Article 3 — Whether free choice is required for the justification of the wicked

Third, it is asked whether free choice is required for the justification of the wicked. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, ad 7; In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2; ST I-II.113.3; Commentary on John, ch. 4, lect. 2; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 5, lect. 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for whatever can belong to those who do not have the use of free choice does not need the use of free choice; (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 3, tit. 42, ch. 3 (ed. Friedberg, 2:644), according to Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2, obj. 3.) but justification pertains to children who do not yet have the use of free choice, namely to those who are justified by baptism; therefore, the justification of the wicked does not require the use of free choice.

Obj. 2: But one might argue that this is particular to children, who are bound by that sin alone that is contracted from another person; whereas this does not take place in adults, who are bound by their own sins.

On the contrary is what Augustine says in the Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 4, ch. 4 (PL 32:696).) that when one of his friends was struggling with fever, he lay for a long time unconscious in a deathly sweat: and when hope was given up, he was baptized without him knowing it, but with me not caring and presuming rather that he would retain the spirit he had gotten from me, not that which he had received in the body without him knowing. But it was completely otherwise, for he was recreated. However, recreation happens by justifying grace; therefore justifying grace is sometimes bestowed on an adult without the movement of free choice.

Obj. 3: But one might argue that this only holds when a man is justified by the sacrament.

On the contrary, God did not bind his power with the sacraments; (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, ch. 5.) thus, since justification is a divine work, depending as it does upon his power, it seems that some adult can also be justified without the sacraments, apart from the movement of free choice.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man can be in a certain state in which he is an adult and does not have actual sin, but original sin alone: for in the first instant that a man is an adult, if he is not baptized, he is still subject to original sin, yet neither does he still have actual sin, since he has still not committed anything by transgressing, and by which he would be held guilty of sin; nor again is he guilty of omission, since the affirmative precepts do not always bind, and for this reason it is not necessary that a man should suddenly observe the affirmative precepts in the first moment that he is an adult. Therefore, it seems from this that an adult can have original sin without any actual sin: therefore, if this is the cause as to why a child can be justified without the movement of free choice, it seems that it is the same reason for an adult.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whenever something is found in common in a number of other things, it must belong to them according to a common cause; however, being justified belongs to children and to adults; therefore, since grace alone is the cause of justification in children, it seems that the same thing would be sufficient for justification in adults, without the use of free choice.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as justice is a gift of God, so also is wisdom; but Solomon received wisdom while sleeping, as it says in 1 Kings 3:5. (I Kings 3.5; 3.12). Therefore, for the same reason, a man can also receive justifying grace while sleeping and without the use of free choice.

Obj. 7: One might argue that Solomon received wisdom while he was sleeping in merit of a preceding will.

On the contrary, just as a will is required in good things, so also in bad things, for sin is only ever voluntary; yet a will preceding sleep does make it so that what is done in sleep is a sin; therefore, neither is there something that contributes to a divine gift being received in sleep.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as the use of free choice is bound up in sleep, so also in sickness; but a sick person is justified without the use of free choice, as is clear from the cited authority of Augustine; therefore, this is also the case for someone sleeping.

