Article 7 — Whether the remission of guilt naturally precedes the infusion of grace

Seventh, it is asked whether the remission of guilt naturally precedes the infusion of grace. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1; ST I-II.113.8.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does, for commenting on Psalm 62:3: thus have I appeared to you in the holy place, the Gloss says unless one is first lacking in evil, one never arrives at the good; (Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Psalm 62:3 (PL 191:572B); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 62:3 (PL 36:753).) but the remission of guilt makes one to be lacking in evil, whereas the infusion of grace makes one to arrive at the good; therefore, the remission of guilt is naturally prior to the infusion of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one understands the recipient first in the order of nature before the reception itself; but a form is not received except into its proper matter; (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 414a25; according to Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 12, a. 1, obj. 1.) therefore, one must understand the proper matter before the reception of the form: but in order for matter to be proper to some form, it is required that it be stripped of the contrary form; therefore, matter being stripped of one form is naturally prior to it receiving another; and so the remission of guilt is also naturally prior to the infusion of grace.

Obj. 3: But one might say that grace is naturally prior to the remission of sins, inasmuch as it possesses a reference to God who infuses the grace; though inasmuch as it has an order to a subject, then it is posterior to the remission of guilt.

On the contrary, the reference of grace to its own subject in whom it is infused is included in the infusion of grace; therefore, if it is posterior according to this reference, it seems that simply speaking the infusion of grace is naturally after the remission of guilt.

Obj. 4: But one might say that grace has a double reference to the subject: one inasmuch as it informs the subject: and with respect to this reference it is posterior to the remission of guilt; and another by which it expels guilt from the subject, and so the infusion of grace naturally precedes the remission of guilt.

On the contrary, grace expels guilt by reason of the opposition that it has toward it; however, opposites mutually expel each other by the fact that they do not tolerate one another to be in the same subject; therefore, grace expels guilt from the very fact that it informs the subject; and so it is not possible that grace is posterior according to the reference that it has to the subject which it informs, and that it be prior according to the reference that it has to the guilt which it expels.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the existence of a thing is naturally before its acting; but since grace is an accident, its existence is to exist within another; (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.22, 1025a14.) therefore, the reference that grace has to the subject which it informs is naturally prior to the reference that it has to the contrary which it expels; and so it seems that the previously mentioned response cannot stand.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, to turn away from evil is naturally prior to doing good; but the remission of guilt pertains to the turning away from evil, however, the infusion of grace is ordered to doing good; therefore, the remission of guilt is naturally before the infusion of grace.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be from Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 17, part 1, a. 2, q. 1, s.c. 2.) the order of causes is with respect to the order of effects; but the effect of the remission of guilt is to be clean, whereas the effect of the infusion of grace is to be graced; however, being clean is naturally before being graced, for everyone graced is clean, but the converse does not hold: but according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 12, 14a34; as said above q. 21, a. 2.) something is before which is consequent to it, but that does not convert; therefore, the remission of guilt is naturally prior to the infusion of grace.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, guilt and grace are related to each other like contrary forms in nature; but in natural things the expulsion of one form is naturally before the introduction of another, inasmuch as contrary forms do not occur together in matter; hence, the form that existed first must be understood as expelled before the new form is introduced; therefore, the remission of guilt is also naturally before the infusion of grace.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be taken from Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 17, part 1, a. 2, q. 1, s.c. 1.) withdrawing from the term "from which" is naturally before arriving at the term "toward which"; but in the justification of the wicked, guilt stands as the term from which one withdraws by the remission of guilt; but the term toward which is the grace itself, at which one arrives by its infusion; therefore, the remission of guilt is naturally before the infusion of grace.

Obj. 10: But one might says that the infusion of grace is posterior, inasmuch as grace is the term of justification; whereas it is prior inasmuch as it is the disposing principle that removes the contrary.

On the contrary, an agent of infinite power does not need a disposition in the matter in which it acts; but the infusion of grace is from an agent of infinite power, namely from God; therefore, no disposition is needed.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, no form that is totally from the outside needs a disposition in matter; but grace is of such a kind; therefore, it does not need such a disposition.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are related as purgation and illumination; but according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3, para. 2 (PG 3:165 B); ch. 2 (PG 3:143–46).) purgation is placed before illumination; therefore, the remission of guilt also precedes the infusion of grace.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, (This argument seems to be taken from Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 17, part 1, a. 2, q. 1, s.c. 5.) if God works successively in the justification of the wicked, he would first in time remove guilt before he infuses grace; just as in the case of whitening, nature first removes blackness before it introduces whiteness. But the fact that God causes justification instantly takes away the order of time and not of nature; therefore, the remission of guilt is naturally before the infusion of grace.

On the contrary (1), the cause naturally precedes the effect; but grace is the cause of the remission of guilt only insofar as it is infused; therefore, the infusion of grace naturally precedes the remission of guilt.

Furthermore (2), a natural agent does not expel a contrary form from matter except by the fact that it introduces the likeness of its own form in matter; thus, for the same reason, God does not remove guilt from the soul except by the fact that he introduces into it the likeness of his own goodness, namely grace; and so the infusion of grace naturally precedes the remission of guilt.

