Lecture 5 — Understanding and Wisdom

Since science is an evaluation of universal and necessary truths, and since there are principles of demonstrable things and of every science (science is accompanied by demonstrative reason), the principle of the knowable is neither a science nor an art, nor prudence. What is knowable is demonstrable, but these (namely, art and prudence) deal with contingent things. Likewise, wisdom does not treat these principles, because it is the business of the man of wisdom to furnish demonstrations about some things. If intellectual habits are science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding—by which we have the truth and are never deceived about contingent or necessary things—and none of the three (namely, prudence, science, and wisdom) is concerned with those principles, it remains, then, that understanding treats them. [1175]

We attribute wisdom to the most certain arts; accordingly, we call Phidias a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here, then, by wisdom, we mean nothing more than the excellence of the art. [1180]

But we consider some men wise in an unqualified sense and not just in a particular area or in some other way, as Homer says in his Margites, “the gods made this man neither a miner nor a farmer, nor wise in any other particular way.” It is clear, then, that wisdom is the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. [1181]

Therefore, not only must the wise man know the conclusions drawn from the principles, but he must declare the truth about the principles. Hence, wisdom will be a combination of understanding and science. [1182]

1175. Since science is an evaluation of universal. After the Philosopher has treated the intellectual virtues that perfect the intellect in respect to the things derived from principles, he will now consider the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect in relation to the principles themselves.

He does two things.

First, he discusses understanding, which deals with the principles of demonstration.

Second, at we attribute wisdom (1141a9; [1180]), he considers wisdom, which deals with the principles of being.

He shows first that, over and above the other intellectual virtues, there must be understanding concerning the principles of demonstration. Science is a certain evaluation of universals and things existing of necessity, for particulars and contingents cannot attain the certitude of science, since they are known only insofar as they fall under the senses.

1176. In regard to the science of the things that are demonstrated, we must consider that there are some principles of the science itself necessarily dealing with demonstrable things. This is clear from the fact that science is founded on demonstrative reason proceeding from principles to conclusions. Since this is the case with science, the principle of the science necessarily is neither a science nor an art, nor prudence—which we have just discussed [1142–74].

1177. Obviously it is not a science, because the subject matter of science is demonstrable. But the first principles of demonstrations are indemonstrable; otherwise, we would proceed to infinity. That art and prudence have nothing to do with these principles is evident from the fact that these two virtues deal with contingent things. This cannot be said of the principles of demonstration, for principles must be more certain than necessary conclusions. Likewise, it is clear that wisdom, another intellectual virtue that we will discuss subsequently [1180–81], does not treat these principles. The reason is that it pertains to the wise man to frame a demonstration about some things, namely, the ultimate causes of being. But principles are indemonstrable, as has been said [1148].

1178. If, then, the intellectual virtues—about which we so truly say that falsehood never underlies them, whether concerned with necessary or contingent things—are these habits of science, prudence (under which he includes art, which also has to do with what is contingent), and wisdom, and understanding besides, then it remains that understanding treats these principles, since none of the three (prudence, wisdom, or science) can be concerned with indemonstrable principles, as is clear from the foregoing.

1179. Understanding is not taken here for the intellect itself, but for a particular habit by which a man, in virtue of the light of the active intellect, naturally knows indemonstrable principles. The name is suitable enough, for principles of this kind are immediately understood from a knowledge of their terms. Once we know what a whole and what a part is, we grasp immediately that every whole is greater than its part. It is called understanding (intellectus) because it reads within (intus legit), observing the essence of a thing. Hence, De anima 3 (De anima 3.4.429b5–23; see Aquinas, In III de an., lec. 8, nn. 700–719.) says that the proper object of the intellect is the essence of a thing. So the knowledge of principles, which immediately become known when the essence of the thing is understood, is suitably called “intellect” or “understanding.”

1180. Next, at we attribute wisdom (1141a9), he considers wisdom.

First, he shows what wisdom is.

Second, at therefore, not only (1141a16; [1182]), he infers a corollary from what was said.

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called.

Second, at but we consider some (1141a12; [1181]), he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is.

He says first that, in the arts, we attribute the name wisdom to the most certain ones, those that, knowing the ultimate causes in some category of handicraft, direct other arts concerned with the same category, such as an architectonic art directs technical workers. In this way, we say Phidias was a wise sculptor and Polycletus a wise statuary, that is, a carver of statues. Here we call wisdom nothing other than the excellence of the art (namely, its ultimate perfection) by which a man attains what is ultimate and most perfect in the art. In this the excellence of each thing consists, as was pointed out in De coelo 1. (De coelo 1.11.281a7–15; see Aquinas, In I de coel., lec. 25, nn. 248–49.)

1181. Then, at but we consider (1141a12), he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says that, as we consider some men wise in a particular handicraft, so too we consider others completely wise, namely, with regard to the whole category of beings and not just a part of them, even though they are not wise in a particular handicraft. Thus, Homer remarks that the gods did not make a certain man a miner or a farmer, nor make him gifted in any craft, but simply made him wise. Hence, it is clear that, as the man who is wise in some handicraft is most sure in that art, so also that knowledge that is wisdom in an unqualified sense is the most certain of all modes of knowledge, inasmuch as it treats first principles of being—in themselves most known, although some of them, the immaterial, are less known in regard to us. But the most universal principles are also more known in regard to us, such as those belonging to being as being—the knowledge of which pertains to wisdom taken in this sense, as is evident in Metaphysics 4. (Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21–22; see Aquinas, In IV metaph., lec. 1, nn. 529–30.)

1182. At therefore, not only (1141a16), he infers a corollary from this: because wisdom is most certain and the principles of demonstrations more certain than the conclusions, not only should the wise man know the things inferred in the matter that he is considering, but he should also declare the truth about first principles themselves, not to prove them but to explain common notions, such as whole and part, equal and unequal, and suchlike—a function proper to a philosopher. When these common notions are known, the principles of demonstrations are clear. Hence, the concern of such a man is to argue against those denying principles, as is evident in Metaphysics 4. (Metaphysics 4.3.1005a19–b8; see Aquinas, In IV metaph., lec. 5, nn. 588–95.)

1183. Finally, he draws a further conclusion that wisdom, in declaring the truth about principles, is understanding; but in knowing the things inferred from the principles, it is science. However, wisdom is distinguished from science, taken in the usual sense, by reason of the eminence that it has among other sciences; it is a kind of perfection of all sciences.