Article 6 — Whether we merit by means of the passions

Sixth, it is asked whether we merit by means of the passions. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 36, a. 2; ST I-II.24.1–4; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1; q. 12, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that we do: for we merit by fulfilling the commandments; but we are directed by the divine commandments to rejoice, to fear, to sorrow, and other such passions, as Augustine says in the City of God; (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 9 (PL 41:413).) therefore we do merit by the passions.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the same book, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 6 (PL 41:409).) these passions of the soul do not exist without the will, rather they are nothing else than certain willings; but we are able to merit by the will's acts, not only materially but also formally; therefore we merit by such passions.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, animal passions draw closer to the notion of the voluntary than do bodily ones, for animal passions are in us in some way inasmuch as the concupiscible and the irascible obey reason; however, bodily passions do not. But bodily passions are meritorious, as is clear in the martyrs, who merited the crown of martyrdom by bodily passions; therefore all the more are animal passions meritorious.

Obj. 4: But one might argue that bodily passions are meritorious inasmuch as they are willed.

On the contrary, the will to suffer for Christ can also be in one who never suffers, who nevertheless will not possess a crown; thus bodily suffering merits a crown not only inasmuch as it is willed, but inasmuch as it is experienced in act.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that upon whose increase there follows an increase of reward is essentially meritorious, and not only materially; but an increase of reward follows upon an increase of bodily passion, since someone is crowned more gloriously to the extent that one suffers more, as it says; (Glossa? Peter Lombard, Commentary on Hebrews, at Hebrews 11:35 (PL 192:499B).) therefore we merit by the passions essentially and not only materially.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Hugh of Saint Victor says that activity follows after the will, such that the will is increased in its activity; (Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. 2, part 14, ch. 6 (PL 176:561B).) thus it contributes something to the exterior act's merit; but the will can be similarly augmented in passion; thus passion causes merit, and so the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, since merit consists in the will, that in which the will formally terminates completely belongs formally and completely to merit; but passion is the object of the will inasmuch as it is willed, and thus it determines the will formally; therefore passion itself pertains formally to merit.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, certain confessors suffered heavier trials than some of the martyrs; hence, it is said of them that they endured a long martyrdom, (cf. Hieron. Epist. 108 ad Eustochium n. 31 (PL 22, 905) et Martyrologium Usuardi mens. Mai. die 7 (PL 124, 30 C).) since the passion of some of the martyrs was accomplished in a short space of time; and so it seems that the bodily passion itself of the martyrs essentially merits a crown.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, on James 1:2, my brothers, think of every joy, the Gloss (Glossa interlinearis, at James 1:2 (in Glossa ordinaria 6.1263).) says that tribulation increases justice in the present, but a crown in the future; however, it does not increase except by meriting; therefore, since tribulation is a passion, passion is meritorious.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, the same seems to be the case from what is said in Psalm 115:15: precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints; but something is called precious as being of a worthy price: (cf. Huguccio Liber derivationum s. v. precor (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 7625 A, f. 1337).) yet the reward for work is the price that we merit by work; thus we are able to merit by the passions.

Obj. 11: But one might argue that we merit by the passions inasmuch as they are willed.

On the contrary is what Saint Lucy said, (Cf. Mombritius, Sanctuarium, Passio S. Luciae V. M. (ed. 2%, Parisiis 1910, II p. 108).81 Cap. 1.) that if you should cause my chastity to be violated against my will, my chastity shall be redoubled for me in a double crown; therefore the very suffering of being raped, which she would have suffered against her will, would have merited for her a crown; thus passion does not merit only because it is voluntary.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, difficulty pertains to merit by necessity: which is clear from what the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 1.) that man did not merit in the state of innocence, for nothing impelled him toward evil, neither did anything withdraw him from the good; therefore, since passions cause difficulty, it seems that they cause merit essentially.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, fear is a certain passion; but we are also able to formally merit by it, since it is in the intellectual part, as is clear when we fear what we only know by means of the intellect, such as eternal punishments; therefore we are able to merit by the passions.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, reward corresponds to merit; but the reward of glory will not only be in the soul, but also in the body; therefore merit also consists not only in the soul's action, but also in the body's passion.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, where there is greater difficulty, there is a greater reason for merit; but there is greater difficulty regarding the passions than regarding the activities of the will; thus the passions are more meritorious than the acts of the will, which are nevertheless formally meritorious.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, we formally merit by the virtues; but certain passions are held to be virtues by the saints, (cf. e. g. Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5 (PL 41:260); sec. Thomam infra a. 7 92 et ps.~August. De vera et falsa paen. cap. 19 (PL 40, 1128) sec. Petrum Lomb. Lib. Sent. IV d. 14 c. 2.) such as pity and penitence; some also are held by the philosophers to be praiseworthy and intermediary between the extremes of vice, such as shame and indignation, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.9, 1108a31.) which pertains as a whole to virtue; therefore we merit formally by the passions.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, merit and demerit, being contraries, (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1057b37.) are in the same genus; but demerit is in the genus of the passions, for the first sinful movements that are sins are certain passions; also anger and sloth are certain passions, which are nevertheless placed among the capital sins; also the Apostle in Romans 1:26 calls sins against nature disgraceful passions. Therefore, we also merit by the passions.

