Lecture 8 — Eubulia (Excellence in Deliberating)

Now we must consider the nature of eubulia. Is it science, opinion, or eustochia (the virtue of conjecturing well in practical matters), or does it belong to some other genus? [1217]

Certainly it is not science, for men do not inquire about things they already know. But eubulia is a kind of counsel that is given to inquiry and discursive thinking. [1218]

However, it is not eustochia, because eustochia exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous, while eubulia requires much time for those who deliberate. As the proverb goes: “Be slow to come to a decision; but when you have decided, act quickly.” [1219]

Furthermore, quickness of mind and eubulia differ, for the former is a kind of eustochia. [1220]

Nor is eubulia opinion in any sense whatever. [1221]

But, because the man errs who deliberates badly and the man who deliberates well does so rightly, it is evident that eubulia is a kind of rectitude, although not pertaining to either science or opinion, for rectitude, like error, is not applicable to science, while truth is the rectitude of opinion. [1222–25]

Likewise, everything that is a matter of opinion has already been determined. Nevertheless eubulia is not without discursive knowledge, and so differs from opinion; it is not at all a declaration. And opinion is not an inquiry, but a sort of declaration already made. However, the man who deliberates, well or badly, inquires and thinks discursively about a subject. [1226]

But eubulia is a certain rectitude of deliberation. Therefore, we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned. [1227]

Obviously, rectitude is taken in various senses, because not every rectitude is eubulia. Indeed, the incontinent and evil man will acquire by reasoning what he sets out to know. Therefore, one who keeps in view even some great evil will be said to deliberate rightly. But to deliberate well seems to be a good. And this rectitude of deliberation by which someone obtains a good end is eubulia. [1228]

But it is possible sometimes to determine this even by a false syllogism, such that, if the middle term should be false, we arrive at what we ought to do but not by the means we ought. Therefore, that by which we attain what we ought but not in the way we ought is not eubulia in the full sense. [1230]

Besides, it happens that one man deliberates too slowly but another too quickly. Hence, genuine eubulia is found not in these exaggerations, but in rectitude, which acts according to what is useful and proper in regard to the end, the manner, and the time. [1232]

Again, one person may deliberate well in the unqualified sense and another may simply concern himself about a particular end. Therefore, eubulia without qualification will be that which directs deliberations in relation to an absolute end, but eubulia in a limited sense will be that which directs deliberations in relation to a particular end. If to deliberate well indeed belongs to prudent people, eubulia will be rectitude conducive to that end about which prudence gives the true evaluation. [1233]

1217. Now we must consider the nature of eubulia. After the Philosopher has defined prudence and the other principal intellectual virtues, he now investigates certain virtues connected with prudence.

First, he defines them individually, each in itself.

Second, at all the preceding habits (1143a25; [1245]), he compares them with one another and with prudence.

On the first point he does three things.

First, he investigates the genus of eubulia.

Second, at nor is synesis (1142b34; [1235]), he investigates synesis.

Third, at the virtue called gnome (1143a19; [1243]), he investigates gnome.

Regarding the first point, he does three things.

First, he examines the genus of eubulia, showing that it is a kind of rectitude.

Second, at although not (1142b7; [1223]), he shows to what rectitude is linked.

Third, at obviously, rectitude (1142b17; [1228]), he shows what kind of rectitude he is discussing.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at **certainly it is not **(1142a34; [1218]), he carries it out.

He says first that, after the tract on the principal intellectual virtues [1142–1216], he must treat the nature of eubulia (excellent deliberation) in order to have a complete knowledge of these virtues. Is it a kind of science, or at least opinion, or even eustochia—shrewd conjecturing? Or in what other genus is it?

1218. Then, at certainly it is not (1142a34), he shows what the genus of eubulia is.

First, he shows where it does not belong.

Second, at but because the man (1142b7; [1222]), he determines its genus.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows that eubulia is not science.

Second, at however, it is not (1142b2; [1219]), he shows that it is not eustochia.

Third, at nor is eubulia (1142b6; [1221]), he shows that it is not opinion.

He says first that eubulia is not science. This is clear from the fact that men already possessing science do not inquire about those things that they know, but rather have certain knowledge about them. But eubulia, being a kind of deliberation, is joined with some sort of inquiry, for the man who deliberates inquires and thinks discursively. But discursive knowledge is attained at the end of an inquiry. Therefore, eubulia is not science.

1219. At however, is it not (1142b2), he shows by two reasons that eubulia is not eustochia.

The first is this. Eustochia, or happy conjecture, exists without the inquiry of reason and is instantaneous. It is innate in some men who, by reason of acuteness of powers, richness of imagination, and sensitivity of the external senses, come to a prompt judgment based on intellect or sense whereby they correctly evaluate a situation. Wide experience also develops this. And these two things are lacking in eubulia, which is associated with the inquiry of reason, as was just mentioned [1218]. Besides, eubulia is not instantaneous, but rather takes time for those who deliberate so they may thoroughly explore everything touching the subject. Hence, too, the proverb says that the matters of counsel ought to be carried out quickly but deliberated slowly. So, obviously, eubulia is not eustochia.

1220. At furthermore, quickness (1142b5), he gives the second reason. If eubulia was identical with eustochia, then whatever was contained under eubulia would be contained under eustochia. But quickness of mind is a certain kind of eustochia; it is a rapid conjecture about finding a means. However, quickness of mind differs from eubulia, since eubulia is not concerned with the end that holds the place in practical matters that the middle term holds in syllogisms, for counsel is not taken about the end, as was indicated in book 3 [473–74]. Therefore, eubulia is not the same as eustochia.

