Lecture 4 — Prudence

Let us now investigate prudence in this way, considering who are called prudent. [1161]

It seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can give good advice about proper goods useful not for just one aspect of life—as an example, what are useful for health or bodily strength—but for the benefit of the total life of man. [1162]

A sign of this is that we call men prudent in a particular matter when they can rightly conclude what is useful for a determined good end in things that do not belong to art. Therefore, a man will be absolutely prudent who gives advice about the whole of life. [1163]

But no one takes counsel about things that either are incapable of being in any other way or are not within his power. Therefore, let us consider that science comes about by demonstration, and a demonstration is not possible in things whose principles can be in some other way—otherwise all the conclusions could be different; also, that counsel is not about matters that are necessarily so. Prudence, then, will be neither a science nor an art. It is not a science because the thing to be done is contingent; it is not an art because the genus of action differs from that of making. [1164]

It remains, therefore, that prudence is a genuine habit concerned with action under the guidance of reason, dealing with things good and bad for man. [1166]

Indeed, the end of making is something other than itself. This is not always true in regard to action, for sometimes a good operation is its own end. [1167]

For this reason, we think Pericles and others like him are prudent, because they can reckon what things are good both for themselves and for others. We look upon stewards or dispensers of goods and statesmen or rulers of cities as men of this kind. [1168]

Hence, we call temperance by the name sophrosyne, as it were, a thing preserving prudence. Prudence does preserve an estimation of the kind mentioned, for while pleasure and pain do not distort or pervert all judgments (for example, that a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles), they do affect those dealing with the practicable. The principles of practicable things are the ends for which they are done. But the principle is not clear to a man corrupted by pleasure or pain, nor does he see the obligation to choose and do everything for the sake of it and on account of it, for vice is corruptive of principle. Consequently, prudence is of necessity a habit concerned with action, under the direction of correct reason, regarding the human good. [1169]

Nevertheless, virtue is required for art but not for prudence. [1172]

Likewise, in art, a man who makes a deliberate mistake is the more acceptable, but in prudence, as in the virtues, it is the reverse. It is clear, therefore, that prudence is a particular kind of virtue and not an art. [1173]

But, since there are two parts of the reasoning soul, prudence will be a virtue of the second part—namely, the conjectural—for opinion deals with the contingent as prudence does. Nevertheless, prudence is not a habit connected with reason alone, and a sign of this is that such a habit can be forgotten. But this is not true of prudence. [1174]

1161. Let us now investigate prudence. After the Philosopher has finished his investigation of art, he begins now to investigate prudence.

First, he shows what prudence is.

Second, at but since there are two parts (1140b25; [1174]), he shows what its object is.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows the nature of prudence.

Second, at nevertheless, virtue (1140b21; [1172]), he shows how it differs from art.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows who is prudent.

Second, at but no one takes counsel (1140a31; [1164]), he shows what prudence is.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he determines the method of procedure, saying that we must accept what prudence is from a consideration of people classed as prudent.

1162. Second, at it seems to pertain (1140a25), he shows who are prudent. He says that it seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can, by the power of habit, give good advice about proper and useful goods, not only in some particular matter—for example, what things are useful for health or bodily strength—but also about things good and useful for the benefit of the total life of man.

1163. Third, at a sign of this is (1140a28), he gives a probative sign for his assertion. People are called prudent not absolutely but in a particular matter who can infer correctly what things are good or useful for some determined end. We suppose the end is good because to make deductions about things in reference to an evil end is contrary to prudence. We suppose likewise that there is a question of things to which art does not apply, because to conclude rightly in such matters (which are the concern of art) belongs not to prudence but to art. Therefore, if a man who is capable of giving good advice for a particular incident is presumed prudent in some matter, it follows that he will be absolutely prudent who gives good counsel about things touching the whole of life.

1164. Then, at but no one takes counsel (1140a31), he shows what prudence is.

First, he gives the definition.

Second, at for this reason we think (1140b7; [1168]), he makes it known by signs.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows in this context the difference between prudence and other habits given above [1142–60], namely, science and art.

Second, at it remains (1140b4; [1166]), he infers the definition of prudence.

Third, at indeed the end of making (1140b6; [1167]), he assigns the reason for a statement he has made.

He remarks first that no one deliberates either about things that absolutely cannot be in any other way, or about things not within his power. Let us, then, take the things stated above [1148–49]—namely, that science comes about by demonstration, and also that a demonstration is not possible in matter whose principles can be in some other way, otherwise all the conclusions from those principles could be different. It is not possible that principles should be weaker than the inferences drawn from the principles. But let us now join to these observations what has just been said, namely, that counsel is not about matters that are necessarily so, and that prudence is concerned with things worthy of deliberation, since it was previously stated [1162–63] that the prudent man’s special function is to give good counsel. From all this, it follows that prudence is neither a science nor an art.

1165. That it is not a science is evident from the fact that things to be done, about which counsel is given and prudence is concerned, are contingent; and there is no science about matters of this kind. But that it is not an art is evident because the genus of action and that of making are different. Consequently, prudence, which deals with action, differs from art, which deals with making.

