Lecture 7 — Prudence, the Principal Virtue in Human Affairs

But there will be a certain architectonic knowledge even here. [1195]

However, civic prudence and prudence as such are really the same habit, although they differ from one another. [1196]

One part of the habit dealing with the whole state is, as it were, architectonic prudence, and is denominated legislative; the other part, concerned with individual practicables, goes by the general name of “civic prudence.” The latter is operative and deliberative, for a decree has to do with the practicable as a singular ultimate. Hence, only those with civic prudence are said to be engaged in civic affairs because they alone are active like manual workers. [1197]

But that which is concerned with oneself seems to be prudence in a special way. This retains the general name “prudence,” but of the others, one is called domestic, another legislative, and a third executive. Each of these is divided into consultative and judicial. [1199]

Therefore, to know what is to one’s advantage is a certain kind of human knowledge differing much from other human knowledge. [1202]

Moreover, that man seems to be prudent who knows and diligently cultivates the things pertaining to himself, but public officials seem to be busy about many affairs. [1203]

For this reason, Euripides says: “How could I be prudent—I who have neglected to take care of myself and now share equally with many others in military service?” [1204]

They [public officials] seem to be intent on superfluous things and to do more than is necessary. But men generally seek what is good for themselves and think they must work to secure it. Hence, in this opinion, only such men are prudent. [1205]

It may be, though, that the individual’s good cannot be attained without domestic prudence or civic virtue. But still, it is not evident how the things pertaining to him are to be disposed, and this must be given attention. [1206]

In evidence of this, it may be noted that, while youths become geometricians and scientists and are learned in studies of this kind, they do not seem to become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with particulars that are known by experience. But a young man does not have experience, which requires a great deal of time. [1208]

Here someone may ask why a boy can become a mathematician but not a philosopher or a scientist. The reason is that the truths [belonging to mathematics] are known by abstraction but the principles [of nature] are learned by experience. Then, too, these things [pertaining to wisdom] are mouthed but not believed by youths, while the nature of mathematics is not obscure to them. [1209]

Moreover, error in deliberating can happen regarding either a universal or a particular proposition, because a man can err, for example, about all sluggish waters being unhealthy or about this water being sluggish. [1212]

It is plain that prudence is not science, because prudence deals with a singular ultimate, as was pointed out, and the practicable is of this nature. [1213]

Science and prudence have some agreement with understanding. Understanding indeed concerns those principles requiring no proof. But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, an object not of scientific knowledge, but of a kind of sense—not that by which we perceive proper sensibles, but the sense whereby, in mathematics, we perceive the external triangle (to which we conform our reasoning). This, however, is perception rather than prudence, although it is another kind of perception. [1214]

But inquiry and deliberation differ, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry. [1216]

1195. But there will be a certain architectonic knowledge. After the Philosopher has shown what is absolutely primary among all the intellectual virtues, he now shows what is primary in human affairs.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at in evidence of this (1142a11; [1208]), he makes known something that he had stated above.

On the first point he does three things.

First, he proposes his objective.

Second, at however, civic prudence (1141b23; [1196]), he makes known his proposition.

Third, at moreover, that man (1142a1; [1203]), he rejects an error.

He says first that, although wisdom, which is absolutely primary, does not consist in the knowledge of human things, nevertheless there is a certain architectonic (that is, guiding and governing) reason or knowledge here, namely, in the order of human affairs.

1196. Then, at however, civic prudence (1141b23), he makes known his proposition, distinguishing the things that pertain to a knowledge of human affairs.

First, he distinguishes civic prudence from prudence as such.

Second, at one part of the habit (1141b24; [1197]), he defines civic prudence.

Third, at but that which is (1141b29; [1199]), he defines prudence.

He says, then, that prudence and civic prudence are substantially the same habit, because each is a right plan of things to be done about what is good or bad for man. But they differ specifically, for prudence as such is the right plan of things to be done in the light of what is good or bad for one man, that is oneself. Civic prudence, however, deals with things good or bad for the whole civic multitude. Consequently, civic prudence is to prudence simply as legal justice is to virtue, as was indicated heretofore in book 5 [906–10]. When the extremes have been stated, we see the median, that is, the prudence of the household, which holds a middle place between that regulating one man and that regulating the state.

