Lecture 3 — An Enumeration of the Intellectual Virtues

Introducing again the subject treated above, let us discuss it further. There are five habits by which the soul expresses the truth by affirming or denying. They are art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding, but not suspicion and opinion, which can express falsehood. [1142]

From this, then, it can be made clear what science is, if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth. Indeed, we all suppose that what we know scientifically cannot be in any other way. But contingent things are not of this kind, for when they pass from observation, it is not known whether they exist or not. The object of science, then, concerns necessity, and therefore is eternal, because everything that is of necessity without qualification is eternal. Eternal things, however, are unproduced and indestructible. [1144]

Besides, every science can be taught and every object of science can be learned. But all teaching comes about by reason of previous knowledge, as we have indicated in the Postrerior Analytics; one kind is by induction, the other by syllogism. Induction, then, gives us a first principle and a universal assent, but the syllogism proceeds from universals. Therefore, there are principles from which the syllogism proceeds, principles not derived from the syllogism, and consequently arising from induction. Science, then, is a demonstrative habit having all the other requirements determined in the Posterior Analytics. When a man knows scientifically, he assents to and understands principles in some way; indeed, if he does not know them more than the conclusion, then he has science only incidentally. In this way, therefore, the question of science has been settled. [1147]

The contingent is both something to be made and something to be done; and making is one thing and action another. We assent to these things even by proofs outside the science. For this reason, the habit that is active under reason’s guidance is different from the habit that is productive through reason. Likewise, action and making are not contained under one another, for action is not making, nor is making action. [1150]

However, since architecture is a kind of art and also a kind of habit productive through reason, and no art is found that is not a habit of this sort, and again, since there is no such habit that is not an art, then art will be the same as a habit concerned with making, under the guidance of true reason. [1153]

But every art is concerned with realization, an artifact, and observation; it considers particularly how contingent things may be made and indicates that their principle is in the craftsman, but not in the thing made. [1154]

Art, however, does not deal with things that exist necessarily or come into being by necessity, or with things that are according to nature, for they have these principles in themselves. [1156–7]

Since making and action differ from one another, art necessarily directs making and not action. [1158]

In some manner, art and chance are concerned with the same things, as Agathon remarked, “art highly esteems chance, and chance art.“ [1159]

Art, then, as was previously noted, is a kind of habit productive under the guidance of genuine reason, while unskillfulness is a habit productive under the guidance of incorrect reason operating on contingent matter. [1160]

1142. Introducing again the subject treated above. After the Philosopher has investigated the way in which the intellectual virtues are to be understood, he begins now to discuss the intellectual virtues themselves.

First, he discusses the principal intellectual virtues.

Second, at now we must consider (1142a32; [1217]), he defines certain virtues connected with one of them, namely, prudence.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he enumerates the intellectual virtues.

Second, at from this then it can be made clear (1139b18; [1144]), he discusses each of them.

He says first—after the way of understanding the intellectual virtues has been given—that we ought to begin again from what has been settled before [1115], so that we may treat the intellectual virtues themselves.

1143. It was previously pointed out [1125] that the intellectual virtues are habits by which the soul expresses the truth. But there are five habits by which the soul always expresses the truth by either affirming or denying: art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding. Clearly—these are the five intellectual virtues. He omits suspicion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any particular facts, and opinion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any general things. Although these two sometimes do express the truth, nevertheless at other times, it happens that they express falsehood, which is the evil of the intellect just as truth is the good of the intellect. But it is contrary to the nature of virtue to be the principle of an evil act. Obviously, then, suspicion and opinion cannot be called intellectual virtues.

1144. Then, at from this then it can be made clear (1139b18), he determines the intellectual virtues just enumerated.

First, he discusses each of them.

Second, at as having supremacy (1141a19; [1184]), he shows which is the principal one among them.

On the first point, he proceeds in two ways.

First, he discusses the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect regarding the things that are derived from principles.

Second, at since science is an evaluation (1140b31; [1175]), he discusses the intellectual habits perfecting the intellect in regard to first principles.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he defines the science that perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things.

