Lecture 10 — Doubts About the Usefulness of Wisdom and Prudence

Someone may raise a doubt about the utility of these virtues. [1257]

Wisdom, to be sure, explores none of the ways in which man is made happy, for it does not consider any operation. [1258]

Although prudence considers this very thing, why does man need it? Prudence is the virtue concerned with things that are just and honorable and useful to man—the performance of which belongs to the good of man. But we are not more inclined to do things from knowing them (since virtues are operative habits) than we are inclined to fulfill the requirements of health and good condition from knowing them, but [we are rather inclined] from the fact that they are habits. Surely we are not more inclined to activity because we know medicine and gymnastics. [1259]

If we must assume that a man ought to be prudent not for the sake of these (virtuous works) but to become virtuous, prudence will not be at all useful for men who are virtuous. [1261]

Nor will it be necessary for those not having virtue, for in order to be virtuous, it makes no difference whether men have prudence themselves or are induced to it by others who have it. It is enough that we make use of prudence; in regard to health, we do not learn medicine even though we want to be healthy. [1263]

Again, it seems unreasonable that prudence, which is less perfect, should have predominance over wisdom. Prudence indeed has power over singulars and gives orders in regard to them. But we must discuss the questions proposed; up to the present we have merely raised doubts about them. [1264]

We answer first that wisdom and prudence necessarily are objects of choice in themselves; even if neither of them performs any operation, they are virtues perfecting both parts of the soul. [1266]

Wisdom and prudence do, in fact, perform some operation, but not as the medical art produces health; as health brings about healthful activities, so does wisdom bring happiness. Since wisdom is a part of virtue as a whole, he who has it acts according to it and becomes happy. [1267]

Moreover, a work of virtue is perfected in accord with prudence and moral virtue: moral virtue rectifies the end, and prudence the means to the end. But there is no such virtue in the fourth part of the soul, the power of growth, because this does not have the option of operating or not operating. [1268]

Concerning the objection that men will not the more readily perform good and just deeds by reason of prudence, we must begin a little further back, resuming the following heading. We do not call certain men just who do just works, such as those who do the things decreed by the law, either unwillingly or because of ignorance or some other cause rather than because of the works themselves. We do not call such men just even though they do what they ought to do and even what a good man ought to do. So, as it seems, one ought to do particular things in such a manner as to be virtuous: he should do them from choice and for the sake of the virtuous works themselves. Virtue indeed makes the right choice, but whatever things are designed by nature to be done do not pertain to virtue, but to some other principle. [1270]

But something more must be said in order to understand these matters better. There is a particular quality called shrewdness that is of such a nature that it enables a man to do the things ordained to a determined end and to attain the end by means of these things. When the intention is good, shrewdness is praiseworthy, but when the intention is evil, it is called craftiness. For this reason, we call both prudent and crafty people clever. [1272]

Prudence is not this quality, but it cannot exist without it; the habit in the soul is joined to this insight by moral virtue, as has been pointed out. This is evident because argumentation in the practical order has a principle that such an end is the supreme good, whatever that end may be (in fact, anything may be used as an example). What is the supreme good is not apparent except to a virtuous man, for evil corrupts and causes deception in practical principles. Obviously, then, it is impossible for a man to be prudent who is not virtuous. [1273]

1257. Someone may raise a doubt about the utility. After the Philosopher has considered the intellectual virtues, he raises some doubts about their utility.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he proposes some doubts.

Second, at we answer first (1144a1; [1266]), he solves them.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he raises a doubt about the usefulness of wisdom and prudence, to which the other virtues are referred as to the principal ones.

Second, at again, it seems (1143b33; [1264]), he raises a doubt about the comparison of these two with one another.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he proposes the doubt, saying that a man may be uncertain why or how wisdom and prudence are useful.

1258. Second, at wisdom, to be sure (1143b19), he pursues the doubt.

He does so first in regard to wisdom, which seems to be useless. Whatever is useful in human affairs contributes something to happiness, the ultimate end of human life, to which wisdom seems to contribute nothing. Wisdom does not appear to explore any of the ways by which man is made happy, because this takes place by means of virtuous operation, as was explained in the first book [224–30]. But wisdom does not consider any production—that is, operation—since it treats the first principles of being. So, then, it seems that wisdom is not useful to man.

1259. Second, at although prudence considers (1143b20), he pursues his doubt about prudence.

First, he brings forward the argument that prudence is not necessary for man.