Furthermore (3), just as guilt is sometimes remitted by grace, so also is grace sometimes expelled by guilt; but grace is expelled by a guilt that precedes the expulsion of grace; therefore, guilt is similarly remitted by a grace preceding the remission of guilt.

Furthermore (4), (Argument seems to be from Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 17, part 1, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2.) grace is infused by creating, and it is created by infusing; but the creation of grace is naturally before the remission of guilt; therefore, the infusion of grace is also naturally prior.

Furthermore (5), an agent is naturally prior to the patient; but grace stands on the part of the agent in the justification of the wicked, whereas guilt stands on the side of the patient or of the receiver; therefore, the infusion of grace is naturally before the remission of guilt.

I answer that it must be said that in any type of cause, the cause is naturally before what is caused. However, it happens that according to different kinds of causes one thing is both a cause and is caused in relation to the same thing; such as purification being the cause of health in the genus of efficient cause, but health is the cause of purification according to the genus of final cause; likewise, matter is the cause of form in some way inasmuch as it upholds form, and form is in some way the cause of matter inasmuch as it gives to matter to exist in act. Therefore, nothing prevents one thing from being before and after something else according to a different kind of cause.

Nevertheless, that must be said to be simply before in the order of nature, which is before according to the genus of cause that is prior in the notion of causality; such as the end, which is called the cause of causes, since all other causes receive that they are causes from the final cause; (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 195a24; Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 6, ch. 5.) for the efficient cause does not act except for the sake of the end, and the form perfects the matter from the action of the efficient cause. Therefore, from this it must be said that, whenever one form is expelled from matter and another is introduced, the expulsion of the preceding form is naturally prior in the definition of the material cause; for every disposition to form is reduced to the material cause; however, the stripping of matter from a contrary form is a certain disposition to the reception of form.

Also, as it says in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190b25; 1.82.) the subject, that is matter, exists according to number; for it is numbered according to reason, inasmuch as there is privation in it besides the substance of the subject, which stands on the side of matter and the subject. But according to the notion of formal causality, the introduction of form is naturally prior, which formally perfects the subject and expels the contrary. And since the form and the end coincide in the same thing, one in number, whereas the form and the efficient cause coincide in the same species, (Aristotle, Physics 2.11, 198a24; cf. above: q. 21, a. 4.) inasmuch as the form is the agent's likeness; thus also, the introduction of form is naturally prior according to the order of efficient and final cause. From this it is clear, according to what has been said, that it is simply prior in the order of nature.

Therefore, it is manifest that, simply speaking according to the order of nature, the infusion of grace is before the remission of guilt, but according to the order of material cause the converse holds.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the Gloss speaks with regard to the avoidance of evil works and the carrying out of good works; for it is less to reject evil than to do good, and thus it is naturally prior; however, it is not speaking with regard to habits that are infused or expelled.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that that argument proceeds according to the order of material cause, with respect to which even in relation to the subject the infusion of grace is posterior.

Reply Obj. 3: Hence, the solution to the third is manifest.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that that objection proceeds according to the order of formal cause; for grace expels guilt by inhering formally.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that grace does not expel guilt effectively, but rather formally; hence, it does not exist before it expels the guilt, but at the same time.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the objection proceeds with respect to activities and not with respect to habits, like the first objection.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that being clean is not a proper effect of the remission of guilt, for it can exist even without considering the remission of guilt, as in man in the condition of innocence; but the proper effect of the remission of guilt is being made clean, and this is not more common than being graced, for no one can be made clean except by grace. Also, it must be known that natural priority is not proved by this fact, except with respect to the order of material cause, for genera are like matter in relation to species.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the same distinction is called for among natural forms as well as in the present consideration.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that receding away from the term "from which" is first in the way of generation and motion, which is reduced to the order of matter, for motion is the act of something existing in ability; (Aristotle, Physics 3.2, 201a10; cf. above: q. 24, a. 1.) but drawing nigh to the term "to which" is prior according to the order of final cause.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that a disposition is not required in God's works because of the weakness of the agent, but because of the condition of the effect; and especially for such a disposition, namely the removal of the contrary, for contraries cannot exist together. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.15, 1011b21.)

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that even a form which is completely from the outside needs a due disposition in the subject, whether as preexisting, such as light needing transparency in air, or else as being impressed together by the same agent, such as heat in its fullness being introduced together with the form of fire; and similarly guilt is expelled by God together with the infusion of grace.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that a similar distinction is used in the order of purification and illumination as in the present case.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that if God causes justification successively, the expulsion of guilt would exist before in time, though afterwards in nature; for the order of time follows upon the order of motion and matter. In this respect, the Philosopher says (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7, 1049b4sqq; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's On The Soul, bk. 3, lect. 20, 27.) that in the same thing, act is after ability in time, though it is before it according to nature; for in that respect it is said to be simply before by nature, since it is before according to the order of final cause, as has been said.