Article 5 — Whether hope, fear, joy, and sadness are the principal passions of the soul

Fifth, it is asked whether hope, fear, joy, and sadness are the principal passions of the soul. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4; ST I-II.25.4; I-II.84.4, ad 2; II-II.141.7, ad 3.)

Obj. 1: It seems that they are not, for when enumerating the four principal passions in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 3.) Augustine places longing in place of hope, which also seems to be taken from the words of Virgil, who says when designating these principal passions that thus men desire, fear, rejoice, and sorrow. (Apud Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 3 (PL 41:406).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the extent that something is more perfect, so much does it seem to be more primary; but the movement of audacity is more perfect than the movement of hope, inasmuch as it tends toward its own object with greater intensity; thus audacity is a more principle passion than hope.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, anything is named from that which is more fundamental; but the irascible is named from anger; therefore anger ought to be counted among the principle passions.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as in the irascible there is a passion with respect to the future, so also in the concupiscible; but the passion that is in the concupiscible with respect to the future, namely desire, is not placed among the principle passions; therefore neither are fear and hope, which are similarly related to the what is future in the irascible appetite.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that is called principle which exists first among others, for to be a principle according to Gregory, is to be first among others; (In Evang. II hom. 34 (PL 76, 1251 D).) but among the remaining passions love is first: for all the other passions are born from love; therefore love ought to placed as a principle passion.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, those passions seem to be first upon which the other depend; but all the passions depend upon joy and sadness, for the passion of love is what joy and sadness follow upon, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 2.3, 1104b14; ibid. 5, 1105b21.) therefore these two passions alone, namely joy and sadness, are the principle passions.

Obj. 7: But one might say that joy and sadness are the principle passions in the concupiscible part, whereas fear and hope are the principle passions in the irascible.

On the contrary is what is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul: from concupiscibility arise joy and hope, from irascibility arise sorrow and fear. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 4 (PL 40:782).)

Obj. 8: Furthermore, with respect to what is proper to the irascible power, hope is opposed to despair and fear to audacity; but on the part of the concupiscible there are placed two principle passions contrary with respect to what is proper to the concupiscible, namely joy and sadness; therefore either hope and despair or else fear and audacity ought to placed as principle passions on the part of the irascible power.

On the contrary (1) is what is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 4 (PL 40:782).) that passion is recognized as being fourfold, since from what we love we now rejoice in, or else we hope to rejoice in it; and from what we hate, we now sorrow in it, or else we fear to sorrow in it; therefore these are the four principle passions, joy, pain or sadness, hope and fear.

Furthermore (2), when enumerating the four principle passions, Boethius says in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 1, verse 7 (PL 63:657A).) drive away joy, drive away fear, with hope put to flight, nor shall pain be near. And so the same conclusion follows as before.

I answer that it must be said that there are four principle passions of the soul, namely sadness, joy, hope and fear. The reason for this is that those passions are called principle which are prior to and the origin of the others. However, since the soul's passions are in the appetitive sensitive part, those passions will be prior which arise immediately from the object of the appetitive power, which object is goodness and evil; but those will be secondary which arise by means of others.

Two things are necessary in order for any passion to arise immediately from good or evil: the first of these is that it arise essentially from good and evil, for the incidental cannot be first; but the second is that it should arise with nothing presupposed, so that a passion is called principle because of two things, that it comes from the object, which hold the place of an active principle, neither accidentally, nor consequently. However, the passion which comes from the good insofar as it is good proceeds from the good essentially, whereas the passion that comes from the good insofar as it is evil comes from it incidentally; and one must understand in a contrary way regarding what is evil. (Cicero, On Invention, bk. 2, ch. 52, n. 157, as said above: q. 22, a. 8, obj. 3; cf. Moralium dogma philosophorum, q. 1, n. 4 (PL 171:1009C).)

However, the good inasmuch as it is good entices and draws to itself; thus, if there is some passion of the appetite tending toward the good, it will be a passion following from the good essentially. But to repel the appetite is proper to evil inasmuch as it is evil; thus, if there is such a passion related to the good, by which the good is fled, that passion will not be from the good essentially, but insofar as it is apprehended as being evil in some way. This must be understood in a contrary sense regarding what is evil, namely that the passion which consists in a flight from evil comes from what is evil essentially, whereas that which consists in a going toward evil is accidental. Thus it is clear how some passion arises from goodness or evil incidentally.

But since something is prior in intention and desire to the extent that it is later in the attainment of an end, thus, those passions arise from good or evil without others being presupposed, which consist in the attainment of the end, and others arise with them having been presupposed. However, joy and sadness come essentially from the attainment itself of good or evil; for joy comes from the good insofar as it is good, and sadness comes from evil insofar as it is evil. All other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come essentially from good or evil, which happens from the fact that the object of the concupiscible is good or evil according to an absolute notion. Nevertheless, other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as a cause; for the good is thus made beloved and desired for the concupiscible, since it is apprehended as desirable; but evil is made hateful and to be fled inasmuch as it is apprehended as able to cause sadness.