1166. Next, at it remains, therefore (1140b4), he infers the definition of prudence from the premises. He says that, inasmuch as prudence is neither a science (a habit of demonstration concerning necessary things) nor an art (a habit concerned with making under the guidance of reason), it follows that it is a habit dealing with action directed by genuine reason and is concerned not about things to be made—which are outside man—but about things good and bad for man himself.

1167. At indeed, the end of making (1140b6), he assigns the reason for his statement [1166] that prudence is a habit dealing with action and concerned with things good and bad for man. Obviously, the end of making is always something other than the making itself, as the end of building is a constructed edifice. Consequently, the good of making is not in the maker, but in the thing made. So, then, art, which deals with making, is not concerned with the good and bad of man, but with the good and bad of things wrought by art. But the end of action is not always something other than the action, because sometimes eupraxia or good operation is its own end, that is, for itself, or even for the agent. This, however, is not always so. Nothing prevents one action from being ordered to another as an end; for example, the consideration of effects is ordered to a consideration of the cause, but the end of each is a good. Clearly, then, the good of action is in the agent himself. Hence, prudence, which deals with action, is said to be concerned with the goods of man.

1168. Then, at for this reason (1140b7), he gives two signs indicating the validity of the proposed definition.

The first of these is that, since prudence is concerned with things good and bad for man, Pericles and others like him are thought to be prudent because they can consider what are the good things not only for themselves but also for others. Likewise, we think of stewards or dispensers of goods and of statesmen or governors of cities as men of this kind, that is, who can reckon good things for themselves and others.

1169. At hence we call (1140b11), he presents the second sign. He says that, because prudence is concerned with good and bad things to be done, for this reason temperance is called in Greek sophrosyne (as it were, a thing preserving the reason), from which prudence gets the name phronesis. But temperance, precisely as it moderates the pleasures and pains of touch, preserves an estimation of this kind, namely, concerned with things to be done that are good or bad for man. Likewise, this is made clear from the converse, since pleasure and pain, which temperance moderates, do not altogether distort (nor pervert by bringing about the exact opposite) every estimation—for example, the speculative judgment on whether a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles. But pleasure and pain do distort and pervert estimations that have to do with the practicable.

1170. Subsequently, he shows how this distortion comes about. It is evident that the principles of practicable things are the ends for the sake of which the practicable are done; these are in practicable matters like principles in demonstrations, as is stated in Physics 2. (Physics 2.9.200a15–b10; see Aquinas, In II phys., lec. 15, nn. 273–74.) But, to a man experiencing intense pleasure or pain, that thing appears best by which he attains pleasure and avoids pain. So, when the judgment of his reason is distorted, a man does not see clearly the end that is the principle of prudence regarding the practicable, nor does he desire the end; likewise, it does not seem to him necessary to choose and do everything on account of the true end, but rather on account of pleasure. Every vice or bad habit distorts the principle, since it distorts the correct estimation of the end. However, this distortion is prevented to a great degree by temperance.

1171. Thus, he comes to the conclusion from the foregoing signs that prudence is necessarily a habit of action with correct reason regarding the good of man.

1172. Next, at nevertheless, virtue (1140b21), he shows a twofold difference between art and prudence from the nature of virtue.

The first is that, in the art, a moral virtue regulating its use is required, for it is possible for a man to have the use of art enabling him to build a good building, but not will it because of some other vice. But moral virtue, such as justice, causes a craftsman rightly to use his art. On the other hand, in the use of prudence, an additional moral virtue is not required, for it was said [1170] that the principles of prudence are ends in regard to which rectitude of judgment is preserved by the moral virtues. Hence, prudence, which is concerned with things good for man, necessarily has joined with it the moral virtues preserving its principles. This is not true of art, which deals with external goods, but after art is acquired, moral virtue is still necessary to regulate its use.

1173. He presents the second difference at likewise in art (1140b22). Obviously, if a man deliberately makes a mistake in art, he is considered a better artist than if he does not do this of his own will, because then he would seem to act out of ignorance of his art. This is evident in those who deliberately make grammatical errors in their speech. But, in the case of prudence, a man who willingly sins is less commended than one who sins against his will; the same is true of the moral virtues. This is true because, for prudence, there is required a rectitude of the appetitive faculty concerning the ends, in order that its principles be preserved. Thus, it is clear that prudence is not an art consisting, as it were, only in the truth of reason, but a virtue requiring rectitude of the appetitive faculty after the manner of the moral virtues.

1174. Then, at but since there are two parts (1140b25), he shows what the subject of prudence is. He says that, since there are two parts of the rational soul—one of which is called scientific, and the other estimative or conjectural—it is clear that prudence is a virtue of the second of these, namely, the conjectural. Opinion indeed deals with contingent things, as prudence does. Nevertheless, although prudence resides in this part of the reason as in a subject—because of this it is called an intellectual virtue—it is not connected with reason alone, as art or science, but it requires rectitude of the appetitive faculty. A sign of this is that a habit in the reason alone can be forgotten (for example, art and science), unless the habit is a natural one like understanding. Prudence, however, is not forgotten by disuse, but it is destroyed by the cessation of right desire, which, while remaining, is continually engaged with the things belonging to prudence, such that oblivion cannot come along unawares.