Article 9 — Whether there was in Christ's soul the passion of pain with respect to his higher reason

Ninth, it is asked whether there was in Christ's soul the passion of pain with respect to his higher reason. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a.1, qa. 3; a. 3, qa. 2; Quodlibet, bk. 7, q. 2; ST III.46.7; Compendum Theologiae, ch. 232.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for a man is said to be disturbed and to be led by passion when the agitation of passion attains all the way to reason; but to be disturbed and to be led by passion does not pertain to a wise man; (Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis, part 7, n. 2; part 5, n. 4; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, obj. 2.) therefore, since Christ was most of all wise, it seems that in him pain did not come all the way to his higher reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, any power is said to be pleased with respect to the agreeableness of its proper object; thus pain ought not to be attributed to any power except on account of the harm that happens on the part of the object; but with respect to eternal things, which are the objects of higher reason, Christ suffered no defect or impediment; therefore, there was not any passion of pain in Christ's higher reason.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 7 (PL 41:411).) pain pertains to bodily passions; thus pain does not pertain to the soul except insofar as it is joined to the body; but the soul is not joined to the body with regard to its higher reason, since according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 429a24.) the intellect is the act of no body; therefore pain cannot exist in the higher reason.

Obj. 4: But one might say that although higher reason is not joined to the body by an activity, it is nevertheless joined to it as a form.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in On Sleep and Sleeplessness, (Aristotle, On Sleep, ch. 1, 454a8.) power and action belong to the same thing; therefore, if the intellect's act belongs to the soul without any participation in it by the body, then the intellectual power will not belong to the soul insofar as it is joined to the body, and so higher reason will not be joined to the body as its form.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:940D).) passion is a movement of the irrational and appetitive soul; but pain, sadness, and the like are certain passions; therefore these were not in the higher part of Christ's reason.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God, pain and sadness pertain to those things which happen to us without us willing them; (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 15 (PL 41:424).) but Christ willed his own bodily Passion with respect to his higher reason, and neither does anything happen against his will, which was perfectly conformed to the divine will; therefore, there was not sadness or pain in Christ with regard to his higher reason.

Obj. 7: But one may say that it was higher reason as reason that willed the body's passion, not reason as nature. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 40, p. 64.)

On the contrary, it is the same power that is considered both as reason and as nature; for a different consideration does not change the substance; therefore, if higher reason as reason willed something, and as nature did not will it, then by the same power at one and the same time it both willed something and did not will it, which is impossible.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Topics 1.15, 106a38, according to Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, obj. 5.) there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure taken in contemplation; but the pleasure that belongs to higher reason is in the contemplation of eternal things; therefore, there cannot be any pain or sadness in it, for this sadness or pain would be opposed to contemplative pleasure; therefore the passion of pain or sadness was not in Christ's soul with regard to his higher reason.

On the contrary (1) is what is said in Psalm 87:4, my soul is filled with evils, and the Gloss, (Glossa interlinearis, at Ps 87:4 (Glossa ordinaria 3.1109); Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 87:4 (PL 191:811D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 87:4 (PL 37:1110).) not of evils but of sorrows; therefore pain was in every part of Christ's soul, and so also in his higher reason.

Furthermore (2), (See Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 143, arg. 1, p. 200; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2.) recompense corresponds to guilt; but by his Passion Christ made satisfaction for the guilt of the first man; thus, since that guilt attained even unto his higher reason, so also did Christ's Passion need to attain to his own higher reason.

Furthermore (3), as the Gloss says on that verse, (Glossa interlinearis, at Ps 87:4 (in Glossa ordinaria 3.1109); Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 87:4 (PL 191:811D); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 87:4 (PL 37:1110).) my soul is filled with evils, the soul suffers by grieving with the body, to which it is united; but reason as reason denotes a relationship with the body, which is clear from the fact that in angels who do not have bodies naturally united to themselves, we do not say "reason" but "intellect"; but in souls united to bodies we say "reason"; therefore, the pain of Christ's Passion was also in his higher reason as reason.

Furthermore (4), according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 6 (PL 42:929); cf. ST I.76.8.) the entire soul is in the entire body; therefore any part of it is united to the body; but higher reason as reason is a part of the soul; therefore, it is united to the body, and so it suffers pain together with the suffering body.

