Chapter 34 — That man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue

It is clear that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral works.

For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral deeds can be directed to something else. This is clear from a consideration of the principal among them. For deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace: for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake. (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.) Again, deeds of justice are directed to keeping peace among men, through each one possessing his own in peace. The same applies to all other virtues. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds.

Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man’s life, since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore, it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man’s final happiness.

Further. Since man is man through having reason, his proper good, which is happiness, must be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing, then, that the good of moral virtue is something effected by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be man’s greatest good, which is happiness. Rather, it must be a good that is in reason itself.

Moreover. We have already proved (Ch. 19.) that the last end of all is to become like God. Therefore, man’s happiness is that in which man chiefly becomes like God. Now this is not in regard to moral actions, since such actions cannot be ascribed to God except metaphorically; for it is not becoming to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions.

Furthermore. Happiness is man’s proper good. Therefore, that good which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue: for animals share somewhat either in liberality, or in fortitude. But no animal has a share in intellectual action. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral actions.