Article 7 — Whether a passion joined to merit takes something away from merit

Seventh, it is asked whether a passion joined to merit takes something away from merit, namely whether someone would merit more who does good to a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or else who does it without any passion, and from the judgment of reason alone. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.24.3; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 2, 11; q. 12, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that he who does it from reason's judgment alone would merit more: for merit is opposed to sin; but he sins more who commits sin from choice alone than one who sins when instigated by passion, for the first is said to sin from a certain malice, the second from weakness; therefore he merits more who does something good from reason's judgment alone than who does it with a passion of pity.

Obj. 2: One might respond that for something to be meritorious or an act of virtue, it is necessary that not only some good be done, but that it be done in such a way that it be done well, which cannot be without the emotion of pity.

On the contrary, for any act to be done well, three things are required according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.7, 1106b36.) namely the will choosing the act, reason establishing the mean within the act, and the relation of the act to the due end: but all of these can be without the passion of pity in the one who gives alms. Therefore, not only can something good be done without it, but it can be done well.

Proof of the minor: all three of the previously mentioned things come to be by acts of the will and reason; but the acts of the will and of reason do not depend upon passion, for reason and will move the lower powers in which are the passions, but the motion of the mover does not depend upon the movement of the mobile; thus, the three mentioned before can be without passion.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, reason's discretion is needed for an act of virtue; thus Gregory says in the Morals on the Book of Job (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 2, ch. 46 (PL 75:588D).) that unless the other virtues prudently do what they want, they can never be virtues; but all passions impede the judgment and discretion of reason: hence, Sallust says in the War with Catilin, (Sallust, The War with Catiline, ch. 51, n. 1; cf. Moralium dogma philosophorum, q. 1, n. 17 (PL 171:1020C).) all men who confer regarding doubtful things should be free from anger, love, hate, and pity; for the spirit does not easily behold truth where these things hold sway; therefore, such passions diminish the praise due to virtue, and so also merit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the concupiscible does not impede reason's judgment any less than the irascible; but irascible passion joined to an act of virtue also disturbs reason's judgment, hence Gregory says that anger disturbs the eye by its fervor; (Cf. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 5, ch. 45 (PL 75:726C).) thus pity, which is a passion of the concupiscible power, disturbs reason's judgment in a similar way.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, virtue is a disposition of the perfect for what is best, as it says in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246b23.) Therefore, that is more virtuous within us by which we draw closer to what is perfect; but are made more like to God and the angels by acting from reason's judgment without passion: for God punishes without anger and relieves misery without the passion of pity; (cf. Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5 (PL 41:261).) therefore, it is more virtuous to do good without these passions.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the virtues of a soul that is cleansed are more noble than other virtues; but as Macrobius says in On the Dream of Scipio, (I c. 8,9.) the virtues of a soul that is cleansed cause passions to be wholly forgotten; therefore, an act of virtue performed without passion is more praiseworthy and more meritorious.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the love of charity within us is more praiseworthy to the extent that it is more cleansed of fleshly love: for the love between us should not be carnal but spiritual, as Augustine says in the Rule; (Augustine, Regula ad servos Dei, ch. 10 [ch. 6] (PL 32:1384).) but the passion of love has some carnality; therefore, an act of charity is more praiseworthy without the passion of love, and it is the same argument for other passions.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Cicero says in the book On Duties (I c. 15 n. 47.) that benevolence should not have love's ardor, but rather the mind's stability; but ardor pertains to passion; therefore, passions diminish the praise for an act of virtue.

On the contrary (1) is what Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 9 (PL 41:415).) that so long as we bear the weakness of this life, if we have no passions at all, we do not live correctly; for the Apostle rebuked and denounced some whom he said were without affection; the sacred Psalmist also blames those of whom it says: 'I looked for one that would grieve together with me, but there was none'; so it seems that we cannot live correctly without passions.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5 (PL 41:260).) to be angered at the sinner that he be corrected, to be saddened for the afflicted that he be liberated, to fear for the one tested that he not perish: I know not whether one of sound judgment should rebuke such as these. For the Stoics are wont to blame even pity; thus it seems much better, more human, and more conformed to the feelings of the pious what was said by Cicero in praise of Caesar, where he says: none of your virtues is more admirable nor more gracious than pity; and thus the same conclusion as before.

