Lecture 9 — Synesis (Habit of Right Judgment in Practical Individual Cases)

Nor is synesis, and asynesia, according to which we are called sensible and foolish, entirely the same as science or opinion, for if this were so, all men would be sensible. [1235]

Nor is it any of the particular sciences, for example, medicine, which deals with health, or geometry, which deals with magnitudes. Nor is synesis concerned with eternal and unchangeable substances, nor with anything made. But it treats those matters about which men may doubt and seek counsel. [1236]

For this reason, synesis is concerned with the same things that prudence is. [1237]

But synesis is not the same as prudence, for prudence gives orders, inasmuch as its end is to lay down what is to be done or not to be done. Synesis, however, merely forms judgments. In fact, judgment and good judgment, like people of judgment and people of good judgment, are looked upon as identical. [1238]

Likewise, synesis is not the same as having or acquiring prudence. But, just as learning is called syniene when it uses knowledge, it is also so called when it uses practical evaluation to judge things about which prudence treats, or (as someone else says) to judge well, for eu means “well.” Hence, the name synesis, in accord with which some are called eusyneti (men of good judgment), is derived from the word used in connection with learning. Indeed, we often use “learning” in the sense of “understanding.” [1241]

The virtue called gnome, according to which we say men are lenient and have just evaluation, is nothing more than a correct judgment of what is equitable. A proof of this is that we say the man of equity in a special way is inclined to leniency and that what is equitable has a measure of pardon in certain matters. Gnome itself judges what is equitable, and the judgment is right when it corresponds to the truth. [1243]

All the preceding habits, it is reasonable to affirm, tend to the same thing. We use the names gnome, synesis, prudence, and understanding in such a way as to imply that the same persons possess gnome and understanding, and on that account are both prudent and sensible. In fact, all these habits deal with singulars and particular ultimates, inasmuch as a man of good sense or someone pronouncing favorable judgment, or passing a lenient sentence, judges the actions that the prudent man commands. Indeed, every equitable thing has a relation to all human goods in this, that it refers to another. All these have to do with singulars and particular ultimates, which are practicable things. Because of this, the prudent person should know them; likewise synesis and gnome are concerned with things to be done, and these are particular ultimates. [1245–46]

Understanding in both kinds of knowledge is concerned with ultimates, because it is understanding that deals with first principles and ultimates, not reasoning. One kind [of understanding] is about unchangeable and first principles in demonstrations, but the other is about a singular and contingent ultimate in practical matters and about a proposition of a different nature. This latter concerns principles of purposeful activity, for the universal is drawn from singulars. Hence, it is necessary that man experience these singulars by sense, and this perception is understanding. [1247]

Therefore, the preceding habits seem to be natural. While a man is not naturally wise, he does have good sense, judgment, and understanding by nature. This is indicated by the fact that we think such aptitudes follow man’s years. In fact, a particular age of life has understanding and good sense, just as if nature caused them. [1250]

On this account, understanding is both a principle and an end, for demonstrations proceed from them and are given for their sake. [1253]

So we must heed the indemonstrable statements and opinions of experienced, old and prudent men no less than demonstrations themselves, since the elderly understand principles by their experience. We have thus far considered the nature of prudence and wisdom, what material each virtue treats, and in what part of the soul each exists. [1254]

1235. Nor is synesis, and asynesia. After the Philosopher has explained eubulia, he now explains synesis.

On this subject, he does two things.

First, he compares synesis with science and opinion.

Second, at for this reason, synesis (1143a6; [1237]), he compares synesis with prudence.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows that not all science or opinion is synesis.

Second, at nor is it (1143a2; [1236]), he shows that no one science is synesis.

He says first that synesis (by reason of which we call some men synetos, or sensible) and its contrary, asynesis (by reason of which we call other men asynetos, or asinine or foolish), are not entirely the same as science or opinion. Surely there is no one who does not have some science or opinion. If, then, all science or opinion was synesis, it would follow that all men would be sensible, something obviously false.

1236. Then, at nor is it (1143a2), he shows that no one science is synesis, saying that synesis is not any of the particular sciences. The reason is that, if it was medicine, it would deal with health and sickness; if it was geometry, it would deal with magnitudes. Certainly synesis is not said to be concerned with other particular sciences like the divine sciences, which treat eternal and unchangeable substances; nor is it said to treat the things done by nature or by man, which the natural sciences and the arts consider. But it has to do with matters about which a man can doubt and deliberate. So it is evident that synesis is not a particular science.

1237. Next, at for this reason, synesis (1143a6), he compares synesis with prudence.

First, he infers an agreement between them from our discussion. Since synesis is concerned with matters worthy of deliberation that prudence also considers, as was noted above [1164], it follows that synesis is concerned with the things treated by prudence.