Second, at the contingent is both (1140a1; [1150]), he defines the habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he explains science on the part of the matter.

Second, at besides, every science can be taught (1139b25; [1147]), he explains it on the part of the cause.

1145. He affirms first that what science is can be made clear from what has been said if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth, for in this latter way, we are sometimes said to know sensible things about which we are certain. But a well-founded notion of science is taken from the fact that we all agree that what we know cannot be in any other way; otherwise, we would have the doubt of the guesser and not the certitude of the knower. However, certitude of this kind—namely, that cannot be in any other way—is not possible about things that can be in some other way, for in that case, certitude can be attained about them only when they fall under the senses. But when they pass from observation—that is, cease to be seen or felt—then their existence or non-existence escapes us, as is obvious in the fact that Socrates is sitting. It is evident, then, that everything known by science is of necessity. From this, he infers that it is eternal because everything that is of necessity without qualification is eternal. But things of this kind are neither produced nor destroyed. Therefore, it is about such things that science is concerned.

1146. There can even be a science about producible and perishable things, such as natural science; yet it cannot be based on particulars that are subject to generation and destruction, but on universal reasons that are necessary and eternal.

1147. Next, at besides, every science (1139b25), he explains science by its cause, saying that every science seems to be teachable. Hence, it is stated in Metaphysics 1 (Metaphysics 1.2.982a14; see Aquinas, In I metaph., lec. 2, n. 39.) that a characteristic of the one possessing science is his ability to teach, for a thing is led from potency to actuality by another that is actual. For the same reason, every knowable thing can be learned by a man who has the potentiality. But all teaching or science must come about by reason of some previous knowledge, as was indicated in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics. (Posterior Analytics 1.1.71a; see Aquinas, In I an. post., lec. 1, n. 8.) We cannot arrive at the knowledge of an unknown thing except by means of something known.

1148. There is a twofold teaching by means of things known: one by induction and the other by syllogism. Induction leads us to perceive some principle and something universal at which we arrive by experiments with singulars, as is noted in Metaphysics 1. (Metaphysics 1.1.980b25–981a12; see Aquinas, In I metaph., lec. 1, nn. 17–19.) But the syllogism proceeds from universal principles previously known in the aforementioned manner. Therefore, it is evident from this that there are certain principles from which the syllogism proceeds that are not attested as accurate by the syllogism. Otherwise, there would be a process to infinity in the principles of syllogisms—which is impossible, as is proved in Posterior Analytics 1. (Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b25–73a20;(see Aquinas, In I an. post. lec. 8, nn. 68–75) and 1.19.81b10–1.22.84b2 (see Aquinas, In I an. post., lec. 31–35, nn. 255–307).) So, then, it remains that the principle of the syllogism is induction. However, not all syllogisms are productive of knowledge or causes science, but only the demonstrative, which infers necessary things from the necessary.

1149. So, obviously, science is a demonstrative habit—that is, produced by demonstration—taking into consideration what has been noted about science in the Posterior Analytics. In order that a man may have science, it is necessary that the principles by which he knows be assented to in some way and understood even more than the conclusions which are known. Otherwise, he will not have science essentially, but only incidentally, inasmuch as it can happen that he knows this conclusion through certain other principles and not through these that he does not know better than the conclusion. The cause, certainly, must be more powerful than the effect. Hence, that which is the cause of knowing must be more known. In this way, then, the question of science has been settled.

1150. Next, at the contingent is both (1140a1), he defines the habits that perfect the intellect in regard to contingent things.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things.

Second, at however, since architecture (1140a6; [1153]) he defines one of these.

Third, at let us now investigate (1140a24; [1161]), he defines the other, namely, prudence.

He says first that the contingent is divided into two sections: something to be done and something to be made. Thus, we know that the one is an action and the other a making.