I answer that it must be said that, as is clear from what was said, there is a twofold passion by which the soul suffers incidentally: one is bodily, which begins from the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body; but the other is an animal passion that is caused from the soul apprehending something by which its appetite is moved, and upon this motion there follows a bodily change.

Thus, speaking of the first passion, to which pain belongs, according to Augustine, it must be said that the pain of Christ's Passion was in his higher reason in one way, but in another way it was not. For there are two things in any pain: namely an injury, and the perception of that experience of injury. Injury is indeed primarily in the body, but it exists consequently in the soul, inasmuch as it is united to the body. However, the soul is united to the body through its own essence; but all the powers are rooted in the soul's essence, and in this respect that injury in Christ pertained to the soul and to all its parts, and even to his higher reason, inasmuch as it is grounded in the soul's essence; however, the perception of the experience of injury only pertains to the sense of touch, as was said above. (Above: a. 3.) But when speaking of animal passion, sadness, which is properly an animal passion, can only be in that part of the soul from whose object sadness arises, and by the apprehension and desire of which sadness is wont to occur. However, no reason for sadness could occur in Christ's soul from the object of his higher reason, namely on the part of eternal things, which he enjoyed perfectly; and thus animal sadness was not able to exist in the higher reason of Christ's soul.

Thus, the higher reason in Christ suffered bodily pain inasmuch it is rooted in the soul's essence; but it did not suffer from animal sadness, inasmuch as by its proper operation it looked so as to gaze upon eternal things.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that man is disturbed and led by passion when reason follows the inclination of passion in its proper activity by consenting and choosing; however, bodily pain does not attain to the higher reason of Christ's soul by changing its proper activity, but only inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence, as was said, and so the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although there was not any pain in the higher reason of Christ's soul in comparison with its proper object, yet it was in it inasmuch as it is compared to its proper root, which is the soul's essence.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that a power can be the act of a body in two ways: in one way inasmuch as it is a certain power, and then it is said to be the body's act inasmuch as it informs some bodily organ for it to carry out its own proper act, such as the power of sight perfecting the eye so as to carry out the act of seeing; and in this way the intellect is not the act of the body. But a power can be the body's act in another by reason of the essence in which it is grounded; and in this way both the intellect as well as the other powers are joined to the body as a form, inasmuch as they are in the soul, which is the body's form by its own essence.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the objection argues from the power with respect to the power's account, but not inasmuch as it is rooted in the soul's essence.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that Damascene is speaking of animal passion, which passion exists in the sensitive appetite as in its proper subject, but it also exists causally in the apprehensive power, inasmuch as the movement of passion arises in the appetitive power from an apprehended object. However, there are in the higher appetite certain activities similar to the passions of the lower appetite, and by reason of this likeness the names of passions are sometimes attributed to angels or else to God, as Augustine says in the City of God. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5. (PL 41:261).) In this way sadness is sometimes said to be in the higher reason with respect to the apprehensive and appetitive powers. But we do not say that in this respect there was pain in the higher reason of Christ's soul, but rather inasmuch it is rooted in the soul's essence, as was said.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the objection proves there was no pain in his higher reason, inasmuch as it is compared by its proper activity to its own object; for in this way nothing happens against his will.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the distinction by which reason as reason is distinguished from reason as nature can be understood in two ways: in one way such that reason as nature is called "reason" inasmuch as it is the nature of a rational creature, namely inasmuch it gives natural existence to the body by being grounded in the soul's essence; but it is called reason as reason with respect to what is proper to reason inasmuch as it is reason; and this is its action, for powers are defined by action.

Therefore, since pain is is not in the higher reason inasmuch as it is related to an object with regard its proper act, but rather inasmuch as it is rooted in the soul's essence; thus it is said (This opinion is from Alexander of Hales, Summae fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 143, p. 200; Questiones antequam esset Frater, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3, n. 48; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2; Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 3, sol. 2.) that his higher reason suffered pain as nature, but not as reason. It is similarly the case with regard to sight, which is established upon touch, inasmuch as the organ of sight is also an organ of touch. Hence, sight can suffer an injury in two ways: in one way by its proper act, as when sight is blunted by an excess of light, and this is a passion of sight as sight; in another way insofar as it is grounded in touch, as when the eye is poked or is destroyed by heat, and this passion is not a passion of sight as being sight, but as being touch.

