Article 8 — Whether the motion of free choice in the justification of the wicked naturally precedes the infusion of grace

Eighth, it is asked whether the motion of free choice in the justification of the wicked naturally precedes the infusion of grace. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 2–3; ST I-II.113.8, ad 2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does, for a cause naturally precedes the effect; but contrition is the cause of the remission of guilt; therefore it naturally precedes it, and as a consequence also the infusion of grace, since these accompany one another.

Obj. 2: But one might argue that contrition is not the cause of the remission of guilt except in the manner of a material disposition.

On the contrary, contrition is the cause of the sacramental remission of guilt and the infusion of grace; for since penance is a sacrament of the New Law, it causes grace, and so also the remission of guilt; and it does not do this by reason of its other parts, namely confession and satisfaction, which presuppose grace and the remission of guilt: and so it follows that contrition itself is the sacramental cause of the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace. But a sacramental cause is an instrumental cause, as is clear from the preceding question; (Above: q. 27, a. 4.) therefore, since an instrument is reduced back to the genus of efficient cause, contrition will not be the cause of the remission of guilt as a material disposition, but rather in the genus of efficient cause.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, attrition precedes the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt; but contrition does not differ from attrition except with regard to the intensity of sorrow, which does not change the species; therefore, contrition also at least naturally precedes the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it says in Psalm 88:15, justice and judgment are the preparation of his seat. (Text conflated from 88:15 and 96:2) However, the soul becomes God's seat by the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt; therefore, since man performs judgment and justice by the fact that he has contrition for sins, it seems that contrition is a preparation for the infusion of grace, and so it is naturally prior.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the motion towards the term is naturally before that term; but contrition is a motion tending toward the destruction of sin; therefore, it naturally precedes the remission of sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Augustine says: he who created you without you will not justify you without you; (Augustine, Sermon 169, ch. 11, para. 13 (PL 38:923) according to William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, ch. 2; cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 72, para. 3 (PL 35:1824).) and so the motion of free choice, which is on our side, is required for justification and naturally precedes it; but justification terminates in the remission of guilt; therefore, the motion of free choice naturally precedes the remission of guilt.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, in carnal marriage mutual consent naturally precedes the marriage bond; but a certain spiritual marriage of the soul with God is contracted by the infusion of grace, according to Hosea 2:19, I will espouse you to myself in justice; therefore, the motion of free choice, by which is the soul's consent toward God, naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, among those things that are moved by another, the exterior mover's motion stands to the mobile's being moved in the same way as among things moved by themselves; but the motion by which an agent moves exteriorly, whether it moves as a principle agent or as one assisting, naturally precedes the being-moved of the mobile itself; therefore, since the soul is not wholly moved in the justification of the wicked, but rather it moves itself in some way as an assistant, according to 1 Cor. 3:9, we are God's helpers, hence it seems that the soul's very activity, namely the motion of free choice, naturally precedes the remission of guilt, according to which the soul is moved from vice to virtue.

On the contrary (1), contrition is a meritorious act; but there is no meritorious act except from grace; therefore, grace is the cause of contrition; but a cause naturally precedes its effect; therefore the infusion of grace naturally precedes contrition.

Furthermore (2), commenting on the Roman 5:1, therefore, justified by faith and so on, the Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 5:1–3, 6.64; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 5:1 (PL 191:1378D).) says that there is not any human merit that precedes grace; but contrition is a human merit; therefore, it does not precede the infusion of grace.

But one might argue (3) that it precedes as a disposition.

On the contrary, a disposition is less perfect than the form for which it disposes; however, contrition denotes something more perfect than grace; therefore contrition is not a disposition for grace.

Proof of the minor: second act is of greater perfection than first act; but grace is a first act, for it exists in the manner of a habit; however, contrition is a second act since it is an activity of grace, just as considering is an activity of knowledge; (Cf. above: q. 2, a. 1.) therefore, just as considering is more perfect than knowledge, so also is contrition more perfect than grace.

Furthermore (4), the effect of an efficient cause is never the disposition for an efficient cause, for it follows upon the efficient cause in the line of motion, whereas in the same line a disposition precedes that to which it disposes; but contrition is related to grace as the effect of an efficient cause is related to its own efficient cause. Therefore, contrition is not a disposition for grace, and so the same conclusion as before.

Proof of the minor: habit and power are reduced to the same genus of cause, for a habit supplies what is lacking to a power; but power is the cause of act in the genus of efficient cause; therefore, so also is habit; but grace is compared to contrition as a habit to an act; therefore, contrition is compared to grace as an effect to an efficient cause.

Furthermore (5), what contributes nothing to the introduction of a form is not a disposition to form; but contrition contributes nothing to the infusion of grace, for there can be an infusion of grace without contrition, as is clear in Christ, the angels, and the first man in the state of innocence; therefore, contrition is not a disposition for grace, and so the same conclusion as before.

Furthermore (6), Bernard says (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 1 (PL 182:1002B).) that two things are required for the work of our salvation; namely God, who gives and free choice that receives; but giving is naturally before receiving; therefore grace, which in our justification is from God who gives it, naturally precedes contrition, which is from free choice that receives it.

Furthermore (7), contrition cannot exist together with sin; therefore, the remission of sin naturally precedes contrition.

