Chapter 40 — That man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God by faith

There is yet another knowledge of God superior in one respect to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely, that through which God is known by men through faith. In this respect, it surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration, because by faith we know certain things about God, which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work. (Bk. 1, ch. 5.) But not even in this knowledge of God can man’s ultimate happiness consist.

For happiness is the intellect’s perfect operation, as already declared. (Ch. 25.) But in knowledge by faith the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards that which is on the part of the intellect—although it is most perfect on the part of the object—for the intellect in believing does not grasp the object of its assent. Therefore, neither does man’s happiness consist in this knowledge of God.

Again. It has been shown (Ch. 26.) that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will. Now in knowledge by faith the will has the leading place: for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it because it wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore, man’s final happiness does not consist in this knowledge.

Besides. The believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself: so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man does not believe in what is unseen by him and proposed to him by another unless he thinks this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed than he himself has who sees not. Either, therefore, the believer thinks wrong, or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we cannot proceed thus indefinitely: for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude, since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself to give certitude to the faith of believers. But it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work: (Bk. 1, ch. 7.) yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in such knowledge.

There is, therefore, some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowledge of faith: whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ, or receives the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and prophets. Since, then, man’s happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.

Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest by it. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it, because everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith.

Further. Knowledge of God has been declared to be the end insofar as it unites us to the last end of all, namely God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the mind, since faith is of distant and not present things. Hence the Apostle says that so long as we walk by faith, we are pilgrims from the Lord (2 Cor 5:6–7). (The Vulgate reads: quoniam dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem.) Yet faith makes God to be present to the heart, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephesians: that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith (Eph 3:17). Therefore, the knowledge of faith cannot be man’s ultimate happiness.