Lecture 6 — Wisdom, the Principal Intellectual Virtue

As having supremacy, it is the science of the most honorable things, for it is unreasonable to consider political science or prudence the best of the sciences if man is not the most excellent thing in the world. [1184]

What is healthful and what is good for men and fish are different, but white and straight are always the same; and everyone would say that, in godlike things, what is wise is always the same. However, what is prudent may be different, for the man who can properly consider individual things pertaining to himself is called prudent, and we entrust such matters to him. For this reason, people call prudent all dumb animals who seem to have the ability to care for themselves. It will certainly be evident, then, that wisdom is not the same as political science. If people call wisdom that science dealing with things useful to themselves, there will be many kinds of wisdom, for there is not one consideration regarding the good of all animals, but there is a different consideration for individual animals. Likewise, there is not one medicine for all beings. [1187]

That man is the most excellent of all animals makes no difference, because there are other creatures more divine by their nature, such as the very evident things that constitute the universe. [1189]

From what has been said, it is obvious that wisdom is both science and understanding about the things most honorable by their nature. [1190]

For this reason, people say Anaxagoras and Thales, and others like them, are wise, but not prudent: men, seeing them ignorant of what is useful to themselves, assert that they know superfluous and wonderful things both difficult and divine, but that this knowledge is useless because they do not seek human goods. [1191]

Prudence has to do with human goods about which we deliberate, for skillful deliberation seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about things that cannot be in any other way, nor about whatsoever is not ordered to some end—and this a practicable good. Moreover, the man is a good counsellor absolutely speaking who can conjecture, by reasoning, what is best for man to do. [1193]

Prudence not only considers universals, but must also know singulars, for it is active, and action is concerned with singulars. Hence, some men not informed scientifically but expert in different particulars are more effective than other men with scientific knowledge. Certainly, if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know what meats are light, he will not make people well. But if he knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful, he will be better able to effect a cure. Since prudence is concerned with action, it must therefore have both kinds (of knowledge), but especially the latter (of particulars). [1194]

1184. As having supremacy, it is the science. After the Philosopher has defined the individual intellectual virtues, he now explains the principal one among them.

First, he shows which is absolutely principal.

Second, at but there will be (1141b22; [1195]), he shows which is principal in the genus of the practicable in reference to man.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows that wisdom is principal among all without qualification.

Second, at for this reason (1141b2; [1191]), he infers a corollary from the premises, clarifying what has been said, by a sign.

On the initial point he does three things.

First, he proposes what he intends.

Second, at for it is unreasonable (1141a19; [1185]), he rejects the opposite error.

Third, at from what has been said (1141a33; [1190]), he infers the truth.

He says first that wisdom is not science of any sort whatever, but the science of the most honorable and divine things, inasmuch as it has the essential elements to be head of all sciences. As the senses located in the head direct the movements and operations of all the other members, so wisdom directs all the other sciences, since they take their principles from it.

1185. Then, at for it is unreasonable (1141a19), he rejects the error of certain philosophers who, considering usefulness rather than the dignity of science, assign primacy of the sciences to political science, by which the multitude is governed, or to prudence, by which a man governs himself. As was pointed out in the beginning of the Metaphysics, (Metaphysics 1.1.981b13–25; See Aquinas, In I metaph., lec. 1, nn. 31–33.) the speculative sciences are not sought as useful for some further end, but simply as honorable in themselves.

Hence, he does two things on this point.

First, he rejects this error.

Second, at that man (1141a22; [1189]), he dismisses an objection raised.

For the first statement, he gives two reasons.

1186. Concerning the first of these, he says that it is unreasonable for a man to consider political science or prudence the most desirable science, that is, the best of the sciences. This could not be unless man were the most excellent of all things in the world, for one science is better and more honorable than another because it deals with better and more honorable subjects—as is said in De anima 1. (De anima 1.402a1–5; see Aquinas, In 1 de an., lec. 1, n. 4–5.) But it is false to say that man is the most excellent thing in the world. Consequently, neither political science nor prudence—both dealing with human affairs—is the best among the sciences.