Obj. 9: God is more powerful than every acting creature; but the material sun pours its light into the air with no preceding preparation in the air itself; therefore, all the more does God pour the light of grace into the soul without any preparation that happens by an act of free choice.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, since the good is liable to share itself, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:700A).) God who is the highest good shares himself in the highest way; however, this would not be the case unless he were to share himself both with the one who prepares himself and to the one who does not prepare himself; therefore, the use of free choice is not required for the justification of the wicked as a preparation on the part of man.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (It is actually Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 12, para. 26 (PL 34:383); cf. ch. 14 (PL 34:384).) that God causes justice in man in the same way that the sun causes light in air, which ceases when the influence of the sun ceases; but not like an artisan who makes a bow, in which he does nothing after it has been made; rather, the sun acts in the same way upon the air when it first illuminates the air and when it sustains the light in it. Therefore, God causes justice in man in the same way when he is first justified and when justice is preserved in him. But justice is preserved in man when the use of free choice has ceased, as is clear in someone sleeping; therefore, a man can be justified from the beginning without any movement of free choice.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, the disposition that is necessarily required for the introduction of any form is such that a form cannot remain without it, as is clear in the case of heat and the form of fire; but justice can remain without the use of free choice, as in the case of one sleeping; therefore, the use of free choice is not a disposition that is necessarily required for the infusion of grace.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, what is naturally before and can both exist and not exist without what comes after, does not need what comes after in order for it to be brought into existence; as is clear with weight and descent, without which there cannot be any weight; namely when a heavy body is impeded in its motion. But grace is naturally more prior than the use of free choice, without which it can also either exist or not exist: for it is its formal principle, just as natural heaviness is that of motion; therefore, grace can be infused without the use of free choice.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, a sickly body introduces original guilt into the soul without any use of free choice; therefore, all the more does God, who is most powerful, not need the use of free choice so as to infuse grace.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, God is more prone to have mercy than to condemn, as the Gloss says at the beginning of Jeremiah; (Glossa ordinaria, at Jeremiah, prologue from Origen, 4.579; Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah, hom. 1, para. 1 (PG 13:255A); see also William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 30, ch. 1.) but God punishes children who die without baptism who are without any use of free choice; therefore, all the more does he have mercy by infusing grace.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, the disposition to form, which is needed when receiving a form, is not from the receiver, but rather from another; this is just like heat which precedes in wood as a disposition to the form of fire, but which is not from the wood itself. But the use of free choice is from the man who is to be justified; therefore, it is not required as a disposition for possessing grace.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, justification happens by an infusion of grace and of virtues; but according to Augustine, (Augustine, according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 27, ch. 5; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 27, a. 2.) God alone causes virtue in us without us; therefore, our activity, which occurs through the use of free choice, is not needed for justification.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, according to the Apostle in Romans 4:4, a reward is not imputed according to grace to the one who acts, but rather according to debt; however, the use of free choice is a certain activity; therefore, if the use of free choice is needed for justification, justification will not be from grace, but rather from debt, which is heretical.

Obj. 19: Furthermore, one who acts against grace is farther removed from grace than one who does not act at all; but God sometimes gives grace to one who acts contrary to it by free choice, as is clear with Paul in Acts 9:5, to whom it was said it hurts you to kick against the goad; therefore, all the more is grace sometimes infused in someone without the use of free choice.

Obj. 20: Furthermore, an agent of infinite power does not need any disposition in the patient; for the stronger that an agent is, he completes his effect with so much a lesser preexisting disposition; but God is an agent of infinite power, so much so that he does not need preexisting matter, but rather he works from nothing; therefore, much less does he need a disposition, and so in the justification of the wicked, which is a divine work, the use of free choice is not needed as a disposition on the part of man.

On the contrary (1) is what the Gloss (Glossa interlin.) says when commenting on 1 Kings 3:5 (3 Kings 3.5): ask what you will, that I might give it to you, namely that God's grace requires free choice; but justification happens by God's grace, as it says in Romans 3:24; therefore, the use of free choice is needed for justification.

Furthermore (2), Bernard says (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 182:1002B).) that there cannot be justification without the consent of the receiver, or the grace of the giver; but the consent of the receiver is an act of free choice; therefore, man cannot be justified without the use of free choice.

Furthermore (3), a disposition is required in the receiver for the reception of a form: for not just any form is received into anything whatsoever. But an act of free choice is like a disposition for grace; therefore, the use of free choice is needed for the reception of justifying grace.

Furthermore (4), in the justification of the wicked, a type of spiritual marriage is contracted between man and God; Hosea 11:19: I will espouse you to myself in justice; but mutual consent is required in fleshly marriage; therefore, all the more is it required in the justification of the wicked; and so the use of free choice is needed there.

Furthermore (5), the justification of the wicked does not happen without charity: for as it says in Proverbs 10:12, charity covers all sins. But since charity is a kind of friendship, it needs mutual love; for it is a friendship with love in return, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 8.2, 1155b27; 8.3.) however, mutual love requires the use of free choice in both parties; therefore, there cannot be justification without the use of free choice.

I answer that it must be said that no one having the use of free choice can be justified without the use of free choice, which is in the very moment of one's own justification; however, this is not needed for justification in those who do not have mastery over their own will, as in children. Three reasons can be given for this.

The first is taken from the relation of an agent and a patient to one another. For it is clear that in bodily things an action is not perfected without some contact, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 322b22; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 10, obj. 3; Averroes, On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, comm. 45.) by which either the agent alone touches the patient, when the patient is not of such a nature as to touch the agent, as when higher bodily things act upon these lower ones, touching them and not being touched by them; or else the agent and patient mutually touch one another, as when both are of such a nature as to touch and be touched, like when fire acts upon water or conversely.

