Article 10 — Whether the pleasure of enjoyment in Christ's higher reason was impeded by the pain of the Passion, and conversely

Tenth, it is asked whether the pleasure of enjoyment in Christ's higher reason was impeded by the pain of the Passion, and conversely. (Parallel texts: Above: q. 10, a. 11, ad 3; In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2, ad 5; ST III.46.8; Quodlibet, bk. 7, q. 2; Compendium Theologiae ch. 232.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it was: for blessedness is more properly in the soul than in the body; but the body cannot be called blessed or glorious so long as it suffers, for impassibility pertains to the body's glory; therefore neither were the passion of pain and the joy of blessed enjoyment able to exist together in Christ's higher reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics (Aristotle, Ethics 7.14, 1154b13.) that any pleasure expels its contrary sadness; however, if it is vehement, it expels all sadness; but the pleasure by which the higher reason in Christ's soul enjoyed his divinity was most vehement; therefore it expelled all sadness and pain from Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be from Bonaventurae, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, s.c. 1.) his higher reason contemplated more clearly than did Paul in his rapture; but Paul's soul was removed from his body by the force of his contemplation, not only with respect to reason's activity, but also with respect to the activities of sense; therefore, Christ also did not feel any pain, neither with respect to his reason nor with respect to his senses.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a strong effect follows from a strong cause; but the soul's activity is the cause of bodily change, as for example from the imagination of terrifying or pleasurable things the body becomes hot or cold: (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 4.) therefore, since the joy in Christ's soul with respect to his higher reason was most vehement, it seems that even the body would have been changed by this joy; and so there could not be any pain, whether in the body or in the higher reason insofar as it is united to the body.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, (Alexander of Hales, Questiones antequam esset Frater, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 7, n. 58; Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 37, arg. 10, p. 59.) the vision of God is more efficacious in his own essence than it is in a created subject; but the vision (Cf. Exodus 34:28.) by which Moses saw God in a created subject (See Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 21 (PL 42:911); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 15, ch. 9.) caused him to be not afflicted by hunger for forty days; thus all the more does the vision of God in his own essence, which belonged to Christ with respect to his higher reason, remove all bodily affliction, and so the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be from Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, s.c. 3.) whatever is at its greatest, yet from which there is able to be a decrease, does not admit of any admixture of contraries; just as the heat of fire, which is at its greatest, does not admit of any admixture of cold, even though that heat is changeable; but the pleasure of enjoyment existed in his higher reason at its greatest and also unchangeably; thus, there was no mixture of pain there.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, man is made blessed both with regard to his soul and with regard to his body; but he lost each kind of blessedness by sin; however, human nature was restored in Christ to blessedness of soul, which consists in this, that higher reason enjoyed the divinity; therefore, all the more was he restored to blessedness of the body which was inferior. And so there was not even any pain in him with respect to the body; and thus neither was there any in his higher reason, insofar as it is united to the body.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as Christ's soul is united to the Word, so also is his flesh; but if his flesh was glorified by union with the Word, there could not be in it any pain; therefore, since his higher reason was beatified by union with the Word, there could not be in him any pain.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be from Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, s.c. 2.) according to Augustine On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 24 (PL 34:474).) joy and pain are in the soul essentially; but joy and pain are contraries; therefore, since contraries cannot exist in the same thing according to essence, it seems that the pleasure of enjoyment and the pain of passion could not exist together in the higher part of reason.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, pain follows from the apprehension of what is harmful, but joy from the apprehension of what is agreeable; but it is not possible to apprehend both the harmful and the agreeable at the same time, for only one thing is understood at a time, according to the Philosopher; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7, 1006b10; sec. Thomam supra q. 21 a. 3.) therefore, pain and joy could not exist together in his higher reason.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, reason has more power over sensuality in integral nature than sensuality has over reason in corrupted nature; but in corrupted nature sensuality drags reason after itself; thus, reason dragged sensuality after itself much more strongly in Christ in whom human nature was integral, and so his sensuality was a participant in the pleasure of enjoyment, which was in reason; from which it seems that Christ's soul was totally free from pain.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, a contracted weakness is greater than one that is assumed; and similarly, the union in the person is stronger than a union by grace; but for the three boys who had a contracted weakness, union with God by grace kept their bodies incapable of suffering injury by fire; (Dan. 3:19) thus, all the more in Christ, who had no weakness except that assumed, did the union in the person of God's Word and his enjoyment preserve his reason immune from the pain of passion.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be from Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, s.c. 5.) the pleasure of enjoyment is in higher reason by being turned toward God, but the pain of passion by being turned toward the body; but since reason is simple, it cannot be turned at the same time both toward God and toward the body, for what is simple turns completely toward that to which it turns; thus, the pleasure of enjoyment and the pain of passion could not exist at the same time in Christ's higher reason.