I answer that it must be said that the soul's passions can be related to the will in a twofold order, either as preceding it or else as following upon it: as preceding it inasmuch as the passions impel the will to want something, but as following insofar as, from the will's vehemence, the lower appetite is moved by a certain overflowing with regard to these passions, or else inasmuch as the will itself brings about and excites these passions voluntarily.

Thus, inasmuch as they precede the will, they detract from the notion of praiseworthiness, for the will's act is praiseworthy inasmuch as it is ordered by reason toward the good according to a due measure and mode. Indeed, this measure and mode is not maintained except when the action is performed with discretion; but this discretion is not maintained when a man is provoked from an impulse of passion to will something, even if it is good; but the action's mode will be great or small with respect to the passion's impulse; and thus it only happens by chance that the due measure is maintained. But insofar as they follow upon the will, they do not diminish the act's praise or goodness, for they will be moderated according to reason's judgment, upon which the will follows; but even more so, they add to an act's goodness under two aspects: first as being a sign, for the consequent passion itself in the lower appetite is a sign that there is an intense motion of the will; for the will in a passable nature cannot be moved strongly toward something without there following some passion in the lower part: thus Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 9 (PL 41:415).) so long as we bear the weakness of this life, we do not live correctly if we have no passions.; and after a little he gives the cause saying, for not to feel any sorrow while we are in this place of misery does not happen without the great cost of savageness in the soul and dullness in the body. In the second place it is a help, for when the will chooses something by reason's judgment, it performs it more promptly and more easily if there is excited together with this a passion in the lower part, for the lower appetite is closer to the body's movement: thus Augustine says in the City of God, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5 (PL 41:261).) the movement of pity serves reason when pity is offered in such a way that justice is preserved.

This is also what the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.11, 1116b28.) citing the verse from Homer: stir up your courage and rage, for when someone is virtuous with the virtue of courage, then the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue causes the action to be done with greater readiness; but if it should precede, then it disturbs the mode requisite for virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the complete account of the praiseworthy and the reprehensible consists in the voluntary; hence, what detracts from the notion of the voluntary diminishes the notion of the praiseworthy in goodness and the reprehensible in evil. However, passion preceding choice diminishes the notion of the voluntary, and thus it diminishes praise for good acts and censure for bad. But a consequent passion is a sign of the magnitude of the voluntary, as has been said; hence, just as it adds to praise in good acts, so also does it add to blame in evil. But he is said to sin from passion in whom passion leads to choosing sin; however, one who from choosing sin falls into a passion of sin is not said to sin from passion but with passion. Thus, it is true that to act from passion diminishes both praise and blame; but to act with passion can increase both of them.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the mode of virtue, which consists in a perfect will, cannot be without passion, not because the will depends upon passion, but because passion follows necessarily from a perfect will in a passable nature.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that in a virtuous deed both choice and execution are necessary; discretion is required for choice and promptitude is required to carry out that which one has already determined. However, it is not very necessary that a man deliberate who is actually carrying out a work; for as Avicenna says in his Sufficiency, (Avicenna, Sufficientia, bk. 1, ch. 14.) this would impede more than it would help. This is clear in the case of a lute player who would be much impeded if he had to apply his thought in order to pluck each string; it would be similarly the case for a writer who had to think in order to form each one of his letters. Thus, the passion preceding choice impedes the act of virtue, insofar as it impedes reason's judgment, which is necessary in choosing; but after choice has been brought to perfection by the pure judgment of reason, a consequent passion is more profitable than harmful, for although it might disturb reason in some way, yet it makes the carrying out of the deed more prompt.

Reply Obj. 4: And from this the solution to the fourth is also made clear.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that God and the angels are not susceptible to passions, and so in them no passion follows upon a perfect will; but it would follow if they were capable of passion. For this reason the names of passions are used for the angels by custom of human speech, because of a certain similarity with their works, but not because there is any weakness of emotion in them. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 9, ch. 5 (PL 41:261); cf. ST I-II.22.3, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that those who have the virtues of a purified soul are in some way immune from the passions inclining toward what is contrary to virtue's choice, and likewise from the passions influencing the will; but not from those passions following upon the will.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that if love's passion precedes the will's love, then it pertains to the carnality of love, but not if it follows upon it; for this pertains to the fervor of charity, which consists in this, that the love in the higher part makes its vehemence to overflow such that it changes the lower part.

Reply Obj. 8: The solution to the last objection is clear from this.