Hence, in spiritual things as well, when it is natural for there to be mutual contact, the action is not completed without mutual touch; otherwise it suffices for the agent to touch the patient. However, God himself, who justifies the wicked, touches the soul by causing grace within it; thus also, commenting on Psalm 143:5, touch the mountains, the Gloss says (Glossa Petri Lomb. (PL 191, 1256 D) et interlin. ex August. Enarr. in Ps, 143:5 (PL 37, 1865).) with your grace. However, the human mind touches God in some way by knowing and loving him; thus, in adults as well, who are able to know and to love God, some use of free choice is needed by which they know and love God; and this is a turning toward God; about which it says in Zachariah 1:3 be turned to me, and I will turn to you. However, children lacking the use of free choice cannot know and love God, and thus for justification it suffices that they be touched by him through the infusion of grace.

The second reason is taken from the definition of justification itself. For according to Anselm in the book On Truth, (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 12 (PL 58:482B; ch. 13.) justice is rectitude of will conserved for its own sake; and thus justification is a certain alteration of the will. However, "will" is taken both for the power itself and for the power's activity. However, the activity of the power of the will cannot be changed without it cooperating; for if it were not from it, then it would not be its act. But just as the power itself of the will was made without its own cooperation, so also is it able to be changed without its own cooperation. However, in adults, the change of the will's act is required for justification; for they have been turned toward some creature in a disordered way by an act of the will; and indeed, this turning cannot be changed except by a contrary act of the will; and thus an act of free choice is needed for the justification of adults. But children, who do not have a will turned toward a creature through an act of their own will, but rather only possess the power of will that is culpably deprived of original justice, can be justified without a movement of their own will.

The third reason is taken from the likeness of divine activity found in bodily things. For God, when producing some effect that nature can likewise produce, produces it according to the same disposition as does nature. For example, if God heals something miraculously, he will cause health in him with a certain balancing of humors, which nature also does at times when it heals someone, according to what the Philosopher says in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.14, 199b28.) that if nature were to make a work of art, it would make it in the same way as does art, and conversely. However, a man can possess some justice from his natural capabilities in two ways: in one way as natural or innate, in respect of which some people are liable by nature itself to works of justice; in another way as acquired. Therefore, the infused justice, by which adults are justified, is similar to the justice acquired from works; hence, just as in acquired political justice an act of will is needed, by which someone loves justice: so also is justification not completed in adults without the use of free choice. But infused justice, by which children are justified, is similar to the natural aptitude for justice, which is also found in children; and the use of free choice is not needed for either of these.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that since children do not possess that by which they might be turned toward the justifying cause, the justifying cause itself, namely Christ's Passion, is applied to them by the sacrament of baptism, and they are justified by this.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that one must make a distinction regarding the adult who is not in control of his own mind: for if he never had the use of his own reason, there is the same judgment of him as of children; however, if he possessed the judgment of reason at some time, and if he desired baptism in the time that he possessed the use of reason, then if he were baptized in a period of insanity, not being conscious of it or even resisting, the effect of baptism is attained on account of the preceding will.

And this is especially the case when he recovers the use of free choice after baptism and he approves of what has been done; in which case, says Augustine, the fact that he struggled against it is not imputed to him, since he did not act with his will, but was rather acted upon by his imagination. However, if while in control of his mind he did not desire baptism, it must not be given to him when not aware and not offering resistance, in however much danger of death he might be; for he will be judged according to the last moment in which he was in control of his mind. And if it is given to him, he receives neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament, although a disposition can be miraculously left in him from the invocation of the Trinity and the sanctification of water, such that when he has recovered the use of free choice, he is more easily changed to the good.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that God infuses grace in some children even without the sacrament, as is clear with those sanctified in the womb; (Blessed Mary, John the Baptist, and Jeremiah, as found in ST III.27.1.) and in a similar way he could bestow grace upon an adult who was not in control of his own mind without the sacrament, in the same way as when he confers the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that this position is held to be impossible by some, (E. g. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 42, a. 4, ad 3; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 2.) namely that an adult has original sin without actual sin. For when he begins to be an adult, if he does what he is capable of, grace will be given to him, by which he will be cleared of original sin; which if he does not do, he will be guilty of a sin of omission. For since anyone is bound to avoid sin, and this cannot be done without setting before one the final end, anyone is bound to turn oneself toward God and to place one's end in him, from when one is first in control of one's mind; and one is disposed for grace by this. Likewise, Augustine says (From Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 30, ch. 9; cf. Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism, bk. 2, ch. 4 (PL 44:182); cf. ST I-II.82.1, s.c.: Sermon On time XLV as referred to In II Sent., dist. 30;) that the concupiscence of original sin makes children liable to concupiscence, whereas it makes adults to have concupiscence in act; for it cannot easily happen that someone infected by original sin does not submit oneself to concupiscence through the consent of sin.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that justification is in the child and the adult according to a common cause, namely according to grace; which is nevertheless received differently in the child and in the adult according to the different conditions of each; for whatever is received into another is in it according to the manner of the receiver. And it is for this reason that grace is received into the adult with the use of free choice, but not in the child.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that one can respond to this in three ways: in one way saying that the sleep in which wisdom was infused into Solomon was not a natural sleep, but the sleep of prophecy, about which it says in Numbers 12:6: if there should be among you a prophet of the Lord, let him speak to him by a dream or in a vision; however, the use of free choice is not bound in this sleep. In another way it can be said that just as for the infusion of grace it is necessary that the will, which is its subject, be turned toward God, so also in the infusion of wisdom does the intellect need to be turned toward God; however, the intellect can be turned toward God in sleep, though not free choice or the will: the reason for this is that two things pertain to the intellect, namely to perceive and to judge regarding what has been perceived.