Obj. 14: But one may say that there was a twofold condition in Christ, namely that of a wayfarer and that of a possessor; (Cf. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 2.) and so with respect to these two conditions the pleasure of enjoyment and the pain of passion could exist within him at the same time.

On the contrary, the twofold condition of Christ neither removed the contrariety between joy and pain, nor did it diversify the subject of that joy and pain; however, contraries cannot exist together in the same subject; therefore, Christ's twofold condition did not make it possible for both pain and joy to exist in him with respect to his higher reason.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, the condition of a wayfarer and that of a possessor are either contrary or they are not: if they are contrary, then they cannot exist together within Christ; but if they are not contrary, then since contrary causes give rise to contrary effects, it seems that his twofold condition cannot be the cause by which the contraries of joy and sadness are in Christ at the same time.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, when one power is focused upon its own act, another is withdrawn from its act; thus, when one power is intense in a single act, so much more is it itself withdrawn from another act; but there was intense joy in his higher reason, therefore, it was completely withdrawn for this reason from pain.

Obj. 17: But one might argue that his pain was material with respect to his joy, and thus his joy was not impeded by pain.

On the contrary, the pain pertained to the body's passion, but the joy to the vision of God; therefore, the pain of the Passion was not material with respect to the pleasure of enjoyment; and so pain and joy were not able to exist at the same time in Christ's higher reason.

On the contrary (1), the proportion between effects is with respect to the proportion between causes; but the union of Christ's soul with the body was the cause of pain, whereas its union with the divinity was the cause of joy: however, these two unions do not impede each other; therefore neither do joy and sorrow impede each other.

Furthermore (2), Christ was at the same instant both a wayfarer and a possessor; therefore he possessed what pertains to both the wayfarer and the possessor; but it belongs to the possessor to rejoice exceedingly in divine enjoyment, whereas it belongs to the wayfarer to feel bodily pains; therefore, both the pain of the Passion and the pleasure of enjoyment existed together in Christ.

I answer that it must be said that in Christ the two things previously mentioned, namely the pleasure of enjoyment and the pain of bodily passion, did not impede one another in any way. In evidence of this it must be known that, in conformity with the order of nature, on account of the binding together of the soul's powers in one essence and that of the soul and body in the one existence of the composite, the higher and lower powers as well as the body and soul allow to flow into one another whatever is superabundant in any one of them. Hence, it happens that the body is transformed with respect to heat and cold because of the soul's apprehension, sometimes also with regards to health and sickness, and sometimes even unto death; for it happens that some people incur death from joy, sadness, or love.

It is for this reason that there is an overflowing from the soul's own glory itself so as to glorify the body, as is manifest from the authority of Augustine quoted above; (Augustine, Epistulae, letter 118, "To Dioscorus," ch. 3, para. 14 (PL 33:439); see above: a. 8, ad 10.) and the converse is likewise true, namely that the body's changed overflows into the soul. For the soul, being joined to the body, imitates its constitution, such as with respect to frenzies or as being teachable and the like, as it says in the book Six Principles. (Gilbert of Poitiers, Liber Sex Principiorum, bk. 4.) Likewise, there is an overflowing from the higher powers into the lower, as when an intense passion in the sensitive appetite follows upon the will's movement, and as when the animal powers are withdrawn from their acts, or else impeded in them because of an intense contemplation.

