Article 1 — Whether the justification of the wicked is the remission of sins

The question is on the justification of the wicked. First, it is asked whether the justification of the wicked is the remission of sins. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1; ST I-II.113.1; 113.6, ad 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for justification is named from justice, which is one virtue. However, the remission of sins does not happen by one virtue alone, for sins are not opposed to one virtue alone but to all of them; therefore justification is not the remission of sins.

Obj. 2: But one might object that the remission of sins happens through generic justice. (Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono: gratia non est idem quod iustitia generalis, sed iustitia huiusmodi est effectus generalis (ms. Vat. lat. 7669, f. 76ra); Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 9, diffinitio 3; Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, obj. 3.)

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 5.2, 1130a8.) generic justice is the same as every virtue; yet the remission of sins is not the effect of virtue but of grace; therefore the remission of sins should not be called justification, but rather the conferral of grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if the remission of sins happens by some virtue, it ought to happen especially by what cannot exist together with sin; but this is charity, which is never unformed; (Cf. above: q. 27, a. 2 ad 6.) therefore the remission of sin should not be attributed to justice, but rather to charity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the same seems to be the case from what it says in Proverbs 10:12 charity covers a multitude of sins.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sin is spiritual death of the soul; but life is opposed to death; therefore, since the spiritual life is especially attributed to faith in the Scriptures, as is clear from Habacuc 2:4 and Romans 1:17, my just man lives by faith, it seems that the remission of sin should be attributed to faith and not to justice.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the same seems to be the case from what it says in Acts 15:9, purifying their hearts by faith.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, justification precedes grace just as motion does the end to which it tends; but the remission of sins follows upon grace like an effect does a cause; therefore justification is prior to the remission of sins, and so it is not the same.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, an act of justice is to render what is due; but indulgence is not due to a sinner, rather punishment; therefore the remission of sins ought not to be attributed to justice.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, justice regards merit, whereas mercy regards misery, as Bernard says; (Cf. Epist. 12 (PL 182, 116 A).) but there is not anything meritorious that belongs to the sinner, rather he is in a state of misery, for sin makes the people miserable as it says in Proverbs 14:34; therefore the remission of sins should not be attributed to justice, but rather to mercy.

Obj. 10: But one might argue that although there is no condign merit in the sinner, yet there is congruous merit in him. (The distinction between "condign merit" and "congruous merit" is between that which is strictly owed, according to commutative justice, and between that which is only fittingly owed, according to distributive justice.)

On the contrary, justice requires equality; but congruous merit is not equal to the reward; therefore congruous merit is not enough for the notion of justice.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, the remission of sins is one of the four things required for the justification of the wicked; (These four, commonly attributed to the masters, are now found in Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PL 211:1044A); cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Questiones antequam esset Frater, q. 66; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 11:25–32 (PL 191:1450D).) therefore the justification of the wicked is not the remission of sins.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, whoever becomes just is justified; but there is someone made just to whom sins were not remitted, such as Christ and the first man in the state of innocence, if he possessed grace; therefore justification is not the remission of sins.

On the contrary is what is said in the Gloss (Glossa Petri Lomb. (PL 191, 1450 D) et Glossa interlin.) on Romans 8:30, (Romans 8:29) whom he called he also justified: that it happens by the remission of sins. Therefore, justification is the remission of sins.

I answer that it must be said that there is a difference between motion and change. For there is one motion in which something signified affirmatively is cast off, and something else signified affirmatively is acquired; for motion is from one subject to another, as it says in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225b1; 5.7.) however, by subject is meant this thing that is indicated affirmatively, as being white or black: (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225a6 et b4.) hence one kind of alteration is that by which white is cast off and black is acquired. But it is different in changes that consist in generation and corruption, for generation is a change from a non-subject to a subject, such as from non-white to white, (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225a12.) whereas corruption is the change from a subject to a non-subject, such as from white to non-white. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225a17.) Therefore, one must understand two changes in the casting off of one affirmed thing and the acquisition of another, one of which is generation and the other is corruption, whether simply or in a certain respect. Thus, if one considers the motion itself from whiteness to blackness, the same motion is signified by the removal of one and the introduction of the other; however, it is not the same change that is signified, but different ones, yet they accompany each other, for the generation of one does not happen without the corruption of the other.

However, justification means the movement toward justice, just as whitening means the movement toward whiteness; even though justification can also mean the formal effect of justice, for justice justifies in the same way that whiteness makes something to be white. Therefore, if justification is taken as a kind of motion, since one must understand it to be the same motion by which sin is removed and justice is introduced, justification will be the same as the remission of sins, being only different according to reason: inasmuch as both denote the same movement, but one with respect to the term from which, whereas the other with respect to the term toward which. However, if justification is taken by way of change, then justification means one change, namely the generation of justice, and the remission of sins means another, namely the corruption of guilt: but in this way justification and the remission of sins will not be the same, except by concurrence. However, in whichever way one understands justification, it must be named from such a justice that is opposed to any sin whatsoever; for motion is also from one contrary to another, and the generation and corruption that accompany each other are of contraries.