1221. Next, at nor is eubulia (1142b6), he shows that eubulia is not opinion: not only is it not the case that all opinion is eubulia, but rather no opinion is eubulia. This is evident for the same reason stated previously [1145, 1165] about science, for although a man who holds an opinion is not certain, nevertheless he has already limited himself to one viewpoint—something that is not true of a man deliberating.

1222. Then, at but, because the man (1142b7), he shows what is the real genus of eubulia from the fact that the man who deliberates badly is said to err in deliberating but the man who deliberates well is said to deliberate rightly. The latter is eubuleos (namely, correct in deliberation). Hence, it is plain that eubulia is a kind of rectitude.

1223. At although not (1142b7), he shows to what rectitude is linked.

First, he shows whence it does not arise;

second, at but* eubulia *is (1142b16; [1227]), whence it does arise.

On this first point, he does two things.

First, he proposes what he intends, saying that eubulia is rectitude neither of science nor of opinion.

1224. Next, at for rectitude (1142b7), he establishes his proposition.

He does so first in regard to science. In an area where error is possible, rectitude appears necessary. But error does not apply to science, which always has to do with true and necessary things. Therefore, eubulia is not rectitude of science.

1225. Then, at while truth (1142b7), he establishes his proposition in regard to opinion, by two arguments.

The first is this. Since error is possible in opinion, rectitude is applicable to it. However, its rectitude is not called goodness, but truth, just as its defect is called falsity. Therefore, eubulia, which takes its name from goodness, is not rectitude of opinion.

1226. He gives the second argument at likewise (1142b11), saying that everything that is a matter of opinion is already determined so far as concerns the one holding it, but not in reality. On this point eubulia, since it is not without the inquiry of reason, differs from opinion. Eubulia is not a declaration of something, but an inquiry, whereas opinion is not an inquiry, but a kind of declaration of the man holding it, for a person expressing an opinion states what he imagines to be true. But the man who deliberates, whether well or badly, seeks something and thinks discursively about the subject; hence he does not yet declare it is or is not so. Therefore, eubulia is not rectitude of opinion.

1227. Then, at but eubulia (1142b16), he shows of what subject eubulia is rectitude. He says that, since eubulia is rectitude of neither science nor opinion, we conclude that it must be a certain rectitude of deliberation, as the very name indicates. Consequently, to have a perfect notion of eubulia, we must inquire what deliberation is and about what it is concerned. These questions have been discussed before in book 3 [458–82], so there is no need that they be resumed here.

1228. Next, at obviously, rectitude (1142b17), he shows what kind of rectitude eubulia is.

On this point, he determines four conditions by turns.

He says first that rectitude is used in various senses:

in one sense properly,

in another figuratively.

Properly, it is used in reference to good things, but figuratively, it is applied to evil things, just as if we should say that a man is a real burglar, as we do say he is a good burglar.

1229. Obviously, not every rectitude of deliberation is eubulia, for rectitude of deliberation does not refer to evil things, but to good things only. The incontinent and evil man sometimes attains what he sets out to know by his reasoning, such as when he finds out the way he can commit sin. Hence, figuratively he is said to deliberate correctly, inasmuch as he discovers a way effectively leading to an evil end. However, he takes some great evil for his end, such as theft or adultery. But to deliberate well—the name eubulia means this—seems to be something good. Hence, it is evident that this rectitude of deliberation is eubulia by which a man attains a good end.

1230. At but it is possible (1142b22), he explains the second condition, that sometimes in syllogistic arguments a true conclusion is drawn by a false syllogism. So also, sometimes in practical matters, we arrive at a good end by some evil means. This is what he means by saying that sometimes we determine a good end by a false syllogism, as it were. Thus, a man, by deliberating, arrives at what he ought to do but not at the means he ought to use, such as when someone steals to help the poor. It is as if a man, in reasoning, would take some false middle term to arrive at a true conclusion.

1231. Although the end in the order of intention is like the principle and the middle term, nevertheless, in the order of execution, which the counselor seeks, the end takes the place of the conclusion and the means the place of the middle term. Obviously, the man who draws a true conclusion by means of a false middle term is not reasoning correctly. Consequently, eubulia is not genuine if a man attains the end he ought but not in the way he ought.

1232. At besides, it happens (1142b26), he gives the third condition. He says that sometimes a man takes so much time in deliberating that perhaps the opportunity for action occasionally slips by. Likewise, another man may deliberate too hastily. Hence, genuine eubulia consists not in this, but in that rectitude that aims at what is useful for the proper end, manner, and time.

1233. At again, one person (1142b28), he introduces the fourth condition, saying that one man may deliberate well, without qualification, about the whole end of life. Also, it is possible that another may rightly deliberate about some particular end. Hence, unqualified eubulia will be that which directs deliberation in relation to the common end of human life. But eubulia of a particular kind will direct deliberation in relation to some special end. Because to deliberate well is characteristic of prudent people, unqualified eubulia must be rectitude of deliberation in respect to that end that so-called absolute prudence truly evaluates. This is the common end of the whole of life, as was noted above [1163].

1234. Therefore, it can be seen from all our discussions that eubulia is rectitude of deliberation in relation to an absolutely good end, by suitable methods, and at an opportune time.