Chapter 35 — That ultimate happiness does not consist in the act of prudence

It is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man’s happiness consist in the act of prudence.

For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue. But human happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue. (Ch. 34.) Neither, therefore, does it consist in the practice of prudence.

Again. Man’s ultimate happiness consists in man’s most excellent operation. Now man’s most excellent operation, in respect of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason, since it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters. (Nicomachean Ethics 6.6.) Therefore, its act is not man’s ultimate happiness.

Besides. That which is directed to another as its end is not man’s ultimate happiness. Now the act of prudence is directed to another as its end: both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is comprised, is directed to operation; and because prudence gives man a good disposition as regards things directed to the end, as may be gathered from Aristotle. (Nicomachean Ethics 6.13.) Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence.

Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness, as Aristotle proves. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.9.) Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence, as may be gathered from the same authority. (Metaphysics 1.1, 2.) Therefore, happiness does not consist in an act of prudence.