I answer that it must be said that there are three opinions regarding this question. Some say (Some: William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, ch. 1, q. 3; bk. 4, ch. "De paenitentia.") that the motion of free choice naturally precedes, without qualification, the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt. For they say that that motion of free choice is not contrition but attrition, which is not an act of formed faith but of unformed faith. But this does not seem to be to the point, for every sorrow for sin in the one possessing grace is contrition, and likewise every act of faith conjoined to grace is of formed faith; therefore, attrition and the act of unformed faith, about which these people are speaking, temporally precedes the infusion of grace. We are not speaking of such motions of free choice at present, but rather of those which exist together with the infusion of grace, without which there cannot be justification in adults, for it can be without the preceding motions, as is clear from what was said above.

Therefore, others say (E.g. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 17, part 1, a. 2, q. 2.) that these motions are meritorious and informed by grace, and thus they naturally follow upon grace; however, they naturally precede the remission of guilt, for grace causes the remission of guilt by means of these actions. But this cannot be, for whatever causes something by means of an activity causes it in the manner of an efficient cause; therefore if grace causes the remission of guilt by an act of contrition and formed faith, it will cause it in the manner of an efficient cause, which cannot be. For there is first a cause effectively destroying something before what it destroys is in a state of non-existence; for it would not act for the destruction of what no longer exists; hence it would follow that grace is first in the soul before guilt is remitted, which is impossible. Thus, it is clear that grace is not the cause of the remission of guilt by any activity, but rather by the informing of the subject, which is implied in the infusion of grace; therefore, nothing falls in between the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt.

Therefore, it is necessary that, according to another opinion, (E. g. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 17, a. 11.) the previously mentioned motions are related to both with respect to the same order, such that they precede in one manner and in another manner they follow, in the order of nature. For if the order of nature is understood with respect to the notion of a material cause, then the motion of free choice naturally precedes the infusion of grace, like a material disposition preceding form; however, if one understands it according to the notion of a formal cause, the converse holds true. It is similarly the cause among natural things, regarding the disposition which is necessary for a form, which precedes substantial form in some way, namely according to the notion of a material cause; for a material disposition stands on the side of matter. But in another way, namely on the part of the formal cause, the substantial form is prior, inasmuch as it perfects matter and material accidents.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first objection it must be said that contrition is the cause of the remission of guilt inasmuch as it is a disposition for grace.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that it belongs to the sacrament of penance to confer grace by the power of the keys, to which the penitent subjects himself. Therefore, if one considers contrition in itself, it is not related to grace except in the manner of a disposition; but if it is considered inasmuch as it has the power of the keys in desire, then it acts sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, just as in the power of baptism, as is manifest in the adult who has the sacrament of baptism in desire alone. Therefore, it does not follow from this that contrition is an efficient cause of the remission of guilt, speaking essentially, but rather baptism or the power of the keys. Or else it can be said that, with respect to the charge of temporal punishment, contrition is related to the remission of guilt in the manner of an efficient cause, whereas it is related only in the manner of a disposition with respect to the stain and the charge of eternal punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that contrition does not differ from a preceding attrition only with respect to the intensity of pain, but also with respect to the informing of grace; and so contrition has a certain relation of posteriority to grace, which attrition does not have.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that that preparation exists in the manner of a material disposition.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that contrition is a motion toward the remission of guilt, not as though being distant from it, but as being joined to it: hence, it is considered more as being in motion than as being moved; yet motion precedes the term in the order of material causality, for motion is the act of something existing in potency.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that he will not justify you without you must be understood as disposing towards grace to some extent; and so it is not necessary that the motion of free choice precedes except in the manner of a disposition.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that consent is the efficient cause of carnal marriage, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 27, ch. 3.) but the motion of free choice is not the efficient cause of the infusion of grace, and thus the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that in the justification of the wicked man is not God's helper, as though causing grace together with him, but only as preparing himself for grace.

Reply Sed Contra 1: But to the first that argued on the contrary, it must be said that contrition is from grace as from what informs, and so it follows that grace is before in the line of formal causality.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that human merit does not precede grace in the line of meriting, namely that grace should fall under merit; yet a human act can precede grace as a material disposition.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that contrition is from free choice and from grace; and inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice, it is a disposition for grace, existing together with grace; just as a disposition which is a necessity exists together with a form; but inasmuch as it is from grace, it is compared to grace as a second act.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that just as a habit perfects a power formally, so is what is left in the act from the habit formal with respect to the substance of the act, which the power administers; and so a habit is the formal principle of a formed act, even though it possesses a notion of efficient cause with respect to formation.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that a disposition does not do something to the form in the manner of an efficient cause, but only materially, inasmuch as by the disposition the matter is made apt for the reception of a form; and so contrition contributes to the infusion of grace in him who has guilt, although it is not required in the innocent: for more things are required in the manner of a disposition for the removal of a contrary form and for the introduction of a form at the same time than are required for the introduction of a form alone.

Reply Sed Contra 6: To the sixth it must be said that what exists on the part of the giver is formally prior, but what exists on the part of the receiver is materially prior.

Reply Sed Contra 7: To the seventh it must be said that it does not follow from that objection that the removal of guilt precedes contrition, for guilt is remitted in some way by contrition itself; as for example when the form of water is expelled by heat at its greatest intensity; and so they are not together at the same time; and similarly, neither is this the case for guilt and contrition.