Article 6 — Whether the infusion of grace is the same as the remission of guilt

Sixth, it is asked whether the infusion of grace is the same as the remission of guilt. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 5; ST I-II.113.6.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is: for the setting forth of an affirmation is the same as the removal of a negation; but guilt seems to be nothing else than a deficiency of grace; therefore, the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace seem to be the same.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, guilt and grace are opposed like shadows and light; but the removal of a shadow and the introduction of light are the same thing; therefore, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are the same thing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the removal of guilt is understood in particular with regard to the annihilation of the stain; however, the stain does not seem to be something positively in the soul, for then it would be from God in some way, and thus it seems that it would only be a privation. However, there is no privation except of that with which it cannot exist at the same time, which is grace. But the removal of a privation is nothing else than the imposition of a habit; therefore, the removal of guilt is nothing else than the infusion of grace.

Obj. 4: But one might say that the stain not only imposes an absence of grace, but an aptitude and a debt with respect to possessing grace.

On the contrary, every privation imposes an aptitude in the subject, and yet the removal of a privation is the same as the introduction of a habit; therefore, this does not prevent the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace from being the same.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 318a23; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 16.) the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; therefore, since the removal of guilt is its corruption, whereas the infusion of grace is its generation; then the infusion of grace is the same as the removal of guilt.

On the contrary (1), is that two of the things listed among the four that are required for the justification of the wicked are the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt. (Cf. supra: a. 1)

Furthermore (2), whatever things are such that one can exist without the other are not the same; but the infusion of grace can exist without the remission of guilt, just as it is among the blessed angels, in the first man before the fall, and in Christ; therefore, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same.

I answer that it must be said that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same; and this is clear from the following. For alterations are distinguished according to their terms; however, the term of the infusion of grace is that grace exists within the soul, whereas that of the remission of guilt is that guilt does not exist within the soul. But, in this respect, one must attend to a difference between the opposites. For there are some opposites both of which posit some nature, such as white and black; and in such opposites the negation of either one is a real negation, that is of a real thing. Therefore, since affirmation is not negation, to be white is not the same as not to be black, but they differ in reality; and thus the corruption of black, whose term is to not be black, and the generation of white, whose term is to be white, are really different changes, even though they are one motion, as said above. (Above: a. 1.)

But there are some opposites of which only one of them is a nature, whereas the other is only a removal or negation of it, as is clear in things opposed according to affirmation and negation, or else according to privation and habit; and in such as these, the negation of the opposite that posits some nature is real, since it belongs to some thing; but the negation of the other opposite is not real, for it does not belong to some thing, for it is a negation of a negation. Therefore, this negation of a negation, which is the negation of the other opposite, does not differ at all in reality from the positing of the other. Hence, in reality, the generation of white and the corruption of non-white are the same. But since a negation is a being of reason, even though it is not a being of nature, therefore, the negation of a negation according to reason or according to the mode of understanding is something other than the positing of an affirmation; and so the corruption of non-white according to the mode of understanding is something other than the generation of white.

Therefore, it is clear that, if guilt is completely not something positive, the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are the same in reality; but they are not the same according to reason. However, if guilt places something in the soul, not only according to reason but also in reality, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are different, if they are considered as changes, even though the motion is one thing in reason, as said above. (Above: a. 1.) But guilt does posit something, and not only an absence of grace. For the absence of grace considered in itself only possesses the notion of punishment, but not the notion of guilt, except inasmuch as it is left from a preceding voluntary act; just as darkness does not have the notion of shadow except inasmuch as it is left by the interposition of an opaque body.

Therefore, just as the removal of a shadow implies not only the removal of darkness but also the removal of the impeding body, so also does the remission of guilt not only imply the removal of the absence of grace, but also the removal of what impedes grace, which was from a preceding act of sin; not such that that act did not exist, since this is impossible, but that the influence of grace is not impeded because of it. Therefore, it is clear that the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same thing in reality.

Reply Obj. 1–4: The solution to the first four objections is clear from this.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the generation of one thing is said by the Philosopher to be the corruption of another by means of concomitance, for they necessarily exist together, or else it is because of the unity of motion which terminates in these two changes.