1187. At what is healthful (1141a20), he gives the second reason. It arises from this, that there are certain things whose prime characteristic consists in a proportion and relation to another. For this reason, such things cannot be the same in reference to all objects. Thus, it is clear that what is healthful and what is good are not identical for men and fish. But other things are predicated without limitation, such as “white” of colors and “straight” of figures. Because wisdom is one of the things that are such simply and in themselves (it is numbered among the primary entities), everyone must say that what is wise is the same in all things and that wisdom is the same without qualification in relation to everything. But what is prudent must be a thing that may be different in different subjects, because prudence is predicated according to a proportion and a relation to something. The man who can properly consider each thing pertaining to him is said to be prudent, and to such a one we grant or attribute prudence. Hence, by a kind of analogy men say that certain dumb animals are prudent, namely, those that seem to be able to care for themselves, not however by means of reason, which properly belongs to prudence. So, then, it is evident that wisdom, which is a particular virtue, is not the same as political science.

1188. If we would hold that a science such as politics, which deals with useful things, was wisdom—the chief of all the sciences—it would follow that there would be many kinds of wisdom. Certainly there cannot be one identical formality in the things that are good for all animals, but a different consideration must be accorded to individual animals, taking into account what is good for each. A similar reason holds for medicine that cannot be the same for all. It was just said [1187] that what is healthful and what is good differ for men and fish. But there must be only one wisdom, because its function is to consider things that are common to all entities. So it remains that political science, which governs a human multitude, cannot be wisdom without qualification; much less can ordinary prudence be, which governs one man.

1189. Then, at that man (1141a22), he answers a certain objection. Someone could say that political science or prudence, treating as it does of human affairs, is the principal science because man is more excellent than other animals. But this has no relevance to our proposition, because certain other things are by their nature more divine than man by reason of their excellence. And—as we may not treat of God and separated substances, for they do not come under the senses—even the objects most evident to the senses and constituting the universe, the heavenly bodies, are better than men. This is so whether we compare body to body or the moving substances to the human soul.

1190. Next, at from what has been said (1141a33), he infers the truth that wisdom is science and understanding—as was previously pointed out [1183]—not of all possible things, but of the most honorable. This is evident from the preceding, for if any science was more honorable, it would be especially political science or prudence, and this view has just been rejected [1186–88].

1191. At for this reason (1141b2), he infers from the premises a corollary by which some things previously discussed are clarified.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he introduces the corollary.

Second, at prudence not only considers,(1141b14; [1194]), he manifests one aspect of it.

He says first that, because prudence deals with the goods of man, but wisdom with the things that are better than man, accordingly people call Anaxagoras and Thales the philosopher—and others like them—wise, but not prudent. This is because men see these philosophers ignorant of things useful to themselves but admit they know useless truths that are wonderful (exceeding the common knowledge of mortals, as it were), difficult (needing careful investigation), and divine by reason of their exalted character.

1192. He gives in particular the example of Thales and Anaxagoras because they are especially censured on this point. When Thales was leaving his house to look at the stars, he fell into a ditch; while he was bewailing the fact, an old woman remarked to him, “You, O Thales, cannot see what is at your feet and you expect to see what is in the heavens?” And Anaxagoras, though noble and wealthy, left his family possessions to his relatives and devoted himself to the investigation of natural phenomena; taking no interest in civic affairs, he was consequently blamed for his negligence. When someone asked him, “Do you not care about your country?” he answered, “I will have great concern for my country after I have explained the heavens.”

1193. Therefore, people say they know useless things, since they do not seek human goods; on this account, too, they are not called prudent, for prudence deals with human goods about which we deliberate. Now, to deliberate well seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about necessary things, cannot possibly be in any other way; and the divine things, which these wise men consider, are necessary. Likewise, deliberation is not possible about things in general that are not ordered to some end, namely, to a practicable good—things that the speculative sciences consider even when they treat what is corruptible. That man is a good counselor without qualification, and consequently prudent, who can conjecture by reasoning what is best for man to do.

1194. Then, at prudence not only considers (1141b14), he makes clear something he had said, assigning the reason why the prudent man is concerned about practicable things. Prudence not only considers universals, in which action does not occur, but must know singulars, because it is active, that is, a principle of doing. But action has to do with singulars. Hence it is that certain people not possessing the knowledge of universals are more effective about some particulars than those who have universal knowledge, from the fact that they are expert in other particulars. Thus, if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know which meats are light, he cannot help people to get well. But the man who knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful is better able to effect a cure. Since, then, prudence is reason concerning an action, the prudent person must have a knowledge of both kinds, namely, universals and particulars. But if it is possible for him to have one kind, he ought rather to have the latter, that is, the knowledge of particulars that are closer to operation.