Article 2 — Whether the remission of sins can happen without grace

Second, it is asked whether the remission of sins can happen without grace. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1; ST I-II.113.2; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 5, lect. 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it can, for it is easier to destroy than it is to build; but man is sufficient by himself for building up sin; therefore he is sufficient by himself to destroy it; and so the remission of sins can happen without grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, contrary sins cannot exist together in the same thing; but someone who was in one sin can pass by himself to its contrary; as for example, one who was miserly can become wasteful by himself. Thus, someone can leave the sin in which he was by himself; and so it seems that grace is not required for the remission of sins.

Obj. 3: But one might argue that sins are contrary just like contrary actions, though not like contrary forms.

On the contrary, sin still remains when the action has passed, as Augustine says in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence; (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 1, ch. 26 (PL 44:430).) and neither is it sufficient for the notion of sin that the action of sin should pass: therefore something of sin remains which needs remission; but contrary things have contrary effects; (Cf. Aristotle, e. g. De gen. et corr. bk. 2, ch. 10 (336:430); ibid. (336b9), Meteor. IV c. 6 (383 b 16), ibid. cap. 7 (384b 2).) and thus whatever remains from contrary sins are themselves contrary and cannot exist together, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one of several intermediate contraries can be removed without introducing another, just as blackness can be expelled without the introduction of whiteness; but there is something in between the state of guilt and the state of grace, namely the state of created nature, in which according to some, (See Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, cc. 1–2; cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 24, a. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 3, q. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, n. 505, 2:729; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 29, a. 2, q. 2.) man possessed neither grace nor guilt; therefore it is not necessary for the remission of guilt that someone receive grace.

Obj. 5: Futhermore, God is capable of more in restoring than man is capable of in destroying; but man was able to fall from the state of nature, in which he did not have grace, into the state of guilt; therefore God can bring man back from the state of guilt into the state of nature without grace.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, after a sin in act has passed, it is said to remain in guilt, according to Augustine in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence, (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 1, ch. 26 (PL 44:430).) inasmuch as the act of a past sin is reckoned for punishment; therefore, it is said conversely to be remitted inasmuch as it is not reckoned for punishment; according to Psalm 31:2: blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not reckon sin. But to reckon or not to reckon puts something in God who reckons or does not reckon; thus, grace is not required for the remission of sin in the one to whom the sin is remitted.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, whoever is wholly the cause of something is fully capable of destroying it and building it up, for when the activity of the cause ceases, the effect ceases; but man is wholly the cause of sin; therefore, he is wholly capable of destroying or of building up sin; and so it seems that man does not need grace for the remission of sin.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, since sin is in the soul, the remission of sin can only be done by that which enters into the soul; but God alone enters into the soul, according to Augustine; (Cf. Pseudo-Augustine, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 83 (PL 58:999B).) therefore God alone remits sin by himself without grace.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, if grace removes guilt, it is either grace that exists or grace that does not exist: but it is not grace that does not exist, for what does not exist does not do anything; similarly, it is not grace that exists, for since it is an accident, its being is to exist within another; however, when grace exists within, then guilt is not within, and so it cannot be expelled; therefore grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, grace and guilt cannot exist together in the soul; therefore, if grace is infused for the remission of guilt, guilt would first have to be in the soul when grace was not there; therefore, when guilt should cease existing, it will be necessary to give a final moment in which there was guilt; and likewise when grace begins to exist, one must grant a first moment in which there is grace within: but these must be two instants since grace and guilt do not inhere together at once, as has been said; but there is a middle time between any two instants, as is proved in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231b6.) therefore, there will be a time in which man has neither grace nor guilt; and so it seems that grace is not necessary for the remission of guilt.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, Augustine says that since God loves us, (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 32 (PL 40:248; CCSL 46).) he therefore gives his gifts to us, and not conversely; therefore the gift of grace presupposes divine love; but the divine love by which the Father loves his only-begotten Son and his members does not belong to man when in a state of guilt; therefore, the remission of guilt precedes grace by the order of nature, and so grace is not required for the remission of sins.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, original sin was remitted in the Old Law by circumcision, as is clear from Bede. (Homiliae genuinae 1 hom. 10 (PL 94, 54 B) sec. Thomam III Pars q. 62 a. 6 arg. 3.) But circumcision did not confer grace, for since the least amount of grace suffices to resist any temptation, man possessed in the condition of the Law that by which he was able to overcome concupiscence; and so the Old Law did not kill by chance, as it says in Romans 7:11; (7:8, 7:11) and so Christ's death was not necessary, since if justice is from the Law, Christ died in vain, as it says in Galatians 2:21: but this is inadmissable; therefore it seems to be inadmissable that circumcision should bestow grace; thus the remission of sins can happen without grace.