However, justice is named in three ways: (Aristotle, Ethics 5.1, 1129a31, according to Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1.) in one way inasmuch as it is a particular virtue distinguished against the other cardinal virtues, inasmuch as that is named justice by which a man is directed in what pertains to a sharing in life, such as various contracts. However, this virtue is not contrary to every sin, but only to those sins which are concerned with such sharing, such as theft, robbery, and other such things. Hence, justice cannot be taken here in this way. In another way justice is said to be legal, which is every virtue according to the Philosopher, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 5.2, 1130a8; 5.1.) only differing from virtue according to reason. For virtue is said to be legal inasmuch as it orders its activity to the common good, which the legislator also intends, for he preserves the law, like a strong man when fighting valiantly in battle for the sake of the wellbeing of the state. Thus, it is clear that even though each virtue is legal justice in some respect, yet not every act of virtue is an act of legal justice, but that alone which is ordered to the common good, which can happen to the activity of any virtue. Consequently, not every act of sin is opposed to legal justice, and so the justification that is the remission of sins cannot be named from legal justice. In a third way, justice names a certain proper state, according to which a man stands in due order to God, to neighbor, and to self, such that the lower powers within him are subject to the higher, which the Philosopher, in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 5.17, 1138b5.) calls justice spoken of metaphorically when it is understood to be between different powers of the same person, but justice said properly when it is always between different persons. Every sin is opposed to this justice, since something of the previously mentioned order is corrupted by any sin. Therefore, justification is named from this justice, whether as a motion is named from a term or else as a formal effect is named from a form.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that the objection argues from particular justice.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that justification is not named from legal justice, which is every virtue, but from the justice that denotes a general uprightness in the soul, yet from which justification is named rather from grace; for every sin is directly and immediately opposed to this justice, since it touches upon all the soul's powers; whereas grace is in the soul's essence.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that charity is called the cause of the remission of sins inasmuch as man is joined to God through it, from whom he had turned away in sin; yet not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to charity, rather to the previously mentioned justice.

Reply Obj. 4: From this the solution to the fourth is made clear.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the spiritual life is attributed to faith inasmuch as the spiritual life is first manifested in an act of faith. For example, it says in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7, 415a23; 14, 34.) that living is within living things according to the vegetative soul in this respect, that life is first manifested in its activity; though not every action of natural life is through the vegetative soul. Similarly, not every action of the spiritual life belongs to faith, but also to the other virtues. Thus, not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to faith.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the purification of hearts is attributed to faith inasmuch as the movement of faith first appears in the previously mentioned purification: for it is necessary that one drawing near to God believe, as it says in Hebrews 11:6.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that just as justification can be taken as both a movement toward justice and as justice's formal effect, so also can the remission of guilt: for just as justice formally justifies, so also does it formally cast off guilt, in the same way that whiteness formally casts off blackness. Therefore, as the remission of guilt, being a formal effect of justice or of grace, follows upon grace, so in a similar way does justification; however, inasmuch as it means a certain movement, it is presupposed to grace, just like justification.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that an activity can be named in two ways, either from its principle, or from its end: just as the activity by which a doctor acts on the sick man is called medication on the part of the principle, since it is an effect of medicine, but it is called healing on the part of the end, since it is a path toward health. Thus also is the remission of sins is called justification on the part of the term or end; and it is also called compassion on the part of the principle, inasmuch as it is the work of divine mercy; even though some justice is also maintained in the remission of sins, inasmuch as all the Lord's ways are mercy and truth (Ps 25:10) (24:10): especially from God's point of view, insofar as he does what befits him by remitting sin, according to what Anselm says in the Proslogion: (Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 10 (PL 158:233B).) when you spare sinners, it is just, for it is befitting you. And this is why it says in Psalm 30:2, (30.1) deliver me in your justice. In another way as well, though not sufficiently, justice appears on the part of the one to whom the sin is remitted, inasmuch as some disposition toward grace is in him, though insufficient.

Reply Obj. 9–10: From this the response to the ninth and tenth is clear.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the remission of sins is distinguished in some way from justification, whether in reality or else by reason; and so it is divided against the infusion of grace, and it is held to be one of the four things required for the justification of the wicked.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the conferral of justice belongs to justification as such; but inasmuch as it is the justification of the wicked, then in this way the remission of sins belongs to it; and in this way it belongs neither to Christ nor even to man in the state of innocence.