Chapter 43 — That we cannot understand separate substances in this life in the manner suggested by Averroes

That we cannot understand separate substances in this life in the manner suggested by Averroes (Averroes, On the Soul, bk. 3, text, comm. 30.)

As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander’s opinion was that he supposed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the active intellect.

First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the active intellect to those principles which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect, by which we understand, does not only have the action ‘to understand,’ but also this one, ‘to make things actually understood’: for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now to make things actually understood indicates more specially the habitual intellect than to understand, because it is necessary to make a thing actually understood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actually understood naturally, and not by study or by choice, as the first intelligible principles. And it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to this power to make actually understood those things which we know by study. Rather they are beginning of the habitual intellect; hence Aristotle gives the name ‘understanding’ to the habit of these principles. (Nicomachean Ethics 6.6.) And they are made actually understood by the active intellect alone: and by them those other things are made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly, to make these things which are by way of consequence understood actually is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the active intellect. Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently, the active intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter.

How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible intellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance, (Bk. 2, ch. 59.) it understands the active intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge: consequently, it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other. Even so, since color and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them (namely, light) must be the form of the other (namely, color). And this is necessary when one of them is ordained to the other, but not when they are united accidentally in the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the object of speculative knowledge and the active intellect are mutually ordained to each other, since these understood speculative principles are made actually understood by the active intellect. Therefore, the active intellect is related to these understood speculative principles as form to matter.

Consequently, since these same principles are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the active intellect also is joined to us, being the form of these principles. When, therefore, these principles are in us only potentially, the active intellect is only joined to us potentially. When some of these principles are in us actually and some potentially, the active intellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part: and then it is said to be moved towards the above conjunction, because as the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the active intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards conjunction is effected by study in speculative sciences, by which we acquire true knowledge and put aside false opinions, which are outside the order of this movement just as monstrosities are outside the operation of nature. Hence men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in speculative sciences.

And so, when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the active intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the active intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate substances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man’s ultimate happiness, in which man will be like a god.

That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said: for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved.

First, we have shown above (Bk. 2, ch. 59.) that the possible intellect is not a substance distinct from us in being. Hence it does not follow that it is the subject of separate substances: especially since Aristotle asserts (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5.) that the possible intellect is the power of becoming all things, so that seemingly it is the subject only of such things as are made to be understood.

Again. It has also been proved above (Bk. 2, ch. 76.) that the active intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns the operation of making things to be actually understood, which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the active intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances: else we would always understand them.

Further. If the active intellect were a separate substance, it would not be joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation, as neither would the possible intellect be united to us (although the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the active intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form to matter). Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, by means of the phantasms, which stand related to the possible intellect as colors to the sight, but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5.) Now we cannot ascribe to a stone, in which color is, either the action of seeing (so that it sees), nor the action of the sun (so that it gives light). Therefore, according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understands, or the action of the active intellect, so that he understands separate substances, or that he makes things to be actually understood.

Besides. According to this opinion, the active intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the principles of understanding—of which it is stated to be the form also because the active intellect and these principles have an action in common (namely, to make things actually understood). Consequently, it cannot be a form to us except insofar as the principles of knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action of understanding separate substances, because they are species of sensible things: unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of separate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore, in no way can we understand separate substances by this means.

Moreover. The active intellect bears a different relation to principles of knowledge, of which it is the cause, and to separate substances, of which it is not the cause, but which it only knows (according to his theory). Therefore, if it be joined to us through being the cause of principles of knowledge, it does not follow that it is joined to us insofar as it knows separate substances. Clearly his argument contains a fallacy of accident.

Again. If we know separate substances by means of the active intellect, this is not because the active intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but through its becoming a form in us, for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore, from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the active intellect.

If, however, it be said that the active intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances, the sole reason for this is that these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all these principles of understanding combined together equal this perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances, since all of them are not intelligible except insofar as they are made to be actually understood, whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore, although we shall know all these intelligible principles, it does not follow that the active intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand separate substances by it. Otherwise, if this is not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible, we also understand separate substances.