Lecture 11 — Moral Virtue and Prudence

We must again turn our attention to virtue. Moral virtue is related to natural virtue as prudence is related to shrewdness; prudence and shrewdness are not identical, but they have some likeness. Thus principal virtue is related to natural virtue, for it seems to everyone that each kind of moral practice exists by nature to some extent. Indeed, immediately from birth, we are just, temperate, and brave and have other qualities. However, we are looking for something different, a good as a principle, so that virtues of this kind may be in us according to another manner of existence. It is a fact that children and dumb animals have natural habits, but these seem detrimental without the direction of reason. Certainly this much seems clear: as a powerful body moved without the guidance of vision goes astray more powerfully because it lacks that guidance, so in this matter. But if a principle similar (to prudence) operates, then virtue in the proper sense will be present. Hence, as in the discursive faculty there are two kinds of principles, namely, shrewdness and prudence, so in the moral faculty there are two kinds of principles: natural virtue and the principal virtue. The latter cannot be without prudence. [1275]

Therefore, it is said that all virtues are kinds of prudence. [1281]

In this, Socrates’ investigation was correct in one respect and wrong in an other. He erroneously held that all virtues are species of prudence, but correctly stated that virtue cannot be without prudence. [1282]

An indication of this is that, at the present time all men, in defining virtue, place it in the genus of habit and state to what matters it extends and that it is according to right reason. But right reason is that which is according to prudence. Therefore, they all seem to guess in some manner that virtue is the kind of habit that is in accord with prudence. [1283]

But we must go a little further, for virtue is not only in conformity with reason, but a habit accompanied by reason. But right reason in such matters is prudence. Socrates, then, was of the opinion that virtues are kinds of reason because he thought they were species of knowledge. But we maintain they are accompanied by reason. Therefore, it is obvious from the discussion how it is not possible for a man to be good in the strict sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without moral virtue. [1284]

In this way, we can refute the argument that some use to prove that virtues are separated one from another. We see that the same man is not equally well inclined by nature to all virtues. Therefore, he will be said to acquire the virtue he has known but not any other. [1286]

This does happen in regard to the natural virtues, but not in regard to those virtues according to which a man is called absolutely good. The reason is that all the virtues are present simultaneously with prudence, a single virtue. [1287]

Evidently, man would need prudence even though it were not practical, because it is a virtue perfecting a part of the soul; he would need it because there will be no right choice without either prudence or virtue, for the latter disposes the end and the former directs the means to the end. [1289]

Nevertheless, prudence does not rule over wisdom, nor does an inferior thing rule over what is more excellent, just as medicine does not rule health. This is so because medicine does not use health, but sees how it may be produced; it gives orders for the sake of health, but not to it. Again, it would be like saying that political science rules the gods because it gives orders about everything in the state. [1290]

1275. We must again turn our attention to virtue. After the Philosopher has shown that prudence cannot exist without moral virtue, he now shows that moral virtue cannot exist without prudence.

On this point he does three things.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at in this way we can (1144b32; [1286]), he solves a particular incidental doubt.

Third, at evidently, man (1145a2; [1289]), he brings his principal proposition to a conclusion.

On the first point he does two things.

First, he proves his proposition initially by reason;

second, by the observations of others at therefore, it is (1144b17; [1281]).

He says first that, since it has been shown [1273] that prudence cannot be without moral virtue, we must again turn our attention to moral virtue, inquiring whether it can be without prudence. It is the same in moral virtue as has been said about prudence and shrewdness [1272–74], that, although they are not identical, nevertheless they have some likeness to one another, inasmuch as each discovers means suitable for the proposed end. This seems to be the case with natural and principal virtue, that is, moral virtue that is the perfect kind.

1276. That there is a natural virtue presupposed to principal moral virtue is obvious from the fact that individual virtuous or vicious practices seem to exist in some people naturally; immediately from birth certain men seem to be just or temperate or brave because of a natural disposition by which they are inclined to virtuous works. This natural disposition can be considered from three viewpoints.

1277. It can be considered first on the part of the reason, since the first principles of human conduct are implanted by nature (for instance, that no one should be injured, and the like).

Second, on the part of the will, which of itself is naturally moved by the good apprehended as its proper object.

Third, on the part of the sensitive appetite, according as, by natural temperament, some men are inclined to anger and others to concupiscence or passions of a different kind either too much or too little, or with the moderation in which moral virtue consists.

The first two are common to all men, but the third is what makes the differences among men.

1278. Hence, according to this, the Philosopher says that some men are brave and just by nature, although those who are so naturally need something good as a principle, so that these virtues may exist in a more perfect manner; the foregoing natural habits or inclinations exist in children and dumb animals (for example, the lion is brave and noble by nature). Nevertheless, natural habits of this kind may be harmful unless the discrimination of reason is present.

1279. Moreover, it seems that, just as in physical movement, when a body is moved by force without the guidance of vision, it happens that the moved object is struck and damaged by the force, so also in this matter. If a man has a strong inclination to the work of some moral virtue and does not use discretion with regard to that work of the moral virtue, grave harm will occur either to his own body (as in one who is inclined to abstinence without discretion) or to external things (in one who is inclined to liberality). The same is true in other virtues. But if such an inclination jointly accepts reason in its operation so that it operates with discretion, then there will be a great difference in the excellence of goodness. Likewise, the habit, which will be similar to the operation of this kind done with discretion, will be a virtue in the proper and perfect sense, that is, a moral virtue.

1280. As, then, there are two kinds of principles of operationin the discursive part of the soul—namely, shrewdness and prudence—so also in the appetitive part pertaining to moral matters, there are two kinds of principles: natural virtue and moral, the principal virtue. The latter cannot come into being without prudence, as has been indicated [1275].