On the contrary (1), nothing can be meritorious except what is in us, for according to Augustine, the will is that by which one sins and lives correctly; (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PL 32:596); cf. ST I-II.20.1, s.c. 1.) but the passions are not within us, since as Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 9 (PL 41:415).) we give in unwillingly to the passions; therefore we do not merit by the passions.

Furthermore (2), what is a preamble to the will cannot be meritorious, since merit depends upon the will; but the soul's passions precede the will's act, since they are in the sensitive part, whereas the will's act is in the intellectual part; but the intellectual part receives from sensation; therefore the soul's passions cannot be meritorious.

Furthermore (3), all merit is praiseworthy; but we are neither praised nor derided for our passions according to the Philosopher in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105b31.) therefore, we do not merit by the passions.

Furthermore (4), there was in Christ a greater efficacy in meriting than in us; but Christ did not merit by his passions; (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 129, p. 181; Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 18, a. 1; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 2; from Alan of Lille, Regulae de sacra theologia, rule 106 (PL 210:677D).) therefore neither do we merit by our passions.

Proof of the minor: to merit is to makes one's own what is not one's own, or to make what is less one's own more one's own; but Christ was not able to make his own what was not his own, nor what was less his own more his own, for from the first moment of his conception, whatever falls under merit was perfectly owed to him; therefore Christ merited nothing by passion.

But it might be answered (5), that he merited by making what was his in one way to be his in many ways.

On the contrary, a double bond makes a greater obligation; therefore, in a similar way, a twofold reason for debt makes a greater debt. Thus, if Christ was unable to make something more due to himself, neither was he able to make something due to himself in more ways.

Furthermore (6), difficulty diminishes the voluntary; therefore since merit must be voluntary, it seems that difficulty diminishes merit: but passions cause difficulty; therefore they diminish merit more than they contribute something to merit.

I answer that it must be said that we do not merit by the passions essentially, but incidentally, as it were, if merit is taken properly. For since to merit is said with respect to a reward, to merit properly is to acquire something for oneself as a reward: which, indeed, does not happen unless we give something that is wholly deserving of what we are said to merit. But we are not able to give except what is ours, over which we have some control. Yet we are in control of our acts by the will, not only of those that are immediately elicited from the will, such as loving and willing, but also those which are commanded by the will, but elicited by other powers, such as walking, speaking, and other such things. But these acts are not wholly equal as a price with respect to eternal life, except insofar as they are informed by grace and charity. Thus, for any act to be essentially meritorious, it must be an act either commanded or elicited by the will; and again, it must be informed by charity. But since the principle of an act is the habit, the power, and also the object itself, therefore, we are said to merit as though secondarily by habits, powers, and objects; but that which is first and essentially meritorious is a voluntary act informed by grace. However, the passions do not pertain to the will, neither as being commanded nor as being elicited; for the beginning of the passions, being as such, is not within us; but some of them are called voluntary from the fact that they are within us; hence, the passions at times also precede the will's act. Thus, we do not essentially merit by the passions; nevertheless, inasmuch as they accompany the will, they are related in some way to merit, such that they can be called meritorious incidentally.

