Chapter 38 — That human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God which is possessed generally by the majority

It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of the intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God which is in almost all men, whether as some think because the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as was stated in the first book; (Ch. 10.) or, as seems nearer to the truth, because man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God by his natural reason. For, seeing that natural things are arranged in a certain order—since there cannot be order without a cause of order—men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who arranges in order the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration. In the same way, when we see a man in motion and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is a cause of these operations which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of ‘soul,’ but without knowing yet what the soul is, if it is a body, or how it brings about operations in question.

Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.

For the operation of the happy must be without any defect: and this knowledge is subject to an admixture of many errors. Some believed that there is no other ordainer of worldly things than the heavenly bodies; hence they said that the heavenly bodies are gods. Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them, as though they deemed their movements and natural operations not to be due to another ordainer, and the order in other things to be caused by them. Some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human ordinance, declared that men who cause order in other men are gods. Accordingly, this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.

Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as their end: indeed, it is in everyone almost from the very beginning. Therefore, happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.

Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness: nay, those who have it not and seek it are praised. But he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God seems very much to be blamed, since it is a very clear sign of a man’s stupidity if he fails to perceive such evident signs of God’s existence—even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, did not understood that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm: The fool says in his heart: ‘There is no God’ (Ps 13:1; 52:1). Therefore, this knowledge is not enough for happiness.

Further. Knowledge of a thing only in general, and not in respect of something proper to it, is most imperfect: for instance, knowledge of man from the fact that he is moved, for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially, because the proper is only potentially contained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man’s supreme good must be in respect of what he is actually, and not in respect of what he is only potentially, since potency perfected by act has the aspect of a good. Therefore, the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness.