Article 4 — In what respect is there contrariety and diversity between the soul's passions

Fourth, it is asked in what respect is there contrariety and diversity between the soul's passions. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.23.1-4; In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3; Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not according to good and evil: for audacity is opposed to fear; (Aristotle, Ethics 3.15, 1116a3; cf. ST I-II.23.2, s.c.) but each passion stands with respect to evil, for what fear flees audacity attacks; therefore the contrariety of the soul's passions is not with respect to good and evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, hope is opposed to desperation; but each of them stands with respect to the good, which hope expects to attain but despair does not expect to attain it: therefore, the contrariety of the soul's passions is not with regard to good and evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Damascene in book 2 and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the soul's passions by present and future, and by good and evil; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:929B); Nemesius (Psuedo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 17 (PG 40:676B).) such that hope or desire are of a future good, satisfaction and delight, or else enjoyment are of a present good, fear is of a future evil, and sadness is of a present evil. But present and future are related incidentally to good and evil; therefore the difference between the soul's passions is not considered to be essentially according to good and evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine in the City of God (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 7 (PL 41:411).) distinguishes between sadness and pain, that sadness is of the soul, but pain is of the body, which do not pertain to the notions of good and evil; therefore, the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, exultation, joy, happiness, and delight, amiability, and cheerfulness possess a certain difference; otherwise two of these would be uselessly conjoined, as is clear in Isaiah 35:10, they shall obtain joy and happiness; therefore, since all of these are spoken of with respect to the good, it seems that good and evil do not distinguish the soul's passions.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in book 2 Damascene distinguishes four species of sadness, which are sloth, distress, envy, misery, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 14 (PG 94:932B).) aside from which there is also repentance, which are all spoken with respect to evil, therefore the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, he distinguishes six species of fear, namely sloth, embarassment, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).) which therefore do not pertain to the aforementioned difference, thus the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Dionysius lists jealousy with love in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 13 (PG 3:711).) each of which is a passion regarding the good; and so the same conclusion as before.

On the contrary (1) is that acts are distinguished by their objects; (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.6, 415a18; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, obj. 2, In II Sent., d. 38, a. 4, obj. 1.) but the soul's passions are the acts of the appetitive power, whose object is the good and evil; therefore the soul's passions are distinguished by good and evil.

Furthermore (2), furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.3, 1104b14; 2.5, 1105b21.) the soul's passions are that upon which joy and sadness follow; but joy and sadness are distinguished with regard to good and evil; therefore good and evil distinguish the soul's passions.

I answer that it must be said that a threefold distinction is found in the soul's passions: the first is that by which they differ generically, namely, as pertaining to different powers of the soul; just as the powers of the concupiscible are distinguished from the passions of the irascible. However, the reason for such a distinction of the passions is taken from the reason itself for distinguishing the powers. For when it was said above in the question "On sensuality" (Above: q. 25, a. 2.) that the object of the concupiscible is what is pleasurable with regard to sensation, whereas that of the irascible is something difficult or lofty, those passions pertain to the concupiscible, in which is implied an order to the simple pleasure of sensation or else to its contrary; whereas those pertain to the irascible which are ordered to something difficult concerning such things. And thus the difference between desire and hope is made clear, for it is called desire inasmuch as the appetite is moved toward something pleasurable; but hope names a certain elevation of the appetite toward a good that is held to be arduous or difficult; and it is similarly the case with the others.

But the second distinction of the soul's passions is that by which they are distinguished as species existing in the same power. This distinction regards the passions of the concupiscible in two ways: in way according to the contrariety of the object; and in this way joy, which regards the good, is distinguished from fear, which regards evil. It is in another way inasmuch as the concupiscible power is ordered in diverse ways to the same object, or according to diverse grades that are considered in the movement of the appetite; for that which pleases is first conjoined to the one desiring in an animal way, inasmuch as it is apprehended as being similar or suitable; and from this follows the passion of love, which is nothing else than a certain informing of the appetite by what is itself desired: hence, love is said to be a certain union of the lover and the thing loved. (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 15 (PG 3:713A).)

However, regarding what is thus conjoined in an animal way, one must further ask whether it is really conjoined, such that the lover enjoys the beloved; and in this way the passion of desire is born, which, when it should be grasped in reality, gives birth to joy. Therefore, what is first in the movement of the concupiscible is love, second is desire, and last of all is joy; and the passions that are ordered to evil should be taken up by what are contrary to these, such that hate is contrary to love, flight is contrary to desire, and sadness contrary to joy.

But as has been said in another question, (Above: q. 25, a. 2.) the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them, and therefore a certain distinction is found in them that is conformed to the distinction of the concupiscible; and furthermore, there is a proper distinction within them with regard to the notion of their proper object.

On the part of the concupiscible there is the distinction according to which they are distinguished by good and evil or else by the pleasurable and its contrary, and again what is really possessed and what is not really possessed. But the proper distinction of the irascible itself is such that its passions are distinguished according as they exceed the power of the one desiring or do not exceed it, and this is according to one's own estimation, for these seem to distinguish what is arduous as essential differences.

Therefore, passion can exist in the irascible either with respect to being good or to being evil; if it is with respect to the good, it is either as possessed or not possessed. With respect to the possessed good, no passion can exist within the irascible, for goodness that is now possessed does not cause any difficulty for the one possessing it, and so the notion of the arduous is not maintained there.

But with respect to the good that is not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be maintained because of the difficulty in attaining it, if that good is esteemed as exceeding one's powers, it causes despair, but if as not exceeding, then it causes hope. However, if one considers the movement of the irascible toward evil, this happens in two ways: namely, toward the evil that is not yet possessed, which is esteemed as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or else as already possessed or conjoined, which likewise has the notion of arduous inasmuch as it is esteemed difficult to repel; but if it is with respect to an evil not yet present, if such an evil is though to exceed one's powers, then it causes the passion of fear, but if as not exceeding, then it causes the passion of audacity.

However, if the evil is present, then it is either esteemed as not exceeding one's power, and then it causes the passion of anger, or else as exceeding it, and then it causes no passion in the irascible, but there remains in the concupiscible alone the passion of sadness.

Hence, the distinction that is taken according to different grades that are in the appetitive motion is not the cause of any contrariety, for such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is clear in desire and joy; but the distinction which is with respect to the contrariety of the object properly causes a contrariety in the passion: thus contrary passions are understood in the concupiscible power with respect to good and evil, such as joy and sadness, love and hate; but one can understand a twofold contrariety in the irascible appetite: one according to a distinction of the proper object, namely as exceeding the power and as not exceeding, and in this way hope and despair, audacity and fear, are contraries, and this contrariety is more proper to it. But the other is with respect to the difference of the object of the concupiscible, that is with respect to good and evil; in which way hope and fear seem to possess a contrariety. But anger cannot have a contrary in either way; neither according to the contrariety of good and evil, since with respect to the present good there is no passion in the irascible; likewise, neither with respect to the contrariety of exceeding one's power or not exceeding it, for evil that exceeds one's power does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Thus, among the rest of the passions, this is proper to anger, that there is nothing contrary to it.

However, the third difference of the soul's passions is as it were incidental, which happens in two ways: in way according to intensity and remission, (Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 5; cf. ST I-II.23.2, obj. 3.) as as when jealousy entails an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger; in another way with regard to the material differences of good and evil, such as the difference between mercy and envy, which are species of sadness, for envy is sadness at another's prosperity inasmuch as it is esteemed as one's own evil: (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 14 (PG 94:932B).) and this is also the case in certain other of the passions.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the object of the irascible is not the good and the bad taken absolutely, but with the added circumstance of being arduous; hence, there is not only contrariety by means of good and evil in those passions, but also by means of the differences that distinguish the arduous in both the good and the evil.