However, passion is related to the will in three ways: in one way as the will's object, and in this way passions are called meritorious inasmuch as they are willed or loved; for that by which we merit essentially will not be the passion itself in this respect, but the willing of the passion. In a second way, inasmuch as a passion excites the will or focuses it, which can happen in two ways, either essentially or incidentally: it is essential when the passion excites the will toward what is like itself, as when the will is inclined from concupiscence to consent to what is desirable, and from anger to will revenge; but it is incidental when the passion excites the will to what is contrary from some occasion; for example, when there arises in the chaste man the passion of concupiscence, the will resists the concupiscence with greater effort; for we strive more regarding difficult things. And so, passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as the will that is aroused by passion is meritorious. In a third way, it is the converse, when a passion is roused up from the will, inasmuch as the movement of a higher appetite redounds to a lower; for example, when someone detests the shame of sin with their will, by this very fact the lower appetite is afflicted with shame; and so shame is said to be praiseworthy or meritorious by reason of the will causing it. Therefore, in the first way passion is related to the will as its object, in the second as its principle, in the third as its effect. Hence, the first way is more remote from merit: for the same reason one can say that gold or silver is meritorious or blameworthy, inasmuch as by willing such things we either merit or demerit. However, the last way is closer to merit, inasmuch as the effect receives from the cause, and not conversely. Thus, taking merit properly, we do not merit by the passions except incidentally.

However, merit and demerit can be taken broadly, inasmuch as any disposition causing agreement with something is said to merit it; as when we say that a woman merits marriage with the king by reason of her beauty. In this way we are also said to merit by bodily passions, inasmuch as the passions themselves render us in some way apt to receive a certain amount of glory. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to both sets of arguments.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that we are warned by God's commands to rejoice and to fear, inasmuch as joy, fear, and other such things consist in the will's act and are not passions, as is clear from what was said, (Above: a. 3, ad 3.) or else inasmuch as such passions follow from the will.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that Augustine calls these passions "wills" inasmuch in us they follow from the will; thus he adds further that in general, with regard to the variation among things that are desired or fled, whether man's will is enticed or vexed, so also is his affection changed and turned into these things or those. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 6 (PL 41:409).) Or he is speaking of them inasmuch they denote a certain act of the will, as has been said. (Above: a. 3, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the martyr's bodily passion does not cause merit for an essential reward, except insofar as it is willed, but it is ordered to an incidental reward, which is the crown of martyrdom, in the mode of merit, insofar as it brings about a certain appropriateness with respect to that crown: (See Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5, a. 1.) for it is appropriate that the one who is conformed to Christ in his Passion should be conformed to him in glory, as in Romans 8:17: nevertheless, if we should suffer, so also will we be glorified. Nevertheless, it must be known that the will cannot be related to bodily passions in the same way when it suffers them as when it does not suffer them, on account of their harshness. Thus, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.18, 1117a32.) in such things it is enough that the strong man not be saddened. Thus bodily passion itself that is endured in act is both a sign of the will's constancy and firmness, and it is also that which evokes it, insofar as a man strives after difficult things: and so a crown is not due to a confessor, even though it is due to the martyr.

Reply Obj. 4: The answer to the fourth is thus made clear.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that an increase of reward follows from an increase of passion, either by reason of a certain fittingness, or by reason of an increase in willing.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that although the will is augmented in both the passion and in the exterior act, yet it is not the same in both cases: for the act is commanded by the will, but not the passion. Thus, they are not related to merit in the same way.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the object determines the will according to the act's species; however, merit does not consist in the act, properly speaking, according to the act's species. but according to its root, which is charity; thus, it is not necessary that we merit formally by passion, even though it stands as the object.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that all the effort which a confessor bears with for a lengthy time cannot be equated according to the work's genus with the death that a martyr undergoes in just a moment. For by death one is deprived of that which is most of all lovable, namely to live and to exist: thus, it is a terrible end, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.9, 1115a26.) and the virtue of fortitude is the greatest with respect to it. This is manifestly the case from the fact that men who are wearied by long torments are still afraid of death, as though choosing to suffer other afflictions rather than death.

Thus the Philosopher, in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 9.8, 1169a24.) says that the strong man exposes himself to death, choosing rather one great and good act rather than many small acts, as though that act of fortitude, in undergoing death, outweighs many other virtuous activities. Therefore, with regard to the genus of the act, the least martyr merits more than any confessor. Nevertheless, the confessor can merit more according to the root of the act, inasmuch as it is done with greater charity; and since the essential reward corresponds with the root of charity, whereas the incidental reward with the act's genus, thus a confessor can be more eminent than a martyr, with respect to the essential reward, even though the martyr is more eminent with respect to the incidental reward.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the Gloss speaks of tribulation inasmuch as it is willed, or else it excites the will. (Glossa interlinearis, at James 1:2 (in Glossa ordinaria 6.1263).)