On the contrary (1) commenting on Psalm 77:39, he remembered that they were flesh, a spirit going out and not returning: the Gloss (Glossa Petri Lomb. (PL 191, 736 B) ex August. Enarr. in Ps. 77:39 (PL 36, 998).) says that it is going into sin by itself, and not returning by itself from sin; thus God recalls men by grace, for they cannot return by themselves.

Furthermore (2), in Romans 3:24 it says justified gratuitously by his very grace, and so on.

I answer that it must be said that there cannot be a remission of sins in any way without sanctifying grace. In evidence of this it must be known that since there are two things in sin, namely a turning away and turning toward, the remission and the retaining of sin do not regard a turning toward, but rather a turning away, and what follows upon a turning away; and thus when someone ceases having a will to sin, the sin is not remitted to him by this very fact, even though he should pass to the contrary will. Hence, Augustine says in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 1, ch. 26 (PL 44:430).) that if to cease from sin were not to have sins, it would suffice for scripture to warn us of this: 'Children, you have sinned, do not do it again.' But that is not enough, for it adds: 'and beg regarding what is past, that they might be remitted to you.' In this respect, then, sin is said to be remitted, inasmuch as the turning away and what follows from it, resulting from a past act of sin, is healed.

However, there are three things accompanying each other, from the point of view of the turning away, by reason of which the remission of sins cannot happen without grace: namely the turning away, the offense against God, and the charge of guilt.

For the turning away is understood to be away from the unchangeable good, (Cf. Augustine, e. g. On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 32:1269).) which one was able to possess, but in respect of which one has made oneself incapable; otherwise the turning away would not be blameworthy. Therefore, the previously mentioned turning away cannot be removed unless there be a union with the unchangeable good, from which man had departed by sin. However, this union only happens by grace, by which God inhabits minds, and by which the mind dwells in God himself through the love of charity.

Hence, in order to heal the previously mentioned turning away, the infusion of grace and charity are required, just as the restoration of the power of sight is required for the healing of blindness. Also, the offense that follows from sin cannot be abolished without grace, whether the offense is understood to be on the part of man, inasmuch as man offends God by sinning; or else on the part of God, inasmuch as he takes offense at the sinner, according to Psalm 5:7: you have hated all who work iniquity. For whoever places a more worthy thing beneath one that is less worthy, causes it injury, and so much more to the extent that the thing is more worthy. However, whoever places his end in a temporal thing (which everyone does who sins mortally), by this very fact, he places the creature before the Creator with regard to his affections, loving the creature more than the Creator; for the end is what is loved most of all. Therefore, since God exceeds creatures infinitely, the offense of one who sins mortally against God will be infinite on the part of his dignity, against which an injury has been done in some way by sin, for God himself and his commands are despised.