1151. We can assent to these things by external reasons, by what has been determined outside this science in Metaphysics 9. (Metaphysics 9.8.1050a23–1050b; see Aquinas, In IX metaph., lec. 8, 1nn. 862–65.) There the difference between action and making has been explained. Action is an operation remaining in the agent, like seeing, understanding, and willing. But making is an operation passing into external matter to fashion something out of it, like constructing and sawing. Since habits are distinguished according to the object, it follows that the habit that is active by means of reason, meaning prudence, is different from the habit that is productive through reason, meaning art. It follows also that one of these is not contained under the other, as action and making are not contained under one another, since neither is action making nor is making action. They are distinguished by opposing differences, as is clear from what has just been said.

1152. We must consider that the knowledge of contingent things cannot possess the truth’s certitude rejecting untruth. Therefore, where there is question of knowledge alone, contingent things are passed over by the intellect, which is perfected by the knowledge of the truth. But the knowledge of the contingent is useful according as it gives direction to human operation, which is concerned with what is contingent. For that reason, he makes the division of contingent things—when treating the intellectual virtues—only as they are subject to human operation. Hence, also, only the practical sciences are concerned with contingent things precisely, as they are contingent, namely, in the area of the particular. The speculative sciences, on the other hand, do not deal with contingent things except according to universal reasons, as was noted before [1146].

1153. Then, at however, since architecture (1140a6), he defines art.

First, he defines art in itself;

second, at art, then (1140a20; [1160]), by comparison with its opposite.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows what art is.

Second, at but every art is concerned (1140a10; [1154]), he shows what the subject matter of art is.

He makes the first point by induction. We see architecture as a kind of art, and also as a kind of habit for making something through reason. Likewise, every art is so constituted that it is a habit, concerned with making, under the guidance of reason. Likewise, no productive habit of this kind (that is, directed by reason) is found that is not an art. Hence, it is evident that art is the same as a habit, concerned with making under the guidance of true reason.

1154. Next, at but every art (1140a10), he considers the subject matter of art.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he proposes the subject matter of art.

Second, at art, however, does not (1140a14; [1156]), he shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter.

Third, at in some manner (1140a17; [1159]), he shows with what it agrees in subject matter.

We should consider two things about the subject matter of art:

the very operation of the craftsman that is directed by the art,

and the product manufactured.

Now, there is a threefold operation of art:

the first is to consider how an artifact is to be produced;

the second is to operate on the external matter;

the third is to accomplish the work itself.

For this reason, he says that every art is concerned with the creation, or the achievement and completion of the work, which he places as the end of art. It is concerned also with the artistic—that is, with the operation of art that disposes the material—and with observing how a thing may be made by art.

1155. On the part of the work itself, we should consider two things.

The first of these is that the things that are made by art are contingent—they can be or not be. This is evident from the fact that, when they are made, they begin to be in a new form.

The second is that the principle of the creation of artistic works is in the craftsman alone, as it were, in something extrinsic to the artifact, but is not in the thing made as something intrinsic to it.

1156. Then, at art, however, does not (1140a14), he explains what was just said [1154–55], showing how art differs from three other areas of knowledge.

First, in relation to the divine sciences and mathematics dealing with those things that exist or come into being by necessity; about these subjects there is no art.

1157. Second, at or with things (1140a14), he shows the difference in relation to natural science, which treats of those things that are according to nature, and about which there is no art. The things that are according to nature have the principle of motion in themselves, as was stated in Physics 2. (Physics 2.1.192b15; see Aquinas, In II phys., lec. 1, n. 142.) This does not belong to the works of art, as we just pointed out [1155].

1158. Third, at since making (1140a16), he shows how art differs from prudence. He says that, since action and making differ from one another, art is restricted to giving directions to making, and not to action, which prudence directs.

1159. At in some manner (1140a17), he shows that with which art is in material agreement. He says that chance and art have to do with those things that are done by intellect: art in company with reason, and chance without reason. Agathon indicated this agreement when he said that art values chance and chance art, inasmuch as they agree in matter.

1160. Then, at art, then (1140a20), he considers art by comparison with its opposite. He says that, as art is a certain habit concerned with making under the guidance of true reason, as was previously noted [1153], so atechnia or unskillfulness is a habit concerned with making directed by incorrect reason regarding what is contingent.