The previously mentioned distinction can be understood in another way, such that reason as nature is understood inasmuch as reason is referred to what it naturally knows or desires; but reason as reason inasmuch as it is ordered by a certain comparison to know something or to desire something, since it is proper to reason to make comparisons. For there are certain things which considered in themselves are to be fled, but they are desired with respect to an order toward something else; such as hunger and thirst which considered according to themselves are to be fled, but inasmuch as they are considered as useful for the soul's or body's health, then they are desired; and in this way reason as reason rejoices in them, whereas reason as nature is saddened by them. So also was Christ's bodily passion when considered in itself something to be fled: hence, reason as nature was saddened by it and did not will it; but insofar as it was ordered to the salvation of human kind, then it was good and desirable, and so reason as reason willed it and rejoiced in it.

Yet this cannot be referred to higher reason, but to lower reason alone, which directs its attention to bodily things as to its proper object: hence, it can be brought to bear upon the body's passions both absolutely and comparatively. But higher reason does not direct its attention to bodily things as its objects, for in this way it regards eternal things alone; yet it does look to bodily things by judging them through eternal reasons, which it regards not only so as to gaze upon them, but also so as to consult them. And so the higher reason in Christ did not look upon the body's passion except with reference to the eternal reasons, about which he rejoiced inasmuch it was pleasing to God. Thus, in no way did sadness or pain fall into his higher reason with respect its proper activity. But it is not inadmissible that one and the same power should will the same thing as ordered to something else, which it also does not will with respect to itself; for it can happen that what is not good in itself receives a certain goodness as ordered to something else, even though this was not the case in the higher reason in Christ with respect to the body's passion, to which it was not ordered except as to something willed, as is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that contemplation can cause pleasure in two ways: in one way on the part of the activity which is contemplation; and in this way there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure found in contemplation, for there is no contemplation that is the cause of sadness contrary to the contemplation that is the cause of pleasure; for all contemplation is pleasurable. But this is not the case on the part of sensation, for sensation happens to be saddened and to be pained with respect to its activity; as when we are pleased by touching something agreeable, but we are pained by touching something harmful. It causes pleasure in another way on the part of the thing contemplated, namely inasmuch as something is considered as good or as evil; and in this way pleasure and the contrary sadness can occur from contemplation; for in this way not understanding itself is what causes sadness, inasmuch as it is considered as something evil, but with respect to itself it only causes the negation of pleasure. Nevertheless, we do not say that pain is in the higher reason of Christ's soul in this way, but insofar as it is rooted in the soul's essence.

Reply Sed Contra 1: But to the first objection on the contrary, it must be said that the Gloss does not say that Christ's soul was full of sadness, but that it was full of pains, inasmuch as it suffered together with the body; and it is not necessary that the passion of pain should pertain in this way to his higher reason, except insofar as it is in the soul's essence, for in this way it is united to the body.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that Christ's Passion is not satisfactory except insofar as it is voluntary and taken up out of charity. Thus it is not necessary that there be pain in the higher part of Christ's reason with respect to its proper activity, as there was fault in Adam through the activity of his higher reason; for the movement itself of suffering charity, which is in the higher part of reason, corresponds in reparation to that which was in the fault with respect to higher reason.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that two things are understood to be in reason, namely a certain participation of an intellectual power and then the darkening or failure of the intellect. Therefore, the failure of the intellectual power is consequent to the soul inasmuch it is able to be united to the body; but the intellectual power is within it inasmuch as it is subdued beneath the body, as are other material forms. And so, when reason's activity is in the soul insofar as it participates in the intellectual power, such an activity is not exercised by means of the body.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that reason as reason does not denote a certain power distinct from reason as nature, but rather it denotes a certain way of considering the power itself. But although according to a certain way of thinking passion does not pertain to any power of the soul, yet neither does this prevent the whole soul from suffering.