Hence, human strength is not enough to abolish this offense, but the gift of divine grace is needed. Also, God himself is said to take offense at the sinner, or even to hate him, not with the hate that is opposed to the love by which he loves all things, for he hates nothing of the things that he has made, as it says in Wisdom 11:25, but it is opposed rather to the love by which he loves the saints, preparing for them eternal goods. However, the effect of this love is the gift of sanctifying grace, as was said in the question "On Grace." (Above: q. 27.) Hence, the offense by which God takes offense at man is not removed except by the fact that he gives grace. Likewise, the guilt of sin is not only the obligation to sensible suffering, but especially to the suffering of damnation, which is the deprivation of glory. Hence, guilt is not removed so long as there is not given to man that by which he can attain to glory; but this is grace, and so there cannot be a remission of sins without grace.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that sin itself is a certain destruction of grace, but its remission is a building up of grace; thus, it is easier to fall into sin than to get out of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that sins have a contrariety from the point of view of turning towards, from which there is not the remission of sins, as has been said. However, from the point of view of turning away, and of those things that follow upon this turning away, there is agreement: and thus nothing prevents the guilt of preceding contrary acts from remaining in the soul at the same time; for one who changes from avarice to prodigality does not stop having the guilt of avarice, but only its action or habit.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although sins are contrary from the point of view of turning toward, yet it is not necessary that the turning away or the guilt that remains should be contrary, for they are accidental effects of turning toward, since they happen beyond the intention of the one acting. However, contrariety in the effects follows from contrariety of the causes that are essential and that are not accidental. Hence, contrary habits and dispositions also follow from contrary actions; for these are the effects of sinful actions according to their own form.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that, taking up the opinion that Adam had neither grace nor guilt at some time, even though this opinion is not granted by some, yet it must be said that nothing prevents some contraries from being mediated with respect to some subject, taken simply, which are nevertheless unmediated with respect to a determinate time; as for example, being blind and seeing are mediated in a dog, yet not after the ninth day. (cf. e. g. Barthol. Anglic. De propriet. rerum XVIII c. 24.) Likewise, grace and guilt are compared to man with respect to the state of created nature as mediated contraries; but after the time in which Adam received grace or was able to receive it, such that it could also pass to all his offspring, no one would lack grace except by actual or original guilt.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that although according to some Adam did not possess grace in the state of his own creation, yet it is held by these same persons that he attained grace before the fall: hence, he fell from the state of grace, and not only from the state of nature. Nevertheless, if he had only fallen from the state of nature, nonetheless, a gift of divine grace would be required for the expiation of an infinite offense.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that just as God's love by which he loves us leaves some effect in us as a consequence, namely grace, by which we are rendered worthy of eternal life and for the sake of which he loves us; so also does the very fact that God not reckon to us our transgressions leave something in us as a consequence, by which we are made worthy to be absolved from the previously mentioned guilt.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the sinner is essentially the cause of sin with respect to turning toward; but with respect to turning away and what follows upon this, he is the accidental cause, since these are not intended. For these things cannot have an essential cause, since the notion of evil within sin is from these; for evil does not have a cause, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:732A).) Otherwise, it must be said, and in a better way, that the sinner is the cause of sin with respect to becoming, but he is not the cause of the permanence of those things that follow from sin; indeed, the cause of these is rather divine justice in part, by which it is justly ordained that whoever does not want to remain in grace while he can, is not able to even if he wants; but it is partly from the defect of natural powers, which are not sufficient for expiation, for the reasons already mentioned. Just as a man who casts himself into a pit is the cause of the casting in itself, whereas the rest that follows is from nature: hence, he is not able to come out of the pit, just as he was able to cast himself into the pit, and the case is similar in the objection at hand.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that to accomplish the remission of sins is understood in two ways: effectively and formally, in the same way that to make something white belongs effectively to the painter, though formally to whiteness. Thus, grace is not an intermediary in the remission of sins as acting effectively, but only formally. However, the natural or gratuitous qualities of the soul are not excluded by the fact that God alone enters into the soul, for the soul is informed by these; rather, other subsistent substances are excluded, which cannot exist within the soul in the way that God does; for he also exists more intimately within the soul than the previously mentioned forms, inasmuch as God is in the very existence of the soul as causing and preserving it, whereas the previously mentioned forms or qualities do not attain to this, but they stand about the soul's essence, as it were.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the grace which exists and is in the soul drives out guilt, not that which exists, but which does not exist, although it did exist before; for it does not expel guilt in the manner of an efficient cause, for then it would have to act on an existing guilt in order to expel it, as fire acts on existing air for its destruction, rather it expels guilt formally. For, from the fact that it informs the subject, it follows that the guilt is not in the subject, as is clear from the examples of health and sickness.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that for this and similar objections multiple answers are usually given. The first is that, although the instant is one in reality, yet it is many according to reason, inasmuch as it is the beginning of the future and the end of the past; (The Leonine editors were unable to find this reference. This same opinion is found in Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 11, a. 30, opinio 2a; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 11, part 1, a. 1, q. 5, opinio 2a; Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, resp. qa. 2, ad 2.) and so nothing prevents guilt and grace from existing together in the soul at the same instant, yet such that guilt exists in the soul in that instant inasmuch as it is the end of the past, whereas grace is in it inasmuch as it is the beginning of the future.

But this cannot stand, for to be the beginning of the future and the end of the past means different points of view of that instant, inasmuch as its substance is not multiplied but remains one; and so it would follow that grace and guilt would exist in the same indivisible part of time within the soul; for "instant" names the indivisible part of time. However, this is to exist together, and so it would follow that contraries exist together within it. Likewise, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 8.16, 262a12–b8; 96.) when something moving uses one mark as two, an intermediate rest must fall in between; for which reason he proves that reflected motion is not continuous. Hence, in a similar way, if someone uses one instant as two, one must understand there to be something in the middle, and so the soul will be at some time without guilt and grace, which is inadmissible.

