence of this question and the following, one must know what is a passion, speaking properly. Therefore, it must be known that the name of a passion is taken in two ways: commonly and properly. A passion is commonly said to be a reception of anything in any way whatsoever, following the meaning of the word, for passion is said from the Greek word patin which is "to receive." (Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 15, a. 2.) But passion is said properly insofar as action and undergoing consist in motion, namely inasmuch as something is received into the one suffering by way of motion; and since all motion is between two contraries, what is received into the one undergoing must be contrary to something that is cast off from it. However, the patient is likened to the agent with respect to what is received into the patient; and thus taking passion properly, the agent is opposed to the patient, and it casts aside every passion from substance. (Aristotle, Topics 6.6, 145a3; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 3, obj. 1.)

However, there is such a passion only with regard to the motion of alteration, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 319b33; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.) for in local motion, something is not received into the mobile, but rather the mobile itself is received into some place. But in the motion of growth and decrease it is not a form that is received or cast off but something substantial, namely food, and upon its addition or subtraction there follows largeness or smallness in magnitude. However, in generation and corruption there is neither motion nor contrariety, except by reason of the previously mentioned alteration. And thus in regard to alteration alone is passion said properly, according to which one contrary form is received and another is expelled.

Therefore, since passion taken properly is with a certain casting-off, insofar as the one who undergoes it is changed from an original quality to the contrary, the name of passion is broadened according to spoken usage such that something is said to suffer in whichever way it is impeded from what belongs to it; as when we say that the heavy suffers from it being prevented from moving downwards, and man is said to suffer if he be prohibited from doing his own will.

Therefore, passion taken in the first way is found both in the soul and in any creature whatsoever, insofar as every creature has something of potentiality mixed in with it, for which reason every existing creature is receptive of something. But passion taken in the second way is only found where there is motion and contrariety. However, motion is only found in bodily things, and the contrariety of forms or qualities is only found in what is able to be generated and corrupted. Thus, only such things as these can properly be said to suffer. Hence, the soul, since it is incorporeal, cannot suffer in this way; for although it receives something, yet this does not happen through change from one contrary to another, but by a simple influence of the agent, such as air that is illuminated by the sun. But in the third way, in which the name passion is taken according to a transferred sense, the soul can suffer in the same respect that its activity is able to be impeded.

Thus, some seeing that passion cannot properly be in the soul said that everything said in Scripture about the bodily punishments of the damned must be understood metaphorically: namely, that by such bodily punishments being made made known to us is signified spiritual afflictions, by which the spirits of the damned are punished, just as, contrarily, we understand the spiritual pleasures of the blessed by the bodily pleasures promised in the Scriptures. Origen and Algazel seemed to have been of this opinion. (Cf. Origen, On First Principles [Peri Archon], bk. 2, ch. 10, n. 4 (PG 11:237A); see Jerome, Epistle 124, "Ad Avitum," ch. 2 (PL 22:1065); cf. Algazel, Metaphysics, part 2, tract. 5, 4.) But since we, believing in the resurrection, believe that there will be not only be a punishment of spirits but also of bodies; though bodies cannot be punished except by a bodily punishment, and the same punishment is owed to men and to spirits after the resurrection, as is clear from Matthew 25:41 depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire, (See Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 6, ch. 3.) thus one must say, as Augustine proves in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 10 (PL 41:724).) that even spirits are afflicted in some way with bodily sufferings. But the glory of the blessed and the punishment of the damned is not similar, for the blessed are raised up to what exceeds their nature, and so they are made blessed by the enjoyment of the divinity; whereas the damned are weighed down toward what is beneath them, hence they are also punished by bodily torments.

Therefore, others have said that the separated soul is indeed affected by certain punishments, though not by bodily ones, rather by bodily likenesses that are similar to the sufferings that afflict those asleep. It seems that Augustine thought this in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (PL 34:480).) and Avicenna as well. (Cf. Metaph. IX c. 7 (f. 107vb D).) But this also cannot be the case, for such likenesses of bodies cannot be intelligible, since they are universals, and affliction of the soul is not caused from these but rather joy in considering the truth. Hence, this must be understood of imaginary likenesses, which indeed cannot exist except within a bodily organ, as is proved by the philosopher: (E. g. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 403a8; Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 3.) which is of course lacking from the separated soul and from demonic spirits.