1238. Second, at but* synesis *is not (1143a7), he shows the difference between them.

First, he shows that synesis is not prudence;

second, at likewise, synesis (1143a11; [1241]), that it is not the source of prudence.

He says first that, although synesis and prudence have to do with the same things, nevertheless they are not identical.

1239. For proof of this, we must consider that in speculative matters, in which no transient action exists, there is a twofold operation of reason:

first, to find out by inquiry;

second, to judge the information.

These two works belong to the practical reason, whose inquiry is deliberation pertaining to eubulia, but whose judgment about matters deliberated pertains to synesis. People who can judge well about things to be done are called sensible. However, practical reason does not stop here, but proceeds further to do something. Hence, there is required a third work, as it were final and perfecting, namely, to command that the thing be done. This properly belongs to prudence.

1240. Consequently, he says that prudence is preceptive, inasmuch as the work of the end is to determine what must be done. But synesis merely makes a judgment. And synesis and eusynesia are taken for the same thing, namely, sound sense, just as syneti and eusyneti, people of sense and people of good sense, both of whose work of is to judge well, are considered to be alike. So it is clear that prudence is more excellent than synesis, just as synesis is more excellent than eubulia, for inquiry is ordered to judgment as to an end, and judgment to command.

1241. Then, at likewise synesis (1143a11), he shows that synesisis is not the source of prudence. He says that as synesis is not the same as prudence, so it is not the same as having prudence, or as assuming or acquiring it. But, just as learning, which is the use of knowledge, is called syniene in Greek, so also the practical evaluation used by someone to judge things about which prudence treats is called syniene. This can even be called judging well, by another, for eu in Greek means the same as “well.” Hence, the name synesis, in accord with which some are called eusyneti (men of good judgment or of good sense, as it were), is derived from this word syniene, which is used in connection with learning. Indeed, we often call learning syniene.

1242. The sense, then, is that syniene in Greek means a use of some intellectual habit, which use is not only learning, but also judging. But synesis is so called from syniene by reason of that use that is judging, not by reason of that use that is learning. Hence, synesis is not the same as having or learning prudence, as some have thought.

1243. At the virtue called gnome (1143a19), he describes a third virtue called gnome. To understand this virtue, we must draw from a previous discussion [1070–90] on the distinction between equity and legal justice. What is legally just is determined according to what happens in the majority of cases. But what is equitable is directive of the legally just thing, because the law necessarily is deficient in the minority of cases. As synesis signifies a right judgment about the things that happen in the majority of cases, so gnome signifies a right judgment about the direction of what is legally just. Therefore, he says that that virtue called gnome—according to which we say some men are eugnomonas, pronouncing fair judgments, and have correct evaluation, or arrive at just decisions—is nothing more than a correct judgment of that which is the object of equity.

1244. A proof of this is that we say the equitable man is especially inclined to kindness, tempering judgment with a certain clemency, as it were. And what is equitable is especially said to have syngnome, a certain equal measure of pardon. The virtue syngnome rightly judges what is equitable, and it is correct when it judges what is true.

1245. Next, at all the preceding habits (1143a25), he compares these virtues with one another and with prudence.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he mentions the agreement among these habits.

Second, at inasmuch as a man (1143a25; [1246]), he verifies this.

Third, at on this account, understanding (1143b9; [1253]), he makes an inference from what has been said.

He affirms first that all these habits aim at the same thing. And this is reasonable. That they aim at the same thing is evident because they are attributed to the same persons. We use the words gnome, synesis, prudence, and understanding, referring to the same persons, whom we call prudent and sensible as having gnome and understanding. That this reference is reasonable is clear from the fact that all the foregoing—called “powers” because they are principles of action—deal with singulars, which, in the practical order, are particular ultimates, as was stated in the discussion on prudence [1191–94].

1246. Then, at inasmuch as (1143a25), he verifies what he said:

first, by reason;

second, at therefore, the preceding (1143b6; [1250]), by an indication.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows that synesis and gnome deal with particular ultimates and singulars, just as prudence does.

Second, at understanding in both kinds (1143a35; [1247]), he shows the same thing about understanding.

He says first that synesis and gnome obviously deal with singular ultimates, inasmuch as the kindly disposed man of good sense (one pronouncing favorable sentences) or the compassionate man (the one passing sentence with clemency) judges those actions that the prudent man commands. But equitable things, about which gnome treats, in general can be compared to all human goods, inasmuch as each of them has a reference to another—a thing pertaining to the nature of justice. Indeed, it has been said above [1078] that what is equitable is a kind of just thing. So, then, it has been correctly stated that gnome is concerned with the things treated by prudence. However, it is evident that all these have to do with singulars and particular ultimates by reason of the fact that practicable things are singular and particular ultimates. But prudence, synesis, and gnome deal with practicable things, and so, obviously, with particular ultimates.