Therefore, others say (The Leonine editors were unable to find this reference. This same opinion is found in Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 11, a. 30, opinio 3a; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 11, part 1, a. 1, q. 5, opinio 3a; Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, resp. qa. 2, ad 2.) that just as a middle line falls between two points of the same line, though not between two points of two lines touching each other; so also it is not necessary that there be a middle time between the instant, which is the last of that time in which guilt was within the soul, and the instant which is the first of that time in which grace is within the soul, for they are instants of different times. But this also cannot stand, for since a line is an intrinsic measure, it is divided according to the distinction in things; however, time is an extrinsic measure, and it is one with respect to all the things that are in time; for the existence of guilt and the existence of grace are not measured by different times, unless we should say that it is by another time, that is by another part of the same continuous time. Therefore, there must exist a middle time between any two instances, in view of which anything whatsoever is designated.

Furthermore, two points of two lines touching one another, described on locally positioned bodily things, are united in one designated point on the exterior line of the locating bodily thing; for those things are contiguous whose extremes are together. (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231a22; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, obj. 5.) Hence, given that there are different non-continuous times of different things, but touching one another, it will nonetheless be necessary that, in the time which is measuring externally, there should correspond one indivisible instant to those boundaries. And so one comes back to the previously mentioned inadmissibility, that guilt and grace exist together.

Thus, others say (Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 11, ad 3–4.) that spiritual changes of this sort are not measured by the time that is the number of movements of the heavens, inasmuch as the soul and any spiritual substance is above time; rather, they have their own time, inasmuch as what is before and after are found to be in them. Yet, neither is such a time continuous, since the continuity of time follows upon the continuity of motion, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 4.17, 219a12.) whereas the affections of the soul are not continuous. But this also is not applicable in the current question, for not only what exists essentially in time is measured by time, as are the motions of the heavens, but also what has an accidental ordering to the movement of the heavens, inasmuch as they follow upon certain things that have an essential ordering to the previously mentioned time. And this is also the case in the justification of the wicked, which follows from certain thoughts, certain speech, and other such movements, which are essentially measured by the time of the heavenly motions.

Therefore, we must say differently that there is no last instant in which the sinner had guilt, but rather a last time. However, one can give a first moment in which he has grace, which moment is the end of that time in which he had guilt. But there is nothing that falls in the middle between a time and the end of that time. Hence, one must not grant some time or moment in which someone has neither guilt nor grace. This is made clear in the following manner: since the infusion of grace happens in an instant, it is the end of a continuous motion, such as of an act of meditation by which the affection is disposed to receive grace; and the remission of guilt is that same end of motion, for guilt is remitted by the very fact that grace is infused. Thus, the term of the remission of guilt exists first in that moment, namely of not having guilt, as well as the term of the infusion of grace, namely of having grace. Therefore in the entire preceding time that terminates in this instant, by which time the motion of the previously mentioned meditation was measured, the sinner possessed guilt and did not have grace, except in the last moment alone, as was said.

But before the last moment of this time, one cannot discern another moment immediately next to it, for if one takes any moment other than the last, there will be between it and that last one an infinity of intermediate moments. Thus it is clear that one cannot take a last moment in which the man who is justified has guilt and does not possess grace; however, one can discern a first instant in which he has grace and does not have guilt. This solution can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 8.16, 262a12–b8.)

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that, just as God causes the gift of grace in us by his love, so also does he cause the remission of guilt; hence, it is not necessary that the remission of guilt precedes grace; however, this would follow as a consequence if the remission of guilt preceded God's love and did not follow from it.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the sacraments cause by signifying; (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 22, ch. 2.) for they cause what they represent. And since circumcision has meaning in removing, therefore, its efficacy was directly ordered to the removal of original guilt, but as consequent upon grace: whether grace was given by the power of circumcision, in the manner that it is given by the power of baptism, as some say; (e.g. Guill. Altiss. Summa aurea IV c. ‘Quid sit circumcisio et quis effectus eius est’ (f. 246ra).) or else whether it was given by God as accompanying circumcision. (Cf. Albert the Great, On the Sacraments, tract. 2, q. 2.) And so the remission of guilt did not happen without grace. Nevertheless, that grace did not so perfectly suppress concupiscence as does baptismal grace; and so it was more difficult to resist concupiscence being circumcised than being baptized. And it was by reason of this circumstance that the Old Law was said to kill accidentally, even though circumcision was not contained among the sacraments of the Mosaic Law, inasmuch as it is not from Moses, but from the fathers as it says in John 7:22. Thus, if some grace was given in circumcision, this is not contrary to what was said, that the Law did not justify.