1197. Next, at one part of the habit (1141b24), he defines civic prudence. He divides it into two parts, noting that the part of the habit dealing with the whole state is, so to speak, architectonic or legislative prudence. The name “architectonic” derives from its role of determining for others what is to be done. Hence, rulers imposing a law are, in civic matters, as architects regarding things to be built. Because of this, positive law itself (that is, right reason according to which rulers frame just laws) is called architectonic prudence. But the other part of civic prudence—namely, that which is concerned with individual operable things—goes by the general name “civic prudence.” In fact, the laws are compared to the works of man as universals to particulars, as book 5 stated about legally just things [902–3]. Likewise, as legislative prudence gives the precept, so also civic prudence puts it in effect and conserves the norms stated in the law.

1198. Obviously it belongs to executive civil prudence to frame a decree that is simply the application of universal reason to a particular practicable, for it is called a decree only in regard to some practicable. Moreover, since every practicable is individual, it follows that a decree concerns some singular ultimate, that is, an individual norm or precept—it is called an “ultimate” because our knowledge begins from it, proceeding to universals, and terminates at the ultimate itself by way of descent. Likewise, the decree itself can be called ultimate because it is the application of a universally stated law to an individual practicable. Because this executive prudence of positive law retains for itself the general name of civic prudence, it follows that only those who see to the execution of the enacted laws are said to be engaged in civil affairs, since they alone are active among the people like chirotechnae, or manual workers in things to be built. Legislators bear the same relation to them as do architects to those who execute their plans.

1199. At but that which is (1141b29), he treats prudence.

First, he shows what should be called prudence.

Second, at therefore, to know (1141b33; [1202]), he infers a corollary from what has been said.

He says first that, although civic prudence, both legislative and executive, is prudence, nevertheless that which is concerned with one person only, oneself, seems to be especially prudence. And reason of this type directive of oneself retains the general name prudence, since the other parts of prudence are qualified by particular names.

One of these is called domestic, that is, the prudence that administers a household.

Another is called legislative, that is, the prudence in making laws.

Still another is civic, that is, the prudence in executing the laws.

Each of these is divided into consultative and judicial; for, in things to be done, we must first investigate something by the inquiry of counsel, and then judge the feasibility of the thing investigated.

1200. As has been noted previously [1174], we must consider that prudence not only is in the reason, but has a function likewise in the appetitive faculty. Therefore, everything mentioned here is a species of prudence to the extent that it does not reside in the reason alone but has ramifications in the appetitive faculty. Inasmuch as they are exclusively in the reason, they are called certain kinds of practical science, namely, domestic ethics and political science.

1201. Likewise, we must consider that, because the whole is more important than the part, and consequently the city than the household and the household than one man, civic prudence must be more important than domestic and the latter more important than personal prudence. Moreover, legislative prudence has greater importance among the parts of civic prudence, and without qualification is absolutely principal about actions that man must perform.

1202. Then, at therefore, to know (1141b33), he infers a corollary from what has been discussed. He says that, because individual prudence is a part of general prudence, it follows that to know the things good for oneself—which belongs to this prudence—is a particular kind of human knowledge unlike others by reason of the diverse things pertaining to one man.

1203. Next, at moreover, that man (1142a1), he rejects an error.

First, he presents it.

Second, at for this reason (1142a2; [1204]), he gives a proof for it.

Third, at it may be, though (1142a9; [1206]), he excludes the error by disproving it.

He says first that, to some people, only that man seems prudent who knows and diligently cultivates the things having to do with himself. However, those who are public officials do not seem to be prudent, but rather polipragmones, that is, busy with a variety of affairs pertaining to the multitude.

1204. At for this reason (1142a2), he gives a proof of the foregoing error. He does this first by a statement of Euripides the poet, who has one of his characters, a soldier fighting for his country, say: “How could I be prudent when I have neglected to take care of myself” (that is, I did not attend to my own affairs but, one of many, I am sharing military service equally with them).

1205. Then, at they [public officials] seem to be intent (1142a7), he proposes a reason for this notion. He says that some people affirm that public officials are not prudent, since they are intent on superfluous or vain things and are doing something more than their individual concern. Because of the inordinateness of their hidden self-love, men seek only what is good for themselves, and they are concerned that each one must do only what is good for himself. From this opinion of theirs it follows that, for some men, only those are prudent who are intent on their own affairs.

1206. Next, at it may be, though (1142a9), he rejects this error. He says that the particular good of each individual person cannot be attained without domestic prudence—that is, without the proper administration of the household—nor without civic virtue, the proper administration of the state, just as the good of the part cannot be attained without the good of the whole. Hence, it is evident that statesmen and household stewards are not intent on anything superfluous, but on what pertains to themselves.

1207. Nevertheless, civic and domestic prudence are not sufficient without personal prudence. The reason is that, when the state and the household have been properly arranged, it is still not evident how one’s own personal affairs must be disposed. Therefore, it is necessary to attend to this by the prudence dealing with an individual’s good.