Second, at if we must assume (1143b28; [1261]), he rules out a particular answer.

He says first that it is the role of prudence to consider the operations of man by which he may become happy. But, on this account, it does not seem that man needs it. Prudence is concerned with things just in relation to others and with things noble (or honorable) and good, that is, useful to man in relation to himself—the performance of which belongs to the good man. But a person does not seem to perform actions that are in accord with some habit from the fact that he knows them, but from the fact that he has the habit in relation to them.

1260. Thus, it is clear in regard to the body that someone is not more inclined to put into practice the things pertaining to a healthy or well-conditioned man—provided they are not merely activities—because he has a knowledge of medicine or gymnastics, but because he has an inner habit. It happens sometimes that, from a knowledge of his art, a man performs certain healthful activities but does them incidentally and not according as they come from a habit of health, which is why a healthy man does them. So this does not proceed from man because he knows medicine, but only because he is healthy. Therefore, since virtues are habits, a man is not induced to do the works of the virtues as they proceed from the habits and lead to happiness simply because prudence gives him a knowledge of them. And in this manner prudence is not operative of the good.

1261. Then, at if we must assume (1143b28), he rules out a particular answer. Someone could say that, when a man is being virtuous, he is not more ready to perform virtuous acts from the fact that he knows them according to prudence even though he does need prudence to become virtuous, just as a healthy man does not need the art of medicine to perform healthful works but in order that he be made healthy. So we must say that a man ought to be prudent not for the sake of these virtuous works, but for the sake of becoming virtuous.

He excludes this answer for two reasons.

1262. The first reason is that prudence would not be at all useful when men are already good, that is, virtuous. This seems quite unreasonable.

1263. He gives the second reason at nor will it (1143b30). According to the previous answer, it seems that prudence would not be necessary even for those who do not have virtue. Whether men have prudence themselves or they are induced to it by those who have prudence does not seem to make any difference for their becoming virtuous, since, in the latter case, man is sufficiently disposed to become virtuous, as is clear in regard to health. When we want to regain health, we do not, because of this, take the trouble to learn medicine, but it is enough to follow the advice of doctors. Hence, for a similar reason, it is not necessary to have prudence in order to become virtuous, but it is sufficient to be instructed by prudent men.

1264. Next, at again, it seems (1143b33), he raises a doubt about the comparison between prudence and wisdom. It was explained before [1186–89] that prudence is inferior to wisdom in excellence. At least wisdom seems to be prior, that is, more pre-eminent than prudence, which operates with and gives orders regarding singulars. Even political science is contained under prudence, for it has been explained in the introduction to this work [26–31] that political science gives orders as to what sciences ought to be pursued in a state, which sciences each man ought to learn, and for what period. So it seems that prudence has authority over wisdom, since to give orders is the function of a judge. But it seems unreasonable that the less perfect should exercise authority over the more excellent.

1265. Continuing with what follows, he adds a note, saying that he must discuss the proposed questions, which have been treated under the aspect of doubt up to the present.

1266. Then, at we answer first (1144a1), he resolves the foregoing doubts.

First, he solves the doubt about the utility of wisdom and prudence.

Second, at nevertheless, prudence (1145a6; [1290]), he solves the doubt about the comparison between the two.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he solves the doubt in regard to wisdom and prudence in general;

second, at moreover, a work (1144a6; [1268]), in regard to prudence in particular.

In reference to the first, he puts forward two explanations.

The first of these shows that the arguments presented do not prove conclusively. It does not follow that wisdom and prudence are useless because nothing is gained in happiness by them. Even if neither of them had any operation, they would nevertheless be objects of choice in themselves since they are virtues perfecting both parts of the rational soul, as is evident from previous discussions [1255]. Anything is an object of choice by reason of its perfection.

1267. The second explanation, given at wisdom and prudence (1144a3), destroys the arguments. He says that wisdom and prudence in fact do something for happiness. But the example that he had been using was not suitable. Wisdom or prudence is not compared to happiness in the same way as the medical art to health, but rather as health to healthful activities. The medical art brings about health as a particular external work produced, but health brings about healthful activities by use of the habit of health. However, happiness is not a work externally produced, but an operation proceeding from the habit of virtue. Hence, since wisdom is a certain species of virtue as a whole, it follows that, from the very fact that a man has wisdom and operates according to it, he is happy. The same reason holds in the case of prudence. But he mentioned wisdom particularly because happiness consists more in its operation, as will be explained later, in book 10 [2111–25].