Thus, with respect to the order of desiring, joy and sadness are prior, although they are posterior in the order of execution or attainment. But not all the passions in the irascible follow from goodness or evil essentially, but some do essentially and some incidentally; which happens from the fact that good and evil are not the object of the irascible according to an absolute account, but inasmuch as there is also applied the condition of being arduous, according to which the appetite casts off the good as exceeding its power, and it inclines against what is evil inasmuch as it is possible to repelled or overcome.

However, there cannot be any passion in the irascible power that follows from what is good or evil with nothing else having been presupposed; for once the good has been possessed, it does not cause any passion in the irascible, as is clear from what was said; (Above: a. 4.) but a present evil does indeed cause a passion in the irascible, not essentially but incidentally, namely inasmuch as someone inclines against what is evil to repel it or bring it into subjection, as is clear in the case of anger.

Thus, it is clear that there are some passions which arise from goodness and evil first of all and essentially, such as joy and hope; but there are some that do so essentially though not first, such as the other passions of the concupiscible and the two passions of the irascible, fear and hope: one of which denotes a flight from evil, and the other an approach toward the good; but there are some that are neither first nor essential, as are the other passions in the irascible, like despair, audacity, and anger, which express an approach toward evil or else a drawing back from the good.

Thus, the most fundamental passions are joy and sadness; but fear and hope are principle in their own genus, since they do not presuppose other passions in the power in which they are, namely in the irascible. But other passions of the concupiscible, such as love and desire, hate and aversion, although they may be from goodness and evil essentially, are not on that account first in their own genus, since they presuppose other passions existing in the same power; and so they cannot be called principle, neither simply nor generally. And so it remains that there are only four principle passions: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that another passion precedes cupidity or desire in the same power, namely joy, which is the reason for desiring: thus it cannot be a principle passion. However, even though hope presupposes another passion, yet it is not as existing in the same power, but rather as in the concupiscible power: for all the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the concupiscible, as was said in another question, (Above: q. 25, a. 2.) thus it is able to be a principle passion. But Augustine puts cupidity or desire in place of hope, because of a certain likeness that is between them, for each passion is related to the good as not being possessed.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that audacity cannot be a principle passion; for it arises from evil accidentally, it being related to evil by way of approaching it; for the audacious man approaches what is evil inasmuch as he esteems victory over and the repulsion of evil to be some good; and audacity arises from the hope of such a good. By considering it in this subtle way, hope is found to be prior to audacity, for the hope of victory or at least of escape causes audacity.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that anger also arises from evil accidentally, namely inasmuch as the angry man esteems revenge for an evil brought against himself as being good, and he inclines toward it; thus the hope for attaining revenge is the cause of anger. Hence, when someone is injured by another upon whom he has no hope of bringing vengeance, he does not get angry, but is only saddened or else he fears, as Avicenna says, (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 6.) just as if a peasant were injured by a king.

Thus anger cannot be a principle passion; for it presupposes not only sadness, which is in the concupiscible power, but hope as well, which is in the irascible. But the irascible is named from anger, since it is the last of the passions in the irascible power.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the passions which are in the concupiscible power with respect to the future arise in some way from the passions existing within the same power with respect to the present, but the passions that are related to the future in the irascible power do not arise from any passions related to the present existing in the same power, but from those that exist in another power, namely from joy and sadness; thus, the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that in the order of execution or attainment love is the first passion, but in the way of intention joy is before love, and it is the reason for loving; especially inasmuch as love is a passion of the concupiscible power.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that joy and sadness are the most important passions among the others, as has been said; nevertheless, hope and fear are more important within their genus, as is clear from what was said.

Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that since that book is not by Augustine, it does not impose upon us any necessity to accept his authority; especially because it seems here to contain an express falsehood: for hope is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible; whereas sadness is not in the irascible but in the concupiscible. Nevertheless, if one must uphold its authority, it could be said that it is speaking of those powers according to the accounts of the names. However, concupiscence regards the good, and for this reason all the passions ordered to the good can be attributed to the concupiscible; but anger is brought forth because of some evil; thus all the passions which are related to evil can be attributed to the irascible; in this respect sadness is attributed to the irascible and hope to the concupiscible.

Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the contrariety which is a proper to the passions of the irascible power, namely as exceeding the power and as not exceeding, causes another passion to arise incidentally from good and evil; for what exceeds one's power incites one to draw back, whereas what does not exceed it incites one to move against it. Thus, if these differences are considered within goodness, the passion which follows upon what exceeds one's power comes from the good incidentally; but if it concerns evil, then what follows will be incidental insofar as it does not exceed one's power. Thus, there cannot be two principle passions in the irascible power which are directly contrary, such as hope and despair, or else audacity and fear, such as was the case in the concupiscible power with joy and sadness.