Conversely, there is a welling up from the lower powers into the higher, as when reason is overshadowed by the vehemence of the passions existing in the sensitive appetite, such that it judges to be simply good that which a man is affected by through passion.

However, it is different in Christ, for because of the Word's divine power, the order of nature was subject to his will; and so it could happen that the previously mentioned overflowing did not occur, whether from the soul into the body or conversely, or else from the higher powers into the lower or conversely, with the power of the Word causing it, so that the truth of human nature might be shown with respect to each of its parts, and so that the mystery of our restoration might be gracefully fulfilled with regard to everything. Thus, Damascene says in book 3, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1060B).) he was moved with respect to what follows from that nature, with the Word willing and allowing that, according to dispensation, all things proper to it should be suffered and performed, so that by all of this the truth of that nature might be believed. Thus it is clear that when the most supreme joy was in his higher reason, inasmuch as the soul enjoyed God by its activity, that very joy remained in the higher reason and was not diverted into the soul's lower powers, and neither into the body; otherwise no pain nor passion could exist in him.

So also the effects of that enjoyment did not arrive at the soul's essence, inasmuch as it is the body's form, nor insofar as it is the root of the lower powers; for it would otherwise have come to the body and to the lower powers, as happens in the blessed after the resurrection. Conversely, the pain coming from the body's injury, being in the body itself, and in the lower powers in virtue of the soul's essence insofar as it is the body's form, was in a similar way unable to attain to his higher reason, inasmuch as it was turned toward God by its own act, in such a way that this very turning would have been impeded in any degree.

Thus, it follows that pain attained to his higher reason inasmuch it is rooted in the soul's essence, and the highest joy existed there inasmuch as it enjoyed God by its own act; and so joy itself belonged essentially to higher reason, since it was through its own act, but pain belonged incidentally, as it were, since it was by reason of the soul's essence in which it was established.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that just as God is the goodness and the life of the soul, so also is the soul the goodness and life of the body; but the converse is not true, namely that the body is the soul's good. However, the capacity for suffering is a kind of impediment or harm with respect to the soul's union with the body. Thus, the body cannot be blessed in its own way while being able to suffer, having an obstacle regarding its participation in the good, for which reason the inability to suffer pertains to the body's glory. But all of the soul's blessedness consists in the enjoyment of its own good, which is God; and thus the soul that enjoys God is perfectly blessed, even if it happens that it is able to suffer from the fact that it is united to the body, as happened in Christ.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the fact that ardent joy casts out all sadness, even what is not contrary, happens from an overflowing of powers into one other, which did not happen in Christ, as was said; and for this reason the lower powers of Paul himself were withdrawn from their own acts by the ardor of contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3: Thus the solution to the third is manifest.

Reply Obj. 4: For this same reason it also happens that there is a certain change in the body from the soul's activity: from which the solution to the fourth is manifest.

Reply Obj. 5: It is for this reason also that Moses was not afflicted by hunger or sadness in any way, or at least very little, because of his contemplation, even though it was through a created subject: and thus the solution to the fifth is also manifest.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that there was no mixture of joy and sadness in Christ, for joy was in his higher reason, coming from that part from which is the beginning of its act: for it enjoyed God in this way; but there was no pain in him, except insofar as the body's injury attained to it as the body's act mediated by the essence in which it is rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was not impeded in any way; and so there was pure joy and pure pain, and both of these in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that by a certain dispensation it happened that from the beginning of his conception, glory of soul was conferred upon Christ, but not glory of the body; such that by the soul's glory he was like God, and by the body's ability to suffer he was like us; and thus he was the most suitable mediator between God and men, leading us to God's glory, and on our part offering his own suffering to God, according to Hebrews 2:10, it was necessary that he who led many sons to glory should be perfected by suffering.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Christ's soul was joined to the Word in two ways: in one way by an act of enjoyment: and this union made it to be blessed; in another way by union, and in this way it did not possess the reason for its blessedness, but from this it was made to be God's soul. However, if it be held that the soul was assumed into the unity of the person without enjoyment, it would not be blessed properly speaking, for God himself is not blessed except insofar as he enjoys himself. Therefore, Christ's body is not glorious from the fact that it is assumed by the Son of God into the unity of the person, but only from the fact that glory descended into it from the soul, which, being before the Passion, was not glorious.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that it is impossible for contraries to exist essentially in the same thing; nevertheless, it does happen that there are contrary movements within the same thing, such that one movement belongs to it essentially and another incidentally, as when someone walking in a ship goes in the direction contrary toward which the ship is moved. So also did joy exist essentially in the higher reason of Christ's soul, for it was there through its very own act; but pain was there incidentally, since it was through the body's suffering. It can also be said that that joy and pain were not contrary, since they did not concern the same thing.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the intellect cannot understand many things at once through different forms; but it can understand many things at once through one form, or else by understanding many things as one in any other way. And in this way the intellect of Christ's soul and that of any of the blessed understood many things at the same time, inasmuch it knows other things by seeing the divine essence.