1268. Next, at moreover, a work (1144a6), he solves the objections pertaining particularly to prudence:

first, in reference to the doubt as to whether prudence does anything for virtuous works;

second, at concerning the objection (1144a11; [1270]), in reference to the doubt as to whether prudence is necessary in order that a man be virtuous.

He says first—this time as regards prudence in particular—that the objection of prudence not enabling us to perform virtuous works breaks down. This can be false because we perfect the work of virtue according to both prudence and moral virtue.

1269. Two things are needed in a work of virtue.

One is that a man have a right intention for the end, which moral virtue provides in inclining the appetitive faculty to a proper end.

The other is to be well disposed toward the means. This is done by prudence, which gives good advice, judges, and orders the means to the end.

In this way, prudence and moral virtue concur in a virtuous operation: prudence perfecting the part rational by essence, and moral virtue perfecting the appetitive part, which is rational by participation. But in the other, nutritive part of the soul—which is altogether devoid of reason—there is no such virtue concurring in human operation. The evident reason for this is that the power of growth does not have the option of operating or not operating. But this characteristic is required for the operation of human virtue, as is evident from previous discussions in book 2 [305, 308] and 3 [382, 496, 502–3].

1270. At concerning the objection (1144a11), he solves the difficulty that pretended to show that a man could be and could become virtuous without prudence.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows that prudence cannot exist without moral virtue.

Second, at we must again (1144b1; [1275]), he shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows that, for a man to be virtuous, not only moral virtue but also another operative principle is required.

Second, at but something more (1144a22; [1272]), he shows what it is.

Third, at prudence is not (1144a28; [1273]), he shows that prudence makes an addition of a moral virtue to that principle.

He says first that, to answer the assertion [1262–63] that by reason of prudence a man will not perform good and just actions in order to become virtuous, we must begin a little further back, resuming certain things already discussed [1035–49].

1271. We will begin from this point; as has been said [1035–49], some people perform just deeds and we nevertheless do not call them just, as when they do deeds decreed by law but either unwillingly or because of ignorance or for some other reason like gain, and not out of love for the very works of justice. Men of this sort, I say, are not called just, even though they perform the actions they should perform and even actions that a good man should perform. So also in particular virtues, a man ought to work in some measure in order that he be good or virtuous, just as he works from choice and because the virtuous works themselves are pleasing. It has just been said [1269] that moral virtue makes the right choice in regard to the intention of the end. But the things designed by nature to be done for the end do not pertain to moral virtue, but to some other power, that is, to a certain other operative principle that discovers ways leading to ends. So a principle of this kind is necessary in order that a man be virtuous.

1272. Then, at but something more (1144a22), he shows what that principle is. He states that something further must be said about the things discussed above, so that they may be more clearly understood. There is, therefore, a particular power, an operative principle called shrewdness, as it were a certain ingenuity or skillfulness. This is of such a nature that, by means of it, man can do the things ordered to an end—either good or bad—that he has presupposed, and by means of the things he does, he can share or attain the end. When the intention is good, ingenuity of this sort deserves praise, but when the intention is bad, it is called craftiness, which implies evil as prudence implies good. But, because shrewdness is common to each, it follows that we call both prudent and crafty people shrewd, that is, ingenious or skillful. So, then, it seems that wisdom is not useful to man.

1273. At prudence is not (1144a28), he shows that prudence adds something to this principle, saying that prudence is not identical with this trait of shrewdness, although prudence cannot be without it. But the habit of prudence in the soul is not joined to this insight—that is, this perceptive principle of shrewdness—without moral virtue, which always refers to good, as has been pointed out [712]. The reason for this is clear. As argumentation has principles in the speculative field, so it has in the practical field, such as the principle that such an end is the good and the supreme good, whatever that end be for which a man operates (and anything may be used as an example). Thus, for the self-controlled man the supreme good and a quasi principle is the attainment of moderation in the desires of touch. But the supreme good is not apparent except to the good or virtuous man who has the proper evaluation of the end, since moral virtue rectifies the conception of the end.

1274. That what is really the supreme good does not appear in evil things is evident from the fact that vice, the opposite of virtue, perverts the judgment of the reason and causes deception in practical principles, for example, to follow his desires seems the supreme good to the licentious man. It is not possible to reason correctly if we are in error about principles. Since, then, it pertains to the prudent man to reason correctly in practical matters, obviously it is impossible for one to be prudent who is not virtuous, just as a man who errs about the principles of demonstration cannot acquire science.