Reply Obj. 2: From this the answer to the second is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that present and future are taken as differences to distinguish the soul's powers inasmuch as the future is not attained in reality, whereas the present is already attained; but the appetite's movement toward that which is attained is more perfect than toward that which is really distant. Thus, although the future and the present cause some distinction in the passions, yet they do not cause contrariety, just as neither do the perfect and the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that insofar as pain is understood properly, it ought not to be numbered among the soul's passions, for on the side of the soul it has nothing except apprehension alone; for pain is the sensation of being wounded, (Cf. e. g. Aristotle, Topics 6.6, 145b5.) which wounding happens on the part of the body. Therefore, Augustine likewise says in the same place that when treating of the soul's passions, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 7 (PL 41:411).) he preferred to use the name sadness rather than pain, for sadness is perfected in the appetite itself, as is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that pleasure and joy differ in the same way as pain and sadness: for sensible pleasure has on the part of the body the uniting of what is agreeable, but on the soul's part it has the sensation of that agreeability. Similarly, spiritual pleasure has a certain real uniting of one agreeable thing with another and the perception of that union; (Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 5; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 2, obj. 1; Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 7.) thus Plato, (Apud Aristotle, Ethics 7.12, 1152b13; sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 291).) defining sensible pleasure, says that pleasure is a coming to be of sensation toward nature; but Aristotle (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 7.12, 1153a14.) defines pleasure generally, saying that pleasure is a possessed natural activity which is not impeded; for the agreeable activity is the agreeable thing itself which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus, pleasure begins in both cases from a real union, and it is perfected in its apprehension, but joy begins in apprehension and ends in affection, hence pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy as pain is of sadness.

But joy differs accidentally from gladness and the rest with respect to intensity and remission; for some call it a certain intensity of joy, which intensity is understood either with respect to an interior disposition, and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expanding of the heart, for one is said to be glad from a certain expansiveness; (cf. Huguccio Liber derivationum s. v. latus (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 7625 A, f. 87va)) or else it is insofar as the intensity of interior joy bursts forth in certain exterior signs, and then it is exultation, for exultation is named from the fact that interior joy breaks forth in some way exteriorly; (cf. Huguccio Liber derivationum s. v. salio (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 7625 A, f. 142rb).) for this breaking forth is understood either with respect to a changing of the face, in which there first appears an indication of emotion because of its nearness to the imaginative power, and then it is cheerfulness; or else it is understood inasmuch as both words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of interior joy, and then it is amiability.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the species of sadness which Damascene holds are certain modes of sadness adding upon sadness itself certain incidental differences, which are either according to an intensity of movement, and then insofar as this intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called sloth, which is sadness that weighs one down, (Johh Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 14 (PG 94:932B).) that is the heart, such that one does not care to do anything; or else insofar as it comes forth in an exterior disposition, and then it is distress, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 14 (PG 94:932B).) which is sadness that takes away the voice.

But on the part of the object, inasmuch as what belongs to another is considered as one's own evil, then if another's good is considered as one's own evil, it will be envy; but if another's evil is held to be one's own evil, it will be compassion. But repentance does not add upon sadness, taken generally, a special notion, since it is simply of one's own evil, and thus it is passed over by Damascene. Nevertheless, many kinds of sadness can be assigned, if all things are considered which are related incidentally to the evil which causes the sadness.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that, since fear is a certain passion coming from what is harmful, but perceived as exceeding one's power, the kinds of fear will be distinguished according to the difference between these harmful things; which can be referred to the one desiring in three ways: in one way with respect to one's own activity, and then, inasmuch as as one's own activity is feared as being laborious, it is laziness; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C)) but inasmuch as it is feared as being disgraceful, it is shame, which is fear of disgraceful deeds. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).) In the second place it is with respect to knowledge, inasmuch as something knowable is apprehended as entirely exceeding knowledge, and thus its consideration is apprehended as being useless and as harmful.

However, that it exceeds knowledge happens either because of its greatness, and then it is amazement which is fear from the imagination of something great, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).) or else because of its unusualness, and then it is astonishment, which is fear from the imagination of something unusual according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).) In the third place it is with respect to a passion that is from another; which passion can be feared either by reason of its disgracefulness, and then it is embarrassment which is fear in the expectation of ridicule; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).) or by reason of an injury, and then it is anxiety, by which a man fears lest he should fall into some misfortune. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:932C).)

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that zeal adds beyond love a certain intensity; for it is a vehement love that does not tolerate a sharing in the beloved. (Cf. Albert the Great, Commentary on Dionysius's On the Divine Names, ch. 4; Bonaventure, In I Sent., commentary in Prologue, dubium 3.)