Article 2 — How the soul suffers when conjoined to the body

Second, it is asked how the soul suffers when conjoined to the body. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2; ST I-II. 22.1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not suffer accidentally: for as is said in the book the Spirit and the Soul, (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 14 (PL 40:789).) because of the friendship of body and soul, the soul conjoined to the body cannot be free; and though it cannot be destroyed, yet it can fear destruction: however to fear is to suffer in some way; (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 5 (PL 41:408); cf. ST I-II.41.1, s.c.) therefore, the soul conjoined to the body suffers with respect to itself, for it pertains to it according to itself that it not be able to be destroyed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, any thing that gives perfection to another is more excellent; but the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body so that it is made perfect there; therefore the body is more excellent than the soul, and so the soul is able to suffer essentially from the body to which it is united.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the soul is moved incidentally according to place, for it is incidentally in the place in which a body exists essentially; but a form or a quality that is in a body essentially is not said to exist in the soul incidentally; therefore, since passion is with respect to a form or a quality, for it happens with regard to the motion of alteration, it seems that a soul in a body cannot suffer incidentally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to move incidentally is divided against being moved according to a part, as is clear in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 244a21.) but the soul is a part of the composite that is moved by itself, as is clear in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.10, 408a34.) Therefore, the soul should not be said to be moved incidentally, but rather as a part in the motion of the whole.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is essential is prior to what is incidental; (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.10, 198a7.) but in the soul’s passions, what is from the side of the soul is prior to what is from the side of the body, for the body is changed by the soul’s apprehension and desire, as is clear in anger, fear, and other such things; therefore, one must not say that the soul suffers from these passions incidentally and the body essentially.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is formal in a thing is more fundamental than what is material; but in the soul’s passions, what is from the soul is formal, whereas what is from the body is material: for this is the formal definition of anger: anger is the desire for revenge, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a30.) but this is the material definition: anger is the boiling of blood around the heart; (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a30. Sec. transl. veterem (ed. Alonso, p. 93,1); cf. De malo, q. 12, a. 2, arg. 7.) therefore, in such passions, what is from the soul is more fundamental than what is from the body, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, just as joy, sadness, and other such passions of the soul do not belong to the soul without the body, so also neither does sensing; but no one says that the soul senses incidentally; thus also one should not say that the soul suffers incidentally.

On the contrary (1), passion is a kind of motion according to alteration, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) taking passion properly; but the soul is not altered except incidentally; therefore, neither does it suffer except incidentally.

Furthermore (2), the soul’s powers are not more perfect than the soul’s very substance; but according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.10, 408b18.) the powers do not grow older essentially, but only because of the body’s defect; therefore neither does the soul suffer essentially but only incidentally.

Furthermore (3), all that is moved essentially is divisible, as is proved in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 6.5, 234b10.) but the soul is indivisible; therefore it is not moved essentially, and so neither does it suffer.

I answer that it must be said that if taking passion properly, it is impossible for something incorporeal to suffer, as has been shown above; (Above: a. 1.) therefore what suffers essentially is a body, when taking passion properly. Thus, if passion spoken properly pertains in some way to the soul, this is only the case insofar as it is united to the body, and so it is incidental. However, it is united to the body in two ways: in one way as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body by animating it; in another as a mover, inasmuch as it exercises its activities by means of the body. In both ways the soul suffers incidentally, though differently; for what is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of matter, just as it acts by reason of form: and thus passion begins from matter, and it pertains in some way to form incidentally; but the passion of one suffering is derived from an agent, insofar as passion is the effect of action.

Therefore, the body’s passion is attributed to the soul incidentally in two ways: in one way such that the passion begins from the body and terminates in the soul, inasmuch as it is united to the body as a form; and this is a bodily passion; as for example, when the body is wounded, the body’s union with the soul is weakened, and so the soul, which is united to the body according to its own being, suffers incidentally. It is attributed to it in another way such that it begins from the soul, inasmuch as it is the body’s mover, and it terminates in the body; and this is called an animal passion, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:940C); Gregory of Nyssa, that is, Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 16 (PG 40:673B).) as is clear in the case of anger, fear, and other such things, for such things act by means of the soul’s apprehension and desire, upon which follows change of the body, just as the mobile’s change follows from the activity of the mover according to each mode that the mobile is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, with the body having been changed by some alteration, even the soul itself is said to suffer incidentally.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the soul does not fear destruction such that it itself might be destroyed, but it fears the destruction of what is joined together by being separated from its own body; and if it should fear its very own destruction, this does not happen except insofar as it doubts whether the soul is incidentally corrupted at the body’s corruption. Hence, the soul’s destruction itself cannot belong to it essentially; and neither does the passion itself of fear belong to it unless the union with the body should belong to it.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the soul, although it is perfected in the body, as Augustine proves in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 16 (PL 34:467).) is nevertheless not perfected by the body; rather, it is either perfected by God, or else it perfects itself with the help of the subservient body, just as the potential intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect with the help of the phantasms, which become intelligible in act by means of it.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although the body’s quality belongs in no way to the soul, nevertheless the existence of the composite is common to the soul and the body, and similarly activity; hence the body’s passion redounds to the soul incidentally.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that passion does not happen to the composite from the body and soul except by reason of the body; thus it does not happen to the soul except incidentally. However, the objection proceeds as though the passion belongs to the whole by reason of the whole, and not by reason of either part.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that anger, and similarly any passion of the soul, can be considered in two ways: in way according to the proper notion of anger, and in this way it is in the soul prior to being in the body; in another way inasmuch as it is a passion, and in this way it is in the body first; for it first receives therein the notion of a passion. And so we do not say that the soul become angry incidentally, but that it suffers incidentally.

Reply Obj. 6: From this the solution to the sixth is also made clear.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the soul is not said to sense incidentally for the same reason that it is said not to rejoice, even though it is said to suffer incidentally.