Nevertheless, even granting that Christ's soul could only understand one thing at a time, this does not prevent him being able to understand one thing and sensing something else by bodily sensation; and from these two things apprehended in Christ's soul there followed the pleasure of enjoyment from the vision of God, and the pain of the Passion from the sensation of injury. Granting further that it could not understand one thing at the same time as it sensed or imagined something else, yet the higher and lower appetites could be affected in different ways from that one thing being understood, such that the higher would rejoice and the lower would fear or suffer pain, as happens with someone who hopes to obtain health from some dreadful medicine: for considered as health-giving, that very medicine gives rise to joy in the will, but it arouses fear in the lower appetite by reason of its dreadfulness.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the objection argues with regard to the common course of events. But it was special to Christ that there not be an overflowing from one power into another.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the bodies of the boys were not made incapable of suffering in the furnace; but it happened miraculously by divine power that bodies, remaining capable of suffering, were not injured by the fire, as it could also have happened by divine power that neither Christ's soul nor his body should have suffered anything: but as to why that did not happen has already been said.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that the turning of a power toward something happens by its very act: and in this way there was joy in the higher reason by its turning toward God, to whom it was completely turned; but there was pain in the higher reason with regard to the indwelling or the cleaving by which it clung to the soul's essence as to its own root.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that the state of a wayfarer is the state of imperfection, but the state of a possessor is the state of perfection. Thus, with regard to this, Christ had the condition of a wayfarer since he bore a body capable of suffering, and similarly a soul; but he had the condition of a possessor since he perfectly enjoyed God by an act of his higher reason. This was able to happen in Christ since the overflowing from one power into another was impeded by divine power, as was said; and this is also the cause why both joy and sadness were able to exist in him at the same time. Thus, it is said that these two things were in him with respect to these two causes, for to have two states and to suffer pain and joy at the same time followed from the same cause.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that although the condition of a wayfarer and that of a possessor are contrary, yet they were able to exist in Christ simultaneously, not according to the same respect but with regard to different things. For the condition of a possessor was in him inasmuch as he clung to God by enjoyment according to his higher reason; but the condition of a wayfarer was in him inasmuch as the soul was joined by a certain natural union to a body capable of suffering, and the higher reason to the soul itself; such that the condition of a possessor pertains to the act of the higher reason, but the condition of a wayfarer pertains to the body capable of suffering, and to whatever follows upon it.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that, for the reason already mentioned, it was particular in Christ that however so much one power was intent upon its own act, another was not withdrawn from its own act, and neither was it impeded to any extent. Thus the joy of the higher reason was neither impeded by the pain that was in the senses with respect to the act of sensation, nor by the pain that was in the higher reason; for this pain was not in it according to its act, but it touched upon it in some way inasmuch it was grounded in the soul's essence.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that just as beatific knowledge is primarily of the divine essence and secondarily of those things which are known in the divine essence, so also is the affection and joy of the blessed primarily about God, and secondarily of those things about which God is the reason for rejoicing. Thus the pain of the Passion was in some way able to be the material with respect to the pleasure of enjoyment; for that joy was primarily about God and secondarily about the things which were pleasing to God; and so it was also about pain, inasmuch as it was accepted by God, namely as being ordered to the salvation of human kind.