1247. Second, at understanding in both kinds (1143a35), he shows that understanding is concerned with ultimates. He says that understanding in both speculative and practical knowledge has to do with ultimates, because understanding and not reasoning deals with first principles and ultimates (from which reasoning starts). But there are two kinds of understanding.

One of these is about unchangeable and first principles in demonstrations, for they proceed from the unchangeable and first—that is, indemonstrable—principles that are the first things known, and immutable because the knowledge of them cannot be removed from man.

But understanding of practical matters deals with another kind of ultimate: the singular and contingent, and with a different proposition, not the universal—which is a major premise, as it were—but the particular, which is the minor premise of a syllogism in the practical field.

1248. Why understanding is predicated of an ultimate of this kind is evident from the fact that understanding treats of principles. But the singulars, about which we say understanding is concerned, are principles of what is done for an end, that is, principles after the manner of a final cause.

1249. It is obvious that singulars have the nature of principles, because the universal is drawn from singulars. From the fact that this herb cured this man, we gather that this kind of herb has power to cure. Because singulars are properly known by the senses, it is necessary that man should have experience of these singulars (which we say are principles and ultimates) not just by exterior sense, but by interior sense as well; he said before [1214–15] that prudence belongs to the sensory power of judging called particular reason. Hence, this sense is called understanding whose object is the sensible and singular. In De anima 3, (De anima 3.5.430a25; see Aquinas, In III de an., lec. 10, n. 745.) the Philosopher refers to this as the passive intellect, which is perishable.

1250. Next, at therefore, the preceding,(1143b6), he verifies what he said. Since the foregoing habits concern singulars, they must in some way be in contact with the sensitive faculties, which operate by means of bodily organs. Consequently, these habits seem to be natural, not as from nature entirely, but in the sense that some are inclined to them by a natural physical disposition so as to be perfected in them with a little experience. This does not happen with the intellectual habits, like geometry and metaphysics, which deal with things in nature.

1251. And he adds that no one is called a philosopher (that is, a metaphysician) or a geometrician by nature. Some indeed are naturally more apt for these roles than others, but this is due to a remote bent of mind, not an immediate one, as some men are said naturally to have good sense and excellent judgment, as well as that understanding of which we speak of regarding singulars.

1252. An indication of such aptitudes is the opinion we have that they accompany age, as physical nature is changed. Indeed, there is a particular time of life (old age) that, by the cessation of bodily and animal changes, has understanding and good sense as if nature was the cause of them.

1253. Then, at on this account, understanding (1143b9), he infers two corollaries from the discussion.

The first of these is that understanding, which discriminates well among singulars in practical matters, not only has to do with principles (as in the speculative order), but is a quasi-end. In speculative matters, demonstrations proceed from principles (considered by understanding), but there are no demonstrations for the principles. On the other hand, in practical matters, demonstrations proceed from principles (namely, singulars) and there are demonstrations for these principles. In practical argumentation, according to which reason moves to action, a singular must be the minor [premise] and also the conclusion inferring the practicable thing itself, which is a singular.

1254. At so we must heed (1143b11), he sets down a second corollary. It has just been said [1252] that understanding, dealing with practicable principles, follows from experience and age and is perfected by prudence. Hence, we must pay attention to the thoughts and decisions of experienced, old, and prudent men on what is to be done. Although such opinions and resolutions do not lead to demonstrations, they are nonetheless heeded even more than if they were demonstrations themselves. Such men understand practical principles because they have an experienced eye, that is, right judgment in practical matters. And principles are more certain than the conclusions of demonstrations.

1255. Regarding the statements just made [1254], we must consider that just as, in universals, unconditioned judgment about first principles belongs to understanding (and deduction from principles to conclusions belongs to reasoning), so in particulars, unconditioned judgment about singulars belongs to the sensory power of judgment called understanding. We say that prudence, synesis, and gnome pertain to understanding. However, this is called particular reason, inasmuch as it concludes from one to another; to it belongs eubulia, which the Philosopher did not enumerate among the others. Therefore, he said it deals with particular ultimates.

1256. Finally, he sums everything up, saying that we have discussed the nature of prudence (the principal virtue in practical matters) and wisdom (the principal virtue in speculative matters) and the affairs each of these is concerned with, and that they are not in the same part of the rational soul.