Article 9 — Whether the justification of the wicked happens in a moment

Ninth, it is asked whether the justification of the wicked happens in a moment. (Parallel texts: above: a. 2, ad 10; In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, qa. 2–3; ST I-II.113.7.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, for it is impossible for there to be many motions of the same power together at the same time, just as neither is there one matter under different and disparate forms at one and the same time; but two motions of free choice are required in the justification of the wicked, as is clear from what was said; (Above: aa. 3–5.) therefore, the justification of the wicked cannot happen in an instant.

Obj. 2: But one might argue that those two motions belong to different powers, for the motion of free choice toward God pertains to the concupiscible, but the motion of free choice toward sin, it being a certain detestation of sin, is in the irascible power.

On the contrary, to detest something is the same as to hate it; but hate is in the concupiscible power as well as love, according to the Philosopher in the Topics; (Aristotle, Topics 2.7, 113a33; 2.3.) therefore, the act of detesting is not in the irascible power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:928C).) the irascible and the concupiscible are parts of the sensitive appetite; but the sensitive appetite only extends to a good that is agreeable to itself, or else to its contrary; however, God and sin under the notion of sin inasmuch as it is detestable, are not of such a kind; therefore, these motions do not pertain to the concupiscible and the irascible, but rather to the will, and so they belong to one power.

Obj. 4: But one might argue that the motion of free choice toward God is the motion of faith, which pertains to the intellect; however, contrition pertains to the will, whose function it is to feel sorrow, and so they do not belong to one power.

On the contrary, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 26, para. 2 (PL 35:1607); cf. Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 10:10 (PL 191:1476B).) a man cannot believe without willing; therefore, although an act of intellect is required in believing, nevertheless, an act of will is also required there; and so it follows that two motions of the same power are required for the justification of the wicked.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it belongs to one and the same thing to be moved from one term to another term; but to detest sin is to be moved from one term, whereas being moved toward God is to be moved toward another term; therefore, contrition, which is a detestation for sin, belongs to the same power that is moved toward God, and so they cannot exist at the same time.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, nothing is moved at the same time toward different and contrary terms; but God and sin are different and contrary terms; therefore, the soul cannot be moved both toward God and toward sin, and so the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, grace is only given to one who is worthy; but one is not worthy for grace so long as one is subject to guilt; therefore, it is necessary that guilt be first expelled before grace is infused, and so justification, which includes both of these, does not happen in an instant.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, it seems that a form which is susceptible of more and less must come to be in a subject successively, just as a form which does not admit of more and less comes to be in a subject all at once, as is clear with substantial forms; but grace is intended to exist in a subject; therefore, it seems that it is introduced successively, and so the infusion of grace does not happen in an instant: and as a consequence, neither does the justification of the wicked.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, it is necessary to hold two terms in any change whatsoever, just as in the justification of the wicked, namely the term from which and the term to which; but it belongs to any change that there be two terms not happening at the same time, that is, which cannot exist together; (Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 188b3–25, according to Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 37, q. 4, a. 3, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 4, obj. 2.) therefore, two things are included in the justification of the wicked which are related to each other according to before and after, and so the justification of the wicked is successive and not in an instant.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, nothing that exists first in a state of becoming before it exists as having been made occurs in an instant; but grace exists first in a state of becoming before it exists in a state of having been made; therefore, the infusion of grace does not happen in an instant; and so the same conclusion as before.

Proof of the minor: in things that are permanent, what is coming to be does not yet exist; but when it has come to be it exists already; but grace is a permanent thing: therefore, if it both comes to be and has been made at the same time, it both exists and does not exist at the same time, which is impossible.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, every motion happens in time; (Cf. Aristotle, e. g. Physics 6.10, 238b27.) but a motion of free choice is required in the justification of the wicked; therefore, the justification of the wicked happens in time, and so not in an instant.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, contrition for sins is required for the justification of the wicked; but once someone has committed many sins, he cannot think of nor repent of all the sins in the same moment; therefore, the justification of the wicked cannot occur in an instant.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, whenever there is a middle between the extremes of some change, the change is successive, not instantaneous; (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.5, 226b23.) but there is a middle between guilt and grace, namely the state of created nature; therefore, the justification of the wicked is a successive change.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, guilt and grace do not exist in the soul at the same time; therefore, the last instant in which there is guilt is other than the instant in which there is first grace: but a middle time falls between any two moments; therefore, between the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace there falls a middle time; but justification includes both of these; therefore, justification happens in time and not in a moment.