However, the intellect is not impeded in sleeping from perceiving something, (Cf. Aristotle, On Divination Through Sleep, ch. 1, 462b12–463b11; Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 2.) whether from what it has considered beforehand, and thus a sleeping man will sometimes make syllogisms; or else from the illumination of a higher substance, in the perception of which the intellect of the sleeper is even more apt on account of the rest from the activities of the senses, and especially with the phantasms being at rest; and thus it says in Job 33:15: by a dream, in a nocturnal vision, when men are accustomed to be occupied with sleep and they slumber in their beds, then he opens the ears of men and, instructing them, he teaches discipline. (The text is a conflation of Job 4:13 and 33:15–16.) And this is especially the reason why future things are foreseen in sleep. But there cannot be perfect judgment of the intellect in sleep, inasmuch as sensation, which is the first principle of our knowledge, is bound at that time; for judgment happens by a resolution to principles; hence, we must judge all things with respect to what we receive from sensation, as it says in On Heaven. (Aristotle, On Heaven 3.7, 306a14.) However, the use of free choice follows upon the judgment of reason; and thus the use of free choice, by which the will is turned toward God, cannot be sufficient in sleep, for although there is some movement of the will, it follows the phantasm more than the full judgment of reason; and thus man is able to perceive wisdom in sleep, but not justice. In a third way, it can be said that the intellect is coerced by the intelligible, (Cf. supra: q. 22, a. 10.) however, the will cannot be forced by what is desirable; and thus wisdom, which is the intellect's rectitude, can be infused without the use of free choice, but not justice, which is the will's rectitude.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the movement of free choice that precedes in one who is awake cannot make the act of the sleeper either meritorious or blameworthy, considered in itself; yet it can make it so that it has an aspect of goodness or badness, inasmuch as the power of the act of one who is awake remains in the works of the sleeper, just as the power of a cause remains in its effect. This is the reason why virtuous persons stumble upon better ideas when sleeping than those who are not so virtuous, as it says in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 1.20, 1102b9; cf. On Divination Through Sleep 2, 463b15.) and it is for this reason that nocturnal pollution is sometimes held to be blameworthy. Thus was Solomon also able to dispose himself while awake to receive wisdom while asleep.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the sacrament of baptism must not given to the sick man so long as he is not in control of his own mind, even if he had previously made a vow to be baptized, except when danger of death is feared, which is indeed not feared for someone sleeping; and so the case differs in this respect, though in another respect it is similar.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that air is, with respect to the nature of its own form, in the final disposition to receiving light by reason of its transparency, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 117, 415b7.) and so it is illuminated immediately at the presence of what shines; and neither is there required any other preparation, except perhaps the removal of an impediment. But the intellectual mind is not in the final disposition for the reception of justice, except when it is willing in act, for a power is completed by an act, by which it is also determined to either one of two opposites, existing potentially in themselves with respect to both; just as matter existing in potency to many forms is, by reason of dispositions, more fitted to one form than another.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that God communicates himself to creatures with infinite goodness by means of some likeness of his own goodness, which he bestows upon them from the fact that he shares his goodness in the best manner. It pertains to this manner that his gifts be dispensed in an ordered way according to his wisdom, and this is to each according to his own condition; and this is why a disposition or a preparation is needed on the part of those to whom God dispenses his gifts. Or else one can respond that the objection argues regarding the preparation that temporally precedes the infusion of grace, without which God sometimes grants grace, suddenly causing a movement of contrition in someone and infusing grace; for as it says in Sirach 11:23, it is easy in the sight of the Lord to enrich a poor man quickly; however, the use of free choice is not excluded by this, since it happens in the very instant that grace is infused; for in this is shown the more perfect communication of divine goodness, that it at once causes in a man both the habit and the act of justice, than if it were to only cause the habit.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that just as the sun is the cause of light, not only with respect to being but also with respect to becoming, so also is God the cause of grace both with regard to being and with regard to becoming. However, something is needed for the coming to be of a thing that implies a certain change, which is not needed for its existence; as for example, when light comes to be in air, it is necessary that the air be related in a different respect to the sun afterwards than before; which happens by the sun's motion, without which there could be the preservation of light in the air with the sun always being present. Similarly, it is necessary for the coming to be of grace that the will be related in a different way to God than it was before; for which a change of will is needed, which is not in adults without the use of free choice, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that there is some disposition needed for the becoming of a thing, which is not required for the being of a thing, as is especially clear in the generation of animals and plants; and so after a thing has been made, nothing prevents it from still being conserved in its existence, when such dispositions are no longer there. Thus, justice can remain habitually when there ceases the movement of free choice, which was necessary for justification.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that nothing prevents something naturally prior from not being able to come into being without what is posterior, yet which can exist without what is posterior; as for example, the soul, which being the formal, efficient, and final cause of the body, as it says in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7, 415b7.) is naturally prior to the body, can itself exist without the body, yet which according to the order of nature cannot come to be except in a body; and it is similarly the case with grace and the use of free choice.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that the body infects the soul with original sin from the fact that it is united to it. However, this sin does not concern the will of the one who is infected, but rather the nature; and so it is not surprising if the use of free choice is not required for such an infection. But the soul of a child acquires grace in a similar way from the fact that it is united to Christ through the sacrament of baptism without the use of free choice; whereas the use of free choice is needed in adults for the reason already mentioned.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that the fact that God is more prone to have mercy than to punish does not exclude that more is not required for the good that God works in us by having mercy, than for the evil that God punishes in us; for according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:729C).) the good exists from a whole and integral cause, but evil is from individual defects. But from this is shown that God has mercy with respect to what is from him, yet he punishes with respect to what is from us, which is such that it cannot be ordered except by punishment; hence, he has mercy by primary intention, whereas he punishes according to his consequent will and, as it were, beyond the intention of his antecedent will. Yet it can be said with regard to the present question that the justification of children before the use of free choice corresponds by a certain likeness to the infection of original sin, by which the soul is infected before it has the use of free choice.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that natural things can be disposed to a form by a certain violence, such that the principle of the disposition is outside, it contributing nothing while suffering violence; (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a1 et 2, 1110b15; sec. Thomam supra q. 22, a. 5) and so the disposition within them to the form is not from an intrinsic principle, but rather from outside: but the will cannot suffer violence, and so the objection is not similar.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that God makes virtues in us without us causing the virtues, yet not without us consenting to them.