Thus, others say that the separated soul suffers from bodies themselves. How this can be is assigned differently by different people. For some say that the separated soul uses its senses; (Iulianus Toletanus apud Petrum Lomb. Lib, Sent. IV d. 44 c. 7. Cf. Prognosticon II c. 17 (PL 96, 482).) and so by sensing bodily fire, it is punished by fire: and this is what Gregory seems to say in the Dialogues, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:368A).) that the soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it. But this does not seem to be true: first indeed, because the activities of the sensitive powers cannot cannot exist except by means of bodily organs; otherwise the sensitive souls of beasts would be incorruptible, as being capable of having their own operations by themselves. Secondly, because granting that the separated souls sense, yet they would still not be capable of suffering from sensible things, for the sensible is a perfection of the one sensing as such, just as the intelligible is of the one understanding: thus something sensed or understood does not cause pain or sadness as such, but insofar as it is harmful or apprehended as harmful.

Thus, one must find a way in which fire can be harmful for the separated soul. Nor can what some say be the case, (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 44, part 11, a. 3, q. 2.) that although that bodily fire cannot be harmful for the spirit, yet it is able to be apprehended as harmful, which seems to agree with what Gregory says in the Dialogues, that since the soul sees itself being burned, it is burned: (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:368A).) for it is not likely that demons, who abound with sharpness of understanding, (Cf. Isidore of Seville, Sentences (De summo bono), bk. 1, ch. 10, para. 17 (PL 83:556C).) should not know their own natures and bodily fire better than us, such that they falsely believe that bodily fire is able to harm them.

Thus, it must be said that they are truly afflicted by bodily fire and not only by appearance; and this is what Gregory says in the Dialogues, that we can gather from the Gospel sayings that the soul suffers burning not only by seeing but also by experiencing. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:368A).) Some (Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 44, a. 37.) have determined how this happens by saying that bodily fire is able to act upon the soul as an instrument of divine justice, even though it cannot do this according to nature. For there are many things which are not sufficient to accomplish something from their own nature, yet which are able to do it inasmuch as they are the instruments of another agent, just as elemental fire does not suffice for the generation of flesh except insofar as it is the instrument of the nutritive power. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 416a9sqq.) But this also does not seem to be sufficient, for the instrument does not do an action which exceeds its own nature, except by carrying out something that is natural to it, as was said by the objector. Hence, one must find some way in which the soul somehow suffers naturally from bodily fire. This can be understood in the following way: for an incorporeal substance is united to a bodily substance in two ways: in one way as a form inasmuch as it animates a body; in another as a mover is to the mobile or as what is in a place to that place, whether by some operation or by some relationship.

But since there is one existence of a form and that of which it is the form, the formal union of a spiritual substance with one that is bodily is a union with respect to existence. However, the existence of no thing is the subject of its own power, and so it is not in the power of a spiritual substance to be united to a body or to be separated from it formally, but this is done by the law of nature or else by divine power. However, since a thing’s activity is in the power of one that acts voluntarily, therefore it is in the spiritual nature’s power to be united to a body like a mover or like what is in a place, and to be separated from it according to nature’s order; but that a spiritual substance which is united to the body in this way should be held back, impeded, and as it were bound is beyond nature.

Therefore, that bodily fire, acting as an instrument of divine justice, performs something beyond nature’s power, namely to impede or bind the soul; but the union itself is natural in the way previously mentioned. Thus, the soul suffers from bodily fire in the third way mentioned above, inasmuch as we say that anything suffers which is impeded from its own action or else from something that is appropriate to it. Augustine proposes this mode of suffering in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 10 (PL 41:724–25).) saying, why should we not say that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of bodily fire in true though wonderful ways, if the spirits of men, though they are assuredly incorporeal, are both able to be contained by bodily members now, and in the future to be indissolubly bound by the chains of their bodies?

Therefore, the incorporeal spirits of the demons will cling to bodily fires to be tormented; yet not such that the fires themselves to which they cling should be animated by their being conjoined to them, and so become animals, but rather, by clinging to them in marvelous and indescribable ways, they receive punishment from the fire but without giving life to the fire. Gregory also proposes this mode in the Dialogues (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:368B).) saying that: so long as truth presents the rich sinner as being condemned in fire, what wise man would deny that the souls of the damned are bound by flames?