1281. Then, at therefore, it is (1144b17), he confirms his proposition by the observations of others.

First, he does this by a statement of Socrates;

second, at an indication (1144b21; [1283]), by a statement of Aristotle’s contemporaries.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he gives the statement of Socrates, who held that all moral virtues are species of prudence by reason of the previously mentioned relationship between moral virtue and prudence.

1282. Second, at in this, Socrates’* *investigation (1144b18), Aristotle shows how the virtues fall short, saying that, in this statement, Socrates’ investigation was correct in one respect but wrong in another. Socrates erroneously held that all moral virtues are kinds of prudence, since moral virtue and prudence are in different parts of the soul, but he was correct in saying that moral virtue cannot be without prudence.

1283. Next, at an indication (1144b21), he confirms this by the words of his contemporaries.

First, he gives their statement.

Second, at but we must (1144b25; [1284]), he shows how they may be wrong.

He says first that an indication that moral virtue is not without prudence is that all of them, in defining virtue and placing it in the genus of habit, state the scope of virtue and say that this is guidance by right reason. But it is clear from previous discussion [1111] that right reason in things to be done is right reason under the aegis of prudence. Therefore, when they all define virtue in this way, even though they do not decide it expressly, they seem in some manner to divine or conjecture that virtue is the kind of habit that is according to prudence.

1284. At but we must (1144b25), he shows how they may be wrong when they talk this way, saying that their statement needs extension. Not only does it pertain to moral virtue to be in accord with right reason—otherwise someone could be morally virtuous without the need of prudence simply by the fact that he had been instructed by another’s mind—but we must add that moral virtue is a habit accompanied by right reason, which of course is prudence. Evidently, therefore, Socrates said too much in expressing the opinion that all moral virtues are forms of reason and not things accompanied by reason, and that they were species of knowledge or prudence.

1285. Others said too little, holding that virtue is only in accord with reason. But Aristotle maintains a middle position by stating that moral virtue is according to reason and accompanied by reason. Obviously, then, from the discussions [1275–83], it is not possible for a man to be good in the principal sense—that is, according to moral virtue—without prudence, nor even to be prudent without moral virtue.

1286. Then, at in this way, we can (1144b32), from the previous discussion he solves a particular incidental doubt.

First, he raises the doubt.

Second, at this does happen (1144b35; [1287]), he solves the doubt.

He says first that, from the premises it is possible to refute the argument that certain philosophers have used contending that virtues are separated from one another, so one virtue can be had without another. We see that the same person is not inclined to all the virtues, but one to liberality, another to temperance, and so on. It is easy for a man to be led to that to which he is naturally inclined, but it is difficult to acquire a thing contrary to a natural impulse. It follows, then, that a man who is naturally disposed to one virtue and not to another has known—that is, has acquired—the one virtue to which he was naturally disposed. (Here he is taking the position of Socrates, who held that virtues are kinds of knowledge.) But he will never acquire the other virtue to which he is not disposed by nature.

1287. Next, at this does happen (1144b35), his statement is verified in regard to the natural virtues, but not in regard to the moral virtues according to which a man is called good without qualification. This is true because none of them can exist without prudence, nor prudence without them, as has been explained [1275–83]. So, when there is prudence, which is a single virtue, all the virtues will be simultaneous with it, and none of them will be present if prudence is not there.

1288. He expressly says a single virtue, because, if different species of prudence were concerned with the matter of different moral virtues (as is the case with the different objects in the genus of art), one moral virtue would not be hindered from existing without another, each of them having a prudence corresponding to it. But this is impossible, because the same principles of prudence apply to the totality of moral matter, such that everything is subjected to the rule of reason. Therefore, all moral virtues are connected one with the other by prudence. However, it can happen that a man, having other moral virtue, may be said to be without one virtue because of the lack of matter—for example, someone good but poor lacks magnificence because he does not have the mean to make great expenditures. Nevertheless, by reason of prudence, which he does possess, he is so disposed that he may become magnificent when he has matter for the virtue.

1289. Then, at evidently, man (1145a2), he brings his principal proposition to a conclusion by a summation of the discussions. He says that it is now evident from previous discussions [1266] that, even if prudence were not operative, man would need it, because it is a virtue that perfects a particular part of the soul. Again, it is evident that prudence is operative, because right choice, necessary for the operation of virtue, does not exist without prudence and moral virtue. The reason is that moral virtue makes the disposition in regard to the end, while prudence directs the means to the end.

1290. Last, at nevertheless, neither prudence (1145a6), he solves the doubt raised about the comparison between prudence and wisdom, saying that prudence does not have power over wisdom, nor does that which is inferior have power over what is more excellent. He introduces two examples by way of illustration.

The first is that the art of medicine indeed commands what ought to be done to obtain health, but it does not have power over health, because it does not use health itself—something proper to the art or science of one governing—as a man uses a thing over which he has power by commanding it. But the art of medicine commands how health may be brought about, in such a way as to give orders for the sake of health, but not to it. Likewise, prudence, or even political science, does not use wisdom by commanding the manner in which it ought to judge about divine things, but it does give orders by reason of it, that is, ordains how men can arrive at wisdom. Hence, as health is more powerful than the art of medicine—since health is the end of medicine—so wisdom is more excellent than prudence.

1291. The second example is this. Since political science gives orders about all things done in the state, it follows that it should give orders about the things pertaining to divine worship, just as it commands what belongs to the study of wisdom. This, therefore, is like the argument that prudence or political science is preferred to wisdom in the sense that one should prefer wisdom to God—a thing obviously unreasonable. Thus he concludes the teaching of book 6.