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that the act of free choice that happens in the justification of the wicked is related in one way to the habit of justice in general, about which has already been discussed; and it is related in another way to its exercise and its increase. In fact, it cannot be related to the habit as merit, inasmuch as justice, which is the principle of meriting, is infused in that very instant; rather, it is related as a disposition alone. But it stands to the execution of justice and to its increase as being in the notion of merit, for a man merits divine help in these previously mentioned cases by means of a first act that is informed by grace. Therefore, justice is not rendered to human acts as a reward; but rather the increase and continuation of justice has in some way the notion of a reward in comparison to preceding meritorious acts.

Reply Obj. 19: To the nineteenth it must be said that although Paul fought directly against the grace of faith before he was justified, yet he consented in the very moment of his justification by means of a free choice that was moved by grace: for in an instant God can induce in someone a movement of will formed by grace, without which there is no justification; but there can be justification without a preceding preparation.

Reply Obj. 20: To the twentieth it must be said that this disposition is not required on account of the weakness of the agent, but rather because of the condition of the receiver, namely the will, which cannot be changed through violence, but it is changed by its own motion. Also, the motion of free choice not only stands to grace as a disposition, but as a completion, for activities are certain completions of habits; hence, it confirms the perfection of an agent if a habit is induced together with its activity, for the perfection of an effect manifests the perfection of the cause.