1208. At in evidence of this (1142a11), he clarifies a previous assertion [1194] that prudence is concerned not only with universals but also with particulars.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at it is plain that prudence (1142a23; [1213]), he compares prudence with science and understanding.

For the first point, he offers two reasons.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he gives a confirmation of the proposition.

Second, at here someone (1142a15; [1209]), he brings up a particular question on this heading.

He states first that a sign of the previous assertion [1194] that prudence is concerned not only with universals but also with particulars is that youths become geometricians and scientists, that is, learned in the speculative sciences and in mathematics; they are erudite in studies of this kind and attain perfection in these sciences. However, it does not seem that a youth can become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with particulars that are made known to us by experience. But a lad does not have experience, because much time is needed to get experience.

1209. Then, at here someone (1142a15), he raises a question about why a boy can become a mathematician but cannot become wise, that is, a metaphysician or natural philosopher. To this the Philosopher answers that the principles of mathematics are known by abstraction from sensible objects (whose understanding requires experience); for this reason little time is needed to grasp them. But the principles of nature, which are not separated from sensible objects, are studied via experience. For this, much time is needed.

1210. As to wisdom, he adds that youths do not believe—that is, grasp—although they mouth things pertaining to wisdom or metaphysics. But the nature of mathematics is not obscure to them, because mathematical proofs concern sensibly conceivable objects, while things pertaining to wisdom are purely rational. Youths can easily understand whatever falls under imagination, but they do not grasp things exceeding sense and imagination, for their minds are not trained to such considerations, owing to both the shortness of their lives and the many physical changes they are undergoing.

1211. Therefore, the proper order of learning is that boys first be instructed in things pertaining to logic, because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy.

Second, they should be instructed in mathematics, which does not need experience and does not exceed the imagination;

third, in natural sciences, which, even though not exceeding sense and imagination, nevertheless require experience;

fourth, in the moral sciences, which require experience and a soul free from passions, as was noted in the first book [38–40];

fifth, in the sapiential and divine sciences, which exceed imagination and require a strong mind.

1212. He gives the second reason at moreover, error (1142a20). It was said [1164] that the work of prudence is to deliberate well. But in deliberating, a twofold error can happen.

One concerns the universal, such as whether it is true that all sluggish waters are unhealthy.

The other concerns the particular, such as whether this water is sluggish.

Therefore, prudence must give direction in regard to both universals and particulars.

1213. Then, at it is plain that prudence (1142a23), he compares prudence with the things mentioned above:

first, with science;

second, with understanding, at science and prudence have some agreement (1142a25; [1214]).

He says first that it is evident from the premises that prudence is not science, for science has to do with universals, as was stated before [1145–75]. But prudence deals with a singular ultimate—namely, the particular, since it is of the nature of the practicable to be particular. So it is clear that prudence is not science.

1214. Next, at science and prudence have some agreement with understanding (1142a25), he compares prudence with understanding.

First, he shows the agreement.

Second, at but inquiry and deliberation (1142a31; [1216]), he shows the difference.

He says first that both science and prudence are receptive of, or in contact with (according to another text), understanding, that is, they have some agreement with it as a habit of principles. It was previously pointed out [1175–79] that understanding concerns certain principles or ultimates, that is, indemonstrable principles for which there is no proof because they cannot be established by reason, but immediately become known by themselves. But prudence is concerned with an ultimate, a singular practicable that must be taken as a principle in things to be done. Yet there is no scientific knowledge of the singular ultimate, for it is not proved by reason; there is, however, sensitive knowledge of it, because this ultimate is perceived by one of the senses. However, it is not apprehended by that sense that perceives the species of proper sensibles (for instance, color, sound, and so on, which is the proper sense), but by the inner sense, which perceives things sensibly conceivable. Similarly, in mathematics, we know the exterior triangle, or the triangle conceived as singular, because there we also conform to a sensibly conceivable singular, as in the natural sciences we conform to a sensible singular.

1215. Prudence, which perfects particular reason rightly to judge singular practicable relations, pertains rather to this, namely, the inner sense. Hence, even dumb animals who are endowed with an excellent natural estimative power are said to be prudent. But that sense that is concerned with proper sensibles has a certain other perfecting quality, namely, a skill in discerning shades of color or taste and the like. So prudence agrees with understanding in this, that it deals with an ultimate.

1216. Then, at but inquiry and deliberation (1142a31), he shows the difference between prudence and understanding. Understanding is not given to inquiring, but prudence is, because it is deliberative. To deliberate and to inquire differ as proper and common, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry—as was said in book 3 [473, 476, 482].