On the contrary (1), the justification of the wicked is a certain spiritual illumination; but bodily illumination happens in an instant, not in time; (Averroes, Physics, bk. 6, comm. 32; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 37, q. 4, a. 3, obj. 1.) therefore, since spiritual things are more simple than bodily things and less subject to time, it seems that the justification of the wicked happens in an instant.

Furthermore (2), to the extent that an agent is more powerful, in so much less time does it produce its effect; but God, who has infinite power, is the cause of justification; therefore, justification happens in an instant.

Furthermore (3), it says in The Book of Causes (Book of Causes, prop. and comm. 31 [30]; prop. 32.) that both the substance and the action of a spiritual substance, of which kind is the soul, exists in a moment of eternity and not in time; but justification pertains to the soul's action; therefore it does not happen in time.

Furthermore (4), in the same instant in which there exists a complete disposition in matter, there also exists form; but the motion of free choice that is required in the justification of the wicked is a complete disposition for grace; therefore, grace exists in the same instant in which are those motions.

I answer that it must be said that the justification of the wicked happens in an instant. In evidence of this it must be known that whenever some change is said to be in an instant, one should not understand that its two terms occur in an instant; for this is impossible, since every change happens between two opposed terms, essentially speaking; but one should understand that the transition from one term to the other occurs in an instant; indeed, this occurs in some opposites, but does not occur in others.

For whenever one must take some mean between the terms of a motion, it is necessary that the passage from one term to the other be successive, for the middle term is that to which what is continuously moved is changed before it is changed to the last term, as is made clear by the Philosopher in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 5.5, 226b23; 5.22.) and by "middle term" I understand what stands at any distance from the extremes, whether it be a distance in position, as in local motion, or whether the distance be with respect to the notion of quantity, as in the motion of growth and decrease, or else whether it be according to the notion of form, as in alteration; and this is either when the mean is of another species, like pale being between white and black, or else when it is of the same species, like less hot being between more hot and cold.

But whenever there cannot be a middle in any of the previously mentioned ways between the two terms of a motion or a change, then the passage from one term to the other does not happen in time but in an instant. However, this happens whenever the two terms of motion or change are affirmation or negation, or else privation and form. For between affirmation and negation there is in no way a middle, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.16, 1011b23; 1012a7; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 34, a. 1, obj. 3.) nor is there between privation and form with regard to its proper subject: and I am speaking in the manner in which there is something of another species between the extremes. Nevertheless, something can be a middle incidentally, in the way something is a middle according to intensity and remission, even though it cannot be a middle essentially. For negation or else privation are not intensified or remitted essentially speaking, but their intensity or remission can be considered incidentally according to their cause; as for example, one says that he is more blind who has his eye gouged out than one who has a patch over the eye, insofar as the cause of blindness is more efficacious.

Therefore, understanding such changes according to their proper terms, speaking essentially, it is necessary that they be instantaneous and not in time; as for example illumination, generation and corruption, and the like. But one can consider a succession in them when taking them with respect to the causes of their terms, as is manifest in the case of illumination. For although the air passes immediately from darkness to light, yet the cause of darkness is removed successively, namely by the absence of the sun, which becomes present successively by local motion; and so illumination is the term of a local motion, and it is indivisible, just like any term of a continuum.