Reply Obj. 10: One must respond similarly to the tenth.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that for a virgin who was corrupted for Christ's sake, that very corruption would be meritorious, just as are the other sufferings of the martyrs, not because the corruption itself was voluntary, but because its antecedent would be voluntary, namely to stand firm in confessing Christ, which results in her being corrupted, such that the corruption is voluntary not by an absolute will, but by a conditioned will, inasmuch as it chooses to suffer this disgrace rather than to deny Christ.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that there is a twofold difficulty: one which is from the greatness of the deed and its goodness, and this difficulty is required for virtue; another is that which is on the part of the agent, inasmuch as it is deficient or is hampered in its correct operations; and this difficulty either removes or else diminishes virtue; the passions cause difficulty in this way. Hence, the first difficulty, which is on the part of the thing done, contributes to merit essentially, namely the deed's goodness; but the second, which is from the activity's weakness, does not cause merit, except perhaps by chance, inasmuch as it is the occasion of greater effort.

But it is not true that Adam was unable to merit in his first state, if he had grace, even though there was nothing that withdrew him from the good and nothing that impelled him toward evil; for if he had persevered, he would have come at some time to glory, and it would not have been without merit. Nor does the Teacher say that he was unable to merit in his first state, but he says that he was able to avoid sin without meriting; for he was able to avoid sin without grace, from the fact that nothing was impelling him toward evil: but without grace nothing can be of merit.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that the fear of eternal punishment, which is essentially meritorious, is in the will and is not a passion, properly speaking, as is clear from what was said. Nevertheless, the passion of fear of eternal punishment can be excited in the lower appetite either from eternal punishments or by an overflowing from the higher appetite into the lower, or from the fact that the intellect's conception of eternal punishments is formed in the imagination; and so the lower appetite is moved by the passion of fear, but this fear is not related to merit except incidentally, as has been said.

The solution to the fourteenth is missing.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that speaking of the difficulties on our part, the passions have more difficulty than acts of the will; but difficulty does not cause merit in this way, except incidentally, as has been said; and it is similarly the case for the passions. But when speaking of the difficulty that comes from the excellence or goodness of a thing, which causes merit essentially, then there is a greater difficulty on the part of the will's acts.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that some passions are called praiseworthy by the philosophers inasmuch as they are effects and indications of a good will, as is clear regarding shame, which indicates that a man's will flees from the ugliness of sin, and mercy, which is a sign of love; therefore, sometimes the names of these passions are taken by the saints for the habits, by which the will is elicited, which is the source of these passions.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that the first movements do not have a perfect account of sin or of demerit, but they are like certain dispositions for demerit, just as venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. Thus, it is not necessary that the movements themselves of sensuality be essentially meritorious, for there cannot be merit unless there be a voluntary act, as has been said. However, these passions are sometimes called vices inasmuch as either acts of will or else habits are designated by the names of passions. Also, passions against nature are called passions, even though they are voluntary acts, inasmuch as nature is disturbed in its order by such vices.

Reply Sed Contra 1: To the first that was objected on the contrary, it must be said that we unwillingly give in to passions not with respect to consent, since we do not consent to them except by the will, but with respect to some bodily change such as laughter and weeping and other such things: therefore, they are either meritorious or demeritorious insofar as we willingly consent to them or else dissent from them.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that although the passions of the lower appetite sometimes precede the will's act, yet it does not always happen; for the appetitive powers are not ordered in the same way as the apprehensive powers: for our intellect receives from sensation, thus there cannot be an operation of intellect unless there first exist some activity of sensation; however the will does not receive from the lower appetite, but rather it moves it. Thus, it is not necessary that a passion of the lower appetite precede the will's act.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that although the passions are not essentially praiseworthy, yet they can be incidentally praiseworthy, as has been said.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that by his own Passion, Christ merited both for himself and for us: for himself bodily glory, which although he had already merited it by a preceding merit, yet the splendor of the Resurrection is properly the reward for the Passion by a certain fittingness, for exaltation is the proper reward for humiliation. However, he merited for us inasmuch as he made satisfaction by his Passion for the sins of the whole world, but not from preceding works, even though he did merit for us by means of them: for punishment is required for satisfaction as a kind of recompense for the pleasure of sin.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that, by his Passion, Christ did not cause the body's glory to be due after it was not due, nor to be more due after it was less due; rather, he made it to be due in another way which was not there before. But neither does it follow that it was now more due; for this would follow if the cause of debt were increased or multiplied, as happens when an obligation is increased by a double promise, which did not happen in Christ's merit, since his grace was not increased.

Reply Sed Contra 6: To the sixth it must be said that difficulty impedes the voluntary essentially, but it increases it incidentally, inasmuch as someone strives against difficulty; but the difficulty itself contributes to satisfaction by reason of its expiating nature.