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that it is not necessary that an agent be superior to the patient simply speaking, but only insofar as it is an agent; and thus fire, inasmuch as it acts on the soul as an instrument of divine justice, is superior to the soul, though not simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that there is something natural in that suffering and that action, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the objection argues from the second kind of suffering that was spoken of, which is from a contrariety of forms; and this cannot exist there.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (PL 34:480).) Augustine establishes nothing explicitly regarding this subject, rather he speaks by inquiring as though in doubt; hence, he does not assert absolutely that what separated souls are affected by are not bodies but similar to bodies; but he speaks according to a hypothesis, namely that if they were of such a kind, then souls could be affected by them either from sadness or from joy. Also, when he likewise says that they are not born toward bodily places except by another body, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (PL 34:480).) he is speaking with regard to a disjunction, adding that it could happen not locally, namely by being commensurate to a place.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that two things are to be considered in the suffering of the separated soul, namely the first thing that does the afflicting, and then the proximate thing: the first one afflicting is the bodily fire itself, detaining the soul in the aforementioned way; but this would not inflict sadness upon the soul, unless this were apprehended by the soul. Hence, the proximate thing that afflicts is the restraining fire itself as apprehended, and this fire is not material but spiritual; and so what was said by John Damascene can be verified. Or one can say that he calls it non material inasmuch as it does not punish the soul by acting materially, as it punishes bodies.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that that fire is perceived as harmful inasmuch as it inhibits or binds; and thus the sight of it can cause affliction.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that there is no proportion between the body and the spirit, being properly understood with regard to a determinate relationship of quantity to quantity, or of one extension to another, or of one power to another, as when two bodily things are proportioned to each other according to dimension and power; for the power of a spiritual substance is not of the same genus as that of a bodily power. Nevertheless, if we take proportion broadly for any relation whatsoever, then there is a proportion of the spiritual to the bodily, according to which which the spiritual is naturally able to act upon the body, even though the converse does not happen except by divine power.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that an instrument performs an instrumental action inasmuch as it is moved by a primary agent, which, being moved by it, participates in some way in the power of the primary agent, but not such that the power is in the instrument according to an imperfect existence, since motion is an imperfect act; (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 201b31. Sec. Thomam supra q. 4 a 1) however, the objection proceeds as though a perfect power were required in order to perform an instrumental action.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that even the sinful soul is more noble than any bodily power according to its own nature; but with regard to guilt it is rendered less noble than bodily fire, not simply, but inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine justice.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that that fire harms the soul, yet not such that it deprives it of some form inhering within it absolutely, but inasmuch as it impedes its free action by binding it, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that there is in babies only a lack of divine vision because of a defect of grace, without any contrary active impediment; but the damned in hell are deprived not only of divine vision because of a defect of grace, but they are also impeded as though by something contrary, insofar as they are bound up with bodily punishments.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the soul does not suffer from fire as though being changed by it, but in the way already mentioned.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that the voluntary pertains to the notion of justice, though not to the notion of punishment, rather it is more opposed to the notion of punishment; thus the tools of divine mercy do not act upon the resistant soul for justification; instead the tools of divine justice act upon it for punishment.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that the objection follows from passion properly so called, which consists in motion, about which we are not speaking right now.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that for it to be a passion, properly speaking, there must be something that possesses matter subject to contrariety, as has been said; and for there to be mutual suffering, there must be common matter. Yet something is able to suffer from another with which it does not share any matter, as lower bodily things do from the sun; and something is able to suffer in some way which in no way possess matter, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Sed Contra 1: But although some of the objections on the contrary conclude to something true, yet since they do not conclude in a true manner, we must respond to them in order. Hence, to the first it must be said that Augustine shows that that argument is invalid in the City of God: (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch.10 (PL 41:725).) I would say that spirits burn without their own bodies, as when the rich man in hell said ‘I am burning in this flame,’ if I did not see that one could fittingly respond that it was of the same type as the eyes which he raised and saw Lazarus, or as the tongue which he longed to be refreshed with a little moisture, or as Lazarus’s finger by which he asked that it be done; whereas they were nevertheless souls without bodies. Thus, that flame by which he burned can also be understood to be incorporeal. Hence, it is clear that that authority is not sufficient to prove what was proposed, unless something more be added.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that the fire of hell burns incorporeal substances in a bodily way on the part of the agent, but not on the part of the patient; but it also burn the bodies of the damned in a bodily way.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that the saying of Cassiodorus does not seem to contain truth, if he is speaking about the exterior senses; hence, in order for it to be true, it must be understood of the interior spiritual senses.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that one can respond to the gospel authority that it is a spiritual fire, except for the fact that the bodies of the damned could not be punished by it: hence, this argument does not sufficiently prove the point. And one can respond similarly to the following, which proceeds from a similar point.

Reply Sed Contra 6: To the last it must be said that the damned soul, insofar as it is some nature, is better than non-being; but insofar as it is subject to misery and guilt, God’s word is understood as being that it would be better for it not to exist.