Therefore, I say that the extremes of justification are grace and the privation of grace, between which there does not fall a middle with regard to the proper subject; hence, the passage from one to the other must happen in an instant, even though the cause of this privation is removed successively; either inasmuch as man disposes himself for it by thinking, or at least inasmuch as the time has passed after which God preordained that he would give grace; and so the infusion of grace happens in an instant. Likewise, since the expulsion of guilt is the formal effect of infused grace, it is for this reason that the entire justification of the wicked happens in an instant, for the form, the disposition to the complete form, and the casting off of the other form all occur in an instant.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that whenever there are two completely separate motions, they cannot exist simultaneously in the same power. But if one is the reason for the other, then they can exist simultaneously, for they are one motion in some respect; such as when someone desires something for the sake of an end, he simultaneously desires the end and what is for the sake of the end; likewise, when someone flees what is opposed to an end, he simultaneously desires the end and flees the contrary: in a similar way the will is moved toward God and at the same time hates sin, since it is against God.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that such motions of free choice as these pertain to the will, not to the irascible and concupiscible powers; and this is the case because their object is something intelligible, not something sensible. Nevertheless, they are sometimes found to be attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible, inasmuch as the will itself is called irascible or concupiscible because of the likeness of its act; and then contrition can be attributed both to the concupiscible, inasmuch as man hates sin, and to the irascible, inasmuch as he gets angry against sin, proposing revenge within himself concerning it.

Reply Obj. 3–5: From this the solution to the third, fourth, and fifth is made manifest.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the will is not moved to pursue contraries at the same time, but it can be moved simultaneously to flee from one and to pursue the other, and especially if the pursuit of one is the reason for fleeing from the other.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that grace is given to one who is worthy, not such that he is sufficiently worthy before he has grace, but because it makes man to be worthy from the very fact that it is given; and so he possesses grace at the same time that he is worthy for grace.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that it is not the intensification or remission of a form which makes it so that it is received successively into a subject, but rather the intensification or remission of the contrary form or opposite term. However, the privation of grace does not admit of more or less except incidentally by reason of its own cause, as has already been said; and therefore it is not necessary that grace be received into a subject successively. However, if it should be remitted in a subject, this could contribute something to grace being cast off successively; but grace is not remitted in the same subject, and thus neither is it cast off successively for this reason, that it is not remitted; and neither is it introduced successively for this reason, that its privation is not remitted.

Reply Obj. 9: The solution to the ninth is clear from what has been said, for a change is not said to happen in an instant, because its two terms are in the same instant, as was said.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the coming to be of a permanent thing can be understood in two ways: in one way properly, and in this way a thing is said to come to be so long as the motion lasts, the end of which is the generation of the thing.

And so what comes to be is not among permanent things, but the thing's coming to be happens by succession, according to what the Philosopher says in the Physics: (Aristotle, Physics 6.8, 237b9, 237b19.) what is coming to be came to be and will come to be.

In another way coming to be is said improperly, namely that something is said to come to be in that instant in which it has first been made; and this is the case because that instant acquires for itself that it belongs to the previous time, inasmuch as it is the end of the previous time in which it came to be. In this sense it is not true that what comes to be does not exist, but rather that it now exists first and before this it was not; and so it must be understood that in these things that happen all at once, coming to be and having come to be are simultaneous.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that motion is not taken here inasmuch as it is a coming forth from potency to act, for then it would be measured by time; rather the motion of free choice is taken for its very own activity, which is a perfect act, as it says in On the Soul; (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a7; 3.28.) and so it can exist in an instant, just as being perfect is in an instant.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that in the moment that a man is justified, it is not necessary that there be contrition in particular with respect to each sin, but generally with regard to all of them, with particular contrition for individual sins either preceding or else following.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that after man falls into guilt, there cannot be a middle between grace and guilt, for guilt is not removed except by grace, as is clear from what was said above, (A. 2, 6, 7 et 8.) and neither is grace lost except by guilt, even though according to the opinion of some, (See Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, cc. 1–2; cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 24, a. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 3, q. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, n. 505, 2:729; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 29, a. 2, q. 2.) there would previously be a middle state between grace and guilt.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that one must not understand it to be the last moment in which there was guilt, but the last time, as was said above.