Article 5 — Whether a movement of free choice toward sin is required in the justification of the wicked

Fifth, it is asked whether a movement of free choice toward sin is required in the justification of the wicked. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 4; SCG III.158; ST I-II.113.5; III.86.2)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for the movement of charity is sufficient for the remission of sins: Luke 7:47 she was forgiven many sins because she loved much; but the motion of charity is directly towards God; therefore, a motion toward God is sufficient for the justification of the wicked, and a motion toward sin is not required.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the unchangeable good is more efficacious than the changeable good; (Cf. Augustine, e. g., On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 32:1269).) but for a man to incur sin it is sufficient that he turn towards a changeable good; therefore, turning toward the unchangeable good suffices for man to be justified.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a man cannot be moved toward sin unless he thinks about sin; but no one can think of what one does not hold in one's memory: however, it happens that some persons forget sins they have committed; therefore, if a motion toward sin is required for the justification of the wicked, it seems that such a person who has forgotten his own sins can never be justified.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it happens that someone is entangled in many crimes; therefore, if a motion of free choice is required in justification, it seems for an equal reason that one must think of each of one's sins in that moment, which is impossible; for the reason for one is no greater than for the other.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whoever is turned toward something as toward a final end, by that very fact he is turned away from another final end, for it is impossible that there be many final ends of one thing; but when a man is moved by informed faith towards God, he is moved towards him as toward a final end; therefore, by this very fact, he is turned away from sin, and so it does not seem necessary that there be a motion of free choice toward sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the motion from sin and toward sin is not the same, just as neither is that from whiteness and toward whiteness; but justification is a motion from sin; therefore, it is not a motion toward sin.

On the contrary (1), is what it says in Psalm 31:5: I have said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and you have remitted the impiety of my sin; but a man cannot say this without thinking of sin; therefore, a motion of free choice toward sin is required for justification.

Furthermore (2), contrition is required for the justification of the wicked, which is the first part of penance, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 16, ch. 1.) by which sins are removed; but contrition is pain regarding sin; (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 6, ch. 2, q. 1.) therefore, a motion of free choice toward sin is required in the justification of the wicked.

I answer that it must be said that the justification of the wicked adds something beyond justification, understood simply. For justification understood simply only implies the infusion of justice, but the justification of the wicked adds beyond this the remission of sin; which remission does not happen only from the fact that a man stops sinning, but something more is required. Hence, in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence, (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 1, ch. 26 (PL 44:430).) Augustine says that if to cease from sinning would be not to have any sins, what the Scripture warns us of would be enough: 'Son, you have sinned, do not do it again'; yet it is not enough, but adds further: 'and beg that what is past might be forgiven you.'

Therefore, in order for there to be justification, it is required simply that there be a turning of man toward the justifying cause by means of free choice, which is a motion of free choice toward God; but beyond this, there is needed in the justification of the wicked that he be turned toward the destruction of past sin. However, just as a turning toward God happens from the fact that a man knows God by faith, he loves him, and he desires or else hopes for grace; so also is it necessary that there be a turning of free choice toward sin by the fact that man recognizes himself as a sinner, which pertains to humility; and that he detest past sin, so that he is grieved at having done it and does not wish to do it again.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the love of God cannot exist without a detestation of what separates from God; and thus, besides the motion of love towards God in the justification of the wicked, there is also required a detestation of sin. And thus Mary Magdalen let her tears flow, to whom it was said many sins were forgiven her since she loved much. (Luke 7:47.)

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that turning toward the unchangeable good is sufficient for justification simply understood; but for the justification of the wicked there is also required a motion toward sin, as has been said: since, in order for a man to be justified from a past sin, it is not enough that he will justice and not sin, but that he act against the past iniquity by detesting it. However, detesting God or justice is not required in the one who sins except consequentially, for no one hates what is good, except inasmuch as it is incompatible with another good that one loves; hence, a sinner only hates God and justice incidentally, namely, from the fact that he immoderately loves the changeable good.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that it is not necessary that someone think of this or that sin in the very moment of justification, but only that he should be sorry for having turned away from God by his own fault, whether it was absolute or conditional, namely if one should not know whether one has ever turned from God by a mortal sin; and it is also by such a motion that one who has forgotten one's sin is able to repent of sin.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that all sins agree in their turning away from God, for which reason they impede grace; hence, it is not necessary for justification that, in the very moment of justification, one should think of each sin, but it is enough that one thinks of the fact that one has turned away from God by one's own fault: however, recalling each of the sins should either precede or at least follow upon justification.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that from the fact one constitutes God as one's end, it follows that one does not place one's end in sin, and so that one turns away from the intention of sinning; but this does not suffice for the wiping out of past sin, as has been said, and thus the objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the motion of free choice to pursue or embrace sin is opposed to justification, but not free choice's motion to flee from sin; for this motion is in accord with justification, which is a motion from sin, for fleeing from something is a motion away from it.